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Abstract 
This research examines whether the funding of IFED, a dedicated police unit, set up to deal 
exclusively with allegations of insurance fraud brought by those insurers providing the funding, has 
impacted the ability of non-insurer victims of insurance fraud to gain access to justice. 
The first stage of the research sought to identify and quantify the nature of fraud and its impact 
on both the insurance industry and on non-insurers. It included a desk-top review of the credit-hire 
sector, the local bus sector and large fleet-operators. The second stage involved a self-completion 
questionnaire to build econometric and experiential data from the credit-hire sector before 
effecting semi-structured interviews with twenty-nine witnesses working within or proximate to 
the area being investigated and conducting research and further interviews in respect of five case-
studies. 
An emergent theme was the use by the insurance industry of data, predominantly driven by 
uncorroborated estimates, that showed the industry to be impacted hugely by fraud, a conclusion 
that they had deployed to inspire a media and lobbying campaign to seek regulatory change 
protective of their business model whilst also gaining exclusive access to a dedicated police 
resource. Whilst no direct harm was reported by non-insurer victims because of the existence of 
IFED there was evidence of criminal offenders migrating to victims less capable of soliciting a police 
response and so gaming the system to gain impunity. 
The research posits an objective methodology for scoring the economic, societal or 
criminological validity of a privately-funded public-police initiatives with implications for future 
partnerships in other areas where business can contribute to the cost of law enforcement to assess 
whether enforcement success can feed directly through to the profit line but without inspiring 
victim inequality or offender impunity.  
Whilst the Police had, prior to the Fraud Review and the creation of IFED, demonstrated limited 
enthusiasm for investigating allegations of fraud, the creation of IFED, accompanied with the effects 
of austerity measures on policing, has had a meaningful and detrimental impact on the ability of 
certain non-insurers to deal with insurance fraud relative to the protection available to insurers. 
The identity of the victim made a difference. The partisan approach to a single victim-set may be 
contributing to the growth of insurance fraud facilitated by organised criminals and increasing the 
likelihood of impunity for offenders committing acquisitive vehicle offences involving the rental and 
credit-hire industries.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The research 
This thesis is concerned with the impact of the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department 
(“IFED”), a dedicated police unit established in 2012 to deal exclusively with allegations of fraud 
brought by its insurance company funders. IFED was one of a series of government initiatives 
intended to address the growth and expense of fraudulent whiplash claims which insurers had 
problematised from around 2008 (Oliphant, 2016, p. 1). Other measures included reforms to the 
civil justice system, which are also addressed in this thesis, in order to locate insurance fraud within 
the broader policy debate. The thesis does not seek to address IFED’s operational performance; it 
explores the impact on non-insurer victims of insurance fraud and examines if offenders might find 
it easier to avoid arrest and prosecution after IFED’s creation.  
Since 2008, recession has challenged the UK economy and austerity measures have decimated 
public services. Police funding via the central grant paid to local authorities reduced by 25% 
between 2010/11 and 2014/15 and the police workforce fell by 37,400 between March 2010 and 
March 2015 (Johnston & Politowski, 2016, pp. 18–20). The cocktail of fewer police officers and 
consumer illiquidity inspired some people to commit insurance fraud when resources for the 
investigation and enforcement of all crime were declining (ABI, 2009; Gee & Button, 2015; Gill & 
Randall, 2015; Goss & O’Neill, 2009; “Recession ‘fuels insurance fraud,’” 2009). IFED was part of a 
government response to the plea that fraudulent or exaggerated insurance claims, and specifically 
those associated with whiplash, were something the police were generally unwilling to investigate 
and that insurers were incapable of resolving alone (ABI, 2006, pp. 4–6, 2008b, p. 1).  
Five ‘constituencies’ were central to the research: 
• motor insurers, communicating predominantly through the collective voice of their 
trade body, the Association of British Insurers (“ABI”);  
• the police;  
• non-insurer victims of insurance fraud1; 
• the Establishment (parliament and the government acting through its administrative 
and regulatory agencies); and 
                                                             
1 e.g. car hire companies, self-insured fleet operators and bus companies  
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• the media. 
About the Researcher 
The Researcher is a former police officer, was chairman of the Credit Hire Organisation, (“CHO”) 
and was formerly chief executive and chairman of Automotive and Insurance Solutions Group plc 
(“AIS”) which had several subsidiaries including a credit-hire and counter-fraud business. Through 
the non-insurer credit-hire subsidiary he has been a victim of motor insurance fraud and 
experienced multiple refusals from IFED, and several other police forces, to investigate those 
offences detected by the counter-fraud subsidiary. Professionally, he had engagement with some 
of the organisations in the study but acknowledged he only had a position of potential dominance 
through managerial or commercial influence in two of twenty-nine candidates in the semi-
structured interview population that participated in the research. Whilst through the data 
collection procedure he might have been able to develop stronger commercial relations with some 
participants he does not believe that was an outcome and, in any event, had retired from his 
executive and trade responsibilities a year before this research concluded. That aside, he 
acknowledges from the outset that his experiences introduced a possibility for subjective 
interpretations of the phenomenon being studied and created a potential for bias (Locke, 
Silverman, & Spirduso, 1998). Balancing that risk, the Researcher’s standing in the industry offered 
significant advantages for the study:  
• Privileged access to data and to the potential respondents.  
• Familiarity with the research environment.  
• His experience and reputation provided the potential for enhanced rapport and more 
meaningful disclosure in the semi-structured interviews. 
• His inside knowledge brought an enhanced ability to gauge the reliability of responses. 
• Potential for impact from the research, because of his background, was enhanced.  
These arguments, although not strong enough to eliminate the possibility of a lack of critical 
perspective, do provide positive reasons why the Researcher was prepared to neglect the warning 
not to conduct a qualitative research “in one’s own backyard” (Creswell, 1998). Thick and rich 
descriptions of the issues, and the reliance on experiential experts drawn from senior positions in 
the environment being studied, helped to build a holistic view and control some of the backyard 
research issues. To the extent that it doesn’t, the Researcher is explicit in the thesis about where 
he stands and how his insider/outsider status might impact on the research (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009; 
Mercer, 2007). 
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Research Aims 
Reporting of insurance fraud has come largely from journalists repeating, often verbatim, ABI 
media releases. Consumer awareness has been raised through television programmes often 
highlighting audacious offences renowned for their televisual rather than their academic value. 
There is literature addressing the potential impact from the Government dismantling the claims 
eco-system by which consumers gain access to justice in the UK  (Quill & Friel, 2016) but there is no 
independent contemporary research relating to the cost of motor insurance fraud and nothing 
empirical demonstrating the linkage between fraud, the cost to insurers and the direct relationship 
of that cost to insurance premiums. Confronted with a lacuna, this research sought to explore the 
topic of motor insurance fraud and then look at the five constituencies to: 
• Identify how each constituency interacts to influence the outcome for an insurance claim. 
• Chronicle the interplay between insurers, government and the police, identifying their 
respective roles in the changing social, economic and political environment.  
• Explore how the insurance industry procured direct access to its own dedicated police 
resource.  
• Investigate other sectors with exclusive access to a police resource for their own 
commercial advantage. 
• Consider the growth of ‘multi-lateralised policing’ where non-governmental entities have 
either agreed to provide security services or assumed responsibility for their own 
protection consequent from the changing role of the police.  
• Evaluate the opportunities, risks and consequences for stakeholders and victims of private-
police partnerships. 
• Consider the position in the USA where insurers have publicised ‘industry crises’ to reduce 
the ability of victims to obtain compensation.   
Non-insurer victims of insurance fraud 
It is important to understand how a non-insurer can be a victim of insurance fraud and how an 
asymmetric response by the police to an allegation from a non-insurer, as opposed to that from an 
insurer, might create harm.  
IFED is a police unit within the City of London Police (“CLP”) intended to tackle high volume and 
organised criminality and work exclusively with the insurance industry on its strategic priorities to 
change the public perception of insurance fraud (City of London Police, n.d.-c, p. 4). It is, simply put, 
an insurer funded department of the CLP dealing exclusively with offences where its funders are 
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the victims. That such a specialist unit might portend a degraded police response to insurance fraud 
to the detriment of non-insurer victims sounds an improbable scenario on which to base a research 
project especially when, as a matter of semantics, the only entity likely to be impacted by insurance 
fraud should be an insurer.  But, if non-insurer entities were as susceptible to insurance fraud, then 
a lack, or denial, of access to a police response risks creating two harms. One is victim inequality 
where the victim’s identity limits the ability of that non-insurer victim to pursue a remedy. The 
second is when fraudsters realise that if the identity of their victim reduces the likelihood of a police 
response, and so improves their prospects for success, they may ‘game the system’, and target non-
insurers in anticipation of avoiding prosecution. Those two harms, victim inequality and offender 
impunity, are incompatible with any coherent strategy aimed at reducing fraud by increasing 
detection and prosecuting offenders. And as to whether non-insurers can be victims of insurance 
fraud, the answer is yes. Large vehicle fleet-operators often carry significant policy excesses2, 
effectively self-insuring the insurance risk to the limit of that excess. Logically, they are as prone to 
the ills of insurance fraud as insurers and whilst the creation of IFED may have made it easier for 
insurers to pursue criminal sanctions against transgressors, it may also have made it harder for non-
insurer victims of insurance fraud to do the same.  
IFED is novel. It represents only the economic interests of its ‘club members’ although there 
may be wider societal benefits from a privately funded initiative which addresses, if only partly, an 
under-invested area of policing. It was created during a period when the police faced challenges in 
delivering their core service obligations whilst responding to evolving species and types of crime as 
diverse as historic child sexual abuse, terrorism and cybercrime (Association of Chief Police Officers, 
2012, p. 27; Button, 2011, p. 254; Button, Blackbourn, & Tunley, 2015, p. 2; City of London Police, 
2011a; Doig & Levi, 2013, p. 149; Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2014c, p. 24). The 
effect of funding cuts imposed since 2009 make for uncomfortable reading and highlight a challenge 
for all victims of any crime. The Office of National Statistics (“ONS”) (Travis, 2017) revealed the 
largest annual rise for police recorded crime in a decade in the 12-months to March 2017  but 
downplayed their results, in comparison with the Crime Survey of England and Wales (“CSEW”), by 
noting that “police recorded crime data are not designated as national statistics” (Office for 
National Statistics, 2017, p. 6). Sarah Thornton, head of the National Police Chief’s Council (“NPCC”) 
was more definitive protesting that “with officer numbers at 1985 levels, crime up 10% in the last 
year and police work becoming ever more complex, this additional pressure is not sustainable … 
                                                             
2 a policyholder’s financial liability if a claim is made against their insurance policy. For motorists, it may be up to 
£1,000 per claim; for fleet operators, a six-figure sum.  
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leaving police forces unable to cope” (Mendick, 2017). Of relevance to this research, the ONS (2017, 
sec. 46) also reported that insurance fraud fell by 20%, or 2,158 offences, in the 12-months to 
March 2017, largely because of a decrease in the number of offences reported by CIFAS3, but 
acknowledging it was too early to determine if the reported fall reflected a genuine reduction. 
Notably, extrapolating the 20% fall of 2,158 offences suggests that just 10,791 offences of insurance 
fraud were recorded in the period, a figure dramatically at odds with reported levels of insurance 
fraud from the ABI making this research germane.  
Compensation culture 
Whilst not a primary focus of the study it is relevant at this point to record that the ABI has 
portrayed their members as victims of the ‘compensation culture’ (ABI, 2006, p. 3), a pejorative 
term which, according to Collins (2017) had its genesis towards the end of 1999. The trend for 
recorded UK usage of the phrase is represented below.  
 
Figure 1.1: Media use of the term 'compensation culture'. Source: Harper Collins (2017) 
The phrase is typically deployed to infer that claims from innocent accident victims for 
compensation arising from the tortious conduct of another, for example, the guilty driver in an 
accident, are unjustified, exaggerated, frivolous or fraudulent implying the victim should be 
criticised for his misfortune rather than compensated for it (Better Regulation Task Force, 2004; 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2006; Montague, 2012). In 2003, Walker (2003, p. 8) 
characterised it as an ethos wherein “all misfortunes short of an Act of God are probably someone 
else's fault, and that the suffering should be relieved, or at any rate marked, by the receipt of a sum 
of money". According to Williams (2005, p. 500), there is “anecdotal and other evidence of varying 
degrees of quality that can be found to support or deny” its existence as a problem dependant “on 
who is asked”, a conclusion mirrored in a government commissioned report in 2003 (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2003, para. 10.4), which reported “very little analysis of what this term means, let alone 
                                                             
3 a UK wide fraud and financial protection service 
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proof that such a culture exists”. That compensation culture has found a place in the vernacular is 
unedifying when the Better Regulation Commission Task Force (“BRTF”) (2004) failed to find 
evidence of it, suggesting that it was a myth largely perpetuated by the media. Monbiot (2004) 
complained that "compensation culture has usurped political correctness, welfare cheats, single 
mothers and New Age travellers as the right's new bogeyman-in-chief. According to the 
Confederation of British Industry, the Conservative Party and just about every newspaper columnist 
in Britain, it threatens very soon to bankrupt the country".  
A risk exists that the motivation for insurers reporting on compensation arising from tort claims, 
with the simplicity of the compensation culture messaging needed to secure coverage, means the 
media is likely to obscure the complexity of the issues. Williams (2005) remarked, "loose talk of a 
'compensation culture' no doubt helps to sell the very sorts of newspapers that purport to despise it 
most". Analysing the influence of mass media on the law, Haltom and McCann (2004, p. 11) argued 
that “alluring stories that circulate in the media about law often pervade and profoundly reshape – 
or distort – legal policymaking and ordinary legal practice itself … stories routinely produced, 
reproduced and reconstructed through the complex circuitry of mass-mediated culture.”  
Former Prime Minister, David Cameron, in his foreword to a report by Lord Young of Graffham 
(2010, p. 5) opined, albeit in relation to health and safety matters, that “a damaging compensation 
culture has arisen, as if people can absolve themselves from any personal responsibility for their 
own actions, with the spectre of lawyers only too willing to pounce with a claim for damages on the 
slightest pretext.” Young (ibid. p. 19-21) was more circumspect, defining the problem as one of 
“perception rather than reality” and clarifying that “the broad consensus amongst stakeholders was 
that they did not believe that there was a growing compensation culture in the UK.”  Hand (2010, 
p. 2) noted that sensationalist stories about compensation awards make good copy with "national 
newspaper articles concerning the compensation culture having increased exponentially since the 
mid 1990s," while statistics conversely demonstrating "a broad decline" in the number of claims 
during the same period. His conclusion was that “to better redress the popular misconception, more 
attention should be paid both to the statistics that are available ... and to the collection and 
publication of court data … to highlight problems as they arise as well as give the lie to media hype” 
(ibid. p. 14). In 2011, Lord Dyson, then Master of the Rolls, also dismissed the notion of a UK 
compensation culture as a false perception and myth created by the media. Giving the Holdsworth 
Club lecture …”  (Lord Dyson MR, 2013) he said, “I doubt very much whether we are likely to see – 
in the medium term at least – any reduction in news stories expressing concern about our 
compensation culture …” He went on to suggest that “all of this may also require a substantive 
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educative effort on the part of government, the courts and the legal profession to counteract the 
media-created perception.  
Messages from America 
An analogue to the adoption of the compensation culture messaging may exist in the 
emergence of the Tort Reform Movement and its relationship to the American insurance industry 
from 1970 (Bogus, 2003; Daniels & Martin, 1995; Feinman, 2005; Halton & McCann, 2004; Howard, 
2002; Huber, 1990; Huber & Litan, 1991; Koenig & Rustad, 2003; Olson, 1992; Schuck, 1991). US 
tort reform started as a movement spearheaded by insurers and large corporations to attack the 
justice system and change rules of law by influencing public perceptions and sponsoring legislation 
limiting personal injury lawsuits (Funderburk, 2008; Justitia, 2016). According to Hubbard (2006, p. 
438), for more than 40 years “repeat players on the defence side of tort litigation” sought to reform 
tort doctrine in their favour. Feinman (2005, p. 19) attributed the successes of the movement to 
“its political influence, power lobbying, aggressive litigation and production of an elaborate pubic 
campaign of misinformation that convinces people that reducing their rights is actually in their own 
interest.” These are some of the themes that emerged during the research for this thesis. 
Initially, the ad hoc campaigns sought to highlight a series of ‘industry crises’ primarily related 
to the cost and declining availability of liability insurance as the risk-return ratio became 
increasingly unattractive for insurers. In the 1980s, the movement developed a more aligned 
approach to the push for reform against a backdrop of considerable debate about the goals of the 
movement, the equity and efficiency of the doctrinal reforms it sought, and the methods it used 
(Hubbard, 2006). Hubbard argued that legislation, politics, money, and rhetoric played an 
increasing role in the resolution of the argument about the proper role of tort liability in American 
society. Between 1990 and 2006 the level and intensity of the debate increased with the ongoing 
long-term struggle fought by two loosely allied groups. On one side were defence-oriented groups 
like liability insurance companies, defendant lawyers and business groups, which were interested 
in tort reform as the solution to a broad economic crisis in tort liability law and insurance. On the 
other side were two groups: The first was claimant lawyers, occasionally joined by a variety of 
consumer rights organisations, claiming to represent the position and interests of potential victims. 
The second were academics and criminologists using the rational model to criticise the claims of 
the Tort Reform Movement (Hubbard, 2006, p. 469). 
Having set the scene, and if the experiences of the US Tort Reform Movement and the adoption 
of its messages in the UK were the primary focus of this research then, at this point, it might be 
appropriate to embark upon a review of the literature within which the research is bound. Typically, 
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the literature review is given a separate chapter “to identify the gap that the research will occupy, 
the theoretical framework in which you work and the practical precursors which nestle around your 
original contribution” (Carter, Kelly, & Brailsford, 2012, p. 26). However, the Researcher felt that 
having a separate chapter risked detaching the literature from the research and so has adopted, as 
suggested by Dunleavy (2003, pp. 59–60), a more sophisticated ‘opening out’ approach to the 
literature. Whilst this is an approach seldom used in the social sciences and “radically at odds” with 
what supervisors believe is “expected or the norm” (ibid.) it has substantial advantages. Whilst there 
is literature addressing the Tort Reform Movement and the wider issues of UK fraud and the 
evolution of the police and private-public police partnerships, the primary focus of the research is 
the very recent creation of IFED and its impact on insurer and non-insurer victims of fraud. There is 
limited literature, if any, on that, or on the recent and emerging changes to the basis on which the 
civil-justice system will allow honest accident victims to be compensated. The issues addressed in 
the thesis also rely on an analysis of matters impacting the five constituencies identified earlier and 
to review the literature, as it impacts all of those constituencies in the conventional ‘focus down’ 
manner would risk making it harder to engage with the issues when compared with an approach 
where the results of the research mesh directly with the literature as it is embedded throughout 
the thesis. The latter approach has, therefore, been adopted because it allows the reader to engage 
with the research results and the relevance of other people’s work in a more grounded manner. 
Thereafter, the thesis adopts a conventional structure as summarised below.     
Structure of the thesis 
Existing research relating to motor insurance fraud, and to IFED in particular, is limited and 
because the data surrounding the offence and the police strategy for resolving it are either 
confidential or unverifiable, addressing the research question posed a more significant challenge 
than originally anticipated. Accordingly, the investigative strategy required a variety of approaches 
to expose a range of substantive themes and ideas hopeful of advancing knowledge of the subject 
whilst promoting a coherent debate in which to frame a structured and appropriate response. The 
general approach to the research design and methods is set out below but, in a similar way to the 
literature review, the rationale for the research methodology unfolds in sequence in each 
subsequent chapter. 
Summary of research design and methods 
According to Ayiro (2012, p. 3), research is the orderly investigation of an issue with the purpose 
of adding to established knowledge and/or providing possible interventions for desirable solutions. 
It can mean ‘re-search’ implying that the subject matter is already known and needs to be studied 
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again. Alternatively, and as in the case of this research, the expression can be used without a 
hyphen when it means investigating a new problem or phenomenon with a defined motive.  
This research utilised a mixed methods approach using qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies relying upon:  
• a series of semi-structured interviews;  
• a cross-sectional survey;  
• a number of case studies; and  
• desktop research (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 123) “for the purpose of 
breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration”.  
Greene (2008, p. 20) champions the mixed methods approach because it promotes better 
understanding and produces greater equity of voice although Bazeley (2010, p. 432) cautions the 
need to ensure the outcomes are properly integrated “in such a way as to become interdependent 
in reaching a common theoretical or research goal, thereby producing findings that are greater than 
the sum of the parts”.  
The investigative strategy required a variety of approaches to expose a range of substantive 
themes and ideas hopeful of advancing knowledge of the subject whilst promoting a coherent 
debate in which to frame a structured and appropriate response and involved five stages of 
emquiry: 
• Reviewing the existing eco-system; 
• Self-completion questionnaire; 
• Semi-structured interviews; 
• Case studies, and 
• Desktop research. 
Summary of known ethical concerns 
Three principal issues of ethical concern were recognised with the research.  
Insider Research: The first is that by virtue of the Researcher’s former employment and 
industry standing, he was an insider (Merton, 1972). Whilst this may create advantages and 
disadvantages for the research it required certain ethical issues to be addressed.  The Researcher’s 
involvement with data collection in the third and fourth phases of the investigation defined above 
was different to that in the second when the survey was administered and data collected using the 
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standardised procedures. Whilst any data analysis was performed using statistical analysis 
techniques the results were interpreted based on the established values for the statistical 
significance of each function. The survey predominantly sought to establish the prevalence of 
frequency and outcome of certain key research questions in the target population and to collect 
and aggregate some factual empirical data about the size of the motor insurance fraud problem 
amongst the population surveyed. In the third and fourth qualitative phases the Researcher did 
assume a more participatory role due to the “sustained and extensive experience with participants” 
(Creswell, 2014, p. 184) and a personal involvement with the research topic. Brown (2000) discusses 
the positions occupied by people carrying out police research and identifies a number of ‘positions’ 
that might be taken by people conducting research. He categorised them as ‘inside insiders’, 
‘outside insiders’, ‘inside outsiders’ and ‘outside outsiders’. In this study, the Researcher believes 
he occupied a position closer to being an insider which carries with it the risk that greater sympathy 
is expressed to the causes of the group being investigated; he is clear that he could not assert to be 
a value free observer.   
Case Studies: The second issue related to the case study subject matter all of which relied on 
information available in the public domain or derived from the personal involvement of the 
interviewee and which may have constituted evidence used to secure a conviction. Conversely, 
where a conviction was not pursued, or the police declined to investigate, then the information 
disclosed in the case studies might be of a confidential and/or sensitive nature requiring absolute 
anonymity and confidentiality.  The cases studies and cameos involved a narrative analysis based 
on several first-hand reports of a series of individual insurance frauds perpetrated by a single 
individual or group of connected individuals. The impacted parties are credit-hire companies, 
transportation operators and insurers. The narrative utilises publicly available information and data 
provided by those impacted parties and by solicitors and counter fraud specialists involved in the 
incidents. The Researcher had no direct involvement in any of the case studies. All the incidents will 
have resulted in a concluded investigation and, in some cases, a prosecution. None of the studies 
involve on-going criminal investigations or prosecutions. Only those entities that have been a victim 
of the reported offences, and only those individuals who have direct knowledge of the events and 
who attempted, successfully or otherwise, to persuade IFED, and/or other police forces to act, were 
asked to participate in the case study review. Any information provided, to the extent that the case 
studies involved offences where no prosecution was pursued, was coded, as are the entities 
involved in the case, and anonymity is preserved to protect the identities of all of those involved – 
victim, investigator and offender. All of the participants in the interviews supporting the case 
studies were responsible for counter-fraud activities within their organisation. However, the code 
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of ethics published by the British Society of Criminology was reviewed and, as a result, a sentence 
was included in the information sheet for participants, and as part of the second interview schedule 
for the case studies, which provided that “any offer of confidentiality may sometimes be overridden 
by law” (British Society of Criminology, 2006, p. 2). No such concerns arose.  
General Ethical Concerns: The third issue is bounded by the generic guidance issued by the 
British Psychological Society (2010). The research involved the collection of confidential 
organisational information but limited personal data. It was critical that disclosures did not cause 
harm to the participants or their organisations (ibid sec.4). Ethical risk analysis for the research was 
performed (ibid, sec.3) but the analysis, in a simplified form, did not include risk probability and 
consequence (hazard) ratings as they would introduce unnecessary complications. All the 
participants were experienced, professional volunteers. They were trained in, and accustomed to, 
maintaining confidentiality either as insurers, counter fraud specialists, solicitors, police officers 
and managers or directors within commercial organisations. They were not vulnerable individuals. 
Nevertheless, there is always a low residual vulnerability risk from inappropriate disclosures:  
• breach of confidentiality by improper disclosures; 
• disclosure of career limiting criticisms; 
• disclosure of proscribed behaviour of organisation; and 
• disclosure of information, which is ‘sub-judice’ or part of an on-going criminal investigation. 
The following arrangements to protect the participants and the researcher in all ethnographic 
elements ensured that the risks were minimal:  
• Coding arrangements ensured anonymity. 
• Permission to participate was sought from host organisations/employer in addition to 
employee target participants. 
• Participants demonstrated awareness of the risks and their responsibilities by reading and 
signing the informed consent forms. 
• Participants could withdraw at any time or withdraw permission to use data before the 
data gathering phase concluded. 
• Participants were warned against the risks of inappropriate disclosures. 
• The Researcher was alert to the need to detect when inappropriate disclosures were 
imminent, and could interrupt the interviews or dialogue and change focus or terminate, 
and could discard inappropriate data.  
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Data management 
The data collected from each stage of the research was stored and managed in compliance with 
the Data Protection Act 1998. All field data was collected electronically, or digitised post collection, 
and stored on a PC, backed up onto an external hard-drive and not publicly accessible. No data was 
located on any server and none of the original data was shared. Participants had the right to access 
their own data and could withdraw permission for its use at any time during the data gathering 
(British Psychological Society, 2010, p. 15) and the original data will be destroyed 12-months after 
completion of the thesis. The identities of individuals and organisations was coded to create 
anonymity in the raw data. Role and organisation descriptions are sufficiently vague to prevent 
traceability, for example, ‘national journalist – fraud’, although in some instances, the interview 
output rendered complete anonymity of the host organisation impossible, for example where a 
member of the IFB set out their approach to data analysis. In some cases, anonymity was expressly 
waived. The coding used to reference interviewees is set out in Table 2.1 in the next chapter. Each 
participant was identified by code comprising a letter to signify which interest group they inhabited 
and a sequential number. Interviewee contributors are referenced by their alphanumeric code; for 
example, M1 is the first interviewee from the media grouping. 
A summary of the remaining chapters follows: 
Chapter 2: The measurement of insurance fraud 
The ONS  estimate (2017, p. 4) of 11 million fraud and computer misuse offences is double the 
headline estimate of all other CSEW offences (ibid. p.3) providing a stark indication of the scale of 
the fraud problem. Insurance fraud, however, was only referenced for the first time in the CSEW 
2016 (ibid. p. 43), when a 10% increase in insurance fraud offences4 was reported predominantly 
from an increase in insurance application frauds from individuals attempting to get a cheaper policy 
by fraudulent means. Whilst greater clarity and granularity may evolve with future CSEW reports, 
it is currently unhelpful to researchers and policy makers that insurers, predominantly through the 
ABI, have chosen to limit publicly available information on fraud to a variety of non-verifiable 
statistics to populate their media releases. Chapter 2 focuses, inter alia, on the integrity of the data 
supporting the insurer case for extensive regulatory and policy change.  
At least since 2006, fraud has been a corrosive force in society challenging policy makers and 
providing diverse research opportunities for academics  (Attorney General, 2006). Whilst there is 
                                                             
4 10,322 (2% of all fraud offences) 
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literature on the wider topic of fraud, and some research providing direction on the narrower topic 
of insurance fraud, there is little data capable of independent corroboration of either the quantum 
or constituent elements of insurance fraud in the UK. Between 2008 and 2017 insurance fraud was 
one of many industry crises publicised by the ABI including: 
• the increasing frequency of whiplash claims as a percentage of accidents (ABI, 2011b, 
2012b, 2012d, 2013a, 2013b, 2014d, 2014g, 2016b, 2016c);  
• the rising expenses associated with settling claims based on the increased volume and 
value of claims generated (ABI, 2013b, 2013c, 2014d, 2015d; Dalton, 2013);  
• the costs of providing replacement vehicles to innocent road accident victims (ABI, 2013c, 
2015d, 2015i; Dalton, 2013);  
• the right of claims management companies or solicitors to recover costs for acting for an 
innocent victim (ABI, 2011c, 2014d, 2015a; Dalton, 2013); 
• the impact of application fraud (ABI, 2012c, 2014e, 2015a, 2015c, 2015d, 2015h, 2016c; 
Dalton, 2013); and 
• the inability of insurers to manage their own profit and loss account without government 
support (ABI, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2015b, 2015d, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017; Dalton, 
2013).    
The ABI (2017) complained about the difficulty their members had managing their profit and 
loss account throughout the period of research. One press release sought to justify a 14% increase 
in motor insurance premiums because “cold callers and ambulance chasing lawyers are still finding 
ways to exploit the system” and, unrelated to fraud, “the Government has doubled Insurance 
Premium Tax”. In July 2017 the BBC (2017) reported motor insurance premiums at a “record high” 
but at least one media source (Moore, 2017) accused the ABI of strategically deflecting blame from 
the actions of their own industry and denying the reality that premiums are set by insurers “based 
on how much they think they can get away with charging … with the aim of making as much money 
as possible”. Whatever economic pressures insurers faced in 2017 was nothing relative to the 
challenges they faced in 2009  when the ABI (2009) reported that 2,000 fraudulent claims, worth 
£14 million, were detected every week. Chapter 2 attempts to substantiate those claims. It offers 
an analysis of the nature of insurance fraud, narrates the history and typology of the offence, 
explores the identity of offenders and their attitudes, reviews the literature and discusses the 
increasing awareness of insurance fraud and the challenges it appeared to pose for insurers, 
consumers and society generally. Insurers have quantified their experience of fraud, and placed 
some reliance in influencing the political debate and the formulation of policy, on a single piece of 
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empirical work published by the ABI (Goss & O’Neill, 2009). The Researcher examines the 
methodology behind that research in order to assesses its impact on the political debate and 
evolving policy whilst also highlighting the role the report went on to play in shaping the messages 
that insurers sent to government, to regulators and to the media.  
Chapter 3: The Police 
Chapter 3 considers whether an insurer-funded police force was necessary or desirable. To do 
so, the history and evolution of the police is chronicled, the literature reviewed, and the question 
posed as to whether yesterday’s policing model is economically, politically or practically sustainable 
and, more importantly, whether the police have now lost their monopoly. The history, nature and 
increase in privately-funded public-policing, and the debate surrounding the arrangement, is also 
considered as is government policy associated with responsibilisation, the growth in private 
security and the increasing trend towards multi-lateralisation in the face of economic under-
funding of the police generally. Recognising the potential for further public-private partnerships, or 
the need to review the suitability of existing arrangements, this chapter also offers an objective 
risk-scoring model, a tool to identify, create a stimulus to debate and remedy potential weaknesses 
in the funding, impact or governance of privately-funded policing models like the British Transport 
Police (“BTP”), the Ports Police Force, the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit (“DCPCU”) and 
IFED. 
Chapter 4: Non-insurer victims of insurance fraud; credit-hire. 
One of the threads highlighted by insurers in their campaign for a more concerted societal 
response to fraud was the impact, frequency and cost of ‘credit-hire fraud’.  Chapter 4 explores the 
credit-hire industry, outlines the services provided for consumers and the relationship the industry 
has with insurers, solicitors and the Establishment5 and examines the ambiguity relating to the term 
‘credit-hire fraud’. In addition, and absent empirical evidence as to the nature, cost and response 
to fraud where the credit-hire company claims victimhood, this chapter also explores whether, and 
how, members of the credit-hire industry might themselves be victims of insurance fraud. Focusing 
on two case studies the study explores whether industry members feel either empowered or 
denied the right to claim victimhood and to participate in the wider fight against insurance fraud 
and, to the extent they cannot, whether such segregation impedes the effectiveness of the fight 
against fraud as well as increasing the exposure to loss for the victim.  
                                                             
5 Parliament and the government acting through its administrative and regulatory agencies 
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Chapter 5: Other non-insurer victims of fraud 
Chapter 5 extends the analysis to other non-insurer victims, specifically bus companies and 
large vehicle fleet operators, where the motor insurance risk is often self-insured. The chapter 
explores the perspective of a counter-fraud specialist who has identified links between organised 
criminal activity and criminals targeting credit-hire and self-drive hire companies, and includes two 
sectoral case studies and one other case study exploring the outcome of an insurance fraud which 
IFED, the Metropolitan Police (“MET”) and the National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service 
(“NAVCIS”) declined to investigate. It subsequently became the focal point of an international 
investigation into an organised crime ring exporting high value prestige vehicles to East Africa.  
Chapter 6: Making a crisis 
The extent to which an individual’s common law rights might have been impacted during the 
period of research is considered in Chapter 6 as is the basis on which insurance claims are made 
and how, since 1995, these claims have challenged the profitability of motor insurers. Much of the 
research for this chapter was either desktop driven or based on reviewing the literature and 
exploring the interaction between the ABI, media and the Establishment.  The chapter charts the 
changes introduced to impact the claims eco-system between 2009 and 2017 and the role of the 
lobbyist (Van Schendelen, 1994, pp. 3–22) and the many factors driving the creation of criminal 
justice policy. A case emerged during the research phase that the government support for the ABI 
went beyond the facilitation of IFED as a tool to deal with insurance fraud but extended to a wider 
range of responses inspired by the Government’s reliance on a fiction that “Britain had become the 
whiplash capital of the World” (Ministry of Justice, 2012, p. 3). This chapter reviews the evidence 
behind that claim and advances a case that the data and arguments presented to government were 
irredeemably flawed, never challenged and were deployed to conflate whiplash and insurance 
fraud as part of an agenda to remove the common law entitlement of consumers to damages 
following an accident.  
Chapter 7: Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
The final chapter draws together the thesis conclusions, examines the extent to which the 
research aims were achieved, and identifies the research limitations and opportunities for further 
research.    
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Chapter 2 The Measurement of Insurance Fraud 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the experience of insurance companies, a primary target for insurance 
fraud. It analyses offences classified as insurance fraud and explores the identify of offenders and 
their attitudes. Because the research is concerned with motor insurance fraud it also narrates the 
history and typology of that offence, reviews relevant literature and discusses the increased 
reporting of insurance fraud and the significant challenges it poses for insurers, consumers and 
society generally. More importantly for the research, it considers how insurers have quantified their 
exposure to fraud by placing reliance on a single piece of empirical work published by the ABI in 
2009. The chapter also includes a review of the methodology employed in that research and 
questions the reliability of the conclusions. Insurer messaging, specifically the extent to which it is 
reliant on apparently ‘trusted data’ is also considered together with its wider impact on media, 
policy and the law. In addition, and adding depth, opinions from people operating within or 
reporting on the insurance market also feature. 
Research Methods 
The primary technique for obtaining the richest data set possible was a series of semi-
structured interviews carried out with twenty-nine representatives of seven targeted interest 
groups comprising:   
• the media (national and insurance market press, radio, and television); 
• insurers and the ABI;  
• those providing counter fraud support for the insurance (defendant) industry including the 
Insurance Fraud Bureau (“IFB”)6;  
• those providing counter-fraud services for the credit-hire (claimant) industry;  
• members of the credit-hire industry including the director general of the CHO; 
• other non-insurer victims/potential victims of fraud including bus companies and self-
insured fleet operators; and  
• police officers or former police officers engaged in the detection and investigation of fraud.  
                                                             
6 ‘Claimant’ and ‘defendant’ are terms used in litigation in England and Wales (different terms apply elsewhere). The 
labels are used in insurance claims even before litigation is commenced to identify ‘sides’. The ‘claimant’ brings a claim, 
the ‘defendant’ defends it. Credit-hire companies usually act for the claimant, the person claiming innocence in the road 
accident; the defendant will usually be an insurer acting for the tortfeasor.  
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The Researcher considered that semi-structured interviews were an important component of 
the research methodology. The interviews comprised a qualitative phenomenological study where 
the results intended to develop a “complex, holistic picture, analyse words, report detailed views of 
informants, and conduct the study in a natural setting” (Creswell, 1998, p. 15). However, as Cohen 
(1985, p. 82) cautioned, “like fishing, interviewing is an activity requiring careful preparation, much 
patience and considerable practice if the eventual reward is to be  a worthwhile catch”. Interviews 
are the quintessential qualitative method (Westmarland, 2011, p. 89). In determining whether to 
use structured, unstructured or semi-structured interviews, the latter was chosen because of a 
desire to elicit a personal response, irrespective of their native interest group, to the same core 
issues from each interviewee so as to facilitate a more meaningful comparison both amongst, and 
between, the seven targeted interest groups. That proved an effective and successful approach. 
Westmarland (ibid. p. 117) defined semi-structured interviews as “the sort of research where the 
whole game plan has not been cast in stone” and the type of questions asked are focused on areas 
of interest rather than closed questions relying on a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. As Layder (1993, p. 116) 
observed, the method is an efficient way of obtaining qualitative information on the phenomenon 
being studied and, as Dawson (2002, p. 28) remarked, it allows a degree of latitude for unexpected 
disclosures or fresh issues to arise in the course of interviews and for supplementary questions to 
be raised. Morse (1994, p. 228) argued that the optimal interviewee “is the one who has the 
knowledge and experience the researcher requires, has the ability to reflect, is articulate, has the 
time to be interviewed and is willing to participate in the study”.   
Every interviewee, from each of the seven targeted interest groups, had a relevant professional 
interest in insurance fraud and had experienced, or was experiencing at the time of the research, 
the phenomenon being explored; they were experiential experts. The research sought to identify 
the extent of consensus, or discord, amongst the different interest groups where the members of 
those groups were all actively engaged in the identification of, and response to, motor insurance 
fraud but with each of them potentially harbouring a different perspective, or bias, about fraud, 
the role of the police or the expected or desired outcome for victim and offender. In utilising several 
different interest groups, and seeking responses from those groups to the same question set, it was 
anticipated that the outcome might identify aligned, or non-aligned, perspectives, prejudices, 
aspirations or experiences specifically in respect of: 
• the perceived nature and true scale of motor insurance fraud;  
• the response to the insurance fraud problem from insurers, government and the police;  
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• the ability of insurer and non-insurer victims to access police resources, through IFED or 
elsewhere, for reporting and investigating offences; and  
• outcomes based on the identity of the victim, for victim and offender.  
Conducting the interviews 
The host organisation of the prospective participant was contacted by telephone and the 
nature of the research and the desire to approach their employee to participate in the study 
explained. A letter followed that call seeking agreement to approach the targeted employee and, if 
they consented, to them participating in the study. If approval was given, a written briefing, 
invitation and consent form was provided to the target participant, copies of which appear at 
Appendix B. The interviewees, and identified target group, are set out at Table 2.1 below.  
All interview data is anonymous and untraceable unless the interviewee consented to their 
identity being disclosed. The code in the right-hand column is the descriptor used to reference each 
interviewee throughout the thesis.  
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Table 2.1: Semi-structured interview schedule 
The interviews were used to identify and categorise substantive statements and relevant 
themes (Gillham, 2005, p. 136) and to obtain some data on each interviewee’s organisation, the 
industry to which they belonged and, particularly, their opinions and attitude to the research 
environment. The shortest interview took fifty-five minutes, most lasted less than ninety minutes 
but one lasted three hours. All occurred at a location and time of the interviewee’s choice and in 
all cases, written consent was given, interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed 
Interest	Group Organisation	and	Summary	Role Code
Media Insurance	media	publisher	 M1
Media National	journalist	–	fraud M2
Media Mainstream	media	producer	–	consumer	facing M3
Insurer ABI	-	manager	 I1
Insurer IFB	-	director I2
Insurer Insurer	-	head	of	fraud I3
Insurer Insurer	-	head	of	fraud	and	IFED	steering	group I4
Insurer Insurer	-	retired	head	of	motor	claims I5
Insurer ABI	-	former	head	of	public	relations I6
Insurer	(Defendant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Solicitor	-	head	of	fraud DF1
Insurer	(Defendant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Counter	fraud	operator	-	managing	director DF2
Insurer	(Defendant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Counter	fraud	operator	-	analyst DF3
Insurer	(Defendant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Telematics	expert DF4
Credit-hire	(Claimant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Counter	fraud	operator	-	director	and	retried	police	detective CF1
Credit-hire	(Claimant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Solicitor	-	managing	director CF2
Credit-hire	(Claimant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Counter	fraud	-	bounty	hunter;	recovers	stolen	vehicles	for	a	fee CF3
Credit-hire	(Claimant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Solicitor	-	managing	director CF4
Credit-hire	(Claimant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Counter	fraud	-	former	head	of	fraud	/	retired	detective	 CF5
Credit-hire	(Claimant)	Counter	Fraud	Support Counter	Fraud	-	former	fraud	investigator	and	retried	police	officer	 CF6
Credit-hire	Sector CHO	-	director	general CH1
Credit-hire	Sector Credit-hire	company	-	managing	director	 CH2
Credit-hire	Sector Credit-hire	company	-	logistics	director CH3
Credit-hire	Sector Credit-hire	company	-	head	of	complex	debt CH4
Non-Insurer	Victims Transportation	company	-	head	of	claims N1
Non-Insurer	Victims Car	rental	company	-	head	of	insurance N2
Non-Insurer	Victims Chairman	of	Motor	Accident	Solicitors	Society N3
Non-Insurer	Victims Solicitor	representing	non-insurer	large	fleets N4
Police/Prosecution Police	officer	-	engaged	in	investigating	insurance	fraud P1
Police/Prosecution Expert	witness	retained	by	several	police	forces P2
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verbatim. One interviewee requested, and was given, a copy of the tape recording and a copy of 
the transcript.    
Agar (2008, p. 153) argued that “transcription is a chore” whilst Oliver et al (2005, pp. 1273–
1274) observed that it is “a pivotal aspect of qualitative inquiry” but also cautioned that “in the 
haste to begin data analysis, it can be easy to use a transcription style that fails to match one’s 
research objectives or concerns over participant confidentiality”. They conceptualised the exercise 
as a point on a continuum with naturalism at the end where everything is transcribed as fully as 
possible and de-naturalism at the other where idiosyncratic elements of speech are removed. 
Except for the three-hour interview, which included some extraneous discussions, the naturalist 
approach of transcribing the meetings in full, including stutters, pauses and involuntary vocalisation 
was adopted. Notes were also made during the interviews to mark where non-vocal indicators 
impacted on the content of the interview or gave weight to a specific response. The first few 
minutes of each interview involved putting the interviewee at ease, setting out the background to 
the research question and dealing with confidentiality and security of data. Based on their 
respective organisational status, the interview population was commercially mature, which may 
have been a factor in a lack of concern about interviews being recorded even though some 
contributors may have been conscious of the tape recorder, if only initially. All participants were 
given the opportunity to identify during the interview any matters that were confidential and which 
they would not wish to be disclosed or later attributed to them. They were also invited to pause or 
terminate the recording if they felt the interview had gone awry or were uncomfortable with the 
discussion or any other part of the process. Reiner (2000, p. 224) argued that this seldom happens 
because of the momentum generated by the interview once it has begun.  
As the method was reflective it was anticipated that participants would draw on memorable 
events and might relate their answers to significant fraud cases or offences both before and after 
the formation of IFED. That dynamic engagement in the interviews occurred in all but one interview 
with M3 who would only respond to questions in writing. Those responses lacked the richness 
inherent in discussions with other interviewees. The aim with all participants was to obtain data 
relating to:  
• their understanding of the cost of motor insurance fraud to the insurance industry;  
• whether they perceived insurers were the only victim of motor insurance fraud;  
• their view on the situation confronting non-insurer victims of insurance fraud;  
• their knowledge, and opinion, of the government and police response to the issue; 
• how they saw the role that IFED in the fight against motor insurance fraud; 
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• if they felt that IFED should accept reports of fraud from non-insurers where the offence 
fitted their reporting criteria;  
• any experience as a victim of insurance fraud and/or dealing with IFED; 
• their view of the allocation of police resources to fraud; and  
• their opinions about whether a solution might require a greater ‘private response’ to motor 
insurance fraud.      
Using a semi-structured interview technique meant that each interview could cover a wide 
range of issues and interviewees were able to expand upon and, in some instances, as Dawson 
(2002, p. 76) predicted, take the discussions in an unexpected but fruitful direction. The volume 
and breadth of data generated from the target interviews exceeded expectations and interviewing 
participants from seven different interest groups was informative. Not only was the data rich in 
terms of the differing perspectives to the problem of insurance fraud and the range of theoretical 
solutions, but the responses were driven by more than one interest group and, at times 
unexpectedly, included elements of accord from participants in typically competing groups. The 
themes that emerged are explored in this and subsequent chapters and are supported with relevant 
extracts from the interviews. A supplementary objective from the semi-structured interviews was 
to identify cases involving fraud. These went on to form a series of case studies outlined more fully 
in subsequent chapters.  
Problems experienced during the interviews  
Despite being effective the research presented some challenges. It was expected when 
selecting the seven interest groups that they, and the targeted organisation within them, would be 
representative of a victim and/or would be active in, or reporting on, counter-fraud activities and 
so would be keen to share their experiences. That was the case with all but one organisation 
participating in the interview process who, after six weeks of discussion, chose to withdraw their 
oral contribution and replace their participation with a written response. They expressed concern 
about the three broadcasters that they worked with reacting negatively to their contribution if it 
was considered ‘off message’. The response was unexpected but it did highlight the potential 
influence of the media with its content partners.  
There was also a challenge with the police. The Researcher wanted, for background, to explore 
the stimulus and aspirations leading to the formation of IFED by interviewing Commander Steve 
Head, Head of the Economic Crime Directorate (“ECD”) at the CLP and national police co-ordinator 
for economic crime until he retired in September 2015. Disappointingly, he failed to respond to 
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multiple requests to participate. Similar approaches were made to Detective Superintendent Maria 
Woodall who had responsibility for Operations and Funded Units within the ECD, including IFED. 
The Researcher met her twice in a business context and she was initially receptive to participating. 
The request was confirmed in writing but, after several attempts to arrange the interview, the 
Researcher was told that she could not get time with Commander Head to discuss the request. A 
written approach was also made to Dave Wood, former DCI and head of IFED, following a hearing 
of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Insurance and Financial Services (“APPGIFS”) in which he 
and Superintendent Woodall gave evidence7. Mr. Wood also failed to respond to multiple requests. 
Two other target police participants also declined to assist and one Police and Crime Commissioner 
(“PCC”) failed to respond to four separate participation requests. The police officers were middle 
ranking officers engaged in fraud investigation with the West Midlands Police. The Researcher 
considers that the choice of research question, specifically focused on whether the creation of IFED 
had an impact on victims of crime, represented a philosophical challenge to the CLP that they could 
not see past and that a different research question framed less at IFED may have generated a  more 
engaged response. In addition, the fact that IFED was funded by insurers may have meant that the 
decision not to engage (or the lack of a decision to engage) was driven by commercial 
considerations. All other interviewees participated willingly and with informed consent.   
Whilst it would have been helpful to hear from CLP about the drivers for the IFED initiative, 
whether it was considered analogous to CLP relations with, for example, the banking industry and 
how they regarded insurance fraud and, specifically fraud committed against non-insurers, their 
decision to make no contribution to the research at all was a disappointment. It was not wholly 
unexpected, however, and the Researcher is clear that their lack of engagement did not impact the 
efficacy of the research or the validity of the conclusions ultimately reached.   
Interview coding  
Following guidance from Creswell (2002), qualitative analysis of the interviews involved:  
• preliminary exploration of the data by reading the transcripts and writing memos;  
• coding the data by segmenting and labelling the text; 
• using codes to develop themes by aggregating similar codes together;  
• connecting and interrelating themes; and  
                                                             
7 10/02/2015; hearing relating to the interaction between motor insurance fraud, IFED and the credit-hire industry. 
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• constructing a narrative.  
The textual data obtained through interviews was coded and analysed for themes using NVivo, 
software designed for analysing unstructured data. Coding means categorising segments of data 
with a short name that simultaneously summarises and accounts for each piece of data and, as 
Thomas (1993, p. 43) remarks, gives meaning to the story recounted by the interviewee motivated 
by the objective that “we take the collection of observations, anecdotes, impressions, documents, 
and other symbolic representations of the culture we studied that seem depressingly mundane and 
common, and we reframe them into something new”. It is a process that is intense and iterative 
requiring the researcher to ask analytical questions of the data gathered. It is also the pivotal link 
between collecting data and developing a theory to explain it (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 42–46). The 
second phase in the coding exercise is focused coding, used to synthesize and explain larger 
segments of data requiring decisions about which initial codes make the most analytical sense to 
categorise data both incisively and completely. Charmaz (2006, p. 55) advocates that “by studying 
the data, you make fundamental processes explicit, render hidden assumptions visible, and give 
participants new insight”. During initial coding, she argues that simple questions should be posed: 
• ‘What is the data a study of?’ (Glaser, 1978, p. 57; Glaser & Strauss, 1967)  
• What does the data suggest? 
• From whose point of view? 
• What theoretical category does this specific datum indicate? (Glaser, 1978)  
Desktop research was also an important element of the research methodology. Scott (1990, p. 
1) argues that the handling of documentary sources is assumed to be the provenance of the 
professional historian whilst the sociologist has generally been identified with the use of 
questionnaires and interview techniques even though documentary investigation was the main 
research tool of the classical sociologists. Langlois and Seignbos (2009, Chapter 1) observed that 
“documents are the traces which have been left by the thoughts and actions of men of former times 
… there is no substitute for documents: no documents, no history”. Scott (1990, p. 12) regards a 
document “in its most general sense, a written text” irrespective of the medium on which it is held 
and whether that medium is parchment, digital or something in between. He adopts an analytical 
classification methodology using two dimensions of authorship and access to generate a typology 
of modern documents.  Authorship refers to the origin of the documents and is dependent on the 
separation of personal, public and official documents whilst access refers to the availability of the 
documents to people other than their authors. As well as mining evidence for the cases studies, the 
desktop research involved examining a large volume of published material and some confidential 
  
 
35 
documents dealing with the social, political, legal, financial and economic factors leading to the 
inception of IFED and, particularly the role of the ABI in its funding, governance and direction. It 
also included the statistical analysis of secondary empirical data that appeared to underpin the 
reporting of motor insurance fraud with specific reference to the quantification of detected and 
undetected offences such as that reported by the ABI or the National Strategic Fraud Authority 
(“NFA”).  Access to all this documentation provided an indirect method of obtaining information; 
instead of asking direct questions of an interviewee; answers were effectively sought from 
respondent documents, a process termed content analysis (Robson, 1993, p. 273). Table 2.2 defines 
the type of documents used in this study, classified in accordance with Scott’s analytical 
classification methodology. 
 
Table 2.2: Desktop research – document classification 
Before commencing the interviews, a review of the available literature and published empirical 
evidence was undertaken. It was focused on identifying:  
• The nature and reported quantum of motor insurance fraud.  
• The creation, governance, defined objectives and reported results from IFED.  
• The experiences of non-insurer victims of insurance fraud.  
• The history of public-private police partnerships.  
• The approach of government in the period between the Fraud Review and the final report 
of the Insurance Fraud Taskforce (“IFT”) in 2016. 
 
Access Personal Official	-	Private Official	-	Public
Counter	fraud	industry	security	briefings
Correspondence	between	the	ABI	and	
Ministry	of	Justice	(“MOJ”)	regarding	
formulation	of	govt.	policy
Details	of	joint	initiatives	within	the	
CHO
Minutes	from	debrief	with	National	
Crime	Agency	(“NCA”)	on	conclusion	of	
Operation	Navigate
Restricted
Witness	statements	in	matters	involving	
the	arrest	and	prosecution	of	an	
offender
Report	of	police	action	on	the	
investigation	of	fraudulent	insurance	
claims
Company	financial	accounts
Press	releases	from	IFED,	IFB,	ABI,	MOJ	
and	others
Newspapers
Hansard	record	of	parliamentary	
debates
Published	reports	and	statistics Acts	of	Parliament
Research	briefs Judgements	and	proceedings
Television	and	media	coverage
Internet	material
Authorship
Internet	blogsOpen	-	
published
Open	-	
archival
Diary	entries	and	notes	from	those	
involved	in	the	investigation	of	the	case	
studies
Closed
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Insurance fraud 
Significant attention has been given to the impact and consequences of insurance fraud but the 
conundrum postulated in the 2006 Fraud Review (2006, p. 5) remains a challenge today: “…most 
measures of fraud have not been carried out according to a robust methodology, and measure 
different things, so adding them up to produce an overall total is misleading”. In January 2016, after 
a review that was expected to champion solutions aimed at driving a long-term reduction in the 
amount of insurance fraud, the IFT (2016, p. 5) acknowledged that the majority of consumers are 
honest, that their insurance applications and claims are legitimate and that making a claim can be 
daunting and stressful. They offered only anecdotal rather than empirical conclusion, 
acknowledging that insurance fraud exists “on a continuum from application fraud to bogus, 
fictitious or intentionally inflated claims, right through to sophisticated organised crime” and that 
the problem was “deeply rooted”.  
A historical perspective 
Fraudulent and exaggerated claims have troubled insurance markets for years (Tennyson, 2008, 
p. 1188). Morley et al (2006, p. 163) highlighted that as well as being of high magnitude, the 
complexity of insurance fraud made detection difficult with the discovery of one scam often 
inspiring more aggressive and effective counter measures from the offender especially where the 
fraud was part of an organised campaign. Add to that challenging environment the lack of 
agreement on a common definition of insurance fraud and some of the pace in confronting it may 
be explicable. Some attempts have been made at providing a definition. Gill et al. (1994, p. 73) 
chose “knowingly making a fictitious claim, inflating a claim or adding extra items to a claim, or 
being in any way dishonest with the intention of gaining more than legitimate entitlements” but 
also highlighted the lack of empirical research on the topic as a stimulus for their own survey. 
Neither was there agreement within the industry as to the best working definition (Doig, Jones, & 
Wait, 1999, p. 22). Some insurers considered the offence was exaggerating a claim whilst others 
were pre-occupied with classes of systematic fraudulent activity like staged accidents or application 
fraud, relying on false documents or misrepresented information at the proposal stage. Part of the 
problem may be the insurance industry’s reluctance to discuss the issue in public other than 
through sometimes irreconcilable press releases.  
Profiling the fraudster 
Arriving at a simple profile for an insurance fraudster is equally challenging. Smith et al. (2011, 
p. 140) adopted the division of insurance fraud suggested by the ABI: 
  
 
37 
• Opportunistic fraud in general retail insurance by exaggerating or inflating genuine claims 
and, in a minority of cases, completely fabricating them. 
• Opportunistic fraud in commercial general insurance where the same means are employed 
by a commercial, rather than a retail policyholder.  
• Organised fraud involving policies taken out by criminal gangs for the explicit purpose of 
committing fraud. 
Tennyson (2008) identified the same distinction arguing that claims fraud may be a result of 
deliberate planning or casual opportunity motivated by pure profit seeking, a sense of entitlement, 
desperation, or resentment. Gill et al (1994, p. 80) ascribed personal circumstances and a 
resentment of insurance companies as determinants and the IFT (2016, p. 75) noted a “perception 
among some consumers that insurance is ‘fair game’ and that insurance fraud is a legitimate way 
of making some money”. By 2009, the ABI (Goss & O’Neill, 2009, p. 9) had evolved their 
nomenclature and, perhaps to embellish future messaging, coined three media-friendly labels to 
publicise recessionary led increases: 
• Desperation fraud, committed by those making ends meet, the recession having had the 
most profound impact.  
• Lifestyle fraud, committed to maintain a standard of living and, arguably, more prevalent 
after the recession. 
• Entitlement fraud, where honest individuals rationalise that years of paying premiums 
without a claim justifies a dishonest claim in harsher economic times.   
The identity of the target merits comment. Smith et al. (2011) noted similarities between 
benefit fraud and exaggerated or false insurance claims as did the IFT (2016, p. 20), recognising the 
determined, callous and committed traits of the fraudster whether focused on defrauding the state 
or defrauding insurance companies. Gill et al. (1994, p. 80) saw resentment towards insurance 
companies, by both legitimate and fraudulent claimants, going some way to explain why insurance 
fraud has evolved, for some, into an “acceptable misdemeanour”. Goldstraw-White (2012) 
recognised a similar trait noting peoples inclination to feel more tolerant where the victim is a 
faceless insurance company. Academic research on the offender is evolving but Karen Gill (2014) 
cited the limited number of meaningful convictions for insurance fraud offences as a restricting 
factor on the categorisation of insurance fraudsters especially when those offending because of a 
feeling of entitlement don’t generally consider their actions to be offensive. Earlier, Clarke (1990, 
pp. 4–5) had identified three types of fraudster:  
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• The opportunist taking advantage of a genuine loss to commit fraud, e.g. by claiming for 
items not actually stolen in a burglary alongside items that were.  
• The amateur who starts as an opportunist but goes further, e.g. by claiming for items stolen 
in a fictitious burglary. 
• The professional who will engage in systematic frauds, individually or as part of organised 
networks. Clarke contends there is considerable anecdotal evidence that the professional 
operates in the motor insurance market. 
Useful as they are, these categorisations don’t make it easier to spot an insurance fraudster in 
the street and trying to distinguish a fraudster from a genuine claimant based upon personal and 
social characteristics alone is also difficult. Research from Dodd, cited by Morley et al. (2006, p. 165) 
categorised a sample of fraudulent claims suggesting characteristics that make fraudsters, for the 
most part, entirely indistinguishable from genuine claimants. Button et al. (2014) provided a profile 
of a household insurance fraudster based on an analysis of 33,189 dishonest household insurance 
claims, revealing marked differences in the profile of fraudsters to some of the published profiles 
of occupational fraudsters and suggested that “’Routine Activity Theory’ emphasising the 
connection between crime and the everyday life and circumstances of offenders, is a useful lens 
through which these results can be examined.” It is also arguable that some fraudsters possess 
entrepreneurial characteristics, noticeable from the variety of ways in which motor insurer fraud, 
the most common and costly component of insurance fraud, can be committed at a number of 
stages before or after taking out a policy of insurance (ABI, 2015j).  
Types of motor insurance fraud 
Application fraud 
Application fraud occurs in a variety of scenarios e.g. where an applicant:  
• misrepresents salient facts to obtain a lower quote;  
• withholds information or engages in a deception at the time the policy is incepted; or  
• fails to notify a change during the policy life cycle in respect, for example,  
o of the use to which the vehicle is being put,  
o where it is kept,  
o the main driver’s identity, or  
o of a motoring offence.  
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In practice, these acts of deception which might impact the perceived risk, and so the pricing 
too, often only come to light following a claim making it difficult to quantify the cost impact from 
the underlying fraud. Extrapolating potentially lost premium from unidentified omissions or failures 
from an unquantified population of dishonest policyholders where the risk assessment may have 
resulted in a lower premium being charged for the risk is a Herculean task. Insurers have, however, 
respond to the challenge. The Insurance Fraud Register (“IFR”) (Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2014) and 
‘MyLicence’ (ABI, 2014f), a DVLA search tool, allow insurers to validate key data points about a 
driver, reducing the opportunity for application fraud. Additionally, with better tools providing 
greater clarity over the underwriting risk, insurers can now decline a risk in the event of detected 
material non-disclosure or, if they underwrite high-risk business, accept the risk at a higher 
premium. Such a granular approach of underwriting risks ‘one policy at a time’, is not without its 
critics. Ericson et al. (2000) cautioned against the moral hazard of un-pooling risks to maximise the 
insurer return per policyholder particularly where higher rates are charged without explicit pricing 
disclosure. The counter-argument is that intelligent underwriting helps insurers to reduce fraud at 
the inception stage and earn the appropriate premium for the risk to the pooled benefit of all 
policyholders whilst avoiding the possibility that any individual with an adverse history may be 
excluded from obtaining cover at any price.   
Research from Lexis Nexis (2015) highlighted the increasing trend of application fraud, 
specifically where internet users could test the price points of several insurers and then omit or 
adjust data to improve the quote. It is not an offence that lends itself to exposure through the 
medium of television but it is perceived by some as unstoppable. I4 said:  
“… people start their journey committing fraud … they lie to the insurance company to 
obtain insurance … the volume based activity associated with application fraud (we do 120 
million quotes a year) is huge.” 
 
The availability of aggregator price comparison websites8 have made applying for insurance 
easier. They allow simultaneous access to multiple insurers through a single Internet portal avoiding 
inconvenient multiple keying.  Standardising the information required for a quotation has allowed 
insurers to track and detect inconsistencies in supplemental or substituted information by indexing 
the quote with the applicant’s postcode, registration number, driving licence number or IP address. 
This allows an insurer to follow a consumer’s journey through several different price aggregators, 
and/or their own website, and assess whether an application is being manipulated by reference to 
                                                             
8 e.g. www.confused.com 
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sequential changes made to elicit the best price. Many consumers use aggregators because they 
want to modify the information they submit to reduce the quoted premium and some amendments 
are permissible means to do that. For example:  
• selecting a higher excess;  
• deleting an additional driver;  
• not protecting the no-claims bonus;  
• eliminating supplementary legal expense insurance; or 
• determining whether to use a car for commuting. 
These are legitimate choices where the insurer and consumer are effectively ‘bargaining’ over 
risk and reward. However, certain actions may infer an intention to subvert the normal rating and 
pricing algorithm. For example, a consumer:  
• might alter his occupation;  
• change where the car is kept overnight from ‘on the street’ to ‘garaged’;  
• reduce his predicted annual mileage;  
• substitute the identity of the main driver; or  
• change his address to that of a relative.  
These are key pricing risks and so any post-quote manipulation of the initial responses given 
may suggest an attempt at application fraud to secure, by deception, a lower quote than the risk 
justifies. Equally, there is a possibility that the counter-fraud algorithms may misinterpret the 
behaviour of an honest, computer-literate consumer enjoying the ability using technology as an 
enabler to secure better value. It may be, for example, that changing a previous response about 
where a car is parked at night from ‘on the road’ to ‘garaged’ is genuine where the premium saving 
is large enough to persuade the applicant to empty his garage and use it to park his car. I1 said the 
ABI ranked application fraud as their second priority, the first and third being to ensure their 
detected and undetected fraud figures were as robust as possible. They claimed that over 200,000 
suspicious applications for insurance were withdrawn in 2015, albeit without the insurer incurring 
a loss (2015h).  The estimates, however, are not robust with the CSEW (2016, p. 43), citing figures 
provided by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (“NFIB”), attributing a rise in insurance fraud  
as a proportion of all fraud offences between October 2015 and September 2015 to increased levels 
of application fraud but only reported a total of 10,429 instances of all insurance frauds.  
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Ghost broking 
Ghost broking involves criminals falsely advertising to be insurance brokers and selling bogus 
insurance policies. They leave road users vulnerable to a population of uninsured motorists 
defrauded of the cost of the premium paid. I4 saw ghost broking as a declining problem for insurers. 
Crash for Cash 
Probably the most widely-reported and prolific species of claim fraud, euphemistically referred 
to as ‘Crash for Cash’, the IFB (2013, p. 4) estimated that these dishonest claims cost the insurance 
industry £392 million annually. Button and Brooks (2016) decompose them into five different types: 
• The exaggerated claim - an accident where the quantum of damage, personal injury or 
other claimed losses are inflated. 
• The induced accident or ‘slam on’ - an offender targets an insured vehicle and then 
performs a manoeuvre, such as an emergency stop, where the other driver cannot 
avoid a collision for which he is likely to be held liable. 
• The staged accident - two drivers conspire to cause a collision often where the driver 
agreed to be at fault is in a hired vehicle. 
• The fictitious staged accident - similar to the staged accident except the accident never 
takes place; the damage occurs in a sterile environment away from prying eyes. 
• The fictitious paper accident - a fictitious incident that generates claims in the same 
manner as the staged or fictitious staged accident. 
Recently, the ‘Crash for Cash’ label evolved into ‘Flash for Crash’ (Ward, 2013), where the 
fraudster on a major road flashes his headlights to the innocent driver waiting to emerge from a 
side road who then pulls out into the path of the offender. He then claims that he flashed to let the 
other motorist know he was there, as advised in the Highway Code. And to highlight the 
entrepreneurial nature of fraudsters (and the linguistic ability of journalists), ‘Crash for Ready Cash’ 
(Vahl, 2015) is a more recent iteration where, after an induced accident, the fraudster confronts 
the victim at the roadside claiming the damage caused is repairable at a cost below the victim’s 
policy excess, an amount too small to justify involving insurers. The damage is, in fact, pre-existing 
but the fraudster demands a cash payment even offering to accompany the victim to a cash point. 
The victims, often women, and the accidents, usually in the evening when people are keen to get 
home, show the level of pre-meditation often inherent in these offences.  Of more concern is the 
fraudster’s intention to avoid pursuing a claim through insurers, effectively by-passing insurer 
counter fraud defences, by seeking a sum below the victim’s excess. It raises the question of who 
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advocates for the non-insurer victim of fraud if the insurance industry, through their counter-fraud 
strategies, have simply pushed the fraud problem downstream and, in these cases, left the innocent 
motorist as a non-insurer victim to the limit of their excess level? Vahl (2015) characterised the 
incidents as “the equivalent of highway robbery” although the police were less energised as 
narrated by CF1: 
“I witnessed a guy pull sharply in front of another car on a slip road and braked to cause a 
very minor collision … the rear of his car was already damaged and the lady who “hit him” 
had barely a scratch ... It was quite late and I was suspicious … I stopped to help and videoed 
what followed. The male wanted the lady to give him £200 for the damage to avoid 
involving her insurer and the police and when she said she had no money he offered to 
follow her to a cash point. I got involved at that point and the guy bolted. 
  
I reported the incident to the BBC. The video ended up on Facebook and two other women 
contacted me … subject of the same scam, perpetrated by the same bloke, driving the same 
car. I am a former police officer and … collated the evidence and spoke with IFED. I was 
unsuccessful in persuading them to become involved, there being no loss to any insurer. I 
did, however, embarrass a provincial force into investigating but after the incident was 
shown on TV, the index car was found abandoned. Eventually the police traced the offender 
and arrested him. He was identified in a police ID parade (by me and the other victims) and 
the case officer told me that they had linked together several other similar offences.  
 
Over a year later … I was advised that the CPS declined to recommend the offender be 
prosecuted … suggesting I consider a civil prosecution. To add insult to injury, the vehicle 
used by the offender was also uninsured when the offences were committed.”  
Fraud and the media 
In their submission to the Fraud Review (2006, p. 10), the ABI recommended developing a 
media campaign to educate consumers about the perils of insurance fraud. Whether that was an 
attempt to alert them to the type of risks detailed above, invoke the atmospherics for a moral panic, 
pick up on the successes of the Tort Reform Movement in the US  (Halton & McCann, 2004) or was 
just born out of frustration from experience, the inclination to mount a media campaign to 
challenge the notion that insurance fraud was an acceptable offence was echoed by the CLP (2011b) 
years later, re-affirmed in a conference speech on behalf of the ABI in 2013 (Kerr, 2013) and then 
resurrected as one of the recommendations of the IFT (2016, p. 77). The ABI strategy envisioned a 
media campaign labouring the risk of detection and imprisonment for insurance fraudsters with an 
aspiration to make the offence as socially unacceptable as driving whilst drunk or without 
insurance. I1 highlighted the impact of ‘Claimed and Shamed’, a programme from the BBC about 
insurance fraud.  
“There’s been five series … It goes out at the mid-morning Jeremy Kyle type audience, which 
is quite good without trying to sound patronizing, and it has had the best viewing figures 
  
 
43 
for that time of morning ... it’s had a big impact … we are not there yet, but we’re chipping 
away at this hackneyed misconception that fraud is a victimless crime.”   
  
Gaining access to parts of the media proved difficult for the Researcher. M3 replaced his oral 
contribution with a brief written response, expressing concern about the three broadcasters he 
worked with reacting negatively to his contribution if it was ‘off message’. Asked for his definition 
of motor insurance fraud, he provided a narrow, almost myopic response claiming it to be “when 
an individual or group seek to profit financially via insurance by either deliberately causing a 
collision, exaggerating one, or completely fabricating an event”, a view he said he derived “from 
working with a range of insurers, APU and the police.” 
If the figures are accurate, with general insurance fraud reported at £1.32 billion detected and 
£2.1 billion undetected (ibid. p. 5), insurance fraud is undoubtedly newsworthy and with graphic 
portrayal of detected crimes, Crash for Cash has become a staple of both the print and television 
media although M2 was less convinced:  
“I’ve seen it over the years, they just churn out the same old stuff … the Daily Mail pick it up 
and the next things is there’s a story about ‘one legged lesbian working class mothers are 
creating more whiplash claims’. And they just believe it’s news... You don’t have to test 
these claims very far to show it’s nonsense.  It’s not true! The figures are complete nonsense 
and they are just being used to drive the media coverage from those daft enough to 
publicise them.” 
 
According to Greer (2010), the news media are a defining feature of the justice landscape 
providing “key indicators of the nature and extent of crime, the appropriateness and efficacy of 
criminal justice, and the wider state of the nation”. Hall et al. (1978) suggested that the media 
continually reproduce the ideas of the ruling class and that news production is oriented in the 
purported name of “journalistic objectivity and impartiality” to appeal first to the accredited 
experts who represent and command institutional power leaving powerful groups in a position to 
“establish an initial definition or primary interpretation of the topic in question” (ibid. p58) 
prompting Greer (2010, p. 494) to observe that “once the primary definition has been established 
it is extremely difficult to override, and future debate is contained within a forum of ‘controlled 
discourse’ governed by the primary definers”. Hall et al. (1978, p. 59) argued that: 
“The media, then, do not simply ‘create’ the news; nor do they simply transmit the ideology 
of the ‘ruling class’ in a conspiratorial fashion. Indeed, we have suggested that, in a critical 
sense, the media are frequently not the ‘primary definers’ of news events at all; but their 
structured relationship to power has the effect of making them play a crucial but secondary 
role in reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access, as of right, to the 
media as ‘accredited sources’. From this point of view, in the moment of news production, 
the media stand in a position of structured subordination to the primary definers.”  
  
 
44 
Changing attitudes  
It is unarguable that insurance fraud is a problem and that the effect may have increased since 
2008 as fraudsters exploited systemic weaknesses to follow the money. Quantifying the extent of 
the problem is harder. Since the late 1980s attitudes have changed with individuals increasingly 
prepared to engage in misrepresentation for personal gain and a preparedness to attempt to 
defraud ‘well-off’ institutions (Doig et al., 1999, p. 19). For all insurers, but for motor insurers more 
than  life or commercial underwriters, Clarke (1990, p. 4) identified a minority of consumers who 
saw insurance companies as reasonably anonymous and a wealthy target for fraud. The ABI’s 
published research (Goss & O’Neill, 2009, p. 11) (“ABI Research Brief”) claimed that 7 to 11% of 
adults admit to making a fraudulent insurance claim, an estimate they felt likely to be lower bound 
estimates assuming that some of those surveyed would not admit to fraudulent behaviour even 
when anonymity was assured.	The self-justification for committing insurance fraud, as identified by 
Clarke, appears to have persisted until 2010. More recent ABI research (O’Neill, 2010, p. 13) 
suggests 40% of adults regarded claims fraud as either borderline or acceptable. Karstedt and 
Farrall (2006, p. 13) claimed 22% of people would consider padding an insurance claim, suggesting 
a relatively high tolerance towards insurance fraud. According to another insurance survey 
(Bachelor, 2009) reported in January 2009, 1.4 million adults considered insurance fraud more 
acceptable than they did 12 months earlier and almost 5 million people (about 10% of the adult 
population) saw nothing wrong with making a false insurance claim.  	
The slow progress in defining what constitutes fraud in a dynamic, complex and adversarial 
environment makes implementing a coherent industry-wide reporting methodology difficult. If it is 
impossible to measure precisely the financial impact then that lack of clarity must frustrate a proper 
assessment of the effectiveness of any counter measures and the appropriate allocation of 
resources since “measurement is the first step that leads to control and eventually to improvement. 
If you can’t measure something, you can’t understand it. If you can’t understand it, you can’t control 
it. If you can’t control it, you can’t improve it” (Harrington, 1997). The ABI publish the only available 
empirical data on motor insurance fraud although it is, apparently, an aggregation of data from 
several insurance companies utilising a method reliant on multiple estimates with no published 
protocol or control regulating the exercise. The IFT appear not to have tested the methodology 
underpinning the ABI calculations and yet the headline numbers are routinely reported through the 
media and shared with government and so are relied upon, and repeated, in many other reports 
and publications on the subject.  In the foreword to the IFT report (2016), Harriet Baldwin MP, 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, and Lord Faulks QC, Minister of State for Civil Justice, asserted 
that: 
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“insurance fraud has been estimated to cost policyholders up to £50 each per year, and the 
country more than £3 billion … pushing up the prices of essential products, such as motor 
and home insurance, with consequences for everyone through an increased cost of living. 
Valuable public resources, such as those in our NHS and in the courts, are spent on dealing 
with fraudulent cases.”  
 
The researcher discovered that finding evidence to support a cost to policyholders of “£50 each 
per year” AND the basis for a cost to the country of “more than £3 billion” was impossible. 
 
Lies, damned lies and statistics  
The ABI (2015j) reported having detected 67,000 fraudulent motor claims in 2014 with an 
aggregated value of £835 million, 12% higher than the number of claims detected in 2013. £835 
million represents 63% of the £1.32 billion uncovered fraudulent general insurance claims reported 
in the same year, an increase of 3% from the 2013 report. These are just the reported figures for 
detected fraudulent claims with the ABI not offering any estimate of a value for undetected 
fraudulent claims. The difference between the reported cost of detected and undetected fraud will 
prove to be important in the analysis that follows. The 12% increase in detected fraudulent claims 
may have indicated the industry’s ability to identify and thus avoid fraud was improving. Indeed, I6 
claimed “the increase in the detected fraud figure is partly because we’re better at detecting it.” 
Conversely, there may have been no improvement in the detection rate, the reported increase in 
detected claims to 67,000 merely the product of an increased claims incidence and a constant 
detection rate. It could also have been a combination of the two or even a third alternative that we 
just don’t know what the figures truly represent. For the Researcher, that was the scenario which 
motivated his research.   
Fraudulent claims - detected or undetected? 
The ABI’s use of the undefined labels of ‘detected’ and ‘undetected’ fraud requires clarification. 
It is not clear, for example, if the detected claims reported in 2014 generated payments to dishonest 
claimants, effectively cash outflows of £1.32 billion, or if it identifies claims that were determined 
to be fraudulent, or potentially fraudulent, before payment was made so enabling a £1.32 billion 
cash outflow to be avoided. The second of those two alternatives appears more feasible since the 
NFA (2013, p. 41) referenced a much lower cash outflow of just £39 million in the 2013 Annual 
Fraud Indicator (“AFI”), a figure they credited to the ABI in respect of “identified insurance fraud 
(where claims are paid before they have been identified as fraudulent)”. If £39 million was the true 
extent of cash outflow for fraudulent general insurance claims, then the problem may be nowhere 
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near as significant as the market, the media or government, might believe. It still suggests an 
industry under attack but, perhaps, because of the vulnerability in its own processes and systems 
as the investment in counter-fraud measures had yet to mature to a level consistent with the 
emerging threat.  
In 2009, the ABI (2009, p. 5) implied that detected general insurance fraud did represent savings 
to insurers from repudiated detected claims with increased detection ascribed to:  
• greater awareness of the fraud risk; 
• dedicated fraud teams being introduced;  
• increasingly sophisticated IT and systems; and 
• cognitive interviewing techniques and voice-stress analysis software.   
A series of tables supported the narrative and elements from Table 1, 5 and 6 of the ABI 
Research Brief are summarised in Table 2.3 below. 
 
Table 2.3: Detected (repudiated) motor insurance claims 2008 (Source: ABI 2009) 
Three observations emerge from this data:  
• Detected (repudiated) motor insurance fraud in 2008 was £420.12 million.  
• No estimate of claim volume was provided but repudiation, by volume of claims, was below 
1%.  
• There was no analysis of fraudulent claims resulting in cash outflow before the fraud was 
established.   
If the ABI Research Brief was the foundation for subsequent reporting then, by 2016, 
confidence in the data should have been high. Indeed, having given the IFT estimates that annual 
insurance fraud losses had reached £3 billion, confidence in both the provenance and fidelity of the 
data should be non-negotiable it being used to inform, shape and drive criminal justice policy. 
Distribution	
Channel
Annual	Motor	
Premium	(£m)	
(source:	Table	1)
Repudiation	
Rate	by	Value	
(source:	Table	6)
Detected	
Fraud	(£m)	
(Calculated)
Repudiation	Rate	
by	Volume	
(source:	Table	5)
Retail £8,100	 3.56% £288.36	 0.94%
Commercial £2,700	 4.55% £122.85	 0.74%
Total £10,800	 3.89% £420.12	 0.92%
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Neither the data, nor opinion, support that outcome. In interviews conducted for this research, 
there was almost universal disbelief in the reliability of ABI data and, what the numbers meant and 
how the ABI could quantify undetected fraud. CF2 said:  
“… the very idea of £2 billion of undetected fraud is a misnomer; how can you put a statistic 
on something that you don’t know?”  
 
P1 concurred:  
“… if it’s undetected how can you put a figure on it? I keep on getting asked about these 
numbers by the media … I can’t find anyone at the ABI who can give me a proper answer. 
It’s embarrassing …”  
 
I1 disclosed the quantification exercise had not been repeated since 2009 because of the 
expense associated with it, a peculiar admission from an industry purportedly haemorrhaging £3 
billion annually9. He confirmed that £835 million of the reported £1.32 billion figure was detected 
motor insurance fraud that he felt was “pretty solidly based”. On the issue of undetected fraud, he 
said:  
“I know you saw the 2009 report10, which was the last time we actually looked at it … the 
figure that we have for undetected fraud is about £2.1 billion, that relates to 2008, and that 
is not an ABI figure, that is a National Fraud Authority figure ... it’s a combined ABI/IFB 
figure which includes IFB data on crash for cash” (emphasis added). 
 
His explanation of the calculation for undetected fraud placed reliance on the AFI and it seemed 
that the reference to the statistic being an NFA figure was intended to infer that the NFA, a 
government agency, had either produced, or at least validated, the £2.1 billion as being a 
legitimate, reliable and proper estimate. They had done no such thing. In a footnote referencing 
the source of the £2.1 billion figure, the NFA (2013, 40) attributed its estimate of undetected fraud 
to data supplied by the ABI and the IFB. It appears the reference by both the ABI, and later by the 
IFT, to a statistic reported by the NFA was parallel referencing of uncorroborated data the ABI had 
originally supplied and was now relying on the NFA to give it independent legitimacy. I1 was visibly 
uncomfortable when challenged on this point and offered no coherent explanation. Parallel 
referencing of uncorroborated data was a common practice identified throughout the desktop 
research.   
 
                                                             
9 The ABI may have invited proposal in 2016 to re-visit the work done in 2009 
10 The ABI Research Brief 
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The ABI Research Brief 2009  
Goss and O’Neil (2009, p. 17) set out their method for estimating undetected insurance fraud 
in an appendix. Understanding the methodology deployed is helpful in assessing the reliability of 
the estimates deployed by the ABI from 2009. What follows is a worked example of the 
Researcher’s interpretation of the way in which Goss and O’Neill produced their estimates of 
detected and undetected fraud. It requires values for three variables subsequently used in an 
equation. The variables and the three steps involved in calculating them are set out below: 
• Detected Fraudulent Claims (“DFC”),  
• Undetected Fraud Risk Multiplier (“UFRM”). 
• Average Fraudulent Claim Value (“AFCV”).  
Steps in the calculation 
1. Individual insurers report their detected fraud rate - the number of fraudulent claims 
detected as the percentage of total claims. The ABI aggregate individual responses and then 
estimate the DFC for the market by applying the aggregated percentage from all 
participating insurers against the total claims reported by all insurers. Whilst each insurer 
will have known the percentage of total claims detected as fraudulent, the precision of the 
aggregated industry total relies on all insurers contributing and adopting the same 
measurement philosophy. Conversations the Researcher had with insurer and IFB 
employees confirmed that there was no pre-agreed process to ensure uniformity of 
reporting.   
 
2. Calculation of the second variable, the UFRM was subjective. Each insurer’s perception of 
the number of undetected fraudulent claims was aggregated by the ABI and then reported 
as an aggregated variable termed the undetected fraud rate. The UFRM, the second 
variable in the equation, is the undetected fraud rate divided by the detected fraud rate. 
For example, if the detected annual fraud rate was 2% and the estimated undetected fraud 
rate was 10% (based on their calculation of all insurers’ aggregated perception of 
undetected fraudulent incidents in their market) then the UFRM would be 5 i.e. 10% 
divided 2%, the value used in the worked example below.  
 
3. The AFCV is another aggregated value. Individual insurers multiplied their average cost per 
claim by the sum of (a) the proportion of fraudulent claims that are invented and (b) the 
proportion that are exaggerated by (c) the degree to which exaggeration occurs in these 
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claims. The result is the AFCV which appears to be the product of a process as subjective 
and obtuse as the calculations set out in the first two steps above. The AFCV in the ABI 
Research Brief was £1,100. 
Using the variables arrived at from the steps set out above, Goss and O’Neil calculated that 
Undetected Fraud = ((DFC x UFRM) x AFVC) (ibid. p.17).  A worked example using this equation to 
calculate the value of undetected fraud appears below; the values shown are for illustrative 
purposes only. 
• DFC     (detected fraudulent claims)   10,000 
• UFRM (undetected fraudulent risk multiplier) 5 
• AFCV  (average fraudulent claim value)  £1,100 
((10,000 x 5) x £1,100) = £55 million 
Whilst the logic for this calculation appears arithmetically uncontroversial it is at risk of 
distortion and/or bias for several reasons. The UFRM requires that insurers submit their own 
numerical indicator of detected fraudulent claims without reference to an objective definition of a 
detected fraud. Inconsistent measurement will generate inconsistent results. Participants were also 
required to estimate their own UFRM based on their perception of undetected risk relative to the 
number of fraudulent claims detected in their company. That assessment is an entirely subjective 
measure relying on estimating something that, by definition, has not been detected. The 
application of the calculated UFRM in the first and, as it transpires, only result of this methodology, 
may have created a baseline for insurer’s estimating undetected fraud that subsequently influenced 
each insurer’s attitude against the level of provisions it needed to make against the risk of future 
undetected fraudulent claims.  There is a probability that whenever the calculated industry value 
for detected or undetected fraud was high, a prudent actuary would perceive his future risk as likely 
to increase or, as a minimum, to be no better than in previous years compelling him to invoke at 
least the same or higher estimate of the risk of undetected fraud for future calculations divorced 
from the true position. The tension between a prudent actuary and a wholly subjective 
methodology will likely result in higher reporting of undetected fraud.  Equally, the approach to 
providing for the risk of increased costs of fraud is heightened if the industry fears the risk of a fraud 
epidemic. It would be a very brave actuary who determined, in those circumstances, to reserve for 
the risk of fraud less prudently than his peers.  
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What emerges is the potential for a circular and self-perpetuating upward only view where 
insurers might make increasing financial provisions against the prospect of future undetected fraud 
crystallising substantive losses against current revenue.  In accounting terms, the output of that 
prudent approach to provisioning would either be a reduction in profits or an increase in premiums. 
Significantly, the cycle of financial uncertainty equalises when the real claims experience for an 
accounting year is determined. As soon as there is visibility of the real cost of fraudulent claims paid 
out then that figure will be reflected in the profit and loss account and the excess accounting 
provisions, or reserves held in respect of potentially fraudulent claims, can be released. Because 
insurers account for premiums and claims in respect of policy years, and because most general 
insurance claims are either settled or investigated within a year or two of the policy year end, the 
use of estimates when real audited data is available is perplexing.  
Postscript 
The ABI Research Brief concluded that detected insurance fraud had increased by, on average, 
30% a year between 2004 and 2008 (ibid. p.4). If there was a true increase in the detected fraud 
rate it is possible that it may not be because of an increase in the number of fraudulent claims being 
committed; it just might mean that insurers are better at codifying or detecting the offence. 
However, a prudent actuary may impute the effect of that increase into their perception of their 
total fraud risk, specifically undetected fraud, such that the calculated UFRM may be higher than 
the simplicity that the logic originally intended. Consider the position using the worked example 
above but calculating the value of undetected fraud using amended hypothetical values reflecting 
the detected fraud rate increasing by 25% from 2% to 2.5% and so detected fraudulent claims 
increasing to 12,500. This could arise from insurers allocating increased or smarter resources to 
dedicated detection teams. But assume also that actuaries take the reported increase as a portent 
of increased fraud activity generally rather than a result of process improvements. As a best case, 
they may choose not to link the growth in detected fraud to a corresponding increase in the 
perception of the risk of undetected fraud and leave the UFRM at 5.  The net effect of the increase 
in detected claims increases the estimate of undetected claims from 50,000 to 62,500 simply from 
applying the UFRM of 5 to 12,500, rather than 10,000 detected claims. The estimate of undetected 
fraud increases from £55 million to £68.75 million.: 
• DFC     (detected fraudulent claims)   12,500 
• UFRM (undetected fraudulent risk multiplier) 5 
• AFCV  (average fraudulent claim value)  £1,100 
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((12,500 x 5) x £1,100) = £68.75 million 
In a more pessimistic scenario, actuaries may be persuaded anecdotally that the incidence of 
fraud, rather than its detection rate, is increasing and accordingly determine to increase their 
perception of risk applying to undetected fraud from 10% to 15%. The net effect of that actuarially 
driven adjustment would produce a revised UFRM of 6 (15% divided by 2.5%) revising the estimate 
for undetected fraudulent claims to 75,000 (from 50,000), a real increase of 50% which moves the 
estimate for undetected fraud from £55 million to £82.5 million. 
 
• DFC     (detected fraudulent claims)   12,500 
• UFRM (undetected fraudulent risk multiplier) 6 
• AFCV  (average fraudulent claim value)  £1,100 
((12,500 x 6) x £1,100) = £82.5 million 
Testing the data  
The integrity of the ABI figures is paramount. They have:  
• fuelled a long running media and PR campaign; 
• potentially misdirected the response to fraudsters;  
• supported increased insurance premiums and insurer profitability;  
• defined the fraud agenda; 
• catalysed the ABI partnership with the CLP; and 
• influenced, and driven, broader government policy decisions by shaping the political 
debate. 
History is one source of validation for the ABI estimates. Doig et al (1999, p. 20) referenced 
figures from the Crime and Fraud Prevention Bureau Annual Report 97 which reported insurance 
fraud at 3.6% of annual premiums in 1996 although without any granularity and no sense of the 
scale of any underlying undetected problem. Goss and O’Neil (2009, p. 1) concluded that detected 
general insurance claims fraud in 2008 was £730 million (2.2% of premiums) and undetected 
general insurance claim fraud was estimated to be the equivalent of 6% of total premiums 
(effectively applying a UFRM of 3). By 2014, detected general insurance claims fraud was reportedly 
£1.32 billion, of which £835 million was associated with motor insurance (ABI, 2015j). Against £10.5 
billion of reported motor insurance revenue (ABI, 2014b), £835 million represents detected fraud 
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of 7.9% of annual premiums. Adding in the claimed £2.1 billion cost of undetected fraudulent claims 
suggests total detected and undetected fraud running at 28% of annual premiums, which sounds 
infeasible when compared with the average loss rate of 3.9% reported in the 2017 Annual Fraud 
Indicator (Button, Gee, & Mothershaw, 2017, p. 14) or the global average loss rate of 5.6% (Gee & 
Button, 2015, p. 10).   
The separate and most detailed analysis of general insurance detected fraud published by the 
ABI (2015c) is helpful. Of the reported £835 million of detected fraudulent motor insurance claims, 
only £140.5 million was characterised as ‘proven detected fraud’, with the balance (£697 million) 
being categorised as ‘suspected detected fraud’; by deduction, 84% of reported detected motor 
insurance fraud was based on suspicion and not proof and so it appears that even the figure 
attributed by the ABI to detected fraud is less certain than its label might imply. An extract of the 
published data appears in Table 2.4 below.  
 
Table 2.4: General detected fraud by line of business (Source: ABI 2016) 
The use of large aggregated numbers when talking about insurance fraud fuels a very serious 
message which may be why the reported numbers are so high.  Glenn Marr (2014), a former 
director of the IFB and former police officer, referred to the accuracy of the ABI figures as estimates 
to be “viewed/treated accordingly” and that “the methodology used to produce these estimates 
could undoubtedly be improved upon and refined”’.  His views were echoed by others.  
I4 said, in relation to a meeting that he had had with David Hertzell of the IFT:  
“… he’s quite aware the industry is using estimates and that work needs to be done to 
strengthen the data … they do get used widely in the public domain, and with the media, 
which is something I am very, very uncomfortable with.” 
 
DF1 said:  
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“it’s just a big number used to get attention … If it really is £3 billion, then measured against 
£10 or £11 billion of motor insurance turnover that’s 25% of industry turnover which is an 
absolute nonsense.”  
 
M2, complained:  
“they are complete rubbish. Everyone knows they are made up … not actually representative 
of the quantum of fraud because the sums are never paid out. I had this out with James 
Dalton of the ABI a couple of years ago ... It’s all very well talking about £800 million of 
detected fraud but if it was detected then you haven’t paid out. Why are you using these 
ridiculous large numbers? The figures are all bullshit.”  
 
I3 concurred:  
“None of the figures are right; every insurer, and I’ve raised this at the ABI last year, they’ve 
all got different versions of what should go into each piece of the puzzle and on that basis, 
the aggregated figures coming out of the ABI can’t be right.” 
 
M1 said:  
“… it’s all basically put a finger in the air and grab a number isn’t it? You see these figures 
from the ABI and they’re quoted all over the place; you read the white papers and industry 
reports and see the figures in the media and no-one ever questions their validity … the stuff 
about detected and undetected fraud … it’s just guesswork, isn’t it?  … and when you get to 
a figure of £3 billion, it sounds impressive and ridiculous at the same time but it certainly 
managed to get the Government interested.”  
 
There appears to be no agreed and consistent method by which the insurance industry reports 
the volume or cost of detected or undetected fraud. Clarke (1990, 2) highlighted the wide variation 
in available evidence 25 years ago and little progress, or consistency, can be found since. For 
example, Aviva Insurance (Hyde, 2014) claimed that less than 2% of the 910,000 claims handled by 
them in 2014  were fraudulent, demonstrating that insurers can quantify precisely their exposure. 
In addition, the ABI (2016d) published ‘pay out’ rates for the most common claims during 2013 and 
2014. With data from 19 insurers covering 4.3 million motor claims they revealed that 99% of claims 
were successful with an average pay-out of £2,160. Commenting on the figures Huw Evans, Director 
General of the ABI, said:  
“we cannot earn trust without being more transparent about how many claims are paid 
and why a minority of claims are usually declined. Contrary to popular belief, insurers want 
to pay honest claims.” 
 
Superficially at least, these figures imply that only 1% of motor claims were declined (not 
‘honest claims’), wholly inconsistent with the previous ten years of messaging.  The IFT (2016, p. 
16) provided a stark warning in their report that increasing levels of insurance fraud may compel a 
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change from a ‘trust’ to a ‘verify’ society. That warning may also apply in respect of the ABI statistics 
which appear widely mistrusted by some and incapable of verification by anybody. I4 said:  
“the use of undetected fraud as a term is something that I don’t agree with and don’t quite 
understand either … the industry needs to do a lot more around this quantification of fraud 
losses generally ... It needs some investment and we need to move away from what are now 
just crazy estimates that we’ve been relying on for several years … the industry needs to get 
a number which is a more resilient number and has a lot more integrity attached to it.  
We’ve been using estimates for too long.” 
 
The answer to all of this may lie elsewhere. Ericson (1993, p. 540) contends that insurance claim 
fraud is a case of ‘making crime’. Pointing to comments from a US insurance industry executive he 
highlights the irony that the increasing focus on the detection and reporting of claims fraud, and 
the refusal to pay claims, is integral to keeping premiums down in an environment where increased 
claim costs can no longer be passed on to consumers by way of higher premiums. The parallel with 
the UK insurance market is intriguing. During the deepest global recession for a generation, insurers 
avoided regulatory criticism for imposing significant increases in motor premiums because of the 
Establishment’s acceptance of their exposure to several industrial crises of which fraud was one. 
Insurers in the UK were, arguably, wrestling with a different variant of the same problem reported 
by Ericson. Whilst there wasn’t a regulatory cap on premiums, the resentment directed towards 
the banking and finance sector for their role in crystallising the recession created resistance to 
insurers increasing premiums at a time when government were telling consumers (Cameron, 2009) 
that “we’re all in this together”.   
UK Motor insurers had been loss making since 1994 (Transport Committee, 2011a) but during 
a period of government imposed austerity, it was difficult for them to sustain price rises sufficient 
to stem their recurring losses. Creating a groundswell of government support may, if the 
explanation from the US was correct, have given UK insurers the necessary resolve to aggressively 
publicise the scale of insurance fraud as a driver for justifying increased premiums to improve 
profits. The sight of increasing insurance premiums was a stimulus for the 4th Report of the House 
of Commons Transport Committee (“TSC”) on the Cost of Motor Insurance (ibid p.5).  They 
reported:  
“Many motorists have had an unpleasant surprise in recent months in discovering that the 
cost of their motor insurance has increased significantly [with] average quoted premiums 
for comprehensive cover increased by 11.7% in the third quarter of 2010 and by 29.9% in 
the year to October 2010. The average of the lowest three quotes from 90 providers (known 
as the “Shoparound” average) increased by 39.3% in the year to October 2010.”  
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Of perhaps greater importance was the message to government (ibid. p.7) that premiums 
would continue to increase because insurers needed to make up for several recent lean years and 
that insurers spent around £1.20 for every £1 collected in premium. Whilst an increased risk of 
fraud may have been a component part of the reported ‘claims outgo’11 insurers faced, it bears 
mention that as claims experience in each policy year becomes a firm number in the insurer’s 
accounts, and if the predicted exposure to undetected fraud is too high, then the insurer’s audited 
financial results in future years will be flattered by a release of reserves no longer required against 
potential fraud losses that didn’t materialise. A corresponding increase in reported profitability will 
then follow and, in the case of public companies, so will a rising share price and increased dividend 
payments to shareholders.   
In 2014, Direct Line Group plc (“DLG”) and Admiral Insurance Group plc (“Admiral”), who 
between them write 25% of motor insurance policies in the UK, revealed a record rise in profits 
despite the insurance industry’s alarm call over the unrelenting tide of fraudulent insurance claims 
(Thompsons Solicitors, 2015). DLG paid an 8.8p per share final dividend after operating profit for 
the year rose by 14% to £497m and the final dividend took DLG’s total pay-out to shareholders for 
2014 to 27.2p, 32% more than the 20.6p paid for 2013. In total cash terms, DLG shareholders 
received dividends of £407m and the results statement confirmed that profits had been boosted 
by releasing £278.4 million of reserves in respect of motor risks “driven primarily by favourable 
experience on bodily injury claims across recent accident years” as well as the Government’s Legal 
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (“LASPO”) (Direct Line Insurance Group PLC, 
2014, p. 42). The release of reserves was confirmation that provisions made in previous accounting 
periods were higher than had been required. In 2015 (Direct Line Insurance Group PLC, 2015, p. 
34), the trend continued with a further release of £266.8 million of motor insurance reserves and 
an increase in profit before tax to £507.5 million. Admiral (2015, p. 15) reported a profit from UK 
car insurance of £398m and announced a 49p final dividend worth £135m to shareholders because 
the company had been able to make “higher reserve releases” as a result of “positive claims 
development in particular from the 2011, 2012 and 2013 years”. They promised shareholders could 
look forward to more “jam tomorrow” because an upward turn in premiums was already delivering 
profitability that would be reported in the coming two or three years because of the company’s 
“cautious approach to recognising underwriting profit”. In the 2015 financial year (Admiral 
                                                             
11 Profit is the amount by which premiums exceed claims and cost outgo 
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Insurance Group plc, 2015, p. 24) there was a reserve release in respect of UK car insurance of £84.6 
million (2014: £66.8 million) and the Chief Executive, when declaring a dividend to shareholders of 
£377 million, invited those shareholders to “trust me, money from back year releases actually 
spends exactly the same as any other money. And there’s more where that came from” (ibid. p.8). 
Definitions revisited 
Tom Jones, head of policy at Thompsons Solicitors (2015), claimed the results from the two 
insurers were yet more evidence that the scare stories about the scale and cost of fraud were 
misleading:   
“The endless claims of fraud, from whiplash to crash for cash and the huge £multimillion 
sums attributed to it have been exaggerated to get reforms that help insurers make ever-
larger profits and motorists to think that premiums have to stay high.”  
 
I1 confirmed that the 2009 results in the ABI Research Brief had been “grossed up for 
inflationary pressures and stuff like that.” It may follow, therefore, that the estimate of general 
insurance fraud by insurers are themselves evidence of exaggerated claims. Jones (2014b) said:  
“Until the ABI adequately explains its definition of fraud and is transparent, their claims 
aren’t worth the paper they are written on. Trotting out unsubstantiated figures that 
include – unless they prove otherwise – any mistake or oversight made by motorists is 
reminiscent of some tin pot dictator’s factory production figures. They mean nothing at all 
and there is no way to check them.”  
 
Judith Gledhill (2014a), also of Thompsons, raised another concern:  
“Figures released by the ABI and IFED state that there were as many as 59,900 ‘dishonest’ 
motor claims ‘detected’ in 2013 but that only 85 people had been prosecuted since 2011. If 
the ABI’s figures are accurate and if we are in fact in the midst of a fraud epidemic, it begs 
the question why there are so few prosecutions? The way this latest announcement reads 
you’d … be forgiven for thinking that insurers have paid out millions of pounds to dishonest 
policy holders when, in fact, the only multimillion pound payments they’re making is to their 
own shareholders. The fact is, the insurers are crying crisis because it helps them politically 
and no one is challenging the accuracy of what they say.” 
   
The ABI (2015c), perhaps belatedly with much of the agenda for reform to the compensation 
system having been delivered by this stage, softened the tone of its message clarifying that the 
information collected annually “does not provide anything more than an indication of the level of 
detected fraud impacting on the insurance industry” and “reporting on and measuring all cases of 
fraud encountered by insurers presents some challenges.” Whilst arguably helpful, that concession 
brings back into consideration the debate about what detected and undetected actually means and 
what are the true cost of fraudulent claims paid out. Commenting on the delta between the 
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significant number of allegations of fraud and the relatively small number of convictions, I1 
postulated that detected fraud is a complex subject to analyse and that it is not simply about 
convictions:  
“there are not a lot of convictions … a handful of cases … so detected fraud is based on what 
we define as ‘proven known conventional frauds’. It’s a combination of what we call ‘known 
frauds’ and ‘suspicious activity’ and suspicious activity will form the majority of that.” 
 
He went on to explain that the ABI had published its definitions following questions raised by 
the Transport Committee (Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2015, p. 9):  
“‘Suspicious activity’ involves claims where a claim handler having an actual suspicion of fraud (e.g. 
manual fraud indicator(s), tip off, system generated "high risk" referral etc.) challenges the 
applicant/claimant by letter, telephone call or instruction of an investigator etc., to clarify key 
information, provide additional information or documentation etc., and the applicant/claimant 
subsequently:  
• Fails to co-operate or provide further documentation; and/or 
• Formally withdraws the application/claim (by phone, e-mail or letter) without a 
credible explanation; and/or 
• Allows all communication with the insurer to lapse despite the insurer’s reasonable 
attempts to re-establish contact; and/or 
• Accepts (without a credible explanation) either a substantially reduced settlement 
offer in respect of a claim, or a substantially increased premium in respect of an 
application/renewal (other than in cases where there has been a careless 
misrepresentation). 
‘Proven known conventional frauds’ are those that fall into the descriptions in the Fraud Act 
2006, and mirror the definition adopted by the insurance industry in relation to the Insurance Fraud 
Register. They include:  
Any party seeking to obtain a benefit under the terms of any insurance-related product, service 
or activity who can be shown, on a balance of probabilities, through its actions, to have made or 
attempted to make a gain or induced or attempted to induce a loss by intentionally and dishonestly: 
• Making a false representation; and/or 
• Failing to disclose information; and/or 
• Having abused the relevant party's position.  
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In addition, one or more of the following outcomes has taken place which relates to the 
fraudulent act:  
• An insurance policy application has been refused; 
• An insurance policy or contract has been voided, terminated or cancelled; 
• A claim under an insurance policy has been repudiated; 
• A successful prosecution for fraud, the tort of deceit or contempt of court has been 
brought; 
• The relevant party has formally accepted his/her guilt in relation to the fraudulent 
act in question including, but not limited to, accepting a police caution; 
• An insurer has terminated a contract or  non-contracted relationship/recognition 
with a supplier or provider;  
• An insurer has attempted to stop/recover or refused a payment made in relation 
to a transaction; 
• An insurer has challenged or demonstrated that a change to standing policy data 
was made without the relevant customer’s authority. 
Also, the relevant party must have been notified that its claim has been repudiated, or relevant 
policy or contract voided, terminated, or cancelled, for reasons of fraud and/or it is in breach of the 
relevant terms and conditions relating to fraud within the relevant policy or contract” (ibid.).  
Bringing an insurance claim is rare for most innocent consumers and a challenging process that 
can be both daunting and stressful. Appreciating a matrix of conditions under which that claim can 
be categorised as either detected fraud or suspicious activity where the final test appears to be 
whether the policyholder gives up without a fight is an arbitrary basis upon which to determine 
dishonest conduct. In 2015, the Financial Ombudsman (2015) received 7,361 complaints against 
motor insurers, up from 5,784 recorded in 2011 and in May 2015  they reprimanded motor insurers 
for treating genuine mistakes as fraud and for not explaining clearly, and precisely, what they 
expected consumers to tell them when making a claim. The difference in understanding between 
an inexperienced and innocent motorist and the experienced claim handler is vast. Access to voice 
analysis software, risk scoring algorithms, industry fraud databases and counter fraud support to a 
claim-handler primed to look for evidence of suspicious activity can place policyholders at a 
significant psychological disadvantage.  Reported below is the experience of N4:   
“Hill Dickinson’s … came to demonstrate their Netfoil database. I thought it was unlikely to 
be helpful and so I told them to put me in their database and I came up as a red flag, high 
profile alert.  I said, “Jesus Christ, I’m a solicitor; what have I set myself up for here?”  
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It was because I had a wakeboard that was damaged by EasyJet, my son put a load of paint 
all over a carpet about five years before that and a lady went into the rear of me.  So, I’m 
on there, three times and you think: I can’t control the airline completely destroying a 
wakeboard in a bag but they input my data into a database without my knowledge; I’d 
forgotten about the paint claim - a couple of hundred quid after my excess, and a lady hit 
me in the rear.  How does that make me a high-profile risk?  
  
So now, if I have an accident or another claim then I am thinking am I going to come up on 
this thing?  Worse than that, I would never have thought to tell an insurer about these 
claims if asked about previous claims, not because I was failing to make an honest 
disclosure, simply because I had forgotten”. 
 
The Government reaction  
Lobbying 
Besides relying on estimates of the extent of insurance fraud and using the media to raise 
awareness, the ABI has also carried out a successful lobbying campaign. CH1 observed of the ABI 
that:  
“their annual subscription income is £25 million; they’re extremely well-funded, they’ve 
been around for decades, they’re well connected into government, and MPs know only one 
side of the story, about where insurance fits in the piece and are completely blind to the 
facts …” 
 
Commercial lobbying is ubiquitous in Britain, the third biggest market in the world after 
Washington and Brussels (Thompson & John, 2002, pp. 4–5). Cave and Rowell (2014, pp. 1–7) define 
the practice as “a serious hidden feature of British politics … thousands of people whose paid job it 
is to influence the decisions taken by our politicians without scrutiny...reframing a narrow 
commercial interest as synonymous with the national interest”. Lord Razzal, a politician of some 
forty years, said that “lobbying is absolutely fundamental to the way we legislate in the UK, right 
across the board … very often the way to get changes to proposed laws is simply to e-mail them 
over. Do politicians take any notice of the overtures of lobbyists? Absolutely; the government takes 
a ‘huge amount’ of notice.” (Policy Exchange, 2012).  
DAC Beachcroft (“DAC”) is a law firm that works with insurers, advertises its health advisory 
services and boasts of their unrivalled knowledge of the workings of Westminster with two former 
senior cabinet ministers employed. One of them, Conservative peer Lord Hunt of Wirral, led a 
debate on changes to the NHS in the House of Lords in 2012. While he declared his work for DAC, 
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campaigners insisted he should have gone further. Spinwatch12 said Hunt reminded his fellow peers 
during the debate that he was “a partner in the national commercial law firm - Beachcroft. However, 
he does not mention that Beachcroft also offers lobbying services to private healthcare companies” 
including the provision of “expert support for clients seeking access to key policy makers or 
developing campaigns to influence the development of regulation” (“NHS reforms D-day: 40 peers 
have ‘financial interest’ in NHS privatisation, Mirror investigation shows,” 2012). The media also 
allows lobbyists to focus their messaging to influence government, specifically to reinforce the 
impression that a narrow interest has the support of the majority (Zetter, 2011, p. 94). In fact, Zetter 
(ibid. p. 93) references an ABI lobbyist claiming, “a cabinet minister who reads a page lead – 
generated by your campaign – in the Financial Times over his breakfast cornflakes is more likely to 
give that campaign serious consideration.” Oborne (2008, p. 249) argued that politics and 
journalism have “effectively ceased to be separate disciplines” with journalists providing 
collaboration to politicians such that they do not now report political events in “a detached and 
fastidious way.”   
In theory, lobbying is benign; every citizen should have the ability to lobby their MP to ensure 
their views are heard. Commercial lobbying is, however, more problematic. Cave and Rowell (2014, 
p. 9) claim that commercial lobbyists acting for particular, narrow interests distort our system of 
government to such an extent that it no longer serves the interest of the wider public - “paid 
lobbyist are drowning out everything else as a corrupting force that undermines democracy.” In 
recognition, Cameron (2010) made a pledge “to sort it out”:  
“I’m talking about lobbying … we all know how it works. The lunches, the hospitality, the 
quiet word in your ear, the ex- ministers and ex-advisors for hire, helping big business find 
the right way to get its way. We don’t know who is meeting whom. We don’t know whether 
any favours are being exchanged. We don’t know which outside interests are wielding 
unhealthy influence. This isn’t a minor issue with minor consequences. I believe that secret 
corporate lobbying…goes to the heart of why people are so fed up with politics. It arouses 
people’s worst fears and suspicions about how our political system works, with money 
buying powers, power fishing for money and a cosy club at the top making decisions in their 
own interest … when it's open and transparent, when people know who is meeting who, for 
what reason and with what outcome, lobbying is perfectly reasonable [but] lobbying in this 
country is getting out of control.”  
 
                                                             
12 Spinwatch - (http://www.spinwatch.org/index.php/about/who-we-are.) 
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Despite his commitment, Cameron did nothing visible to challenge the influence of lobbyists, a 
hidden corrupting force the influence of which, according to John (2002, p. 52), increases “when it 
goes largely unnoticed by the public”.    
Policymakers and criminological expertise 
As the black art of lobbying was in its ascendancy, Haggerty (2004) saw the rigours of 
criminological expertise in the formulation of policy was increasingly regarded as less useful by 
policymakers in the transition from criminological theory to criminal justice policy. Today, newer 
approaches to policy making require broad consultations (Wheeldon & Heidt, 2007, p. 314). 
Brodeur (1999, p. 134) summarised the ‘not inconsequential’ changes: 
“Knowledge implies validity, whereas research has in itself no such implications research 
can either be good or bad). It is thus easier to marginalize its role in decision making than 
to play down the importance of knowledge. In addition to research, there were some 
thirteen other factors to be taken into account. A significant number of these factors were 
indicators of perceptions: public opinion polls, focus group findings, the opinion of various 
groups having a stake in the issue, petitions, and submissions. Other factors were 
expressions of various interests: pressure from private enterprise lobbies, from single issue 
coalitions and from various institutions such as the churches. There were finally the 
traditional economical and political considerations.” 
 
Haggerty (2004, pp. 211–215) recognised the decline in the long-standing relationship between 
criminal justice policy and the advice of criminologists to the rise of neo conservative policies in the 
US, Canada and the UK which allowed crime to be manipulated as a political issue and increased 
private sector involvement having changed the nature of the relationship between criminological 
theory and practice. Wheeldon and Heidt (2007, p. 314) argued that: 
“without a strong theoretical basis for and internal coherence within new criminological 
approaches, policy influence may be gained at the price of its integrity. While cooperation 
with the state is required to influence policy, the fear of theory co-optation by agencies of 
the state remains a significant concern.” 
Regulatory and legislative support for insurers 
In respect of motor insurance fraud, whether a by-product of the concerns articulated by 
Wheeldon and Heidt and/or lobbying activity aided by media coverage on the issues,13 the media 
discourse presented through the media has been in unsophisticated terms and highlighted a 
                                                             
13 see Chapter 6 
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situation in which the responses were “a central area for presentations by politicians” (Christie, 
2004, p. 38) in which regulatory support for the insurer agenda has been significant:  
• An investigation by the TSC into the cost of motor insurance and the incidence and cost of 
whiplash claims (Transport Committee, 2011a).  
• The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 outlawing referral fees 
for personal injury claims.  
• An OFT market study leading to a two-year Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) 
investigation into the private motor insurance market (Competition and Markets Authority, 
2014).   
• A review by the Claims Management Regulator (“CMR”) into Claim Management 
Companies and whiplash claims (Ministry of Justice, 2015).  
• Introduction of statutory requirement for Courts to dismiss claims for personal injury where 
fundamental dishonesty is established14.  
• Proposed legislation to increase the threshold at which costs are recoverable in injury 
claims effectively consigning innocent accident victims to be litigants in person. 
• Proposals to remove the right to any compensation for road accident induced whiplash 
(Rose, 2015). 
• A review into the control of claims for soft tissue injury by the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) 
(Milligan, 2016). 
•  The IFT review.  
The Insurance Fraud Task Force 
The IFT (2016, p. 15) intended “to investigate the causes of fraudulent behaviour and 
recommend solutions to reduce the level of insurance fraud in order to ultimately lower costs and 
protect the interests of honest consumers.” Reporting in January 2016, they highlighted a number 
of issues: 
• the propensity for insurance fraud to fund organised crime;  
• the tendency for fraudulent claims to clog the courts and deny access to justice for honest 
claimants;    
                                                             
14 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s57. 
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• the risk to consumers from orchestrated road accidents and the follow-on emergency 
service demands; 
• the impact on public services e.g. wasted GP appointments from bogus claimant’s 
validating an injury; 
• social nuisance from persistent cold callers persuading people to make or exaggerate a 
personal injury claim; 
• the frictional costs on businesses targeted by fraudsters; 
• that fraud is socially corrosive if society is forced to move from a trust to a verify model 
increasing frictional processes and cost for everybody. 
Not one of the 26 recommendations (ibid. p. 77) questioned the reliability of the data provided 
by insurers and nor was any common basis proposed on which the levels of detected and 
undetected motor insurance fraud could be defined, monitored or reported upon in the future. The 
absence of any base measurement, and the lack of any reliable indicators designed to assess the 
effectiveness of any implemented recommendations, falls foul of the rule that if you can’t measure 
it then you can’t manage it as well as ignoring the IFT’s resolve to consider “the potential long-term 
benefits against the potential long-term costs” when assessing the merits of any possible solutions 
(ibid. p.75). It also highlights the danger that any policy initiatives will not be curative of the 
perceived harm, a concern actually expressed by the ABI (2006, p. 1) as part of the Fraud Review in 
2006,  when they suggested that it would be optimal if priorities and resources were “based on an 
accurate assessment of the risk of, and harm caused by, fraud”.  
Uncertainty remains 
The concerns of an unquantified basis for reporting on insurance fraud were emphasised by 
the TSC many years after the Fraud Review  (Transport Committee, 2011c, p. 2): 
“the Government should act to ensure that there exists better data about fraudulent or 
exaggerated personal injury claims so that there is a stronger evidence base for policy 
decisions. Since the Government has cited the ABI’s figures for dishonest claims in 2013 it 
should explain how the figures have been arrived at and how dishonest claims have been 
defined.”  
 
The Government’s response was evasive but suggestive that policy makers were prepared to 
utilise unverified evidence on trust from an industry that would likely benefit financially from any 
policy changes (ibid.):  
“The Government does not centrally collect information on fraudulent or exaggerated 
personal injury claims and therefore may refer to data collected via industry sources. Such 
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figures have not been verified by the Government … The Committee has requested an 
explanation of the ABI data on the number of dishonest claims in 2013. This question is best 
answered by the industry … However, for clarification, the Government understands the 
process to be based on an ABI survey of its membership, which requests data in response to 
a list of scenarios in which it is believed fraud is likely to be involved.”  
 
Concerns were also raised in a parliamentary debate when Andy Slaughter MP (Hansard, 2015, 
p. 17) said:  
“We have to take action based on evidence, and we have to realise that there are many 
vested interests. Yes, the claims management companies have interests and we must be on 
guard against fraud, but we must also be aware of the interests of the insurance industry, 
which are not always at one with those of the motorist or consumer. It does not always 
follow that what the industry asks for is beneficial not just to victims or potential victims, 
but to motorists as a whole. I hope that we can crack down on fraud and relieve the 
consumer of the burden of calls—I get them myself on many issues—but I also hope that, 
on this as on other matters, we will bear in mind that the interests of victims and those with 
meritorious claims for personal injury should be respected.” 
  
Thompsons Solicitors (2014b) have been critical of the provenance of the ABI’s data especially 
to the extent that it appears to have influenced Government policy against the interests of 
consumers:  
“Everything we see suggests that the industry regularly puts out figures that are 
exaggerated or false to shore up the impression of a “fraud epidemic”. They do so to bolster 
government moves to restrict access to justice for injured people when policy must be based 
on reliable data.” 
 
The IFT didn’t provide the clarification that the TSC sought from government as to the 
provenance of ABI data although it wasn’t asked to do so. The IFT (HM Government, 2016, p. 15) 
commentary was limited to an unchallenged re-statement of the ABI claim: 
“The ABI has collated statistics from its members and estimates that the size of detected 
insurance claims fraud was £1.32 billion in 2014. Meanwhile, it has been estimated that the 
level of annual undetected insurance fraud is in the region of £2.1 billion.” 
 
These figures appear unreliable. £1.32 billion was the figure disclosed by the ABI (2015j) in July 
2015 for detected general insurance claim fraud of which £835 million was attributed to motor 
claims. The significance of the word detected was mentioned above in the section analysing the ABI 
Research Brief. The source of the £2.1 billion referenced by the IFT for undetected insurance fraud 
is harder to dissect. The IFT (2016, p. 15) attribute the figure to the ‘Annual Fraud Indicator’, 
National Fraud Authority, 2014’. The NFA closed in March 2014 and  the final AFI was published in 
June 2013 (National Fraud Authority, 2013).  The IFT may have intended to reference the 2013 
report and the 2014 reference in their footnote may have been a typographical error. If it was, then 
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the second error is that the £2.1 billion figure was not the result of research by the NFA but was in 
fact provided to the NFA by the ABI and the IFB. The footnote in the AFI (ibid. p. 39) states:  
“Based on figures provided by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the Insurance 
Fraud Bureau (IFB), insurance fraud is estimated to cost £2.1 billion a year. This estimate 
breaks down into £1.7 billion in hidden fraud loss, £392 million in organised ‘Crash for Cash’ 
fraud, and £39 million in identified insurance fraud (where claims are paid before they have 
been identified as fraudulent).”  
 
It will assist the reader if the figures (£2.1 billion, £1.7 billion, £392 million and £39 million) are 
kept in mind. 
I2, an IFB employee, clarified the composition of the £392 million reported by the IFB in respect 
of organised Crash for Cash (2013, p. 5), which matches the £392 million referenced in the AFI. On 
the others, he said: 
“The IFB don’t have detected and undetected numbers.  It’s not one of our KPIs.  It’s not one 
of our measurements in any way … we don’t have it as detected and undetected because 
we quite often don’t know.  We can see within our system what a fraudulent network looks 
like but we do not definitively know whether that claim has been paid or not.” 
 
In fact, the £392 million figure is not the amount of money lost by insurers as a result of paying 
out on fraudulent crash for cash claims. I2 explained that it is a software generated estimate based 
on what the IFB believe the size of the problem to be based on data within the system and 
calculated from an exercise last performed in 2012. He said: 
“The £392 million figure that we have was produced for a piece of work that we did in 2012.  
We’re currently working at the moment to work out how we annualise that figure and how 
we monitor it on an ongoing basis because having a figure that’s three years out of date is 
not the best.” 
 
He also confirmed a potential overlap with the figure reported by the ABI because the £392 
million IFB figure may contain incidents that have already been identified by the impacted insurers 
in data they provide separately to, and which is then consolidated by, the ABI. Based on data the 
NFA confirmed was supplied by the ABI and IFB, and removing the IFB estimate of £392 million from 
the total (ignoring any duplication on consolidation), it follows that the balancing figure of £1.7 
billion (£2.1 billion less £392 million) must have been disclosed to the NFA by the ABI, as must the 
figure of £39 million in respect of “identified insurance fraud (where claims are paid before they 
have been identified as fraudulent).” Missing is any corroboration of the incremental £1.32 billion 
figure reported by the IFT as the quantum of detected fraud. Further analysis of the ambiguity 
surrounding the data relied on by insurers is provided in Chapter 6. 
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Whatever the reality, a concept that appears elusive from the published data, the problem of 
insurance fraud, and of motor insurance fraud particularly, has resonated with government and 
demands a response. The early research by Clarke (1990) shows that insurance fraud is not a novel 
phenomenon; it has, perhaps, just come of age in a period when the motivation, means and 
opportunity have not previously been met by an appropriate and robust response. Whilst the 
commentary on the topic stretches back over thirty years however, the increased contemporary 
focus on the cost of insurance fraud has now generated the political and economic imperative to 
trigger a concerted, aggressive and apparently sustained and evolving response from government. 
One of those responses has been the creation of IFED, a police unit with the vision of altering “the 
misconception that it is acceptable to commit insurance fraud by bringing offenders to justice and 
confiscating their assets” (City of London Police, 2012). It is an example of the vision of partnership 
put forward by Levi et al. (Michael Levi, Burrows, Fleming, & Hopkins, 2007) and, in the next 
chapter, the implications and benefits of such a public-private police-partnership will be 
considered. 
Conclusions  
This chapter explored the history and typology of the offence of insurance fraud, reviewed 
relevant literature and explored how insurers have quantified the problem. It also examined the 
reliability of the only publically available empirical research on the subject, the ABI Research Brief. 
The insurance industry’s apparent vulnerability to incursion, their success in influencing policy 
making, the role of the lobbyist and the media were also introduced and the motivation for the 
messaging was considered against a strategy which allowed insurers to raise premiums with relative 
impunity during a recession and then, in later years, to release reserves, recognise increased profits 
and make significant dividend payments to shareholders. The reaction from government was 
assessed, particularly through the investigative and regulatory instruments at their disposal, in 
respect of policy making and formulation of criminal and civil justice policy.  Opinions from 
stakeholders in, or adjacent to, the insurance market were considered with criticism of the 
reliability of the data on which change was being proposed from parliamentarians, solicitors and 
some elements of the media. The chapter also introduced the recent contribution of the IFT which 
recommended a variety of initiatives to address the incidence and impact of insurance fraud 
between 2016 and 2019 but also noted the absence of any robust empirical analysis by them for 
assessing the cost, benefit or impact on insurers, consumers or society from the panoply of 
recommendations made.  
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Chapter 3 The Police 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a framework for discussions about whether a private police force funded 
by insurers acts to the detriment of non-insurer victims of fraud. Whilst uniform patrolling is the 
visible face of policing, criminal investigations involve the assistance of detectives who accept 
responsibility for investigating reported crimes who will, typically, formulate a theory about who 
committed the crime and then set about building the case to support an arrest and prosecution. 
James (2011, p. 14) highlighted how “members of the detective force shared the conviction that 
unlike the uniform branch they were dealing with ‘real’ crime” but perhaps the most demanding 
part of a detective’s job is developing expertise in the legal requirement for collecting and reporting 
on evidence to understand how the prosecutor will use that evidence and the challenges it will face 
in court. One experienced detective chief inspector said, perhaps prophetically, and over thirty 
years before IFED was conceived, “criminal investigation work is the sort of work any good 
Prudential insurance man could do” (Mclure, 1981) raising the question of whether an insurer-
funded police force was necessary at all.  
The chapter also considers the history and evolution of the police and reviews the literature 
considering whether yesterday’s model of policing is economically, politically or practically 
sustainable and, assuming it isn’t, what that means for the police monopoly. It also addresses the 
history, nature and increasing occurrences of privately-funded public-policing. The Government’s 
involvement in issues of responsibilisation, growth in private security and multi lateralisation in the 
face of economic under-funding of the police generally are also considered, as are the implications 
for victims. A high-level assessment of IFED, in the context of other privately funded policing models 
such as the BTP, Civil Nuclear Constabulary (“CNC”), the Ports Police Force and the DCPCU is 
provided and the essence of those entities is contrasted with IFED’s funding and operational 
relationship with insurers. The concept of a method for assessing privately-funded public-police 
initiatives is introduced but the chapter leads with a discussion of the state of policing in the current 
day with assessments from Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (“HMIC”) (2016, 2017) 
depicting the evolving political drivers behind policy and reporting.  
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Policing today 
HMIC (2016, p. 6) reported that “crime is ever-changing at local, national and international 
levels as criminals have adapted to and embraced the technological advances of the 20th and 21st 
centuries’ with technology allowing offenders to plan and organise themselves in ways which were 
unthinkable even 25 years ago”. The impact and inertia created by motivated dishonest individuals 
is an impediment to chief officers trying not to operate in a reactive paradigm. The intensive 
resource need for investigating offences as diverse as child sex exploitation to terrorism all impact 
the agenda for police priorities in a service that has had to cope with less money to undertake more 
complex and challenging work.  
M2 provided a helpful cameo:  
“the chiefs say budgets are tight; we need bobbies on the beat. We’ve got problems with 
domestic violence and the real problem at the moment is paedophilia and grooming rings. 
I spoke to one chief officer and he asked me: ‘how many paedophiles do you think we have 
on our books that we have to watch? ... it was 1,800; nobody understands the extent of the 
pressures forces are under.”   
 
In an interview with Bernard Hogan-Howe, then Chief Constable of Merseyside, M2 recalls 
being interrupted by him: 
“Bernard, fraud, really important … He said, ‘don’t bother me with your frauds’, these are 
his exact words. ‘I’ve got guns, knives, drugs, youngsters trying to kill each other … which of 
those things shall I drop to deal with your frauds?’ It’s tricky, isn’t it? What do you say?” 
 
More recently, pressures have increased. HMIC (ibid. p. 14) reports that between 2010 and 
2015, “central government funding for the police service in England and Wales has fallen by £1.7 
billion or 19% in cash terms and overall gross revenue expenditure for the police has fallen by 18% 
in cash terms”. Between 2010 and 2016, the police workforce has reduced by 18% (Her Majesty’s 
Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2017, p. 13) with the number of police officers reportedly at the 
lowest level in 30 years (Smith, 2017). Perhaps because of the disparate but continual challenges, 
HMIC (2016, p. 17) issued a curious admonishment that “the prevention of crime is the responsibility 
of every citizen; the police are engaged by the community to give their full attention to it, but it is 
everyone’s business”.  
Between 2010/11 and 2014/15, measured crime fell by 28% (Office for National Statistics, 
2015a). Over the same period, the number of police ofﬁcers reduced by 9% with police staff falling 
by 14%  (Home Office, 2015a). HMIC claimed in 2016 that continuing falls in measured crime, 
reported in the CSEW for the year ending March 2015, had helped the police service to cope with 
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reduced budgets although that analysis appears less convincing when later figures revealed that 
there was a 6% increase in police recorded crime in the year ending September 2015 although 
possibly a rise “following improved compliance with national recording standards by police forces” 
(Office for National Statistics, 2015b, sec. 1).  
In 2017, the consequence of policies implemented by successive governments since 2009 made 
for uncomfortable reading. The ONS (2017, p. 6) reported the largest annual rise for police recorded 
crime in a decade (Travis, 2017) albeit explicit comparing their report and the CSEW remarking 
“police recorded crime data are not designated as national statistics”. Reliable information on 
which to support policy or decision-making by government or chief officers is challenging as 
certainty about what is being measured evolves. The 2016 CSEW (Office for National Statistics, 
2016, p. 7) attributed an estimated 7% increase in offences in the year to “improvements in crime-
recording practices and processes by the police and an increase in the willingness of victims to come 
forward and report offences” (ibid. p.18). Only the number of bicycle thefts showed a downward 
trend reducing by 27% to 291,000 in the year to March 2016 (ibid. p. 10) and to 94,487 in the year 
to March 2017 (Office for National Statistics, 2017, p. 21), something P1 attributed to Mayor Boris 
Johnson’s prioritisation of cycle theft and it becoming an objective for the Metropolitan Police Safer 
Transport Team.  
Recently, the CSEW (Office for National Statistics, 2017, p. 2) reported a 7% reduction in the 
number of estimated offences excluding the statistics on fraud and computer misuse attributing 
the disparity between the CSEW report and the 10% increase in police recorded offences to “a 
range of factors, which vary by crime type, including continuing improvements to recording 
processes and practices, expanded offence coverage and also genuine increases in some crime 
types”. Neither the CSEW, nor the most recent HMIC reports, address adequately the police 
approach to investigating and prosecuting fraud. Historically, the CSEW had excluded fraud from 
its headline estimates although questions were added to the survey in 2015 and estimates derived 
from fraud and computer misuse offences, excluding business related fraud, were reported 
experimentally for the first time in 2016 (Office for National Statistics, 2016, p. 6). The estimate 
then was of 5.6 million such offences between October 2015 and June 201615 and confirmation of 
a 5% increase in the annual number of fraud offences recorded in England and Wales (up to 
627,825) due largely to the number of offences referred by CIFAS, which increased by 16%. In its 
                                                             
15 Total fraud offences cover crimes recorded by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau via Action Fraud, CIFAS and 
Financial Fraud Action UK. Action Fraud record fraud offences on behalf of individual police forces. Data is from Table A5 
of the CSEW 2016 dataset. 
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subsequent survey (Office for National Statistics, 2017, p. 3), CSEW reported an estimate of 5.2 
million fraud and computer misuse offences for the year caveating that it was too early to 
determine if that figure reflected a genuine reduction when CIFAS reported an increase in fraud 
offences to 649,770 offences (ibid. p. 21), albeit noting a fall in “insurance fraud” of 20%, with the 
total offences recorded by the NFIB at just 8,059 offences (ibid. p. 46).    
Button and Tunley (2015, p. 49) argue that “fraud is one of, if not the most costly crimes to the 
United Kingdom … yet the response to it from the government and the criminal justice system, bar 
the exception of benefits fraud, has not matched the magnitude of the problem”. The word fraud 
appears just once in the HMIC 2015 report (2016, p. 76) in a table analysing how forces deal with 
referrals from the NFIB for digital crime and three times in the most recent report (2017, p. 19, 26 
and 53) in the context of the police response to online crime. 
Whilst HMIC are engaged in reviewing the performance of the police service against strategic 
priorities they rely upon the existence of a police and crime plan, issued by the PCC for each police 
area, which sets out, inter alia:  
• the police and crime objectives;  
• the policing which the chief constable is to provide;  
• the available ﬁnancial and other resources; and  
• how the chief constable’s performance will be measured.  
The Chief Constable must have regard to the police and crime plan in exercising his functions, 
perhaps even more so because they are provided for by parliament, have a legislative and 
democratic basis and represent the principal priorities of local people for whose protection the 
police exist; they carry considerable weight (Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2016, 
p. 31). Of thirty police and crime plans reviewed from 2015, fraud featured rarely, the exception 
being for the CLP, the national police lead on economic crime. 
In addition to the local focus from PCCs, the Home Secretary is obliged16 to issue a Strategic 
Policing Requirement (“SPR”). First issued in July 2012, and updated in March 2015 (Home Office, 
2015b), PCCs and Chief Constables are required to have regard to the SPR which sets out the Home 
Secretary’s view of the national threats the police must address and the appropriate national 
policing capabilities that are required to counter those threats. Key threats include terrorism, 
                                                             
16 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 s77 
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serious and organised crime (obliquely referencing fraud), child sexual abuse or exploitation, public 
disorder, civil emergencies and cyber threats (ibid. pp.7-8). 
Managing police performance 
HMIC has evolved its annual assessment of police forces to include a review of “their 
effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy and are judged on these categories (or pillars) based on 
inspection findings, analysis and the Inspectors of Constabulary’s’ professional judgment across the 
year.” Operating under the acronym PEEL (2014a, p. 4), it is interesting that HMIC still references, 
albeit inferentially,  the founding principles as part of the commitment of the police in current 
times. Indeed the Government (Home Office, 2012) still claims those Peelian principles to be as 
relevant today as they were when drafted,  representing, as they still quote, a philosophy of policing 
“unique in history and throughout the world because it derived not from fear but almost exclusively 
from public co-operation with the police, induced by them designedly by behaviour which secures 
and maintains for them the approval, respect and affection of the public” (Reith, 1956). There are 
nine principles (Peel, 1829), two of which are noteworthy because of their potential conflict with 
the right of public access to what is now, with the creation of IFED, a privately-funded police 
gatekeeper. They are, (emphasis added):  
“5). The police seek and preserve public favour, not by catering to public opinion, but by 
constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to the law, in complete 
independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of 
individual laws; by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the 
public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and 
friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and 
preserving life.  
 
7). The police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to 
the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police 
being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which 
are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare.”  
  
They also merit mention because of conflicting comments in two recent HMIC reports. The first 
addressed the Government’s 2010 budget review requiring police forces in England and Wales to 
deliver £2.5 billion of savings between 2010-2014. HMIC (2014b, p. 33) found it impressive that 
whilst protecting their “front line crime-fighting capacity as best they can” they “re-organised 
themselves to be more efficient and continued to provide an effective service to the public”. The 
second report (2014a, p. 147), however, highlighted the disparity of service provision across police 
forces and, specifically and incongruously in light of the earlier comment, expressed concern that 
criminal damage and car crime were on the verge of being decriminalised because forces had 
  
 
72 
"almost given up” even though “the investigation and detection of crime is core business for the 
police”. More recently, faced with having to save £400 million from their budget by 2020, on top of 
£600 million saved in the previous four years, the MET issued a Crime Assessment Policy  (The Crime 
Prevention Website, 2017) in October 2017 empowering police officers to decide whether to 
investigate a lower level crime e.g. shoplifting, car crime, criminal damage, some minor assaults 
and some burglary and theft offences where the value of the crime was less than £50. 
Private policing and ‘responsibilisation’ 
The police remain a comforting and familiar feature of modern life. Bittner (1974, p. 30) saw 
their key purpose being “to stop something that ought not to be happening and about which 
someone had better do something now”. Underneath that broad statement sits a more diverse 
portfolio of responsibilities including:  
• fighting crime (Manning, 1978, pp. 7–32);  
• maintaining order and keeping the peace (Kelling & Moore, 1988; James Wilson, 1978); 
• delivering a public service (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994, pp. 3–23);  
• solving wide ranging societal problems (Eck & Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1979, 1990; 
Kelling & Moore, 1988); 
• enforcing the law for victims (Bittner Egon, 1970, 1974; Muir, 1977); and  
• being uniquely placed and authorised to employ force “to compel specific responses 
from citizens” (Klahm & Tillyer, 2010, p. 215).   
According to Miller (1977, p. 81), the Police are “the most conspicuous representatives of the 
political and social order” or as Reiner (2010, p. 3) claims “a body of people patrolling a public place 
in blue uniforms with a broad mandate of crime control, order maintenance, and some negotiable 
service functions”.	Jones and Newburn (1998, pp. 18–19) defined policing as an activity that has 
been widely adopted and pertaining to “those organised forms of order-maintenance, 
peacekeeping, rule or law enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of 
investigation and information-brokering”. Whilst the image of the police is synonymous with the 
modern state, an important criminological debate about the extent and nature of contemporary 
changes in the delivery, practice and orientation of policing is underway and significant shifts have 
already occurred in public policing accompanied by a substantial expansion in private sector 
security services (Braithwaite, 2000; Garland, 2001; Johnston, 2000; Shearing, 2001). Zedner (2006, 
p. 81) believes that it is increasingly likely that the current model of the police “may come to be 
seen as a historical blip in a more enduring schema of policing as an array of activities undertaken 
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by multiple private and public agencies, and individual and communal endeavours”. Reiner (2010, 
p. 3) cites Shearing and associates as the main exemplar of theoretical perspectives on policing with 
his argument for a complete paradigm shift, from ‘policing’ to ‘security governance’ and Button and 
Brooks (2016, p. 211) contend that, when privatisation and responsibilisation are so high on the 
agenda, the insurance sector makes for an interesting case study.  
The interplay between public and private policing has generated a significant volume of 
literature from leading criminologists (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Benson, 1994; Braithwaite, 2000; 
Button, 2002; Gans, 2000; Garland, 1996; Grabosky, 2007; Hope, 2001; Johnston, 1992; Jones & 
Newburn, 2002; Levi & Maguire, 2012; Loader & Walker, 2001; O’Malley & Hutchinson, 2007; 
Reiner, 2010; Rigakos & Greener, 2000; Spitzer & Scull, 1977; Swanton, 1993; Zedner, 2006) and 
most currently accepted theoretical generalisations on the state of British policing conclude that 
there is an innovative and on-going blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private 
sectors (Williams, 2008, p. 190). Bayley and Shearing (2001, p. 1) noted that, in most democratic 
states, private-police outnumber public-police and most citizens spend more time in locations 
where visible crime prevention and control are provided by non-governmental groups rather than 
by the public-police. They also offer a convenient and concise perspective on the potential direction 
of travel (ibid. p.1):  
“Policing is being transformed and restructured in the modern world. This involves much 
more than reforming the institution regarded as the police, although that is occurring as 
well. The key to the transformation is that policing, meaning the activity of making societies 
safe, is no longer carried out exclusively by governments. Indeed, it is an open question as 
to whether governments are even the primary providers. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, 
policing has been “multilateralised”: a host of non-governmental groups have assumed 
responsibility for their own protection, and a host of non-governmental agencies have 
undertaken to provide security services.”  
 
This transformation has involved several threads increasingly rooted in the assessment of 
performance against cost and the optimal allocation of limited resources.  
Lessons from history 
Policing before the 18th century was in the hands of the community enabled through the 
medieval institutions of hue and cry and ‘possee comitatus’ or unpaid watchmen. In England, 
policing remained largely in private hands until the early 19th century when Spitzer and Scull  (1977, 
p. 19) referred to a point where “personal needs and interest began to take the place of ‘public 
spirit’ as the mainspring of social control”. Policing had the character of a contract negotiated 
between victims who sought protective, investigative or enforcement services and independent 
agents who were willing to supply those services for a fee or reward, not too far removed from the 
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ABI’s current funding of IFED. Between 1825 and 1975, Williams (1998, p. 190) charts a shift in the 
gathering of police functions into a period he claims Zedner described as “the period of the criminal 
justice state when the state’s claim to the monopoly of force was exercised through the new police”. 
Williams questions the portrayal of this new era as one of an impermeable public-sector monopoly 
by highlighting certain practices including the payment of rewards to members of ‘new police 
forces’, from both prosecution and trade associations, such as the Birmingham Jewellers 
Association. He also pointed to the existence of police forces solely under the control of companies 
including those policing the railways and ports. Zedner (2006, p. 26) offers a retrospective 
comparison between the emerging trends in modern day policing and the similarities with practices 
in the late 18th century. Spitzer and Scull (1977, p. 19) offered a similar perspective on the trend 
towards privatisation and the parallels with historical policing for profit initiatives and Bayley and 
Shearing (2001, p. 2) concurred whilst insisting that the restructuring taking place today is following 
a different form because contemporary societies are organised differently. 
The deployment of public-police resources to private entities was termed ‘additional 
constables’ in the 19th century, and then as ‘special policing duties’ in the 20th. Williams (2008, p. 
191) asserts that private payments to public police forces are something that never went away. He 
recounts that, in the 19th century, private payments appear to have been for long-term 
secondments, often for protecting property, whilst in the 20th, the characteristic practice 
increasingly involved large numbers of officers, for a short time, securing public order. There was 
never a time when British police were not for hire “to anyone acceptable who could pay.” He cites 
Lansdowne who said that, in 1870, Scotland Yard’s detectives might be sent from London “on the 
application of any individual in the country who chose to carry the cost” in the UK “or even out of 
it”. Williams (ibid. p. 201) recounts that the deployment for special policing duties fell out of use in 
the 1950s because of a shift from the protection of property to the maintenance of public order 
and most special policing duties were accounted for through the detachment of officers to duties 
at football matches, festivals, and other public events. He offers evidence of one long-term contract 
which the police were keen to exit. In 1959, per documents retrieved from the national archive, the 
Chief Constable of Durham approached the Home Office with a request to terminate the 
arrangement “under which members of the county force are in fact employed by ICI and paid for 
this purpose”. The Home Office refused, pointing out that it was the Chief Constable’s responsibility 
to manage the arrangement (ibid. p. 200). At a private security industry seminar in 1971, senior 
police officers expressed a negative view of payment for services because, “if industry or the 
individual were required to pay directly, they would want to have some say in the operation of the 
police within their domain and it is unlikely that Mr Palfrey [Chief Constable of Lancashire] or any 
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other like-minded Chief Constable would be willing to accept this. The Chief Constable might also be 
faced with the dilemma of deciding to whom to give protection those who could pay or those who 
could not”. Some of the tensions evident today appear to have a precedent. Viewed from a different 
perspective, one focused on the perception of justice and the requirement for integrity from those 
entrusted with the responsibility to bring suspects before the court, a 2005 Court of Appeal decision 
helps distinguish the argument about funding the public-police to one beyond the economics of 
payment for security resources (Wilson & Hernstein, 1985, p. 8). R v Hounsham & Ors [2005] EWCA 
Crim 1366 involved a case where three insurers had paid sums to the Hampshire Police Force to 
fund the arrest stage of a fraud investigation. The Court held:  
“… in our judgment, soliciting by the police of funds from potential victims of fraud, or any 
other crime, quite apart from being ultra vires police powers, is a practice which is fraught 
with danger. It may compromise the essential independence and objectivity of the police 
when carrying out a criminal investigation. It might lead to police officers being selective as 
to which crimes to investigate and which not to investigate. It might lead to victims 
persuading a police investigating team to act partially. It might also lead to investigating 
officers carrying out a more thorough preparation of the evidence in a case of a "paying" 
victim; or a less careful preparation of the evidence in the case of a non-contributing victim. 
In short, it is a practice which, in our judgment, would soon lead to a loss of confidence in a 
police force's ability to investigate crime objectively and impartially.” 
    
Gans (2000) explored the legal framework of privately-funded public-policing observing it was 
an area generally neglected in the literature other than through a focus on the administrative issues 
by Reiss in 1987 and a report critical of the law, by Weatherill, in 1988 (ibid. p 204). Gans identified 
that guidance had only been given by the courts on the question of the legality of privately-paid 
public-policing on a handful of occasions (ibid. p. 185) citing a decision in Glasbrook Brothers Ltd. V 
Glamorgan County Council [1924] 1 KB 879; [1924] 1 All ER 579 holding that the police could decide 
whether they might charge for a service based upon the discretion of the senior police officer if he 
believed those services were additional to those justified in the circumstances. Gans claims 
Weatherill regarded the difficulties of defining the duties of the police as a barrier to the fairness 
of privately-paid public policing and cites Weatherill as having reported that, in 1964, “without any 
parliamentary debate” the Police Act 1964 was amended such that:  
“the chief officer of police of any police force may provide, at the request of any person, 
special police services at any premises or in any locality in the police area for which the force 
is maintained, subject to the payment to the police authority of charges on such scales as 
may be determined by that authority.”	
 
Because this provision was enacted, both common law and legislation are permissive of the 
right of the police to charge for special police services. There is, however, no legislated definition 
of what ‘special police services’ include and the provision of those services is restricted to the 
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‘locality of the police area’ in any event. Johnston (1992, pp. 64–70) expressed concern that the 
lure of “paying customers” might corrupt the public ethic as the police might hone and market their 
services to those capable of paying for them. He accepted, however, that fragmented, diverse, 
networked policing is here to stay but that the challenges involve those of democratic governance 
including, but not limited to, the basis on which victims might be able to seek a fair share or voice 
their concerns about changes that impact upon the quality of their lives (2000, p. 324). This is one 
of the issues considered in this thesis. 
Victims, victimhood and social order  
It was the Government’s adoption of the crime/victim survey in the 1980s that elevated the 
role of victims. These surveys tend to have focused on persons rather than business although there 
were crime surveys covering corporate victims in 1994, 2002 and in 2012 to 2015 (Home Office, 
2017; Hopkins, 2016; Mirlees-Black & Ross, 1995) predominantly addressing the retail sector. 
Goodey (2005, p. 2) identified that these surveys helped quantify and define the nature of crime 
beyond police statistics allowing the Government to claim it was “doing something about it” 
although that was more of an administrative achievement than a victory for victims:  
“In an age where increasing importance was given to meeting service standards for 
consumers of public services, customer satisfaction became a driving force in both rhetoric 
and practical actions [and crime surveys] commonplace barometers of victim services.”  
 
Research on victims of crime has increased over the last 20 years (Button, Wakefield, Brooks, 
Lewis, & Shepherd, 2015; Hopkins, 2016; Kury, Redo, & Shea, 2016) together with an increasing 
focus by policy-makers on their needs (Goodey, 2005; Spalek & Campling, 2006; Walklate, 2017). 
The EU Victims’ Directive 2012/29/EU was adopted by the UK in 2012 to promote improved 
standards on the entitlements, support and protection available to victims of crime. A number of 
victim-centric outcomes have all followed an impetus to give “space to the victim’s voice” (Walklate, 
2017, p. 191) including:  
• restorative justice and restorative sentencing (Roberts & Stalans, 2004);  
• re-orienting the work of criminal justice professionals (Mawby, 2007);  
• improving the experience for victims appearing in court with special support for 
vulnerable victims (Fairclough & Jones, 2017); and  
• reparation and compensation for criminal injuries (Miers, 2007).  
Corporate victims are generally excluded from victim-oriented policies like the state 
compensation scheme or those offering assistance to victims and witnesses in court even though 
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cases directed against businesses have an impact on the people who work within them and who 
have to deal with the consequences (Dignan, 2005). Businesses are also outside the definition of a 
victim in the EU Victims’ Directive and research relating to organisations as victims is less prolific 
with more emphasis focused on organisations as offenders (Braithwaite, 1984; Croall, 2007; Snell 
& Tombs, 2011; Whyte, 2015). But organisations can be victims and losses sustained through fraud 
evidence how commercial victimhood can occur. Doig and MacAuley (2008, p. 185) noted the 
creation of the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”), in 1986, to provide a lead for law enforcement 
resources investigating serious fraud at a time when “lesser frauds were not being investigated” 
something Levi (2013, p. 282) argued was “shifting the economic burden of crime investigation onto 
victims”  when public organisations had traditionally devoted resources to dealing with fraud, large 
or small, without police involvement. Clarke (1990, p. 18) anticipated that the state was unlikely to 
offer any assistance with privatisation, a “part of the ruling ideology”, leaving police forces to 
concentrate on conventional crimes. By 1996, a Home Office commissioned report (Morgan, 
McCulloch, & Burrows, 1996) suggested that the police stop investigating frauds which did not 
directly harm the general public, a view shared by Clarke and Wheeler (1990) who felt that, where 
big business were the victim of larger frauds, investigations should be dealt with by the victim since 
they involve a different set of relationships between offenders and victims with less obvious direct 
harm or “blood on the streets”. Twenty years later, addressing the plight of individuals rather than 
corporate entities, Walklate’s (2017, p. 190) observation that ‘victims are not free to buy the service 
they would prefer but are subject to that service considered appropriate for them” resonates for 
either class of victim. Nonetheless, the subject of commercial victimisation remains on the 
periphery of mainstream victimology (Maguire, 2012, pp. 208–244). While governments have to be 
seen to act so as to protect businesses and whilst trade bodies generally strive to support the 
economic interests of their members (Burrows & Hopkins, 2005) it is arguable that the limits of 
academic research about commercial victimisation is a result of businesses  being regarded as 
undeserving and without the capacity for true victim status (Hopkins, 2016, p. 162). Croall (2007) 
distinguished between deserving and undeserving victims of crime as an issue that impacts both 
individual and corporate victims  citing Levi (1999), for example, who compares a wealthy investor 
who can be blamed for making risky investments as less deserving than older people victimized 
through pensions frauds. Christie (2004, p. 18) defines the “ideal victim” as “a person or category 
of individual who when hit by crime most readily is given the complete and legitimate status of being 
a victim”, the hypothetical ‘little old lady’, and argues the ideal victim:  
• should be weak;  
• carrying out a respectable project;  
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• are not to be blamed;  
• have been victimised by a big/bad offender;  
• the offender is unknown; and  
• the victim is powerful enough to make his or her case known without threatening 
strong countervailing vested interests. 
Arguing that businesses could ever qualify as ideal victims when academics have often cast 
them as offenders is challenging, especially when they are usually economically active and 
demonstrably capable of ensuring their own security needs (Burrows & Hopkins, 2005). However, 
the notion of victimhood has been reconstructed according to Green (2007, p. 452) as businesses 
have argued “that a crime against business is a crime against all of us” highlighting the negative 
effects of crime against society emphasising the wider social impacts, for example, by suggesting 
that shoplifting increase the price of retail goods or insurance fraud has the same impact on 
insurance premiums (ABI, 2011c). Whyte (2007) recognises a view from some that businesses have 
attained sympathy in government policy discussions by characterising themselves as a “victimised 
business” by reference to the economic losses they face. Green (2007, p. 453) argues this has 
inspired a movement against business-crime, responsibilisation perhaps, on an unprecedented 
scale through the proliferation of government-business partnership. Hopkins (2016, p. 162) 
disagrees and feels that merely identifying that businesses suffer from high rates of victimisation 
does not automatically mean they should be considered as ideal or deserving victims and that there 
is support for a contention that by positioning themselves as they have, business has contributed 
to a more generalised hegemonic notion of victimhood where large corporate entities might 
ideologically re-position themselves as “always the victim and never the victimisers” (Sim, 2004). 
Whilst Sim was addressing the State as victim, the corporate analogue is distinctly possible when 
as Coleman (2004) claims “the clamour for more public-private sector resources to be diverted 
towards crime control grows, corporations are progressively empowered to dominate the law and 
order debate” and influence what should and should not be policed. It also brings into focus the 
plight of other victims less able to influence the direction of government policy. Garland (2001, p. 
98), for example, highlighted how an historic solidarity with the victims of social and economic 
dislocation is giving way to a “condemnatory view of claimants, many of whom are now viewed as 
members of a culturally distinct and socially threatening ‘underclass’, in which all of the pathologies 
of late modern life are concentrated”. Linking this research to the direction of policing, Whyte 
(2015) argued that the act of policing is one that not only promotes order but also reproduces the 
boundaries of what can, and should, be policed. As Neocleous (2003) identified, policing fabricates 
the social order. At its simplest, as Spitzer (1993) claims, it minimises any disturbance to the 
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capitalist corporate regimes of production and consumption as part of the complex political 
economy of control  tending to sustain, rather than undermine, the dominant role of the 
corporation in the hierarchy. At its most complex is the question of victimhood and the adherence 
to the Peelian principles. Whyte (2015) maintains that where the social order is fabricated to 
protect corporate interests that it is rare to see obvious forms of collusion between police forces 
and corporations because no criminal justice system could legitimately claim to be consistent and 
impartial were the articulation of private interest through policing to be obvious. History may tell a 
different story.  
The emergence of private security providers 
The era of the ‘criminal justice state’ needs to be considered as a period of evolution (Johnston, 
1992) although Zedner (2006, pp. 86–87) felt that contemporary trends in policing did not signal a 
departure from historical practice with the arrival of a new epoch but more of a parallel to previous 
historical practices.  She argued government, with an increasing sense of realism, has conceded 
that commercial policing increasingly satisfies a need they can no longer sustain. The assumption 
that taxation could provide a base to sustain the level of policing society demands is now challenged 
and, in parallel with a protracted period of conservative political dominance, has driven a desire to 
distribute the burden of policing responsibilities. Even before the start of the 2008 recession, 
Johnston (2003, p. 202) felt the police had capitulated to private security providers helping to meet 
public and corporate demands for protection not capable of being satisfied under conditions of 
fiscal restraint. Support comes from what Rigakos and Greener (2000, p. 183)  report as a 
revolutionary speech when, in 1998, as Chief Constable of Surrey Police, Ian Blair addressed the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (“ACPO”) and confirmed that the tide of privatisation was 
underway and “… within ten years, it is possible that a substantial proportion of the police function 
may be absorbed by other local authorities and by an unregulated private sector.”  
Privatisation and pluralisation 
One argument for reducing the role of the state is that the private sector is more efficient, an 
argument not restricted to the UK. Murphy (2004, p. 1) studied the Canadian police and reported: 
“another period of transition characterised by growing political pressure for greater fiscal 
and operational accountability demanding costs are cut, efficiency and productivity 
improved to deliver ‘value for money’”  
 
This drive for more efficient private-sector services has been part of a growing trend although 
the sustainability of the initiatives, or the metric by which ‘value for money’ is assessed  may have 
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been compromised with a trend of recent failures in the UK outsourcing model pioneered in Britain 
by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. The country has since been the leader in Europe, and second 
only to the United States globally, in its use of companies such as Carillion, G4S, Serco and Capita 
to provide essential services because successive governments of different parties have argued that 
private companies are more efficient at running services and that the outsourcing system allowed 
infrastructure investments to be made without adding considerably to the state’s debts. Carillion’s 
collapse, with debts approaching £1.5 billion, has ignited a row over the system of outsourcing 
public services to competing private companies reliant on government work for a large part of their 
income. (Holton, Pal, & Leary, 2018).  For example, Police forces are failing to meet standards for 
forensic science, making miscarriages of justice inevitable, the government’s forensic regulator has 
said, highlighting her growing concerns about the failure of some forensic firms used by the police 
to meet basic quality standards with the routine outsourcing of criminal forensic work to 
unaccredited laboratories. Some laboratories are not subject to independent oversight making it 
possible that innocent people could be wrongly convicted and offenders escaping justice (Devlin & 
Dodd, 2018). 
 Grabosky (1996, p. 5)  envisioned that law enforcement would re-define itself to monitor “the 
overall crime control system, broadly defined” and would engage in fine tuning – “manipulating 
incentives, accrediting private competencies, and auditing third party performance in order to 
facilitate the constructive contributions of non-government interests.” He thought that traditional 
law enforcement agencies would become less prominent on centre stage whilst remaining 
authoritative and ‘unobtrusively influential’ from a position off-stage but set out the risks that he 
anticipated from the trend towards pluralisation:   
• Accountability - the greatest risk in devolving law enforcement functions to private 
interests.  
• Market failure – under-supply or excessive price demands leading to distributional 
asymmetry where governments rely on market mechanisms as the solution. 
• Gatekeeper failure – private service provider become susceptible to, or financially 
dependent upon, a continuing engagement, distorting the purity of the service provision or 
leading to a conflict of interest. 
• Erosion of civic commitment - a risk that a sense of public duty or civic obligation will be 
lost and that cultural values will regress to a society of mercenaries as citizens witnessed in 
the eighteenth century, and  
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• Lack of policy coherence – relying on decentralised and independent interests may 
precipitate an imbalance in enforcement activity.  
Bayley and Shearing (1996, p. 585) saw the evolving systems of crime control characterised by 
the pluralising of policing:  
“the state’s monopoly has been broken by the creation of a host of both private and 
community-based agencies that prevent crime, deter criminality, catch law-breakers, 
investigate offences, and stop conflict” 
 
 Jones and Newburn (2002, p. 142) questioned the certainty of that perspective levelling 
criticism at the extent to which the degree of change is exaggerated and the level of continuity in 
any transformation is underplayed but do recognise, at least in the UK, that a broader social 
transformation is underway and that privatisation is part of the change.   
Privatisation 
Privatisation, at its simplest, replacing public sector workers with identical private sector 
workers (Donahue, 1988, p. 64), is central to the way the police have reacted to economic and 
organisational challenges and a shrinking of the state.  In the process of ‘load shedding’ and 
‘contracting out’, functions including touchline security for football matches, responding to 
intruder alarms, policing private shopping centres or escorting cash in transit have been abandoned 
by the police and, in the case of certain other tasks previously regarded as core, such as prisoner 
transport, court security, forensic investigation and even some of the work in managing custody 
facilities, dealing with enquiries in police stations and investigating crime, responsibility is retained 
but the services have been contracted out. Button and Johnston (2011, p. 64) go further, 
highlighting that the police have effectively relinquished their role in investigating fraud by obliging 
a complainant to provide prima-facie evidence of the fraud before they will engage. They say, 
consequently, many private organisations have used private investigators to investigate and 
produce compliant evidence packs before reporting to the police and a by-product has been 
improved clear up rates for fraud because the police can cherry pick the better-prepared and most 
compelling cases for prosecution. In other areas this has led to the emergence of employee 
supported policing where impacted organisations have provided resources for qualified individuals 
to become special constables with a focus on offences faced by the employer (Button & Wakefield, 
n.d.; South Yorkshire Police, 2015). Garland (1996, p. 453) identified that agents of the state no 
longer claim that they can “do it alone”, arguing that the increasingly complex nature of crime 
meant conventional law enforcement responses were no longer adequate and required 
supplementary organisational forms to deliver control. He also observed that Australian 
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government agencies had started to contract with private security companies for fraud 
investigation services. But it is not just the divestment of services that has impacted the police 
service, it is also the imperative to adopt private sector practices (latterly termed ‘New Public 
Management’) driven by the Conservative Government from the late 1980s, evolving the police 
force into a ‘modern police service’ with the introduction of policing by objectives, a bastardisation 
of Drucker’s managing by objectives, requiring objectives be set consistent with the financial 
budget and measured using effective key performance indicators (“KPIs”) (Panzarella, 1984). It is 
not coincidental that income generation became an objective for chief constables.  
Payment for services 
The Police are now able to charge for services they might have historically provided for free, 
such as recovering a stolen vehicle to a place of safety, and have received explicit authority to raise 
an additional 1% of their budget through commercial sponsorship (Button & Johnston, 2011, p. 67). 
Whilst the drive for greater economic efficiency is less controversial to spectators if it helps 
preserve the visible ‘bobby on the beat’ to deliver no less protection, the reality is that privatisation 
does have ethical, societal and practical consequences for the control of crime. Zedner (2006, pp. 
81–83) defined the police as “constables in the employ of the state whose task is to deliver up 
criminals to the criminal justice system” and argued that the re-emergence of a market in crime 
control “arises from neo-liberal political thought and from the growing dominance of the economic 
analysis of crime and crime control”. Instead of regarding crime as the product of pathology, 
delinquency or deviancy, she argues that econometric analysis has impacted on traditional 
sociological thinking and re-categorised crime as “a routine activity”, the result of “opportunity” 
and an inevitable consequence of modern life in which costs and risk are now part of a solution to 
an economically driven problem. Evidence of that approach is visible form a trial by NAVCIS of a 
‘pay as you go’ scheme for commercial victims of vehicle theft. For 21% of the value of the 
recovered stolen car, NAVCIS would accept notification of the theft, record the vehicle as stolen on 
the Police National Computer (“PNC”) and pass the report to a provincial force for investigation. 
The point where the police service is funded centrally has apparently been passed. In the 2015 
Spending Review (Treasury Committee, 2015, para. 1.81-1.82), following earlier savage budget 
cuts, the Chancellor promised “real terms protection for police funding” with commitment to a £900 
million increase in funding by 2019-202 but only if all police forces decide to increase their precept 
to the maximum extent possible17. He also offered flexibility for those forces with the lowest council 
                                                             
17 an instrument allowing a PCC to levy a charge on residents through council tax bills 
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tax bills to raise income from the precept by up to £5 per household, rather than 2%, allowing them 
to raise “up to an additional £12 million per year”. Against an evolving picture of declining 
resources, a dictate to police by centrally determined objectives (not necessarily local demand), a 
desire to preserve the image of the bobby on the beat, load shedding, contracting out, policing by 
objectives, a more commercial approach to generating revenue and positioning themselves as 
victims, it is perhaps not difficult to see how insurers have managed to procure their own police 
resource. The fact that they did so at an average annual cost of just £4 million is noteable (Transport 
Committee, 2014, p. 18). Fraud, insurance fraud particularly, has become a focus of the state, part 
of the social order and positioned inside the boundaries of ‘what can and should be policed’, despite 
the comments from one Chief Constable cited by Button and Tunley (2015, p. 58):  
“the investigation of fraud is extremely expensive in terms of hours spent obtaining 
statements and preparing a prosecution case … Our strategy identifies priority areas and 
police resources are directed towards those priority areas. Fraud is not one of them.”  
 
Responsibilisation, the insurance industry and the evolution of security 
O’Malley (1992) proffered that, with “the spiralling costs of social insurance, the state now 
promotes personal responsibility and private insurance”. Insurers have always had incentives they 
can deploy to improve their commercial position by reducing their exposure to risk (Doyle & Barry, 
2003). Using lower premiums as a motivator for rewarding collaborative attitudes, insurers provide 
incentives to policyholders to invest in deterrents. Indeed, they can compel them to invest in 
security measures and do provide advice, define standards for, and monitor the quality of security 
provision for alarm systems and vehicle security devices. Zedner (2006, p. 86) contends that the 
industry acquired that power because the state is mission focused on reducing its role as the 
ultimate underwriter of the hazards of everyday life; societal risks need to be spread and the 
government concluded that social insurance was, economically, the most effective means of 
ensuring the safety net. Successive governments have reacted in this way because, by setting crime 
as a central platform of their political mandates, they have created an ever-deepening fiscal and 
political black hole and have focused on responsibilisation strategies as a means of channelling the 
obligations of the state downstream. Initiatives like neighbourhood watch schemes and community 
safety activities, for example, whilst also part of the public-private partnership between the police 
and the community, share roles with citizens that were once reserved exclusively for the state. As 
insurers have become underwriters of more of the risks faced by society, their demands to be 
allowed to control the effects of the proliferation of that risk have also grown and the creation of 
IFED may, in part, be an inevitable response to those demands. Garland (1996, p. 463) was critical 
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of the consequences of responsibilisation of non-state agencies and “the routinization of crime 
prevention” because of the risk of disparities in the social provision and distribution of security 
which, if not guaranteed to all citizens by the sovereign state, will be distributed by market forces. 
More affluent consumers will procure security in the private market rather than the state providing 
it based on need. The consequence of that, Garland fears, is that the least powerful members of 
society will lack the resources to buy security or the flexibility to adapt their routines or organise 
effectively against crime. The same argument has merit for businesses. Hope (2001, p. 23) argues 
from an actuarial standpoint that as society feels increasingly insecure about the guaranteed 
provision of “the public goods” of everyday safety we are forced to rely on our own “individual and 
collective resources and strategies to acquire the private goods” necessary to remedy the perceived 
security deficit. Loader (1997, p. 388) is critical of the sustainability of a market for private security 
where demand, and therefore price, will increase and restrict access to those without the capital 
to compete in that market leading to distributive injustice where the distribution of wealth defines 
the distribution of safety and which Hope argues encourages the “clubbing’ of private security” 
(Hope, 2000). In the 18th century, when the expense of prosecution was a major obstacle to bringing 
offenders before a court, men of property would club together to share the expense of detaining 
and bringing offenders to trial (Hay & Snyder, 1989, pp. 27–29). Membership of these associations, 
an “expression of the “clubbability” of Englishmen”, foretells the likely transformation of security 
into a ‘club good’, defined by Hope (2001, p. 212) as “one that remains collectively available to 
members of the “club” but where non-members’ permanent access to the good can be wholly or 
partially denied, controlled or charged”. The communal acceptance of responsibility and mutuality 
of these associations in achieving the shared objectives of members, typically engaged in the same 
trade, became an important driver for enabling their members to apprehend and prosecute 
offenders, recover stolen goods, obtain compensatory damages and the recovery of their own costs 
(ibid. p. 212). The potential moral hazards of clubbing public, rather than private security, foretells 
a real risk either of distributive injustice or exclusion of non-members. 	
Review of privately-funded public-police partnerships 
Stenning and Shearing (1979, p. 261) viewed the private security industry as a rapidly expanding 
form of social control; a “quiet revolution” in our social arrangements for policing which finds its 
roots in fundamental economic, social and political changes occurring within our society. Zedner 
(2006, p. 92) argued that “if it is the case that the modernist project of promoting policing as a public 
good is being replaced by something akin to eighteenth-century notions of policing and protection 
as club goods or tradable commodities, then worrisome consequences follow” including the failure 
to provide a policing service available to all. Whilst taking visible and decisive action against 
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offenders and, equally importantly, being seen to take such action has proved popular with 
communities and the police’s political masters, James’ (2014)  concern about the ramifications for 
society arising from changes in access to, and the orientation and goals of, the state police merit 
further enquiry. Reiner (2010, p. 25), discussing the disparity in the treatment of different groups 
and the market failure in the post neo-liberalist world, saw a problem for policing; the change 
violates the public service mandate of the police and contradicts the principle of equality before 
the law. He remarked that “inequality of treatment is a barnacle on the boat of so-called public 
policing”. A potential inequality of treatment for non-insurer victims of fraud was a motivator of 
this research. 
With the combined legacy challenges faced by the police, as well as those identified in the SPR, 
and with austerity defining a limit to resource security then it must be right to search for more 
efficient, cost-effective, but socially acceptable arrangements to target and investigate crimes and 
prosecute offenders.  But, privately-funded police partnerships, like IFED, may foretell the 
regression of policing to that of a club-good where non-members’ access to security can be wholly 
or partially denied. Privately-funded police partnerships existed before the creation of IFED, raising 
a legitimate enquiry about whether IFED has characteristics that are inherent in, or synonymous 
with, other privately-funded public-policing arrangements where the police employ dedicated 
investigative and coercive powers, derived from the state, with reliance on their infrastructure and 
support operations but, in each case, do so in alignment with the very narrow commercial interests 
of their funder.   
Equity, Funding and Governance 
IFED may be the first current-day initiative in which only the commercial funder, the insurance 
industry, is entitled to report offences for investigation whilst others, who may well be victim to 
the same species of offence, are left without a remedy, effectively abandoned by the state. There 
is no objective measure by which the value or efficacy of privately-funded police initiatives can be 
assessed, either economically, socially or by reference to their impact on crime, but current 
budgetary constraints, and the reality that the police have long since lost their historic monopoly, 
imply that private-funding might be an appropriate opportunity for other such police initiatives. A 
potentially valuable area of future research would be the development of an objective scoring 
methodology based on the risks identified from the literature, some of which has been referenced 
above. Reiner (2010, p. 25) notes the disparity in the treatment of different groups as being “a 
perennial problem of policing contradicting the principle of equality before the law” and violating 
the public service mandate of the police.  Zedner (2006, p. 92) feared that the “modernist project 
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of promoting policing as a public good is being replaced by something akin to eighteenth-century 
notions of policing and protection as club goods or tradable commodities” and that worrisome 
consequences will follow if the state police do not provide a public service available to all. Johnston 
(1992, pp. 64–70, 2000, p. 324) highlights the risk that a commercial model where the police might 
charge for services could leave the needs of those who cannot pay unsatisfied or reliant on a public 
service with inferior resources available to respond. He also asserts the more material danger of a 
change in relationship between the public and the police if there are two levels of response (one to 
public demand and the other to demand provided on a commercial basis). He references this 
presenting “serious implications for what one might call ‘the judicious exercise of discretion’ as well 
as for the public’s perception of how that discretion is exercised”. Grabosky (1996, p. 5) felt that if 
“governments loosen the reins of enforcement, relying instead on decentralised and independent 
interests, there may be a loss of policy coherence or an imbalance in enforcement activity” by which 
the public will suffer through the governmental abdication of the rule of law. Garland (1996, p. 
463) highlights the problem created by the responsibilisation of non-state agencies and the 
likelihood that they will create “huge disparities in the social provision and distribution of security” 
and once that ceases to be “guaranteed to all citizens” and distributed without reference to need 
then the least powerful members of society will suffer. Peel (1829) defined the need for the police 
to constantly demonstrate “absolute impartial service to the law, in complete independence of 
policy”” and “to all members of society” and the Court of Appeal, in the Hounsham case, highlighted 
five potential harms that might follow the funding of the police by a victim of crime: 
• The essential independence and objectivity of the police is compromised.  
• Police officers might become selective as to which crimes to investigate based on the 
source of complaint.  
• The police investigating team might cease to act partially.  
• A “paying” victim might benefit from a more thorough preparation of the evidence than a 
non-contributing victim.  
• The practice would soon lead to a loss of confidence in a police force's ability to investigate 
crime objectively and impartially. 
As a basis for developing a scoring methodology, three potential risks were isolated from the 
literature as possible detractors from, or supporters for, police units funded and controlled by a 
commercial entity. Those risks relate to Equity (especially in terms of access to justice), Funding and 
Governance and are referenced going forward as “the Hounsham Risks”: 
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• Equity – are all victims impacted by offences, within the sphere of the police unit, 
treated equally and can they access justice without reference to their economic 
power? 
• Funding – does the unit have security and certainty of funding, shielding it from 
interference in operational or policy decisions at times when the funding is due to 
expire?   
• Governance – does the governance structure provide for independent decision making 
enshrined in regulation, statute or otherwise? 
Whilst questions of Funding and Governance are objectively referable to documentary 
evidence, Equity, the consequences of inappropriate mechanisms underpinning the initiative, 
necessitates a subjective assessment from the downside risk of harm emanating from the 
arrangements. It invites consideration of how the particular initiative views potential victims of the 
offences it intends to address even to the extent that stakeholders, as well as non-stakeholders, 
might be denied access to justice because of an inadequate funding levels relative to the extent of 
the threat posed by those offences.  What follows then is a review of the origins, structure, purpose 
and impact of several privately-funded public-police initiatives aiming to identify the characteristics 
of those partnerships, their susceptibility to the Hounsham Risks, and a visual representation on a 
continuum between the pubic-police at one end of the spectrum and the contrasting characteristics 
of private-policing at the other with the established public police model being the model against 
which other initiatives are assessed (Figure 3.1 below).  
 
Figure 3.1: Hounsham Risk Matrix 
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British Transport Police  
Debate about the rail industry, safety, policing and criminal law is recurrent. In 1830 the 
Liverpool and Manchester Railway opened as the first public railway to transport goods and 
passengers by locomotive, an occasion marred by the first railway fatality.  The accident, and 
difficulties controlling the crowd on the day highlighted the need for policing the railway and within 
months of the introduction of the MET, the first railway police force emerged with duties including 
the maintenance of law and order on the railways.  As the railways stimulated urban development, 
responsibility extended to the conduct of labourers and management of disorder and criminality in 
shanty towns. The early railway policemen were sworn in as special constables under a statute 
passed in 1673 but, by 1921, The Railways Act amalgamated over one hundred railway systems of 
which about 20 had organised police forces (British Transport Police, 2014). In January 1949, the 
British Transport Commission Police was created from the existing railway police forces, canal 
police and several minor dock forces. The British Transport Police Authority (“BTPA”), funded by 
the train operating companies, was formed in 2004 as a consequence of The Railways and Transport 
Safety Act 2003 which provided a statutory framework for the funding, governance and exercise of 
functions of the BTP, ultimately referable to, and amendable by, the Secretary of State. Today, the 
BTPA negotiate payments from the train operating companies and sets the budget to ensure that 
“train operators, their staff and passengers get the best value from BTP” (ibid.). If not the first, the 
BTP is the largest example of a privately-funded UK public-police partnership. To the public, it 
probably appears no different to that of a provincial police force but its funding arrangements and 
range of interactions with society is.  
Reid (2003, p. 496) highlights a risk that the legal and funding structure of the BTP might raise 
issues of independence especially if the BTP is tasked with establishing criminal liability against one 
of its funders because of gross failure to maintain adequate safety systems. There is no basis for 
believing that to be more than a low risk. The BTP investigated the rail crashes at Southall, Ladbroke 
Grove, Hatfield, Selby and Potters Bar, incidents highlighting the catastrophic consequences of 
fatalities from railway accidents and demonstrate why the need for trust in the investigating 
authority is paramount but also how that independence is assured. That assurance is not just in 
respect of catastrophic events.  The BTP were responsible for investigating 392 people fatally 
injured in 2002, 256 involved suicide or trespass on railways with 45 other railway related deaths 
(ibid. p. 499) without any criticism of their impartiality or independence from their funders. Whilst 
there is very little railway-specific criminal law (ibid. p. 496) BTP officers also deal with similar crimes 
to provincial officers including, for example, assault, theft, criminal damage and general anti-social 
behaviour including public order offences. Those activities associated with the prevention of 
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vandalism or disorder extend beyond the economic interests of their funders to the extent that 
they might make woman, and the elderly in particular, afraid to use the railways, especially at night 
(Bradley, 2016, p. 328). Ensuring the public feel safe and reassured is a primary police responsibility 
(Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2012; Mesloh, 2006; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997), a 
responsibility that Braithwaite (2013) highlights from the significance the UK rail network occupies 
in the nation’s infrastructure. Its vulnerability to terrorist threats, which brings with it a sense of 
fear for commuters, means that a key priority for transport policing is to ensure that “fear of crime” 
is low. Research on this topic indicates how fear not only affects those who have been victim to 
criminal activity but also those who have not been directly exposed to it (Warr, 2000). More recent 
advances have highlighted variability in fear of crime based on the context-dependent 
characteristics of the everyday environment (Solymosi, Bowers, & Fujiyama, 2015)  insofar as an 
individual is unlikely to fear being victim to a terrorist attack at home but may fear it when 
commuting to work. To assuage this concern, the Government announced in 2011 that “the security 
of the railways and London Underground” should be further enhanced by the development of a BTP 
armed capability to be deployed as appropriate in response to the terrorism threat level at any 
given time.  
The BTP appears clear about its contemporary role; managing any threat to the continued 
operation of the railway network, from terrorism to vandalism, across a confined and delineated 
footprint, with a dedicated and specialist police service, expert in dealing with the particular needs 
of the railways. They have committed to protecting and serving the railway environment and its 
community, keeping levels of disruption, crime - and the fear of crime - as low as possible (British 
Transport Police Authority, 2012). In terms of the threat to independence, Hamelin and 
Spenlehauer (2014, p. 428)  claim the main cause of dissatisfaction amongst its funding partners 
are that:  
“they see the BTP’s core constabulary side, counterterrorism activity and crime clear-up, as 
too heavily emphasized, when they would prefer greater focus on deterrence, prevention 
and education as a means of promoting train use and diminishing such petty crimes as 
graffiti or vandalism” 
 
Parliament debated the issue of funding ahead of the formation of the BTPA. Despite a 
preference expressed by HMIC that the BTP should be directly funded by government in order to 
guarantee an arm’s length relationship  with the railway industry, parliament determined that the 
BTPA, as an independent authority, would be able to address the “perception of partiality in terms 
of the force being too weak or too tough”’ on the railway companies providing the funding and that 
the continued role of direct funding, by the industry, would maintain pressure for efficiency 
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(Hansard, 2003).  Suggesting the broader risks explored in this thesis existed ten years ago, it is 
notable that one chief officer pointed out that “the police service provides a public good. It is not a 
private security organization for a train operator” (Department for Transport, 2006, p. 13). It is 
outside of the scope of this research to test whether the funding arrangements put in place have 
allowed the BTP to act impartially and it may prove academic in coming years. In 2017, the Scottish 
Government (2016) passed legislation to merge the BTP within Police Scotland claiming an ambition 
to “maintain a specialist national railway policing unit within Police Scotland, which is accountable 
to the people of Scotland, build on the excellent skills, knowledge and experience of BTP and 
enhances railway policing in Scotland through direct access to the local, specialist and national 
resources of Police Scotland”. However, assessed against the Hounsham Risks it appears that the 
current BTP model scores positively against the risks for Equity, Funding and Governance (Figure 
3.2 below).  
 
Figure 3.2: Hounsham Risk Matrix (BTP) 
Civil Nuclear Constabulary 
There is a similar statutory framework for the funding, governance and exercise of functions of 
the Civil Nuclear Police Authority (“CNPA”) and the CNC, ultimately referable to, and amendable 
by, the Secretary of State as provided for within the Energy Act 2004. A private funding 
arrangement exists between the CNPA and those nuclear operating companies that provide nuclear 
research and energy. The CNC and CNPA, the CNC's governing authority which reports to the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change, were established in April 2005 (Civil Nuclear Police 
Authority, 2014). With over 1,000 highly trained officers and staff, the CNC is a specialist armed 
police service with a key role in national security. They are dedicated to protecting 14 civil nuclear 
sites across England, Scotland and Wales and safeguarding nuclear material in transit (ibid.). If there 
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were an attempt to seize nuclear material to construct a dirty device, then the initial deterrent and 
prevention of such an activity lies with the CNC.  
The CNPA (2006) defines three principal strategic aims: 
• Protect nuclear material and facilities on designated licensed sites and in transit throughout 
the UK and beyond. 
• Manage in a way which gets the best use from all its resources through best value 
initiatives.  
• Maintain and improve understanding between the constabulary, its nuclear customers, the 
public, other stakeholders and the government. 
Rogers (2007, p. 239) identifies the power of a CNC constable as quite specific and limited by 
the Energy Act 2004 to all places within a relevant nuclear site, and everywhere within five 
kilometres of such a location, as well as at every trans-shipment site or every other place where it 
seems expedient to be located in order to safeguard nuclear material in transit. They are also 
uniquely placed and authorised to use force “to compel specific responses from citizens” (Klahm & 
Tillyer, 2010, p. 215; Klockars, 1985). Rogers questions whether the CNC should be considered as a 
police force when compared with traditional forces and raises the risk that “not being police or 
military, but an amalgam of both … [they] may stray beyond strict legality from time to time” 
referencing a 2007 report of the police ombudsman for Northern Ireland which found that, on 
occasions, police who consider themselves ‘special cases’ may assume they are above and beyond 
the law (2007, p. 240). In respect of the Hounsham Risks, if this is correct, then it may pose a risk in 
terms of Equity but, to the extent that a member of the public will ever require the assistance of a 
constable from the CNC, the benefits to society from the attainment of the CNC’s mission statement 
(Civil Nuclear Police Authority, 2014) are difficult to impugn:  
“In partnership with the civil nuclear industry, national security agencies and regulatory 
bodies the CNC will deter any attacker whose intent is the theft or sabotage of nuclear 
material and deny access to it. If material is seized or high consequence facilities 
compromised the CNC will recover control of the facility and regain custody of the material”  
 
As with the BTP, assessed against the Hounsham Risks, it appears that the model under which 
the CNC operates scores positively against the risks for Equity, Funding and Governance. 
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Figure 3.3: Hounsham Risks (CNC) 
Port police forces 
Emsley (2015, p. 19) recounts how the Manchester Guardian carried an article in March 1944 
quoting from the annual report of the Liverpool Steamship Owners Association: 
“pilferage of essential supplies, whether those coming into this country or going overseas 
to our forces or those of our allies, is an offence no less serious than looting ... and the small 
fines or short sentences that magistrates impose on its detection are no real deterrent to a 
profitable business. Participants in that business should be so dealt with as will ensure its 
discouragement. It will continue unchecked so long as its rewards are out of proportion to 
its risks.” 
 
In his study of crime at the workplace, Mars (1982, p. 36) categorised dockers as “wolves” 
working in “wolf packs” who fiddled, stole and supported one another. Colquhoun (1806, pp. 213–
287), writing from his experience as a police magistrate  addressing the problem of “plunder in the 
dockyard” saw dockers:  
“with a very few exceptions … nursed from early life in acts of delinquency … so extensive 
there are unquestionably many different shades of turpitude; but certain it is, that long 
habit, and general example, had banished from the minds of the mass of the culprits 
implicated in these offences, that sense of the criminality of the action …” 
 
In the early 19th century dock police were recruited to prevent cargo being smuggled out of the 
docks but the opportunity for a poorly paid work force to supplement their income was rife. Emsley 
(2015, p. 21) narrates the history of dockyard theft through the 20th century observing the scale of 
losses during the second world war persuaded the authorities of the need to deploy special police 
units, including Military Police officers, to supervise the loading and unloading of ships and to 
ensure the safety of military supplies. Military Police were never sworn as constables and so could 
neither arrest nor police civilians, limiting their ability to manage crime involving non-service 
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personnel to reporting suspected offenders to the civilian police. Emsley recounts that even with 
the increased police presence the nature of the offences changed little from the days of Colquhoun 
and the wolf packs were far more effective than the civil and military police. With the volume of 
military supplies, food and provisions moved across the docks during an extended period of 
shortages and rationing, a booming black market emerged and:  
“the docker wolf packs maintained their cohesion … Ultimately it was not legislation, 
policing or prosecutions that ended fiddling … but containerisation and the break-up of the 
traditional communities that for generations had lived, in extended families, close to those 
docks in which all of the menfolk had found work.” 
 
Traffic through the docks peaked in the early 1960s. After that, containerisation, larger ships 
requiring deeper water to dock, and other technological changes, as well as a switch in Britain's 
trade following EEC membership, resulted in a rapid decline and rationalisation of the UK ports 
network (Royal Docks Trust, 2008). Today, there are eight Port police forces in England and Wales 
and two in Northern Ireland. Their 240 constables have a responsibility to maintain the safety and 
security of port estates for the benefit of port authorities, their users and the public. Each force is 
led by a chief officer who can participate in the work of the Port Police Chief Officers’ Association 
(“PPCOA”) which meets to discuss matters of common interest. Maritime ports of entry have 
specific security policing risks and continue to be the subject of detailed review by government and 
so chief officers may also cover the role of Port Facility Security Officer as provided for by the 
International Ship and Port Security Code 2004. Most forces include some civilian staff and they 
may also be responsible for security personnel within the port. Frequently, businesses like car 
manufacturers, importers or freight operators have semi-permanent premises on the port estate 
and their employees are involved in routine daily business and access to ports and movement 
within them must still be controlled. Whilst commercial security is not in itself a policing function, 
it delivers benefits to tenants and the estate in general when goods are often of considerable value 
or transportable hazardous or dangerous substances and usually outside the supervision of their 
owners. Just as in the 1940s, such property can still be at greater risk of theft, damage or misuse 
than property in ordinary private premises. The Port police forces therefore give permitted users 
of the protected areas confidence that their property and security is protected although not to the 
same extent as a Home Office police force. Border control, immigration and duties and taxation at 
ports rests with other government agencies, as they would at airports. Nonetheless, the Port police 
are perceived by their funders as providing a resource saving to the port itself, filling a gap between 
outright reliance on security personnel, closed circuit monitoring and other protection methods, 
and the need to call on local police. Jurisdiction for Port police forces is generally limited to the 
relevant area of private property and, in some cases (e.g. docks and harbours), the neighbouring 
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area. This narrow geographical limitation and the small size of each force, means they are typically 
reliant on the local territorial police to assist with any serious matter, the statutory responsibility 
for law and order remaining with the territorial force. The Government reviewed the arrangements 
for port police within England and Wales in 2001. Following an investigation carried out by the 
Department for Transport (“DFT”) (Department for Transport, n.d.) it was concluded that: 
“Despite their somewhat curious independent status, they have not become an historical 
anomaly but have modernised to emulate Home Office forces…The question of whether 
ports should have their own police forces at all should of course be a matter for the 
individual port authorities, but there is a strong consensus that all port police forces should 
strive to meet recommended national police standards in all aspects of their operations. 
 
Considering the Hounsham Risks, whilst not as directly regulated as either the BTP or CNC, the 
DFT does have close departmental links to Port police forces, and has assumed responsibility for 
them because they are established under harbour legislation18 for which the DFT is ultimately 
responsible. However, it has no direct sponsorship role. The Home Office is responsible for 
standards and general legislation in relation to the police service and to the powers and 
responsibilities of constables. It is also generally responsible for the policing of seaports and airports 
particularly in relation to security and border management matters. As such they will inevitably 
deal with Port police as well as local police forces in port areas. The PPCOA liaises with Home Office, 
NPCC (formerly ACPO) and DFT officials as necessary and their close working relationship ensures 
their ports policing activity supports the National Maritime Security Strategy and is integrated into 
the mainstream policing. Forces are subject to performance monitoring but the chief officer and 
his force have operational independence, in keeping with their status as constables and their 
separate allegiance to the Crown. Some port authorities have separate committees and are 
encouraged to co-opt suitable members of the local community, such as a magistrate or a senior 
local police officer, to bring specialised knowledge of law enforcement functions to their monitoring 
or supervisory roles. The Ports police authority or board have statutory responsibility for setting 
annual budgets and ensuring that best value is achieved (ibid.).  
                                                             
18 Harbours Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847; Dover Harbour Consolidation Act 1954; The Dover Harbour Revision 
Order 2006; Port of London Act 1968; Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority Act 1966; Mersey Docks and Harbour (Police) 
Order 1975 SI No. 1224; Falmouth Docks Act 1959 
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Figure 3.4: Hounsham Risks (Ports police) 
Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (“PIPCU”) 
PIPCU is one of several initiatives operated by the CLP but is probably more accurately identified 
as a government sponsored initiative rather than a privately-funded police force. Nonetheless, 
PIPCU defines itself as a law enforcement gatekeeper for a range of interventions against online 
intellectual property (“IP”) crime which accepts intelligence and evidential packages from 
stakeholders to an agreed minimum standard, recommending appropriate action where there is 
evidence of criminality (City of London Police, n.d.-a). The CLP and the Intellectual Property Office 
(“IPO”), part of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (“BIS”), established PIPCU in 
2013. The IPO provided funding of £2.56 million at launch and a further £3.0 million to fund through 
to 2017 (City of London Police, 2016a; Police International Property Crime Unit, 2014) to run an 
operationally independent law enforcement unit dedicated to tackling serious and organised 
intellectual property crime (counterfeit and piracy) affecting physical and digital goods. PIPCU’s 
focus is on offences committed using an online platform. The unit launched with 19 detectives, 
analysts and researchers, based at the ECD at the CLP where it draws on expertise and experience 
already in place. According to the CLP, PIPCU planned to integrate its activities with other key 
stakeholders, including industry, national and international law enforcement (i.e. HMRC, UK Border 
Agency, Trading Standards, Europol, National Crime Agency), the IPO intelligence hub and other 
public authorities to maximise effectiveness and minimise duplication of effort (City of London 
Police, n.d.-b). A core component of PIPCU’s operational activity is its tactical partnerships with 
several private and public-sector organisations (City of London Police, n.d.-d):   
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• BIS invests in skills and education, promotes trade, boosts innovation and supports those 
starting or growing a business. BIS also protects consumers and reduces the impact of 
regulation. 
• The IPO is an executive agency of BIS responsible for intellectual property rights in the UK, 
including patents, designs, trademarks and copyright. 
• The Alliance for Intellectual Property is a UK-based coalition of 24 trade associations 
concerned with ensuring IP rights are valued in the UK and a legislative regime exists to 
enable the value and contribution of these rights to be fully realised and protected. 
• The Anti-Counterfeiting Group, whose members make the products consumers use every 
day, seek protection for their investment and creativity so supporting UK growth and 
safeguarding the consumer.  
• IFPI represents the recording industry worldwide, comprising some 1,300 record 
companies in 66 countries and affiliated industry associations in 55 countries, and 
• FACT is the UK’s largest content protection organisation, protecting the intellectual 
property of its members across the film, TV, sports rights and technology sectors.  
Intellectual property crime includes the piracy or counterfeiting of goods which, for organised 
criminals, can be highly profitable requiring only a small investment to reap massive return. It 
occurs on a global scale and where the Internet or other digitally enabled networks are involved, it 
is more difficult for authorities to contain and prosecute (“Intellectual Property Crime,” 2016). 
According to a survey of IT managers in 27 countries (Ashford, 2014), only one in five manufacturers 
reported a loss of IP as a result of cyber-attack in 2014. However, figures produced by Ofcom 
(Kantar Media, 2013, p. 16) revealed that more than 1.58 billion protected files were downloaded 
illegally in the UK in 2013, 20% of all protected downloads, with 760,000 ‘high-volume infringers’ 
responsible for 80% of offences.  The Government claimed a direct link between economic 
performance and IP theft with every 1% increase in IP crime estimated to cost 1% of GDP, about 
£1.7 billion (Curtis, 2014). Zourek (European Commission, 2014) said:   
“IP enforcement policy ought to be focused on the fight against commercial-scale IP 
infringement activity, which is most harmful for the EU economy. The overall result should 
be a reorientation towards a 'follow the money' approach, that will deprive commercial-
scale infringers from the significant actual and potential revenue flows that incite them to 
develop such activities against the interest of society at large.” 
 
In 2015 (“Interview: Inside PIPCU’s anti-counterfeiting drive.,” 2015) PIPCU estimated that UK 
consumers spent at least £90 million a year on counterfeit goods, many of which are found online  
driving the main strands to PIPCU's work:   
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• seeking and shutting down websites involved in IP crime;   
• arresting and prosecuting IP crime suspects; and   
• targeting the sources of income of those involved in IP crime.   
In the 18-months to August 2015, PIPCU made 34 arrests for counterfeiting and piracy and 
reports having suspended over 5,500 websites selling fake luxury goods with brands affected 
included Burberry, Longchamp, Oakley, Tiffany and Thomas Sabo (Nurton, 2015). Consumer 
protection in relation to counterfeiting involving physical goods has historically rested with trading 
standards and consumers still retain a remedy for instances where they become an innocent victim 
in that regard. However, PIPCU is part of a wider supra-state initiative against online offending with 
a determination to undermine the distributive efforts of organised criminals responsible for 
massive value destruction. A four-year £5.56 million government investment appears a reasonable 
use of resources when a 1% increase in IP crime costs the UK economy £1.7 billion (Curtis, 2014) 
and since the initiative is driven and funded by the government rather than by stakeholders with 
vested interests, the Equity and Governance risks appear low. There is, however, as with any 
sponsorship agreement the risk that the funding arrangement is short-term and that the police 
modify their behaviour towards the funder as the expiry date for funding approaches. Whilst less 
of a risk where the Government is the funder, certainty of funding is critical to ensure that a long-
term approach can be taken to address the criminal threat. The Minister for BIS (Hansard, 2017) 
confirmed further funding for PIPCU up to 2019 and also that “discussions are currently underway 
on options to ensure the future sustainability of the Unit beyond that date”.  
 
Figure 3.5: Hounsham Risks (PIPCU) 
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DCPCU 
The DCPCU is a police unit, fully sponsored by the banking industry, to investigate, target, arrest 
and prosecute offenders for organised cheque and payment card crimes. It followed a successful 
pilot which ran from 2002 to 2004 and operates through a steering group chaired by the Home 
Office (Hansard, 2004; The UK Cards Association, 2009, p. 10) ensuring a degree of control divorced 
from the sponsoring stakeholders. It comprises officers from the MET and the CLP working 
alongside banking industry fraud investigators. Prior to IFEDs creation, DCPCU was exemplar of the 
need for a private police partnership; a well-funded industry with strong technology platforms 
facilitating the economic activities of every consumer, business and other legitimate entity, but 
highly vulnerable to attack through digital and conventional channels when most police forces 
refused to prioritise cheque and payment card offences, being too labour intensive for local forces 
but not high profile enough for central organised crime units (Michael Levi & Maguire, 2012, p. 
212). 
DCPCUs creation was a response to rapidly growing payment card crime between 1999 and 
2001, attributed to the growth of organised crime and the lack of a dedicated police investigatory 
capacity. Since its formation in April 2002, DCPCU reports (Financial Fraud Action UK, 2014) c. £40 
million annual savings from reduced fraud activity, from annual funding of £5 million, a similar level 
to that being invested by the ABI in IFED. They also recovered approximately 700,000 counterfeit 
cards, resolved 346,000 compromised card numbers and secured 346 convictions on fraud related 
matters – an average of more than one successful prosecution per fortnight over the last decade 
(DCPCU, 2010). A wider perspective on its impact is the link to serious and organised crime. 
Investigations by the Unit have established that a significant proportion of fraud is committed by 
criminal gangs which have strong links to other types of serious criminality, including people 
trafficking, drugs and violent crime (ibid.). 
The UK banking industry has to underwrite the cost of credit card and cheque fraud19, as an 
effective benefit for their account holders. This makes it hard to argue that consumers are impacted 
or denied access to justice because of the deployment of specialist police officers into the industry 
to improve the detection rate of organised criminal gangs that DCPCU claims is responsible for 
much of the UK’s cheque and card fraud.  That said, the return on investment for the banking 
industry, who report saving £40 million p.a., for an investment of £5 million, suggests a poor reward 
                                                             
19  Consumer Credit Act 1974 s75; The Payment Services Regulations 2017 s76; Banking Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (para. 5.1.12) 
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to risk ratio for the taxpayer and possibly too low a price being paid for the services supplied. Unlike 
PIPCU, the initiative is funded by stakeholders with a vested interest in the outcomes. There is no 
regulatory framework, the initiative being a sponsorship arrangement facilitated through section 
93(2) of the Police Act 1966 which grants the PCC, formerly the police authority, permission to 
accept sponsorship on terms ‘that would be appropriate’. Some control may be exercised through 
the governance arrangements in place from a steering group which the Home Office chairs and, as 
mentioned above, victims do benefit from a variety of regulatory protections. There is, however, 
as there is with the sponsorship agreement for PIPCU, a risk that the funding arrangement is short-
term and devoid of parliamentary oversight and that the police might modify their behaviour 
towards the operational demands from their funders as the expiry date for funding approaches. 
However, this appears a remote risk with the initiative now in its 15th year, with two police forces 
participating, with statutory retail protection in place and with the links between credit card and 
cheque fraud and serious criminality established; it would appear unlikely that the DCPCU is 
perceived by the banking industry as a short-term solution.   
 
Figure 3.6: Hounsham Risks (DCPCU) 
IFED  
IFED has similar governance arrangements to DCPCU and is also a beneficiary of sponsorship 
permitted by the Police Act. It is overseen by a strategic board which meets quarterly and which is 
chaired by the Head of Fraud and Financial Crime at the Home Office (City of London Police, 2016b) 
but, similarities with DCPCU diverge in respect of the other risks. The case for DCPCU is supportable 
with the audited economic loss sustained by the banking industry whilst the losses sustained by the 
insurance industry appear, in neutral language, less precise. And whilst victims of cheque and credit 
card fraud are compensated by the banking industry who then investigate and pursue any offender 
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to recover their loss, the insurance industry working with IFED does not offer the same protection 
to non-insurer victims of fraud as will be outlined in following chapters. IFED was launched during 
a period of economic recession when fraudsters saw the industry as a soft target knowing that there 
was little chance they will be caught and brought before the courts. It was a period when police 
budgets were under pressure and insurance fraud was not a high priority for the police in the same 
way, perhaps, that the banking industry had struggled to engage local resources in 1999; too labour 
intensive for local forces but not high profile enough for central organised crime units.  The 
insurance industry has adopted a governance structure for all of their counter-fraud utilities to 
oversee and provide strategic oversight for the direction of the IFB and IFR together with IFED 
suggestive of a holistic approach to the deployment of their own resources and that of the state 
(Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2017) but the perceived Hounsham Risks, emphasising the risks to Equity 
and Funding and Governance are displayed below. 
 
Figure 3.7: Hounsham Risks (IFED) 
Five years post launch there is limited literature that objectively assesses IFED’s effectiveness 
although there has been significant support from government, the ABI, lobbyists and the media, for 
its potential to do so. Although Levi and Maguire (2012, p. 209) report that it was only after “much 
deliberation and unwillingness to pay twice for policing” that the motor insurance industry agreed 
to fund the unit. In 2013, the ABI (UK Parliament Transport Committee, 2014) reported that their 
total committed investment in IFED between 2012 and 2017 would exceed £20 million. They also 
claimed (ibid. Annex B, p. 18) that between 2012 and October 2014:  
“IFED has made 462 arrests, secured 84 convictions in court, and issued 139 cautions. It 
currently has around £29 million of fraud under investigation…[and] has also coordinated 
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two national 'days of action' in respect of 'ghost broking' and credit-hire fraud in which a 
total of 47 people were arrested.” 
 
The creation of IFED, in light of the experience from other historic private-police initiatives, 
suggests more than economic expediency. That crime will always migrate to follow the population 
(or the opportunity) and that it now exists in a global and sometimes virtual digital world, suggests 
that addressing criminality is inconsistent with historic regional police force boundaries predicated 
on local funding and the imperative to respond to local priorities. The use of vehicles in crime, for 
example, and the redistribution of criminal proceeds into organised crime groups and even 
terrorism has created a problem for government wrestling, at least financially, with the conflict 
between resourcing local policing and the insidious threat to the economic fabric of the nation from 
large scale organised crime. To a degree, society faced the same challenges in the early 19th century 
with the dawn of the railways but without the neo-liberal ideology that has suffused the 
management of the police since. Tidball (2015), identified links between ‘transnational’ insurance 
fraud where assets are moved around the world, through links with organised crime. He estimated 
insurance fraud at $80 billion in the United States, “second only to narcotics trafficking” and 
cautioned that there exists “growing symbiotic connections among cartels trafficking drugs, 
terrorists, cyber thieves, mob syndicates and organised insurance fraud … [taking] a collective effort 
between the insurance industry, consumer groups, elected officials and federal, state and local law 
enforcement to effectively bring about meaningful change” (ibid. pp. 24-26).  Subsequent chapters 
in this thesis explore further the events leading to the creation of IFED, the relationship between 
insurance fraud and organised crime and the extent to which the “collective effort” envisaged by 
Tidball has resonance in the UK.   
Conclusions 
This chapter asked whether the creation of a private police force, funded by insurers, impacted 
non-insurer victims of fraud. It chronicled the changing role of the police and questioned whether 
the Peelian principals can still represent a vision of the police that is either economically, politically 
or physically achievable in a world where policing is by objective. A review of the debate around 
the history, nature and increasing use of privately-funded public-policing was preceded by a 
discussion about government, responsibilisation, the growth in private security and the increasing 
trend towards multi-lateralisation in the face of economic under-funding of the police. Some of the 
issues inspiring the creation of IFED were trailed after an exposition of similar issues in other 
privately-funded policing models. The concept of an objective methodology for assessing those 
models based on the Funding, Equity and Governance of the police unit involved, by reference to 
the Peelian principles and several academic and jurisprudential reference points, was introduced. 
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The chapter concluded with a portent of the interaction between insurance fraud and more serious 
organised crime which is developed in later chapters. 
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Chapter 4 Non-Insurer Victims of Fraud - Credit-Hire  
Introduction 
One of the threads insurers highlighted in their campaign for an Establishment response to 
insurance fraud was the frequency and cost of credit-hire fraud.  This chapter looks at the evolution 
of the credit-hire industry, identifies what services a credit-hire company (“CHC”) provides for 
consumers and explores the relationship the credit-hire industry has with insurers, solicitors, 
consumers and the Establishment. It also examines the use of the descriptor, ‘credit-hire fraud’, 
and questions whether it is a label, created to taint and so undermine the credit-hire industry as 
part of a strategy to reduce the legitimate expense it creates. In addition, with no empirical 
evidence available about the amount and type of fraud suffered by credit-hire industry, this chapter 
also explores how a CHC might be a victim of insurance fraud and reports on the results of a self-
completion survey which investigated whether respondents felt empowered or denied the right to 
claim victimhood, and how that impacted their ability to participate actively and collaboratively in 
identifying and reducing the amount of fraud impacting the insurance industry.  
Research methodology 
A self-completion questionnaire and series of case studies were deployed to assist 
understanding of the perception of fraud victims. A critical part of the research focused on the 
credit-hire industry, arguably a potential ‘non-insurer’ victim of fraud. Whilst it claimed annual 
turnover of c.£600 million (The CHO, 2012), and some in the sector operating businesses with 
50,000 hire vehicles, knowledge about the industry is limited with the sector comprising four very 
large operators and a large number of small businesses with no published research. Accordingly, a 
questionnaire was designed to conduct a cross-sectional survey amongst industry members to 
assess whether they believed they were exposed to insurance fraud and to understand their 
reaction to the response they received from insurers and/or the police if they were ever victims.   
“The collection of standardized information from a specific population by means of 
questionnaire or interviews” is a useful means to obtain data for exploratory research (Robson, 
1993, p. 43). According to Leedy and Omrod (1989, p. 142), a questionnaire should seek to elicit 
information that cannot be observed. In this study the purpose was descriptive, the aim being to 
understand the prevalence of ‘frequency and outcome’ of certain matters from the perspective of 
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a credit-hire company or their associated solicitor20. The survey was also intended to be counting 
or evaluative, hopeful of gathering empirical data about the size of the motor insurance fraud 
problem experienced by each respondent so as to aggregate all of the data to quantify the extent 
to which the entire industry fell victim to the offence. There are advantages to using questionnaires 
to collect data (Oppenheim & Oppenheim, 1992, p. 102). The key strengths and weaknesses are 
summarised below (University of South Alabama, 2016). 
STRENGTHS 
• They are good for measuring attitudes. 
• Interviewee bias is avoided.  
• They are inexpensive to administer and quick to turn around.  
• Perceived anonymity by respondents may be high improving the openness of the response.
  
• For well-constructed and validated questionnaires, they have moderately high 
measurement validity.  
• Close-ended items can provide the exact information needed by the researcher and 
provides easy data analysis.  
• Open-ended items can provide detailed information in respondents own words and 
support further exploration in the research and so are useful for exploration as well as 
confirmation.  
WEAKNESSES 
• They must usually be kept short.  
• Reactive effects may occur as interviewees try to show only what is socially desirable. 
• There may be non-response to selective items because of mistrust from the survey 
population.  
• People may not recall or have access to important information.  
• Response rates may be low for e-mail questionnaires reducing the value of the information 
obtained.  
• Data analysis may be time consuming for open-ended items. 
                                                             
20 Some CHCs divide their processes between hire and claim settlement and partner with a solicitor who will handle 
claim settlement.   
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• Measures need validation.  
Westmarland (2011, p. 74) highlighted other weaknesses including access to people, the real 
sources of data and, more particularly, the proposed respondents having access to files or data that 
may be confidential or restricted for a variety of reasons. In fact, data acquisition proved difficult 
because several of the targeted respondents were employees of publicly listed companies and were 
either unable, or unwilling, to divulge potentially price-sensitive information. This weakness was 
more than offset by the compensating benefits of the method which allowed absolute control for 
the survey over the target population, the questions asked, and the basis on which the results could 
be analysed. The questionnaire was also inexpensive to administer and created a data source 
capable of statistical analysis and integration with the outputs from the qualitative elements of the 
research.  
Designing and testing   
O’Muircheartaigh (1997, p. 1) provides, as a definition of errors in surveys, “work purporting to 
do what it does not do”. Whilst survey quality was not an absolute there was still a requirement 
that it should be designed, built and evaluated in line with other facets of the survey (Couper, 2000, 
p. 466). A preliminary qualitative assessment was undertaken with one current and two former 
credit-hire industry employees who later assisted in the pilot testing but took no other part in the 
research. The aim of that assessment was to determine the nature and phraseology of the 
questions and to assess whether the target audience would be able, and willing, to respond (Brace, 
2013, pp. 8–11). The resulting device was a self-developed questionnaire containing items requiring 
a response in various formats:   
• multiple choice;  
• asking either for one option or all that apply;  
• dichotomous answers like “Yes” and “No”;  
• self-assessment items, measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale; and  
• responses requiring numerical completion relating to the number of incidents incurred or 
their financial cost.   
The questionnaire comprised twenty-two questions organised into three sections and elicited 
data about: 
• the size of the insurance fraud problem experienced by each participant;  
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• the attitude of insurers and their response when a credit-hire company identifies fraud; 
and  
• the experience of engaging with the police (including IFED) and, specifically, the initial 
response, willingness to record a reported insurance fraud and indications of any 
subsequent investigation and prosecution.   
Executing the questionnaire  
Pilot testing is the most important step in the survey (Suskie, 1988, p. 48), the goal being to 
validate the instrument, test its reliability and ensure it is error-free. The questionnaire was tested 
with those who assisted in the design phase, a process that helped to establish stability and internal 
consistency reliability, and face and content validity of the questionnaire. The Researcher was 
Chairman of the CHO when the research was conducted and, aspiring to obtain the views of senior 
members of the industry, his position was advantageous. He had the last known working e-mail 
addresses for the managing director or senior partner of all the potential participant entities in the 
survey which was directed to:  
• senior employees of forty-five credit-hire companies who were CHO members; 
• ten associated solicitors who were members of the CHO and acted for credit-hire 
companies in the negotiation of credit-hire claims; and 
• five credit-hire companies who were not CHO members.   
The survey questionnaire used Survey Monkey and was web-based (accessed through the URL 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/7G73NQ2). A web-based instrument was useful because the 
responses automatically populated a database and the results were easily transferrable into 
numeric data in Excel and SPSS formats. Participants were invited to contribute through an e-mail 
invitation. Informed consent was obtained with a form posted on the website, effectively the 
opening page of the survey. To obtain their positive consent, participants had to click on a button 
accepting that “by moving to the next screen you signify your agreement to participate in the 
survey.” The survey invitation, consent and questions and available responses are at Appendix A. 
About 50% of those invited to participate in the survey provided a response. 92% of respondents 
were members of the trade body and 8% were non-members.  
Analysing the responses  
The questionnaire design should aim to achieve specific research objectives rather than just 
gather potentially helpful data (Leedy & Ormrod, 1989, p. 43). The quantitative data obtained from 
the survey was coded and then analysed using SPSS, a statistical software programme. Whilst 
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designed to enable complex statistical testing, the relatively small number of responses and 
diversity of individual respondent experiences, which was specific to the size of the company from 
which the data was obtained, meant that many of the statistical tests were either too complex or 
incapable of being executed. SPSS did, however, enable a rapid basis for assessing the data and for 
displaying some of the key results graphically.  
Case studies were also an important component of the research. Insurers, government and the 
police invest significant private and public resources to represent and promote the insurance 
industry’s definition of insurance fraud and the extent of their victimhood through, as was argued 
in Chapter 2, a reliance on untested and unreliable data. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 26) 
contend that “sound empirical research begins with strong grounding in related literature, identifies 
a research gap, and proposes research questions that address the gap”. In this research, the case 
study approach was chosen, and was of value, because of the lack of independent research or 
literature on the phenomenon being studied. A case study is a type of ethnographic design 
(Creswell, 2002; Tomkinson, 2015), an exploration of a “bounded system” or an activity or process 
over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information 
(Creswell & Maitta, 2002).  Patton (2002) suggests they are valuable in creating a deeper 
understanding of particular people, problems or situations in comprehensive ways and Yin (1994, 
p. 13) advocates that they are a useful research method “when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.  Stake (2000, p. 19) believed that they “are likely 
to continue to be popular because of their style... and, moreover, because of the universality and 
importance of experiential understanding, and because of their compatibility with such 
understanding, case studies can be expected to continue to have an epistemological advantage over 
other inquiry methods as a basis for naturalistic generalization”.  
Theory building from case studies is an increasingly popular and relevant research methodology 
providing “one of the best (if not the best) of the bridges from rich qualitative evidence to 
mainstream deductive research” (Eisenhardt & Graebbner, 2007, pp. 25–30). There are questions 
about whether it is rigorous enough as a research methodology (Sato, 2016, p. 50) but whilst single 
case studies can define the existence of a phenomenon (Sigglekow, 2007), multiple case studies 
provide a stronger basis for constructing theory (Yinn, 1994) because the propositions are more 
grounded in varied empirical evidence (Eisenhardt & Grabiner, 2007, p. 27). Case studies are part 
of a strategy focused on understanding the dynamics present within single settings which can 
inspire theory construction that is highly verifiable (Eisenhardt, 1989). Authors who cite Eisenhardt 
reference her work “as a source to give authority to their choice of case and study method...and still 
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regarded as seminal for her approach” (Ravenswood, 2011, p. 685) allowing opportunities to 
explore a significant phenomenon under rare or extreme circumstances (Weick, 1993; Yin, 1994).  
Pursuing case study research involves the use of several disparate collection methods including 
analysis of a variety of different documents and types of documents combined with interviews, and 
data analysis methods to provide coding for triangulation purposes (Dubé & Paré, 2003). This 
method has received some criticism insofar as the emergent findings might not be generalizable 
especially when compared with findings from survey research. To the extent that the aim of science 
is prediction and control Kaplan (1964, p. 91) argues that nomic or nominological generalizations 
must be “truly universal, unrestricted as to time and space and must formulate what is always and 
everywhere the case, provided only that the appropriate conditions are satisfied”. The classic 
concept of generalizability, as defined by Kaplan, suffers from a number of deficiencies which 
Lincoln and Guba (2000, pp. 29–36) argue give way to a better concept of naturalistic 
generalization. Stake (1978, p. 5) argued that case studies will often be the preferred method of 
research because “they may be epistemologically in harmony with the reader’s experience and thus 
to that person a natural basis for generalization”, the meaning intended by the term ‘naturalistic 
generalization’. 
One of the risks of using case studies as part of a research methodology is the risk of bias from 
case selection. This can be mitigated by combining real time and retrospective cases as part of the 
same study (Leonard-Barton, 1990).  Dubé and Paré (2003) advocted a list of attributes for 
evaulating rigour in positivist case research which they defined as “a listing of what the state of the 
art of positivist case research deems to be major considerations” rather than a ‘how to do’ list. In 
this study, the research relies on five cases of which two involved a credit-hire company, two 
involved a ‘non-insurer’ transportation entity and one involved interactions between insurers, the 
police and a credit-hire company and, subsequently, international security agencies and the UK 
government. In addition, several additional cameos were obtained during the interviews which, 
whilst not fully investigated, were verified. Where they assist understanding of the subject matter 
these cameos have also been included in the thesis. In terms of the selection of the cases studies, 
the basis for inclusion was:  
• The first two involved similar instances of insurance fraud perpetrated against a credit-hire 
company victim.  One case was selected because it occurred before, and the other because 
it occurred after, IFED was formed. The objective was to discern if different outcomes 
ensued for the victim and offender from offences committed and reported before and after 
IFED’s creation.   
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• The second two case studies adopted a similar analytical approach but focused on the 
experiences of a large bus company and a firm of solicitors acting for multiple corporate 
entities who self-insure their fleet and who managed motor insurance claims brought 
against their corporate clients. During the interviews for the second two studies, the 
participants claimed that they had long since abandoned any reliance on the police for 
assistance when they had made allegations of fraud and so the distinction between 
outcomes before and after IFED was considered insignificant in circumstances where the 
respondents felt disenfranchised from a state sponsored remedy. Despite this unexpected 
response, a different perspective to the findings reported from the first two case studies 
was obtained, reducing the risk of the research outcomes being impugned as a 
consequence of the Researcher’s former involvement in the credit-hire sector.  
• The final case study explored the link between insurance fraud impacting non-insurer 
victims, the links to global organised crime and the insidious consequences for society when 
a non-insurer victim of insurance fraud is unable to report an offence to the police. 
Objective selection criteria of case studies 
The case studies were selected against the following objective criteria:  
• each case was not part of an ongoing criminal investigation; 
• regarding the first two case studies, one must have arisen pre, and one post, January 2012; 
• each study must involve motor insurance fraud where the victim was a business or 
organisation, not an individual; 
• the aggregate value of the offences in each case exceeded £100,000; 
• each of the first two cases involved a series of offences, committed by the same individual 
or group of individuals acting in concert; 
• in each case, the offence was reported to the police, even if no investigation or prosecution 
ensued. 
The case studies were inspired from the semi-structured interviews after which desktop 
research was used to assimilate the publicly available information, media reporting and collateral 
evidence and, once reviewed and where it added value to the studies, further semi-structured 
interviews from those involved as victims or investigators followed. Each of the case studies:   
• adopted a narrative approach to chart the identification of the offences of insurance fraud 
committed in each case;  
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• explored the inter agency/entity collaboration between non-insurer victim, insurer and 
police;  
• reviewed the case to assess whether it was integrated and demonstrated a shared 
approach to the investigation, detection and prosecution of the offender; and  
• reported the outcome from any subsequent arrest, trial and conviction. 
The case studies add value to the research. They provide powerful information on the 
frustrations and difficulties of preventing motor insurance fraud and the arbitrary approach of the 
police towards investigation and prosecution. They also offered some perspective on the 
behavioural traits of the offenders and the overlap between insurance fraud and other more 
serious offences as well as highlighting the difficulties in detecting, pursuing and prosecuting 
insurance fraudsters. 
The origins of credit-hire 
An insurer’s liability to its policyholder is limited to the range of losses for which cover is 
purchased and is detailed in the policy documents. In the case of a comprehensive motor policy, 
these ‘insured losses’ will typically include:  
• the replacement value of the vehicle in the event it is stolen or damaged beyond 
economic repair; or 
• In the event of an accident, the recovery from the scene and repair of the damaged 
vehicle; and  
• indemnity for the legal costs of defending any claim, and liability for damages awarded 
to the ‘not at-fault’ motorist, where the policyholder is deemed ‘at-fault’ for the 
accident.  
The credit-hire industry originated in 1981 (The CHO, 2012) principally because motor insurers 
had left a gap in the market. Those who were not at fault in an accident were entitled to restitution 
for all of their recoverable losses at common law and not just their insured losses. The additional 
‘uninsured losses’ might include: 
• independent legal advice;  
• funding and/or managing repairs to the damaged vehicle;  
• negotiating a total loss settlement if the vehicle cannot be repaired economically;  
• pursuing damages for loss of earnings, diminution in value of the damaged vehicle or 
personal injury; 
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• recovery of any policy excess paid where repairs were effected through the motorist’s 
comprehensive insurance policy;  
• seeking re-instatement of any no claims bonus;  
• mobility whilst the damaged vehicle was not roadworthy or being repaired; and 
• any comprehensively insured loss unavailable to the motorist with third party only 
insurance cover or because he elects not to claim on his own insurance policy to avoid 
losing any no claims bonus entitlement.  
CHCs identified the gap, understood the entitlement to restitution at common law and 
recognised the not at-fault motorist was being denied his lawful entitlement and that insurers were 
happy to benefit financially from not meeting the obligations of their negligent policyholder where 
he was the at-fault driver.  
The nature and size of the market 
CHCs range in size from large, well-respected public companies, like Redde plc, to small sole 
traders. In many cases they operate under the auspices of the General Terms of Agreement (“GTA”) 
(ABI, 2001), a protocol created by the ABI  to reduce friction and minimise the costs involved in 
settling claims by pre-agreeing standard hire charge tariffs, imposing obligations on the CHC to 
monitor and control the hire period and, in doing so, reduce the likelihood of expensive litigation. 
Most CHCs are also authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority and regulated by the Prudential 
Regulation Authority and, if they handle claims involving the award of compensation for personal 
injury, they may also be authorised by the MOJ. They obtain their business by referral from many 
sources including insurers, motor manufacturers/dealers, body repairers, insurance brokers, 
solicitors, affinity groups and claim management companies. A commission payment is typically 
made to the referring source but the referrer may also be motivated to enhance their customer’s 
journey following an accident, either to capture incremental business and/or add value to an 
existing customer relationship. Motor dealers for example welcome the referral commission and 
the prospect of generating incremental revenue from supplying replacement parts and carrying out 
the repair to their client’s damaged vehicle if the policyholder is persuaded not to process his claim 
through his comprehensive insurance policy, a consequence of which is that the damaged vehicle 
may be moved to the insurer’s own repair network. 
The credit-hire industry is represented by a trade body, the CHO. Its members are reported to 
generate annual hire revenue of c. £600 million (The CHO, 2012) which is a cost ultimately born by 
the insurance industry. Almost 90% of CHO members are regulated and/or authorised and operate 
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in a legitimate and transparent manner complying with an industry code of conduct supported by 
a statement of consumer rights21 (The CHO, 2015). Probably because of the £600 million aggregated 
cost generated by the industry, the tension between it and the insurance industry is palpable. It 
was recognised, for example, in a judgment given by Lord Justice Aikens (Vasani Pattni and First 
Leicester Buses Limited and Darren Bent and Highways and Utilities Construction [2011] EWCA Civ 
1384, 2011): 
“These appeals are fought on two new fronts in the secular war that has now been 
conducted for over 20 years between the motor insurance market and credit car hire 
companies who provide an innocent victim of a motor accident (“an RTA”) with a 
replacement vehicle whilst his is being repaired.”  
 
The economics of the sector may offer an explanation or stimulus for insurer behaviour. The 
CMA (2014) highlighted the financial pressures pleaded by motor insurers who reported facing a 
perfect storm of:  
• decreasing premiums from increased price competition;  
• lower investment returns from depressed interest rates;  
• reducing claims incidence negated by higher claim costs;  
• a higher value per claim driven by the compensation culture; and  
• a belief that insurers could provide mobility to accident victims at a lower cost than the 
amounts charged to them by the credit-hire industry.  
The motor claims eco-system is complex 
Ironically, insurers were always a significant referrer of not at-fault motorists to CHCs because:  
• insurers didn’t typically have the infrastructure to deliver an immediate customer-
focused response and an effective uninsured loss recovery service to an accident 
victim, or  
• they are motivated by the referral commission income, motor insurance being 
inherently loss-making.  
There were 2.8 million motor insurance claims in 2012 from which insurers earned an estimated 
credit-hire referral commission of c. £100 million22 (ibid. p. 2-12, 6-10). Even to an insider, insurers’ 
engagement with credit-hire companies appears schizophrenic. Whilst the commission opportunity 
                                                             
21 See Appendix C 
22 £84 million estimated from a range of £67 to 178 million 
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is an attractive non-premium addition to their premium revenue, it also represents an unattractive 
cost. The majority of credit-hire claims (and so the majority of referral commission forming part of 
those claims) are settled by the insurance industry who could provide mobility to accident victims 
at a lower cost than the amounts charged to them by the credit-hire industry if they could:  
• establish an effective claims management process compatible with the current CHC 
offering,  
• were prepared to guarantee mobility to every accident victim; and  
• do so at an annual cost less than £500 million (c. £600 million of cost generated by CHCs 
less c.£100 million of referral commission earned).    
Following a 2-year market investigation, the CMA declined to deliver the economic change 
demanded by insurers; pricing controls and/or reduced consumer entitlement in a proposal that 
would have eliminated the credit-hire industry. From their econometric analysis, the CMA (ibid. p. 
9) concluded that, whilst the cost of credit-hire services added £3 to the annual cost of every motor 
insurance policy, they couldn’t identify a more economically efficient mechanism which preserved 
the significant collateral benefits the credit-hire industry routinely delivered to consumers. Their 
final report (Competition and Markets Authority, 2014) proposed no change to the process where 
innocent motorists could pursue at common law their claim for restitution for the cost of mobility.  
Credit-hire fraud 
Most CHCs are as susceptible to the actions of insurance fraudsters as are insurers. However, 
in addition to those companies operating ethically as CHO members there are a significant number 
of predominantly unregulated credit-hire entities operating outside of the trade body. Some of 
these businesses have been identified as fraudsters, some have been prosecuted and many others 
often enjoy a very short commercial lifespan, disappearing and then re-emerging in a different 
corporate guise as a means of avoiding detection and prosecution. One organisation that manages 
c.150,000 insurance claims a year on behalf of insurers highlighted the challenge with unregulated 
credit-hire companies. DF2 explained that:  
“… with the GTA stuff we’re reasonably okay because the entity we’re dealing with is 
generally a reputable CHO. Of the 958 third party representatives we receive claims from - 
and you will know that only about 60 CHOs are actually GTA signatories, the rest of them 
aren’t – so … you’d get a company, say ABC Credit-hire Ltd and then you’ll get another 
company called ABC London Credit-hire Ltd … you’d have two entities, the same address, 
slightly different names, but, in fact, the same company” 
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Part of the motivation to avoid detection arises because some of the criminally motivated 
entities have been engaged in organised crash for cash.  
Case Study – Project Saisir 
The Researcher has personal experience of being a corporate victim of insurance fraud whilst 
he was Chief Executive of a Group of businesses with a subsidiary company specialising in counter 
fraud, APU Ltd (“APU”), a vehicle tracking and telematics business (In-car Cleverness Ltd (“ICC”)) 
and a GTA registered credit–hire business, Accident Exchange Ltd (“AX”). He was not, however, 
engaged in the investigation.  
Between 2007-2009 the management team at AX became concerned about several separate 
credit-hire transactions involving many different customers introduced by a variety of referrers. 
The concern arose because of:  
• the unusual geographical movement of the hire vehicles; 
• the coincidental relationship between the hirers and the at-fault parties in some claims 
and the witnesses in others; 
• difficulty in agreeing settlement for some of those claims with insurers; and 
• the hirers frequenting locations where, from APUs intelligence, known fraudsters 
operated. 
APU notified Aviva, AX’s motor fleet insurer, of their concerns.  In turn, Aviva shared their 
concerns about the credibility of many of the hirers. They provided details of an on-going 
investigation they were conducting with the MET, Operation Saisir, which had failed to gain traction 
through want of credible evidence.  Concerned that the hire cars might subsequently be stolen or 
damaged, and because of the questions raised by the available intelligence about other 
transactions involving the hirer or his linked associates, APU arranged for one of the hire cars to be 
covertly recovered.  
It transpired that one of the hirer’s, “Offender 1”, was operating multiple phantom car-hire 
businesses, the ‘virtual fleet’ for which was obtained from legitimate credit-hire companies, 
including AX, following multiple staged or contrived accidents. AX had been an unwitting victim in 
several such claims. To execute his fraud, the offender would take delivery of a hire car from a first 
claim that was dishonest. He would then stage, or invent, other accidents and would produce rental 
documents to support invoices which he would then use to substantiate and pursue his fraudulent 
claims against insurers as if the bogus not-at fault driver from his contrived accident had hired a car 
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from him. The registration numbers used on the rental documentation were those from the 
vehicles originally hired by AX or other credit-hire companies, a ruse that he deployed because he 
believed it gave the fraudulent transactions from his phantom car-hire business an air of credibility 
because the hire cars were registered to reputable CHCs. Following the covert recovery of the AX 
vehicle, vital incriminating documentation was found in the boot which was used to support the 
MET investigation. It included copies of rental documentation from scores of fabricated claims and 
provided the vital evidence that the offenders were operating a fraudulent phantom credit-hire 
business. The rental documentation, when matched with bogus invoices, also identified that the 
same rental vehicles had ostensibly been hired to several different people simultaneously with 
multiple invoices for the same vehicle covering the same time periods deployed in differing claims 
against multiple insurers. Because AX had telemetry in their hire vehicles, ICC were also able to 
provide crucial evidence on the movement of the hire vehicle during the periods being investigated 
which assisted the police in confirming the identities and addresses of other suspects visited by 
each of the hire vehicles, including dishonest body repair and vehicle recovery operators and 
solicitors who were also engaged in the activity. 
It transpired the offenders had been suspected over a two-year period involving over 250 
fraudulent claims. 52 arrests were eventually made although only 30 people were charged. After 
the trial, in which Offender 1 and his associates were convicted and imprisoned, the investigating 
officer told APU that the intelligence and co-operation provided was the catalyst that brought their 
investigation to life; without APU’s evidence those responsible may have remained active and 
avoided conviction. Offender 1 was imprisoned for seven years and three months having been 
found guilty of staging hundreds of road traffic accidents to make insurance claims which would 
have totalled £6.5 million if the fraud had not been uncovered.  His accomplice was found guilty of 
conspiracy to defraud and was sentenced to four years and ten months, it being proven that 
between 2007 and 2008 the syndicate had submitted over 250 fraudulent insurance claims through 
their London-based accident management company. What followed, however, in terms of the 
media reporting of the operation highlighted an element of disrespect that exposes the distant 
relationship between the insurance industry and the credit-hire sector. After the offenders were 
sentenced, reports in the insurance press (Insurance People, 2012) attributed the results of the 
police investigation to the efforts of the IFB airbrushing out the pivotal contribution of APU:  
“Phil Bird, director of the IFB, says, “this investigation demonstrates the sophistication of 
the insurance industry’s counter-fraud activity.  It also shows how insurers are working 
together, through the IFB, to help the police disrupt organised criminal activity” 
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In a later press report (Prosser, 2013) the MET were quoted and the account was more inclusive  
reporting that Offender 1:  
“was brought to justice with the help of evidence compiled by Asset Protection Unit Ltd 
(“APU”), the counter fraud subsidiary of a large credit-hire company.” 
  
CF5, a retired detective employed by APU, drove the intelligence gathering for Project Saisir:  
“Dave Hindmarsh had a department, which was just starting off in the Met. I managed to 
contact them and they came up … We took them through the file of everything we had … 
and they were bowled over. We then fed them other information from the telematics data 
and also recovered another car … in the boot there were personal belongings that we had 
returned to an individual who turned out to be Offender 1.   
 
I had a phone conversation with him ... Initially he denied who he was but eventually he said 
‘look you know who I am and what I’m about, stop messing me around and just send my 
stuff back’ (or words to that effect) and then hung up.  
 
I think the IFB took all the credit for it. You know, and I know that the IFB just processes data 
and doesn’t do any real investigative work. Without our intelligence, the case couldn’t get 
out the starting grid and so it was a bit frustrating to be airbrushed out of the stories that 
followed.” 
 
Project Saisir highlights some unusual atmospheric factors. The insurers involved reported in 
both versions of the published story that they avoided the £6.5 million loss. AX was, however, less 
fortunate. They lost revenue because the initial accidents giving rise to the first hire proved to be 
fraudulent and the charges were, therefore, not recoverable, but they also incurred operational 
and fleet costs associated with all of the fraudulent transactions. Some of the vehicles were 
returned damaged and significant time and manpower, running into several man months for which 
it was never compensated, was invested in the recovery and subsequent investigation. The 
distinction between an avoided loss and an incurred loss have significant implications for a victim, 
only one of them, the incurred loss, resulting in real pecuniary damage. 
The success of the MET operation pre-dated IFED’s creation and is illustrative of the ability and 
value of an insurer, CHC and the police working collaboratively, intelligently and with a common 
purpose in the fight against fraud. If the insurer’s use of the term ‘credit-hire fraud’ is intended to 
be a label to categorise the actions of offenders like Offender 1 then it is aptly chosen. However, 
concerns emanate from within the credit-hire industry that the label is applied pejoratively and is 
likely to, or actually does, impugn the reputation of all CHCs making it harder for those CHCs to 
build credible relationships with the police when they are victims themselves. Evidence of that 
flows from the second cases study where the credit-hire industry was subjected to another wave 
of organised criminal activity in 2014, after 
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between the victim and the police was even more disturbing than the IFB’s decision to erase the 
positive contribution of AX and APU to the prosecution. 
Case Study – Project Atlanta  
Offender 2 stole many hire cars, collectively valued at more than £500,000, over a nine-month 
period in 2014/2015 by creating a complex scam designed to outwit the police.  It was eventually 
foiled by APU. At least eight different CHCs were impacted by his actions and three of them 
provided evidence as part of this research. Offender 2 stole the identities of innocent people, took 
out fake motor insurance policies and even posed as a care assistant who had been a genuine victim 
of several car crashes. He was caught after a sting operation carried out by APU when he tried to 
hire a second car from AX. He had hired from AX previously, his original deception having been 
successful, and stole an Audi A4 which was never recovered. In April 2016, Offender 2 was 
sentenced to two years in prison after pleading guilty to a specimen charge of conspiracy to make 
false insurance claims and steal courtesy cars. The Judge defined him as part of “a sophisticated 
criminal enterprise which duped insurers and stole cars with a view to moving them on for profit.” 
In fact, the victims were CHCs and not insurers, but the Judge noted the significance of the offences 
adding that “fraud is a prevalent crime which has a large impact on the motoring public and 
Offender 2 played a significant role in this” (“‘£200k hire car thief is jailed for two years,’” 2016). 
Offender 2 used false identity details and created fictitious accidents to make hire car bookings 
with CHCs. Before delivery of the hire car, he would change the delivery location, typically asking 
for cars to be handed over in the North of England, often at medical facilities where he claimed to 
be working as a locum medic or, alternatively, claimed to be visiting sick relatives. He fabricated 
crashes in the South of England, East Midlands and West Midlands and after obtaining the hire car 
would quickly dispose of it before adopting a different identity and targeting another hire company. 
CF1 reported that:  
“He had figured out what he thought was a fool-proof way to steal cars. AX lost one car and 
he came back for a second attempt using a different identity but relying on a similar M.O. 
in terms of the accident circumstances, the fact he had only recently purchased his car and 
that he had also only recently incepted his own insurance cover.  
 
We flagged the claim as suspicious and after an industry-wide alert went out we identified 
five or six similar thefts where other credit-hire companies had been targeted. I don’t know 
to this day where those cars ended up or whether they were involved with organised crime; 
I’d guess they were. I know that Burnley Police were looking at charging with at least nine 
charges of thefts of cars and attempted thefts of cars. I also understand that this guy has 
been operating in this way for probably three or four years at least and was thought to be 
exporting the vehicles he stole to France for onward distribution in Eastern Europe.” 
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CF3 said:  
“We had him from Accident Exchange, AI, Kindertons, Prestige and Hertz. He’s moved stuff 
to France and usually does it from a unit in Tysely which is where I think your first Audi 
went.”  
 
Asked if he was still active, CF3 replied:  
“Do bears crap in the woods? We were asked to get involved twice more; one was between 
the two arrests we were involved in and the other was after the second. It’s like I say. The 
risk and reward for him is easy. Your Audi was worth about £30k to you. He’ll make that 
easily if he exports the car.” 
 
Unrelated to Offender 2, CF1 explained that many of the vehicles lost by CHCs were never 
recovered and were often stolen for export or for the sum of the parts. He provided a photograph 
of a BMW 3 Series that was hired to a Romanian working in the UK. The car sent a telemetry alert 
indicating it was being tampered with just a few hours after the hire started. Within two hours of 
that alert the vehicle was located in a warehouse in Essex where it had been dismantled for the 
value of its parts which were loaded on a truck ready to be moved abroad. The photographs below 
indicate the audacity, ingenuity and efficiency of organised criminal gangs and the limited resource 
needed to cannibalise a car to maximise its disposal value in a matter of hours. 
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Figure 4.1: Cannibalising a hire car for parts 
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Reverting to the Project Atlanta case study, CF1 explained how Offender 2 was arrested and 
the reaction from IFED:  
“This guy was a one-man crime wave! We set up an operation where we did a staged 
delivery on another claim, because all we got was a false identity. We actually had this guy 
arrested in Preston by the local police and on that day, well, … let me just rewind it a little 
bit, even before we did that, I tried to refer the matter to IFED thinking this is a cross border 
problem and Offender 2 knew this. He knew police forces are restricted in responding in just 
their geographic area.   
 
He knew the industry. He got false credit cards to pay for the insurance premiums before he 
made a claim and I referred it to IFED for their help. I thought that as the national lead for 
insurance fraud they would want to be involved in this; even the local police were saying, 
this is an IFED job, you need to refer it to IFED.  The response from IFED was bizarre … I was 
told that this isn’t insurance fraud so refer it to the local police. 
 
The sting operation went well and after his arrest (when he attempted to steal the second 
car from AX), we contacted IFED, as did the local police. We both expected them to want to 
get involved because we had got this guy who has, as I say, taken out insurance policies 
using a stolen credit card with the intent of committing criminal offence, staged an accident 
using an innocent victim’s details as the guilty party and he was locked up with false 
documentation and evidence of his involvement in other similar frauds. I was expecting IFED 
to turn up to the interview and help the local police but they didn’t and they said they 
weren’t going to turn up. 
 
Moving on a couple of weeks and whilst he was on police bail, Offender 2 came in again 
from another staged delivery on the back of another fraudulent claim where, again, we had 
him arrested. Moving on a couple of weeks, he did the same again with another credit-hire 
company who notified me. We did another staged delivery and he was arrested again doing 
the same thing - different identity, different address and with him reporting being involved 
in an accident in a different car. It was clear that he had no intention of stopping.  
 
I tried to refer it again to IFED. I’ve even fed the intelligence into IFED through the IFB, and 
nobody came back to me. In desperation, we even asked our insurer, Aviva, to feed the 
intelligence through knowing how IFED perceived the credit-hire industry as part of the 
problem and not part of the solution but they hit the same brick wall.” 
 
On the role of IFED, he continued:  
“IFED’s acceptance criteria means that they will only take reports from the insurance 
industry and only then where there is a clear line of enquiry; my experience is that IFED don’t 
want to do the big investigations, they want the easy hits”.   
 
CH2 recounted her experience with Offender 2: 
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“The only reason we picked up on him was because I’d seen an intelligence report from 
Netfoil23 and, thankfully, the member of staff that was dealing with that claim picked up on 
something not looking right.”  
 
CH2 also reported giving evidence to the APPGIFS. Commenting on the reaction from Jonathan 
Evans MP, Chair of the group, she said:  
“It was very clear that he was heavily influenced with the sound bite he had from IFED. He 
was adamant that DCI Wood had told him IFED never refused to look at an allegation of 
fraud and therefore we were being untruthful even when IFED had specifically written and 
told Neil Thomas that they would not deal with the allegation around Offender 2 because it 
wasn’t reported by an insurer. The fact that he asked Neil to prove it was understandable 
but it showed, I think, that the establishment already had determined outcomes based on 
what others in the establishment, like DCI Wood, told him. That’s what we’re up against…” 
 
CH3 was also a victim of Offender 2 using an alias. He reported that:  
“he took a Mercedes C220 Sport. Contact was made on 8th January 2014, everything 
checked out and we delivered the hire in that week … it was the only Mercedes on fleet that 
didn’t have a tracker, the car went missing and we told the police but we heard nothing 
from them. To be honest Steve, it seems that with the Police, there is just no point … and we 
don’t see IFED as an active player or adviser or body that we can go to or get support from 
really.” 
 
Credit-hire industry – insurer messaging 
If Projects Saisir and Atlanta are indicative of the threat from credit-hire related fraud 
perpetrated by people such as Offender 1 then a reference by Otto Thoresen, Director General of 
the ABI (2014, pp. 19–21) referring to IFEDs ”days of action” in respect of “credit-hire fraud” is 
understandable when considered against the determination of IFED (City of London Police, 2012, 
p. 4) to work “closely with the insurance industry on its strategic priorities”. Taking the most cynical 
assessment, however, it is probable that the term was coined as part of the ABI’s determination to 
again undermine the credibility of the credit-hire industry, an industry responsible for generating 
£500 million of annual net cost for insurers. The credit-hire days of action were aimed at arresting 
a small number of dishonest credit-hire operators. DF1 said:  
“In terms of the day of action and the coverage it got, it did exactly what the insurers 
wanted, I guess. It painted an entire industry as the bad guys because it was on the radio 
and an important MP was there and “the police don’t make mistakes” so it just supported 
the insurers message that credit-hire is a bad thing.” 
 
                                                             
23 Netfoil - an intelligence database from Hill Dickinson Solicitors available to the insurance, legal and credit-hire 
sectors. 
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CF1 was equally sceptical”  
“… it’s around trust and different people’s perceptions of the credit-hire industry ... my 
experience is that the insurance industry are weighted against the credit-hire industry. I’ll 
give you a quick example; when IFED did a recent focus on fraud, they trailed it as credit-
hire fraud. I think insurers are getting confused with their messaging, perhaps deliberately, 
and that’s picked up by the media and the public, so the public are almost subliminally 
persuaded that the police are saying the credit-hire industry is fraudulent, which is far from 
the truth … a lot of insurers see it as a cost and so use different tactics to damage the 
reputation of the industry.”  
Credit-hire exposure to fraud 
None of the above alters the presumption that there must be dishonesty within at least some 
of the 958 claimant entities identified to have traded with duplicate identities when only 60 or so 
are regarded as legitimate GTA subscribers. Organised fraud can involve claims being pursued 
through criminal networks involving disreputable or dishonest repairers, phantom hire-companies, 
solicitors, engineers or doctors but, whilst the ultimate target may be an insurance company 
standing behind an at-fault driver, Projects Saisir and Atlanta demonstrate that the victims of 
insurance fraud can also be the honest and reputable CHC. When individuals unrelated to the 
targeted CHC submit apparently plausible but, with hindsight, fraudulent claims to that CHC, they 
can obtain the use of a hire vehicle by deception often with the intention of using it as a route to 
further criminal gain. They may seek compensation for fictitious multiple whiplash claims, for 
example, or claim compensation by way of a cash in lieu payment for repairs to a car allegedly 
damaged but which has incurred no accident damage at all, whilst the CHC stands to sustain a loss 
if the fraud is suspected and the uninsured loss claim is challenged before the insurer settles the 
hire claim. Dishonest advantage may also involve the theft of the hire-car or the subsequent use of 
the vehicle in other crimes, exactly as Offender 1 did. Alternatively, it might involve a fraudster 
crashing the hire vehicle into another vehicle of a friend or relative so he can claim damages from 
the hire company’s insurer on behalf of the ‘innocent’ friend or relative. This scenario is one 
consistently challenging the conventional rental industry, according to N2, where “every customer 
is an accident waiting to happen and for which we end up picking up the bill”.  
None of the scenarios in which the CHC is an innocent actor lessens the energy of those 
representing insurers to cast the credit-hire industry as part of the problem. Support for the 
proposition that insurers targeted the credit-hire industry as part of their cost reduction strategy 
can be found in their engagement with government (Fuller, 2015):  
“Credit-hire was on the agenda at a high-level government meeting yesterday (9 December 
2015) ... The meeting included representatives of several groups including the Ministry of 
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Justice, other high-level government officials and senior members of the motor insurance 
sector. Sources have told Post it was a "constructive and positive" meeting that covered the 
whiplash reforms proposed in the 25 November Autumn Statement and concerns around 
credit-hire.   
 
Head of communications at the ABI, Anthony Wright said: "We can confirm that the ABI 
facilitated a private meeting between senior ministers and senior representatives of the top 
motor insurers to discuss various issues relating to the cost of motor insurance.”  
The influence of solicitors as lobbyists 
DAC act routinely for insurers in resisting credit-hire claims and in recent years have extended 
their portfolio to include the identification and detection of fraudulent insurance claims. In 2013, 
they produced a granular codification (DAC Beachcroft, 2013, p. 29) aimed at targeting the source 
of fraud, which they ultimately perceive as emanating from the CHC. It identified nine categories 
which they recommended insurers utilise in their screening together with their proprietary risk 
indicators and bespoke strategies to manage or resist the quantum of credit-hire claims. The nine 
screening categories were: 
• Phantom Hire - a claim presented by a credit-hire company for a hire that did not take 
place. 
• Phantom Hirer – a credit-hire claim where the hirer does not exist or is unaware a claim 
has been submitted in his name. 
• Phantom Hire Vehicle – a credit-hire claim where the hire vehicle does not exist or was 
in the possession or control of another during the alleged hire period. 
• Phantom Hire Organisation – a claim involving a non-verifiable CHC. 
• Simultaneous Hire - claims where the same hire vehicle was in use during the same or 
overlapping periods. 
• Artificial Exaggeration – a claim where duration has been artificially “improved” or 
where vehicle damage has been artificially worsened to extend the hire period. 
• Staged/Contrived - credit-hire claims with concerns the accident has been staged or did 
not happen and generally involves policyholder collusion. 
• Induced - credit-hire claims where an innocent policyholder's vehicle has been induced 
into collision with the third-party vehicle.  
• Credit-hire Fraud Rings/ Networks - networks of organised fraudulent activity generally 
denoted by an Operation Name. 
Detecting insurance related fraud has long been an objective for many solicitors’ keen to 
demonstrate their counter-fraud expertise as a differentiator and means of securing more insurer 
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generated work. It has helped sustain the ‘secular war’ as credit-hire claims became subject to 
increased scrutiny and potential rejection based on a desktop review ahead of engaging with those 
representing the not at-fault motorist. The counter fraud sector’s effectiveness to deal with the 
increased detection of fraud may have peaked by July 2014 as one leading firm, Hill Dickinson, made 
39 of its counter-fraud group redundant (Ganage-Stewart, 2014) whilst at the same time reporting 
an increase in the level of instructions received of 15%. Keoghs, another solicitor firm that work 
with insurers providing outsourced claims management, fraud detection and investigation services, 
also produce an annual motor fraud index. In the 2014 edition (Keoghs, 2014, pp. 4–6) they 
identified high-risk areas by postcode and suggested using that analysis as a means of assessing if 
a claim might be contrived. They also summarised their view of the range of evolving fraud risks: 
• for the first time in several years, the majority of fraudulent claims were linked to fraud 
rings; 
• the current market was “consolidating and volatile”; 
• staged claims accounted for 26.25% of fraudulent claims in 2012 compared with 
40.33% in 2011; 
• in the same period, claims involving organised fraudsters grew from 23.2% in 2011 to 
34.37%; 
• induced claims grew from 5.9% to 10.1; and, 
• the number of fraudulent claims defined as ‘miscellaneous or credit-hire’ increased 
from 8.7% of the total in 2011 to 10.2% in 2013. 
Mixing credit-hire with other claims analysed as ‘miscellaneous’, which the report does, is 
unhelpful in identifying the materiality or frequency of alleged fraud involving credit-hire but, 
perversely, helpful in ensuring that the issue of credit-hire remains identified as a potential source 
of fraud whatever the evidence. Without doubt, the imperative of reducing fraud is well-
established on the dashboard of defendant solicitors and insurers. 
An historic perspective 
Whilst today, data around insurance fraud is more prolific and the conclusions inferred from it 
more insightful, looking back to the late 1980s, Clarke (1990, p. 2) identified two factors driving the 
recognition of fraud by insurers; their willingness to take steps to detect it and then, assuming 
success, deciding whether to record it as fraud. He observed that most insurers applied low cost 
measures to identify dishonest claims and would deal with them by rejecting the claim or, where it 
was discovered afterwards, or considered inimical to the cost of claims generally, increase 
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premiums to compensate in subsequent years.  Clarke identified the priority for insurers was 
protecting their interests, and those of honest policyholders, by resisting suspicious claim and 
refusing further cover with only the most flagrant offenders being reported for criminal 
investigation. Where fraud was a problem he reported the preference was to raise premiums, to 
avoid the costs of effective fraud control and verification systems, and to minimise the damaging 
publicity from civil litigation in disputed claims. By the mid 1990s the increased deployment of 
computerised registers enabled some insurers to start measuring and focusing more diligently on 
identifying potential fraud and, according to Dixon (1997, p. 236)  for the ABI to claim a 2.5% 
reduction in the cost of fraudulent claims between 1994 and 1995. By 2009, the ABI claimed a 
combination of factors driving  improved fraud detection rates (Goss & O’Neill, 2009, p. 6) from 
• dedicated fraud teams;  
• new and sophisticated IT-based processes including rules-based scorecards and 
predictive analytics for automatically flagging suspect claims;  
• voice stress analysis, conversation management and cognitive interviewing techniques; 
and,  
• increasing adoption of commercially available databases and software solutions. 
The economic downturn started in 2008 probably influenced the drive for efficiency too.  By 
2012, Gee, Button and Brooks (2012), felt the insurer engagement with the fraud agenda had 
improved albeit that the response rate to their survey was less than 100% and they did observe 
that those that did respond were more likely to be positively engaged with the fraud agenda and 
so potentially skew the result. That aside, it was reported, inter alia, that 100% of those responding 
had arrangements in place for promptly reporting suspected fraud and 94.3% had a policy setting 
out how to detect possible fraud. 
N4 commented on his experience with insurers:  
“… one of the best bits of advice we ever got was from a guy at AIG, ‘don’t target your guys 
with fraud savings … as soon as you start targeting them with fraud savings, they all start 
saving that level’.   
 
So, if you say, save me a million pounds, they’ll say, I’ve saved a million pounds and most 
insurers put these figures out there.  If you look at what they’ve saved because of captures 
and as a result of fraud, in theory it’s made up. You get a claim with five potential injuries 
and you only pay out on three does not mean the other two were fraudsters … none of our 
guys are targeted because it encourages manipulation; it’s just not factual.” 
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Ericson (1993, p. 540) argued that insurance claim fraud was a case of “making crime”. Pointing 
to a comment from a US insurance industry executive, he highlights the irony that the increasing 
focus on the detection and reporting of claims fraud is integral to keep premiums down in a 
regulatory environment where increased claim costs can no longer be passed on to consumers by 
way of higher premiums. The parallel with the UK insurance market is intriguing. In the depths of 
recession insurers managed to avoid criticism for imposing double-digit percentage increases in 
motor insurance premiums because of  increasing levels of fraudulent claims prompting a comment 
from the TSC (2011a, p. 5) that: 
“premiums would continue to increase because insurers needed to make up for several 
recent lean years; that insurers currently spent around £1.20 for every £1 collected in 
premiums; and that the underwriters of motor insurance had been loss-making since 1994.” 
 
DAC (2013, pp. 7–11) were critical of the maturity of insurer fraud avoidance strategies citing 
the UK Claims Director for Zurich Insurance, that “[credit-hire fraud] needs a tough line from the 
judiciary, and an appetite to tackle the problem head on.” Other insurer commentators reported 
an increase in “credit-hire only fraud, which predominantly follows the approach of false 
documentation, staged accidents or induced accidents. Off the back of this, we’ve seen an increase 
in organisations inflating the costs of their claims in order to maximise their profit margins” (ibid. 
p.13). The latter reference appears to be an attack on CHCs based on DAC’s screening categorisation 
although such a conclusion might be unfounded before a claim is properly investigated.  Ben 
Fletcher (ibid. p. 5), director of the IFB, suggested a more balanced view, which touches on the 
nature of the research:  
“… In other examples, credit-hire companies become the victims of ‘crash for cash’ gangs, 
where hire vehicles are obtained following a ‘crash for cash’ and used to commit other 
serious crimes.”  
 
This was an isolated outcome from the DAC report; an insurer-related source acknowledging 
that CHCs can become innocent victims of fraudulent claims although DAC did advance an 
argument (ibid. p.27)  
“a credit-hire organisation is uniquely placed to be a first line of defence to the opportunistic 
fraudsters who use credit-hire organisations’ own fleets vehicles to commit fraud”. 
 
Resistance from insurers to engage with the credit-hire industry on the issue of fraud became 
a recurrent feature in the research. I6, DF1, DF3, DF4, CF1, CF2, CF3, CF4, CH1, CH2, CH3, CH4, N1, 
N2 and N3 all expressed similar views that it was because of the indirect economic benefits of 
supressing the effectiveness of the credit-hire industry. DF1 felt that by maintaining the impression 
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that the industry was dishonest, and so making it harder for CHCs to settle claims, insurers would 
deliver improved profitability absent the ability to increase insurance premiums as suggested by 
Ericson. He said:  
“part of this has been … that since the formation of IFED, if you can get the Daily Mail behind 
the government and behind the insurance industry then you are going to create an 
environment where insurers have got the power to determine exactly how they play in the 
space and how they control the normal economic threats. The thing that confuses me is that 
… there are bad guys out there who need to be stopped and brought to justice. I am not 
convinced that same perspective exists with insurers; I think they are motivated solely by 
their profit and loss.” 
 
CH2 said:  
“I would like to be able to say to an insurer, “OK; we’ve done these checks, this is the 
evidence we’ve got so let’s share it. 
 
 I’d like to allow registered access to the information so that we all share the same warnings 
and alerts and can deal with the challenges we face and prevent whoever it is, getting 
access to assets or value that he should not have access to … but that won’t happen will it 
… insurers have too much data which they don’t want us to have and they seem quite happy 
hanging us out to dry when they know we’ve inadvertently become involved in a dodgy 
claim that they have no intention of settling?”  
 
N4 said:  
“Everybody’s so paranoid about fraud that they just don’t help or share.  I think the only 
person that helps is the fraudster who relies on that disorganisation from those paying the 
claims … I can’t help thinking though that insurers like concealing their hand knowing the 
irrecoverable costs they are pushing into our side of the supply chain.”  
Credit-hire companies – experience of fraud 
So, what of fraud perpetrated against CHCs in circumstances where they become unwittingly 
deceived? There is no literature addressing the circumstances in which CHCs might be victims of 
fraud and there has been no discernible appetite by insurers, or IFED, to engage the credit-hire 
industry in the fight against it. After repeated requests for assistance, Detective Superintendent 
Woodall from the CLP declined to participate in the research. Further, in a business meeting with 
the Researcher24, she indicated that IFED was not an available route for the credit-hire industry to 
                                                             
24 8th April 2015 
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pursue fraudsters although she did say CLP would be happy to take data to feed in to their 
intelligence systems through Action Fraud25.    
As well as a lack of literature, there is also no published data quantifying the levels of fraud 
against credit-hire companies. There is, however, evidence from individual CHCs of the police, 
including IFED, declining to investigate allegations of fraud where the complainant is a CHC 
(Finnegan, 2014). To resolve the information deficit, a cross-sectional survey was undertaken, to 
investigate outcomes from the perspective of the CHC or, if they sub-contracted the claim 
management process, their associated solicitor. The survey also aimed to gather some empirical 
data on the size of the motor insurance fraud problem to the credit-hire industry and, more 
specifically: 
• the quantum of insurance fraud impacting the credit-hire sector; 
• the relationship between insurers and CHCs in respect of allegations of fraud in cases 
where the insurer suspected an insurance claim submitted by the CHC was fraudulent 
and sought to reject it; 
• the attitude of insurers towards the credit-hire sector; 
• the relationship between the police and CHCs in respect of allegations of fraud where 
the hire company had been deceived by a client acting fraudulently and sought to 
report an offence; and 
• the attitude of the credit-hire industry to the police and the impact, or perceived 
impact on the credit-hire industry, following the creation of IFED in 2011. 
The survey was opened on 7th March 2015 for twenty-one days with the final response received 
on the 24th March 2015. The survey document appears at Appendix A and the responses to the 
survey questions are analysed below.  
Survey response - analysis  
From sixty invitations to participate, twenty-nine completed responses (48%) were received. 
Nineteen further responses were ignored because they were incomplete or duplicated26 . An 
analysis of the respondent demographic appears in Table 4.1 below. 
                                                             
25 Action Fraud; a central point for reporting fraud (http://www.actionfraud.police.uk)  
26 The duplications were identified by the IP address from which the survey responses were submitted and those 
that were incomplete were aborted too early in the survey to make the data of any value. 
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Table 4.1: Respondent demographic by source 
To assist in the data analysis, CHCs were asked to indicate the size of their business by reference 
to:  
• turnover,  
• size of fleet, and  
• number of claims processed annually.  
Three variables were selected because, like conventional car-hire companies, a CHC may 
operate a mix of vehicle types which, in the case of those operating in the prestige sector where 
the typical per diem rental rate for hire is high, can produce anomalies between reported turnover 
and the size of fleet operated or number of claims processed. Using a combination of the three 
chosen variables, the respondents were classified as either small, medium or large in size based on 
the divisions set out in Table 4.2. No analysis was carried out in respect of those five solicitors 
responding, effectively, as agents for those CHCs who sub-contracted their claim settlement work. 
 
Table 4.2: Respondent demographic by size 
By reference to the preponderance of small operators in the sector, the credit-hire industry is 
a relatively immature industry. The largest provider is Enterprise Rent a Car, a global operator that 
includes credit-hire turnover as a component of its total revenue but doesn’t publish any segmental 
analysis. In the period to July 2014 Enterprise reported UK turnover in excess of £500 million (2014).   
The CHO represents the majority of survey respondents but the response rate in respect of the 
small number of companies who were not members of the CHO, but were invited to participate in 
the survey, was broadly similar. Responses were received from about 50% of invitations sent in 
Count 	% Count % Count 	%
Credit	Hire	Company	("CHC") 24 83% 22 88% 2 50%
Solicitor	acting	for	a	CHC 5 17% 3 12% 2 50%
Total 29 25 4
Respondent										
Demographic NoYes
CHO	Member
Total
Value Count Value Count Value Count
Annual	turnover <£5m 15 £5m	-	£20m 5 £20m	+ 4
Size	of	rental	fleet <500 15 501	-	2,000 5 2,000	+ 4
Claims	processed	annually <5,000 15 5,001	-20,000 5 20,000	+ 4
Variable
LargeMediumSmall
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respect of those who were or were not members of the trade body. The respondents and whether 
they were members of the trade body is analysed in Table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3: Respondents analysed by CHO membership 
Credit-hire experience of insurance fraud  
As previously outlined, CHCs can experience fraud in many ways. At its most simplistic, they 
may have been deceived into providing a hire car to a fraudster believing him to be a genuine 
accident victim when the accident was a staged or phantom accident and where the fraudster gains 
pecuniary advantage using the vehicle without payment or possibly by stealing the hire car. 
Alternatively, it may be that the CHC has acted in good faith in providing a hire car only to be alerted 
by the insurer against whom they seek to recover their hire charges that the claim is perceived by 
that insurer to be fraudulent. In fact, it may or may not transpire that the claim is fraudulent but 
the adoption of an immediate defensive stance by the insurer will have multiple effects:  
• It might impact the expense the hire company incurs by reference to the time taken to 
fully investigate the claim, obtain evidence and litigate in order to obtain a settlement; 
or  
• to avoid these potential additional costs, the CHC may terminate the hire writing off 
any recorded charges and recover their hire vehicle. 
The chart at Figure 4.2 below illustrates the extent to which CHCs report having experienced 
claims being rejected by insurers because of allegations of fraud.  All medium and large CHCs 
reported having experienced rejection and most small companies concurred. 
Count 	% Count 	% Count 	% Count 	%
Yes 22 92% 15 100% 4 80% 3 75%
No 2 8% 0 0% 1 20% 1 25%
Total 24 15 5 4
CHO	by	size
Total
CHO	Member LargeMediumSmall
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Figure 4.2: Do insurers reject claims by alleging fraud 
Whilst insurers choosing to allege fraud doesn’t seem controversial, especially if fraud is as 
endemic as the ABI suggests, the point at which they choose to notify the CHC of a potential fraud 
possibly is. A CHC will typically hire a car to an accident victim for a period up to three weeks whilst 
their own vehicle is repaired. Depending on the hire car, the rental income generated per 
transaction can range between £300 and £2,500 and the hire car will have a value of between 
£8,000 and £150,000.  The CHC is at risk from the prospect of not recovering their revenue and 
from the expensive asset being damaged or stolen during the period their client’s car is being 
repaired. The point at which an insurer advances any allegation of potential fraud, therefore, could 
be critical to the avoidance of any loss by the hire company if an allegation has merit.  
Comments from interviewees post completion of the survey emphasised the significance of the 
timing of notification. CH3 said:   
“One of the things we experience is that we put a car on hire and then, at some stage, an 
insurer will allege fraud but their handler says, ‘we can’t deal with you or talk about the 
claim because it’s been passed to our fraud team’ … we used to say ‘if the insurer says it’s 
fraud, then it must be fraud’ and so we’re stuffed, won’t make a recovery and we wrote it 
off.  
 
We got a bit more assertive about it over time and were surprised to see that insurers would 
back down and we started to get these claims settled. It’s an easy word to use if you are an 
insurer isn’t it? Say ‘fraud’ and everyone just backs away for fear of being accused of being 
involved.” 
 
When asked if he considered it might be a tactical ruse to avoid paying claims he replied: 
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“Possibly … I am not convinced they are that intelligent but it may be. Our industry is 
relatively young, insurers have had to face with paying hire charges they probably would 
rather not pay and so it may be just a tactic or part of a plan to make it harder for businesses 
like ours to survive. You’d think they might have learnt how to communicate more 
intelligently … when I am talking to our recoveries department, if they are trying to settle 
bigger files above £5,000 that alleging fraud is almost a reflex reaction – ‘we can’t pay 
because we are investigating and I can’t tell you what or why’”.  
 
CH2, when asked when insurers would typically notify her about a fraud allegation responded:  
“Always after you’ve invoiced ...  That’s the unbelievably frustrating thing because if you 
have a claim referred to the insurer’s investigation department then, obviously, we could 
have an alert on the hire straight away and will seriously question whether we leave the 
client in hire.  Likewise, if we are having conversations and they say there is information we 
have but we can’t talk to you about it then we will have a look at the claim more closely to 
see where we are but that refusal to say “well, this is why we’re investigating and we think 
you need to be careful as well” why can't they do that when the failure to work together 
only benefits the fraudster and harms us all?” 
 
The Director General of the CHO said:  
“… it’s a horrible virtual circle. The insurers have more data than we do on fraud … You then 
get the issue about whether that data is on known fraud or suspected fraud, which is 
inevitable.  It regularly happens where we would be unaware of the data that might attach 
to an individual when we put them in a car.  And five months later, when we’re still chasing 
payment, we’re told, ‘we’re not paying it because we think it’s fraudulent, because of 
undisclosed reasons’.  And our members just don’t get paid.   
 
The co-operation between us and insurance companies is poor.  I understand some of the 
issues why they can’t data share but we’ve been talking to insurers for four years about 
improving our data sharing, and nothing’s happened; our members are the only losers and 
the fraudster wins every time.” 
 
Whilst those responses might have been anticipated some insurers agreed. I4 commented: 
“…if I had a frustration it would be the credit-hire industry sits on data, our industry sits on 
data, the claimant law firm community sits on data and I hear a lot of people in the claimant 
law firm community are quite perturbed about how much it’s hurting them; they waste 
large amounts of money dealing with dishonest clients.  We should all be saying, well, can’t 
we just have something we all feed into and we all benefit from?  And there’d be a lot of 
people saying that couldn’t happen, I’m in the camp where it should happen, you know, we 
just need to find a way of doing it. “ 
 
Reverting to the survey, the analysis revealed that insurers communicated most allegations of 
fraud to the CHC after or near the end of the hire period. At this point, assuming the hire car had 
not been stolen, the CHC will have incurred the costs and expense of providing their service and, if 
the claim was fraudulent, would suffer the greatest revenue loss. Only one small CHC respondent 
reported insurers having provided full disclosure at the start of the hire period at which point they 
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could have managed their risk of exposure accordingly. The chart at Figure 4.3 below indicates the 
respondent’s experience of this phenomenon. 
 
Figure 4.3: At what point do insurers first allege fraud 
It is noteworthy that in less than 20% of claims where insurers had originally alleged fraud was 
the allegation pursued by them or the claim proven to be fraudulent.  
In addition, most respondents reported difficulty in engaging with insurers to share intelligence 
to help reduce the incidence of fraud. The responses are summarised in Figure 4.4 below and 
indicated that most small, medium and large credit-hire companies disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the assertion that insurers engaged adequately to reduce the incidence of fraud. 
 
Figure 4.4: perception of intelligence sharing by insurers 
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In terms of the frequency at which insurers raised allegations of fraud in claims managed by 
CHC’s there were a majority of small, medium and large companies that reported the incident rate 
had increased or stayed the same. When so few allegations are pursued or proven, the consistency 
in terms of the allegations being notified suggests either overuse of the mechanism or the selection 
for the allegations on the same volume of claims being driven by some other operational metric 
e.g. the likely size of the claim based on the vehicle hired, the postcode location of the claimant or 
the identity of the CHC, as a means of impacting the operational efficiency of the CHC in the 
expectation that they might abandon the claim. The analysis appears in the chart at Figure 4.5 
below. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Change in incidence of insurer fraud allegations 
In terms of losses experienced by the credit-hire industry, all four of the large companies 
surveyed, 67% of medium CHCs and 62% of smaller CHCs reported having suffered a loss having 
fallen victim to a fraudulent event (see Figure 4.6 below). 
29%
14%
50%
80%
0%
20%
50%
0%
50%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
No Change Decreased Increased
C
olum
n %
Have fraud allegeations decreased, stayed the same, increased or don't know?
(N=24) 
Small CHC Medium CHC Large CHC
  
 
135 
 
Figure 4.6: CHC report of a loss after a fraud 
The average fraud loss reported varied between small, medium and large CHCs with the 
analysis set out in Table 4.4 below. The mean for all respondents was £5,768.16 per incident with 
medium size CHCs reporting a far higher mean loss of £12,500 and larger companies a smaller loss 
of £2,690.48. It may be that the scale at which larger companies operate allow for stronger counter 
fraud measures to be implemented whilst smaller companies have a smaller fleet and might impose 
greater control over the quality of the hirer or simply be less exposed to fraud based on their smaller 
market share; the variance, however, may merit further investigation.  
 
Table 4.4: Average fraud loss per incident 
Credit-hire engagement with the police 
The Police are not regarded by CHCs as an effective ally in the fight against fraud. CH3 said:  
“We do report things but I don’t have that much faith in the police. In the end, we just have 
to give up. The police are not interested in helping…” 
 
Commenting on his impression of the level of engagement by both IFED and local forces with 
his members, the CHO Director General said:  
“I’m tempted to use the words defensive and frictional although it’s limited interaction, at 
this stage.  One of the reasons for that is that I can only talk to IFED about individual 
circumstances that my members report back to me.  But where I have seen examples of a 
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member having definitive, even video recorded evidence, of an individual engaging in 
systematic and repetitive fraud and … where those members have reported this to IFED the 
responses have been “we only investigate fraud reported by insurance companies” which, 
is a little bit shocking, to think that if you don’t directly fund that particular police activity, 
they won’t investigate it.” 
  
Ten respondents confirmed having been victims of frauds and having approached the police to 
report the offences. Table 4.5 below identifies that eight of ten confirmed the police accepted a 
report of at least ‘some’ of the incidents they reported and in the case of two out of ten CHCs there 
was an arrest and prosecution. 
 
 
Table 4.5: CHC engagement with the police post fraud allegation 
Those respondents, who had suffered a loss through fraud but were unable to persuade the 
police to investigate were asked to identify as many reasons that they were given for the refusal 
from a list of options. Table 4.6 lists the options and indicates the number of references made to 
each option.  
 
Table 4.6: Reasons given by police for refusing to investigate a fraud 
The most common response was that insurance fraud was not a force priority followed by a 
lack of available resources and a suggestion that the complainant should contact IFED. The chart at 
Count 	% Count 	% Count 	% Count 	%
Yes 10 71% 5 63% 2 67% 3 100%
No 4 29% 3 38% 1 33% 0 0%
Total 14 8 3 3
Yes,	for	all	reported	offences	 1 10% 1 20% 0 0% 0 0%
Not	for	all	reported	offences	 8 80% 4 80% 1 50% 3 100%
No 1 10% 0 0% 1 50% 0 0%
Offences	not	reported 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 10 5 2 3
2 100% 1 100% 	-	 	-	 1 100%
Total 2 1 	-	 1
Have	you	had	a	fraud	loss?
If	so,	were	the	police	willing	to	accept	your	report	of	an	offence	and	investigate	it?
How	often	did	an	arrest	and	prosecution	ensued?
LargeMediumSmall
CHC	by	Size
Total
Total Small Medium Large
Mentions Mentions Mentions Mentions
Civil	matter	-	sue	the	hirer 2 2 0 0
Claim	on	your	insurance	policy 1 1 0 0
No	resource	to	investigate 3 1 1 1
Referred	me	to	IFED 3 0 1 2
Referred	offence	to	IFED	who	declined	to	act 2 0 0 2
Insurance	fraud	is	not	a	force	priority 5 0 2 3
Insufficient	evidence	to	investigate 1 1 0 0
Come	back	with	more	evidence 0 0 0 0
Total 17 5 4 8
Why	could	you	not	report	to	the	police
CHC	Size
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Figure 4.7 presents the same results graphically and show the similarity of responses for small 
medium and large companies save that one smaller CHC reported a rejection due to insufficient 
evidence. In addition, five smaller respondents said they did not know why the police declined to 
act. 
 
Figure 4.7: Reasons given by police for refusing to investigate a fraud 
Turning to those incidents where an attempt was made by the CHC to report a fraud, and the 
police refused to even record the offence, respondents were given a similar list of response options 
to choose from.  The next table, 4.7, summarises the responses and the chart at Figure 4.8 presents 
the same results graphically. 
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Figure 4.8: Reasons given by police for refusing to record a fraud 
When asked if it had become harder for CHCs to engage the police to investigate fraudulent 
claims since the formation of IFED the majority thought it had although with less conviction than 
the response to earlier questions about the propensity for insurers to allege fraud.  
20% of small CHCs, 60% of medium and 75% of the large companies responded that it had 
become harder for the credit-hire industry to engage the police since the formation of IFED. The 
bias towards larger companies expressing a more critical view may be a function of their greater 
exposure to fraud due to their size and the number of transactions handled annually and their 
relative maturity and commitment to best practice in eliminating risk. Based on publicly available 
accounting records, the largest four suppliers in the sector accounted for more than 80% of the 
industry’s annual turnover. The results are presented at Figure 4.9 below. 
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Figure 4.9: Difficulties in engaging police post creation of IFED 
CF1, a former detective, outlined how his perspective had altered since retirement when 
comparing how he would have reacted to an allegation of fraud by a CHC compared with the 
experience he now has of engaging with the police:  
“I think back then, first your complaint would have been recorded as a crime … we’d have 
understood, yes, it is a crime as opposed to civil debt. It would have been analysed and 
investigated by the person taking the report and then it would have been allocated to an 
investigator. I think the difference, and my experience reinforces this, is that if the same 
crime were reported today, I’m not confident that, firstly, it would be recorded and, 
secondly, that it would be investigated.  I base that on a conversation I’ve had with serving 
police officers where we’ve been told to report things to Action Fraud but then I’ve also been 
told that West Midlands have a policy of filing more than 60% of reported frauds that come 
to them for action from Action Fraud” 
 
 
As well as the perception that it has become harder to engage the police, most CHCs responding 
to the survey expressed a view that the ABI relationship with IFED had helped promote a negative 
view of the credit-hire industry (see Figure 4.10 below). 
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Figure 4.10: Have the ABI and IFED promoted a negative view of the credit-hire industry 
Most respondents also felt that the relationship between the ABI had created a situation where 
insurers benefitted to the detriment of the credit-hire industry. The responses are represented 
graphically in the chart at Figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.11: Perceived detriment to the credit-hire industry from the ABI’s relationship with IFED 
One of the issues explored in the research is whether the perceived detriment applies to other 
non-insurer victims of fraud, specifically bus companies like Stagecoach and First Group and self-
insured corporate entities operating large fleets. N4 said in interview:  
“My experience is that the large corporate companies I deal with are not able to get 
anything reported into IFED because they don’t contribute to it so they won’t have their 
cases accepted. They don’t generally report it to the police because they know after long 
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years of experience that the police just aren’t interested.  I think it’s probably no longer a 
frustration; it’s probably something they’ve come to accept.” 
 
N1, head of claims for a transportation company, gave a similar response. He said:  
“… we, and our insurer, have never been able to get IFED to look at anything big that we 
have felt should involve the police. The feedback from Travellers has been that the loss 
needs to be well into six figures before we can get them interested and because our excess 
is at that level anyway, it’s doubtful we’ll ever reach their claim threshold.” 
 
There are two case studies featured in the next chapter which explore in more depth the 
experiences of these two sector respondents as non-insurer victims of fraud. 
Conclusion from survey data 
It had been an aim of the survey to quantify the extent of fraud being suffered by the credit-
hire industry because of the absence of published research on the subject. However, the nature of 
the questions, deliberately framed to protect respondents from having to disclose sensitive 
information, impacted on the ability to obtain granular data which might have allowed the 
Researcher to quantify the scale of the fraud problem. In addition, one of the larger CHCs, Helphire, 
declined to complete the survey at all, their Chief Executive unwilling to disclose what he felt was 
commercial and potentially market sensitive information. That aside, just under 50% of the 
population responded to the survey from a mix of small, medium and large companies and the 
results were, therefore, compelling and of value as a basis for identifying the issues to be explored 
in the subsequent qualitative interviews.  
The results indicated a fragile relationship between insurers and CHCs in cases where the 
insurer alleged a claim submitted by the CHC was fraudulent, often failed to disclose why and 
occasionally sought to reject it. The survey also identified a perceived resistance from insurers to 
communicate and share intelligence on fraud issues. It also highlighted a disconnected relationship 
between the police and the credit-hire industry and CHCs in respect of their willingness to accept 
reports of fraud allegations where the credit-hire company had been deceived by a client acting 
fraudulently although in a number of cases there was evidence of investigations being carried out. 
A lack of meaningful communication between CHCs, the ABI, insurers, the police and IFED was the 
deficiency which, if resolved, might improve the prospects for identifying and prosecuting those 
engaged in organised crime, a theme that emerged through some of the case studies and 
qualitative interviews. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter identified that the credit-hire industry evolved to fill a demand for consumers 
arising from a disengaged insurance industry over a period of thirty years. It detailed the nature of 
the services that CHCs provide for consumers and exposed a relationship between the industry and 
insurers that the judiciary has likened to a ‘secular war’. Examples were detailed of solicitors using 
evolving counter-fraud strategies to assist insurers reduce the cost of credit-hire claims, as part of 
their overall claims cost, in an environment where, ironically, the insurance industry benefits from 
an annual credit-hire commissions of £100 million but also shares the £600 million cost of credit-
hire. The ambiguity of the term ‘credit-hire fraud’ was explored and the emerging regulatory 
interest in the sector was noted with the TSC and CMA both encouraged to review the cost of 
private motor insurance because of insurer concerns about profitability. The chapter also provided 
commentary on the limited empirical data available on the quantum of fraud impacting the credit-
hire industry and whilst the output from a cross-sectional survey did not advance knowledge in 
respect of quantum, it did identify tensions between CHCs and insurers and the police; insurers 
lacked any appetite to collaborate to reduce the incidence of fraud and the police were reluctant 
to record or investigate fraud reported by CHCs and more reluctant post the creation of IFED. The 
chapter also offered two case studies that highlighted the extent to which CHCs are targeted by, 
and are victims of, insurance fraudsters, the advantages of collaboration and the pivotal role that a 
CHC can play in helping to expose organised criminal activity using intelligent ‘real-time’ telematics 
data. 
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Chapter 5 Other Non-Insurer Victims of Fraud  
Introduction 
The previous chapter looked at the credit-hire sector and the perception CHCs had of their 
exposure, as victim, to offences involving insurance fraud. Two cases studies contrasted the 
experience of CHCs impacted by fraud before and after the creation of IFED. This chapter explores 
the position for other non-insurer victims of fraud, focusing on the experiences and approach of 
bus companies and businesses operating large vehicle fleets where the insurance risk is largely self-
insured. Typically, those entities find it economically beneficial to retain responsibility for a high 
policy excess and to deal with the cost of claims brought against them up to the amount of the 
excess without the indemnifying background insurer’s involvement. In one case the excess was £5 
million. The chapter includes the outcomes from the semi-structured interviews with participants 
from both sectors, and desktop analysis supporting two cases studies using the experience of bus 
companies and large fleet operators. The chapter also relates the perspective of a counter-fraud 
specialist who has identified links between those offenders targeting CHCs and car-hire companies 
with serious organised criminal activity.  A further case study then chronicles the events 
surrounding a fraud committed against a CHC which involved the acquisition of a high-value vehicle 
as part of an uninsured loss claim which was reported to but rejected for investigation by the MET, 
IFED and by NAVCIS but which then became the focal point of an international investigation into an 
organised crime ring stealing and exporting high value prestige vehicles to East Africa. The case 
study includes a summary of the de-brief at the end of the investigation.  
Self-insured and co-insured fleets 
In this thesis, the term ‘self-insured’ defines those entities that behave as an insurer by taking 
the full economic risk of insuring a motor vehicle together with those organisations that share the 
initial economic risk with their insurer by settling claims brought against them up to a specified 
excess limit before expecting a background insurer to pay claims beyond that amount. Whilst an 
alternative to conventional motor insurance, self-insuring requires policyholders to assume skills 
and competencies normally provided by an insurer. As a minimum, and before assuming the risk, 
estimating the potential ‘per claim’ cost and the probability of their employee being involved in an 
accident relative to the age, history and driving experience of all of those people likely to drive as 
well as the annual mileage covered and the claims history in prior years. To be viable, the expected 
costs of self-insuring need to be lower than the cost of conventional insurance arrangements where 
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an insurer will price and manage the risk and deal with the expense of any claims. Self-insurers pay 
something and, in some cases, everything, for every collision and accepting that open-ended risk 
requires a cultural change to risk and for line managers, and those settling claims, to focus the 
business on the cost of collisions and preventing them (“‘Insurance: 10 fleet questions answered,’” 
2010). CH4 confirmed his company’s excess level to be £25,000 and N1 and N2 confirmed theirs to 
be £100,000. N4, a solicitor acting for larger corporate fleet operators, reported several of his 
clients were “effectively self-insured but carried ‘long-stop’ cover with a background insurer in the 
event of a catastrophic claim”. He reported clients often carrying excesses as high as £1 million and, 
in one case, £5 million. These self-insurance arrangements mean that many commercial entities are 
exposed to the same financial risks arising from motor claims as an insurer might be and so, 
logically, they are as exposed to the risk and cost of fraudulent claims.  
Case Study – UK bus sector 
The UK bus sector is a mainstay of local and regional transportation. In 2016, of 38.4 million UK 
registered vehicles, 167,000 were registered as buses and coaches (Department for Transport, 
2017a) with just 50,000 operating as Public Service Vehicles in the local bus sector (Department for 
Transport, 2016, p. 197). Whilst a small proportion of the 38.4 million vehicles on the road in 2016, 
those 50,000 vehicles facilitated 5.04 billion passenger journeys travelling over 1.5 billion miles on 
local buses and generated annual revenues, inclusive of government support, of c.£5.6 billion (ibid. 
pp. 35, 184, 189). 
Most bus services, and several rail franchises, are run by regional subsidiaries of a few large 
transportation concerns including Arriva, FirstGroup, Go-Ahead, National Express and Stagecoach. 
In a report prepared for the DFT, KPMG (2016) identified that these businesses focus on profit and 
revenue growth with the primary objective of managing operating costs including “pension, fuel, 
accident claim and bid costs.” Although they recognised accident claims impacted on operating 
costs, the authors were silent on quantum (bid. P.58). Analysing the published accounts reveals 
that Stagecoach (2015, p. 12) monitor, as a KPI, the number of blameworthy accidents per million 
miles; in 2015 it was 19.7 for regional operators and 28.5 for operations in London with an 
increasing number of accidents, mostly from low speed manoeuvring incidents, attributed to a 
larger proportion of newer and less experienced drivers. No mention is made of the cost or number 
of accidents attributable to fraud or to any loss arising as a result. First Group (2016) are silent 
about accident rates, cost and experience of fraud in their bus network  and Arriva, owned by 
Deutsche Bahn, publish nothing of assistance to the UK market. Go-Ahead (2016, p. 26) monitor 
the number of bus accidents resulting in a notification being made to a claims handler for every 
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million miles they operate but, unlike Stagecoach, their KPI includes cases where they are both at-
fault and not at-fault, preventing any comparison between the two operators. Go-Ahead reported 
37.3 notifications per million miles and claimed bus accidents overall have reduced since 2011 
despite their involvement in not at-fault accidents having increased. National Express (2015, p. 44) 
offer no analysis in their annual report save that the number of accidents have reduced and they 
have invested in safety and driver-aid technology, demonstrating their commitment to driving up 
safety standards. The DFT (2016, p. 34) reported that, in 2016, there were 117 recorded passenger 
casualties for every billion-passenger kilometres travelled on local buses and a total of 39 billion-
passenger kilometres travelled suggesting the number of accident casualties at just 4,563.  
N1 is the head of claims for a large bus operator with a “significant six-figure” policy excess 
making him responsible for settling most of the claims incurred. He identified that fraud faced by 
bus companies:  
• involves accidents,  
• is largely committed by opportunists,  
• can take a variety of different forms, and  
• is always difficult to repudiate.  
He identified several challenges, considered below, where he described feeling increasingly 
powerless to respond and “abandoned by the police and the justice system” in obtaining a remedy 
against offenders.  N1 had given up reporting offences to the police “a long time ago” because “we 
don’t ever have the cases they are interested in.” Asked about IFED, he said that he had little support 
from his background insurer, an IFED funder, because “our insurer never sustains a loss - we never 
reach the claim threshold (the limit of our six-figure excess)” and so the insurer has never been 
persuaded to make a referral.  
Challenges faced 
N1 was clear about the commercial imperative of his company needing “to carry a lot of people 
to pay for the claims we get even before dealing with the loss from fraud”. He reported:  
• a limited opportunity to mitigate the fraud risk;  
• a disinclination for the police to investigate at a time when the incidence of fraudulent 
claims was rising; and  
• with limited resource, and no easy basis for co-operation across the sector, decreasing 
opportunities to avoid fraudulent claims.  
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He identified three species of fraudulent threat characterising the major challenges facing bus 
operators: 
Threat 1: Other road users and staged accidents 
As with the insurance sector, N1 saw motorists involved in staged accidents as the biggest 
challenge with cars pulling in front of buses and causing a collision by braking sharply the principal 
modus operandii and little the bus operator could do to address it: 
“… we have CCTV footage and you can see somebody has pulled in front of the bus, but that 
doesn’t prove it’s fraudulent. You can sometimes get rid of the claim if you can see his brake 
lights come on before the collision but … these claims are not valuable enough individually 
to pursue them as a fraud.”  
 
He felt the courts were unsupportive of bus operators if civil litigation ensued. The claimant’s 
solicitor would typically refuse to accept the bus company’s video footage and characterise it as 
only one inconclusive part of the story:  
“I go around all the bus companies and I say to people ‘we don’t really have a justice system, 
we have a system that rules in favour of who the judge prefers on the day, depending on 
what his mood is.’  And, that’s the reality of what we face … Sometimes, it’s easier and 
cheaper to just settle the claim.”  
 
He confirmed that staged accidents are an increasing challenge because “the same individual 
might do it five times a week in different parts of the country – a different bus company every day.” 
Pointing to the fact that his company was a very lean business with limited counter-fraud resources 
and a very large and dislocated geographical footprint he said that “unlike insurers, we wouldn’t 
even try to exchange information with other bus companies where we suspect a staged accident; 
there’s just too much work involved and it would be too difficult to marry everything up.” 
In fact, N1 was ambivalent about data sharing contrasting the mixed results he might get from 
using CUE27 with the unfiltered and large volume of alerts he saw from the IFB:   
“Every claim goes to the Compensation Recovery Unit to get what benefits have been paid.  
We then get feedback from CUE to say, ‘this person has had five claims, here are the 
insurers, and here are the reference numbers.  The address that they live at has maybe had 
15 claims, and here are these’, and you would then consider them, and try to identify if the 
                                                             
27 CUE, the Claims and Underwriting Exchange, a central database of incidents reported to insurers which may or 
may not have given rise to a claim and intended to make it harder for people to commit claims fraud or misrepresent 
claims history.   
 
  
 
147 
previous claims are linked to your claim … if you had a whiplash claim, for example, a day 
after Arriva had had one, you would then be saying, ‘well, the symptoms of the two must 
be so closely linked that, if they’re both genuine, we probably both should only pay half of 
the damage’.  But, that’s possibly as good as it’s going to get.” 
 
Despite having access to the data held by IFB he was critical of its utility to him:  
“I find it very difficult to keep up.  The number of alerts that you get … trying to get through 
them is almost impossible. Sometimes an insurer or a compensator, like us, will run through 
a claim until it gets to the end and they’ve successfully dealt with it, or successfully not dealt 
with it, I suppose … and they’ll report it to the IFB.  But some of the alerts are just cheat line 
calls, so … members of the public will phone in and say, ‘my neighbour’s making a claim for 
such and such’.  Those are a lot less reliable, somebody with a grudge … there’s all kinds of 
reasons.  A lot of the time they just end up being nothing ...” 
 
Contrasting N1’s experience, First Group have reported success in several staged crash 
investigations although a review of those reports shows that the losses arising from those claims 
were incurred by insurers, and not by First Group. That may have triggered the police intervention 
despite media reports giving an impression that First Group had triggered the police response. One 
case involved a Sheffield-based accident claims company run by Offenders 3 and 4 who deliberately 
crashed into a bus carrying 26 passengers as part of a £500,000 crash for cash scam (Edwards, 
2013). Investigations following the crash led to a wider inquiry involving a further 10 incidents in 
Halifax, Sheffield and Rotherham which exposed many fraudulent claims against several insurance 
companies. DC Mark Wooton, from South Yorkshire Police (ibid.) said  
“The fraud involved false claims for personal injury, vehicle damage, over-inflated recovery 
and storage costs, together with extortionate and false claims for hire vehicles … involving 
a professionally-planned, highly-organised group of individuals” (including the bus driver) 
who set out to commit fraud by making deliberate false claims and pocketing the money 
for themselves.” 
 
Offenders 3 and 4 were sent to prison for four and a half and three and a half years respectively 
and the bus driver received a 20-month custodial sentence.  
Another First Group case involved a £1.3 million crash for cash fraud where the mastermind 
(“Offender 5”), was jailed for six and a half years along with fourteen co-conspirators who received 
sentences up to three years’ (Holmes, 2015a).  According to the trial judge:  
“this was a carefully organised and skilfully executed fraud. In order to get more bang for 
their buck, the conspirators packed a scheduled bus with all their friends and relations and 
then a car gently collides with the bus. There would be little or no damage to the car but 
multiple bus passengers would, in the coming days, develop whiplash, would go to see a 
friendly claim manager who would refer them to a solicitor who in turn would send them 
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for a medical examination. The doctor would be told that the crash caused them to jolt their 
necks resulting in pain.”  
 
Despite the incidents, all involving scenarios in which a car would collide with the side of a First 
Group bus, the true victims were the respective insurers of the cars in each collision, rather than 
First Group. A total of 218 fraudulent personal injury claims were submitted when, in each case, 
the driver of the car causing the collision would admit full liability leaving the passengers on each 
bus to submit personal injury claims to his motor insurer. (Holmes, 2015b). 
Threat 2: Passenger demographic  
Another threat reported by N1 was the challenge of regional hotspots and the demographic 
from which claimants are drawn:  
“Liverpool, the Preston area, Yorkshire can all be quite bad ...  A lot of the time it’s where 
there has been a heavily unionised industry, you’ve got the economic desolation and the 
entitlement mentality … people who are union members, or were union members, have the 
backing of some historically related firms of solicitors.”  
 
He specifically references Thompsons Solicitors who are acknowledged elsewhere in this 
research as staunch critics of the ABI and government lobbyists:  
“Thompsons are actually quite a good firm ... but … sometimes the claims that they’re 
bringing are only being brought because there’s a union backing, and they’re rubbish; the 
only way to get rid of them is to pay them something to go away.  And, that’s just the way 
life is…”  
 
N1 identified a number of claims scenarios which he believed were driven by the nature of the 
local population. 
Whiplash	claims	
“We had one incident where we had our bus collide with a vehicle, an Arriva bus in Liverpool.  
The damage to our vehicle was a broken windscreen wiper on the front of the bus and the 
damage to the Arriva vehicle was negligible, pretty much nothing. Well, the Arriva driver 
claimed for whiplash … and we then had 32 passengers between the two vehicles who have 
made claims for varying degrees of injury …  
 
We gave up with the police and decided to reject the claims and then defend the civil 
litigation that followed. Our defence was, ‘we just don’t accept these people were injured’. 
We didn’t go as far as to say it’s fraud, but we almost got there; the difficulty is there are 
reputational risks of alleging fraud and it not being proved.   
 
It ended up that we had 16 or 17 cases that continued to trial, including the Arriva driver … 
they were all very low value cases, but what we wanted to do was call each claimant as a 
witness to prove their injuries ... the judge wouldn’t allow it. Instead, we ended up with eight 
conjoined cases and the judge refusing to allow us to join each claimant individually to cross 
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examine them all over their injury.  His reasoning was, ‘they say they have been injured, 
there is a medical report from an expert, what reason would the claimants have to lie?’ Of 
course, it’s blindingly obvious; they’re going to get some money if you rule in their favour 
and we don’t dispute that they’re absolutely entitled to money if they’ve been injured.  The 
issue was we didn’t believe that they had actually been injured and so we wanted to put 
them to proof but he wouldn’t allow it.   
 
So, damages on all the cases that were settled was £27,000 (not enough to exceed our 
excess) but third-party costs paid to date are £250,000 and we have yet to receive cost 
schedules from about half a dozen. Our estimate of what we will pay … a further £203,000, 
plus our own solicitor costs … these are cases that should have been thrown out; we can’t 
see how these 32 people would have been injured in such a low velocity impact where the 
only damage to both buses was a windscreen wiper. The same solicitor acted for several of 
them, and once they had the one, you know, once they knew that one had settled, they were 
never going to give up on the rest.” 
 
N1’s belief that the civil justice system let him down was telling especially when compared with 
the reports from First Group. The insurers in that case had managed to enlist the support of the 
police to pursue a criminal investigation for incidents that centred on First Group buses but, and 
N1 pointed this out, it was the insurers of the cars that had driven in to each bus who were the 
force behind the criminal investigations and the bus company were just used to add colour to the 
headline.   
Delayed	claims	for	other	injuries	
Whiplash is not, according to N1, the only challenge around opportunistic suspicious claims: 
“What we see quite a lot is the guy who has been on our bus, the driver has braked, the 
passenger hasn't said anything to the driver, and the next day the claim comes … the driver 
knows nothing about it [and] we take it to trial. The claimant will say, a, b, c, happened and 
I fell over and I broke my wrist, or whatever it was. Our driver says, ‘I don’t know anything 
about it’.  
 
We’ll lose that; we can’t risk taking it to trial because we’ll lose it and pay additional costs.  
So, initially, we’ll resist it and make it hard work for the claimant.  ‘Have you got your bus 
ticket?’ to which he’ll say, ‘no, it was a multi journey ticket’.  So, we’ll ask him for a 
photograph of himself so we can check the CCTV to make sure he was on the bus – you’d be 
surprised how many people claim even when they weren’t. We just try and make life harder, 
and some of them will go away, but if they’re persistent we will pay them simply because 
we know that we won’t be able to avoid paying them … it’s probably cheaper than taking 
them to trial and losing and, of course, because it’s opportunistic, the police are not 
interested.” 
Ticket	fraud	
Another emerging fraud risk is the use of forged multi-journey tickets. As bus companies retired 
conductors and restricted the driver’s role to driving, multi-journey tickets, as distinct from 
electronic payment cards like Oyster, were introduced. In 2010, Offenders 6 and 7 were jailed for 
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48 weeks each (suspended for two years) having created hundreds of forged bus tickets to sell on 
at knockdown prices. Offender 6 hatched the plot with his IT student stepson to create the fake bus 
tickets at their home in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Prosecutors said the fraud could have cost bus 
company Stagecoach up to £168,000 after the Court heard the pair procured 17,000 individual 
blank tickets and then doctored them on a computer (Willey, 2010). N1 explained that:  
“because the sector is moving to multi-journey tickets, more than getting on the bus and 
asking for a single into town … people have been going around pubs in some of the bigger 
cities, with 50 copied mega bus or mega rider tickets ... we have revenue inspectors carrying 
out checks but that usually only catches the individual who bought the ticket cheap thinking 
it was legitimate and not the fraudster who sold it.” 
 
First Group has collaborated with South Yorkshire police specifically targeting fare evasion in 
an operation following an earlier arrest for possession of articles used in the manufacture of forged 
bus tickets. Revenue Inspectors, supported by Special Constables, conducted a week of action. They 
checked 362 buses, issued 34 penalty tickets and seized six forged bus tickets. In addition, special 
constables conducted 27 stop searches as part of the operation, issued two fixed penalty tickets for 
drugs offences, seized six forged bus tickets in connection with the ongoing police investigation, 
and ejected one passenger for drinking alcohol on a bus whilst the Revenue Inspectors revoked 
eight mobility passes being used by other people, identified 107 non-payment/ticket irregularities 
and issued 32 Standard Penalty Fares. (South Yorkshire Police, 2015). In a potentially useful 
response to the threat posed by opportunistic fraudsters, First Group (South Yorkshire Passenger 
Transport, 2008) reported that “two of our drivers, who have gone through South Yorkshire Police's 
training, provide support for the Revenue Protection team in the form of Special Police Officers." 
The initiative to promote an integrated approach between the South Yorkshire Passenger Transport 
Executive and South Yorkshire Police originated in 2008 under the banner of Employee Supported 
Policing intended to improve safety and security on the transport network and deliver visible 
benefits for customers, staff and the wider community. Through increased visible police on and 
around the transport network, it was anticipated that passenger perception would improve and the 
levels of crime and anti-social behaviour reduce. Under the scheme, paid time-off was granted to 
support 50% of the time required by employees for the initial police training and 50% of the 
minimum number of shifts which must be undertaken per year.  
It might appear that First Group are more fortunate or more proactive than N1’s employer, that 
they have a better relationship with the police or just that they have suffered higher levels of 
incursion and have used their success in court to drive better media coverage (or any combination 
of these factors). Unfortunately, First Group declined to participate further in the research. The 
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Employee Supported policing initiative did appear unique to First Group and when asked whether 
he thought it might pre-dispose the police to co-operate more in the investigation of fraud made 
by bus companies, N1 was less certain of whether it was a case of insurance companies driving the 
police interest and the bus company making the headlines:  
“We have had our fingers burnt … I think fingers burnt is probably too strong, but we’ve 
attempted to identify cases to the police in the past, and got nowhere; it’s pointless. It’s a 
waste of time putting the information together and hoping the police will pick it up knowing 
they probably won’t; it’s time that could be spent doing something else.”  
 
Regarding strategy, he said:  
“… we’d far rather just fight the claims that we get than trying to pursue the claimant for a 
prosecution … if we make their life sufficiently difficult so that they’ve either given up the 
claim or, if they’ve been claiming £50,000 and they’ve only gotten £1,000, or whatever, then 
we’ve done our job. And, in future, they should think twice about doing it again to us which 
is as good a sanction as we think we’re going to get …”   
 
Threat 3: The Bus Driver 
The bus driver played a role in the First Group case involving Offender 4 in Sheffield and N1 
identified the role of the driver as a potential fraud threat: 
“We had one case where our bus driver … he was working for us in Manchester, but he’d 
worked for First in Bradford … he had an incident where he collided with the rear of a car 
and, initially, we never really thought an awful lot about it.  Then, we did the CUE check and 
we identified that the people that were claiming all lived round about where he lived in 
Bradford. He was driving a route in Manchester and we thought this is a bit odd … we dug 
into it a bit and discovered he’d been sacked by First Group and he’d had two or three similar 
incidents there, where all the people lived in a block round about where he lived.  And, we 
thought, this just can’t be right.  
 
We did a full investigation, packaged it all up and then sent it off to the Police who said, ‘it 
might look a bit iffy, but we don’t think there’s evidence of any wrongdoing here; what you 
have is circumstantial at best and coincidental at worst.’ They just weren’t interested … it 
left a sour taste and, after that, we got a bit disillusioned.”   
 
N1 narrated details of another case involving a driver who had claimed damages in excess of 
£100,000 alleging negligence against his employer after tripping on some rubbish left on the bus by 
another driver. Since the claim is ongoing it would be inappropriate to publish the detail but N1 did 
volunteer that there was an increasing investigative focus on the potential role of the driver in 
accident fraud.  
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Failing to Mitigate 
Whilst N1 provided a helpful account of the challenges faced by the sector it was clear the 
strategy for mitigating against the risk was not part of a uniform cross-sectoral approach and, in 
some respects, was typified by capitulation rather than mitigation. It may be that, save for the 
intelligence circulated by CUE, the nature of the incursion is too sporadic to control where the fraud  
• is often opportunistic; 
• involves no pre-existing relationship with the claimant;  
• is targeted against geographically disconnected regional bus depots; 
• may involve collusion between fraudster and driver; 
• is not met by any integrated intelligence strategy;  
• unlike accidents involving two separately insured cars where fraud is suspected, there 
is no counter party with aligned interests; and 
• One off acts of opportunistic fraud are very difficult to identify and trace.  
It was noted that, despite N1 being a self-insured entity for most claims, he defined himself as 
a compensator. He was clear about the lack of sector co-operation on fraud issues and opined that 
the collaboration between CHCs seemed stronger, better aligned and more productive. He 
attributed the different approach to the lack of geographical overlap amongst bus operators when 
each operator faces threats native to its own geographical market within which it has no 
competition from other suppliers. Market intelligence about individual threats has a local bias and 
was unlikely, he felt, to be replicated by those same offenders operating in different localities 
although that seems inconsistent with the risk of bus operators being victims of organised fraud. 
N1 also pointed out that most bus operators are publicly listed businesses facing challenges of 
governance, commercial confidentiality and compliance with competition regulation and so limiting 
the opportunity and motivation to share best practice. That view extended to sharing intelligence 
with insurers. He thought bus companies and insurers could “rub along OK” but was less supportive 
of the “prominence” of the IFB and IFED and the publicity that they generated and was unsupportive 
of the motivation behind the media noise:  
“We shy away from that … our energy should be spent dealing with claims and, where we 
can avoid them, we should avoid them … I also think, all these programmes and stories … 
encourage people to say, ‘he got caught because he did this, this and this, I could do that 
and not get caught.’” 
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Reputational risk also figured high on N1’s agenda and was a barrier to mitigating some of the 
risk of fraud, something he felt would apply to his publicly listed peers. Alleging, but then failing to 
prove fraud, was very high risk: 
“You don’t want the reputation that you plead fraud and then lose. You end up with the 
reputation that you will say fraud at the drop of a hat and the impact on our brand in local 
markets where we are almost monopoly suppliers...”  
 
He also expressed concern about the prospects of success:  
“The whole civil procedure regime is a bit of a lottery; who you have as a judge on the day, 
what sort of mood he is and where the court is based. Liverpool is probably not the best 
place … and if you do it once and fail then you make it harder the next time ...” 
 
In terms of reducing claims, legitimate and fraudulent, he felt that absent sector co-operation 
there was some commonality of approach emerging:  
“As with all bus companies, we’ve invested in this telematics stuff, with the intention of 
making the ride smoother and avoiding harsh breaking, harsh acceleration, all that sort of 
thing … part of the reason is, obviously, so that the customer has a more comfortable ride, 
but if you don’t accelerate away from a stop quickly, and you don’t rev up to the traffic 
lights and then stand on the brakes, you’ll use less fuel.  So, that’s a money saving thing.  
You would also imagine you would have less people falling about the bus if the driver knows 
his driving style is being monitored so it should save money on claims although that’s not 
been proven yet.” 
 
Regarding the IFB he expressed frustration at the volume of alerts:  
“I had the lady from IFB up the week before last … telling me about all these new initiatives; 
people taking information that’s come in and cross fertilising it to see where there’s links 
between them.  That’s all great, but you then relate it back to what you’re doing, and the 
fact that someone has made a claim against me, and has also made a claim against 
Admiral, doesn’t mean that they’re doing anything wrong.  It could mean they’re just 
unlucky … they could very well have had two accidents for which they need to make a claim.  
 
The fact people have had more than one claim may get your tentacles up but, that’s the 
best that you can say ...”  
 
In terms of IFED he said:  
“we are responsible for providing over 1 billion bus journeys a year but don’t see IFED as 
part of our solution for identifying or prosecuting fraudsters … our insurers are happy to 
leave us with the problem whilst ever the loss is within our excess level. You asked the 
question whether they have affected our approach to fraud and the answer is probably 
‘no’.” 
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Case Study – corporate fleet operators 
Assessing the size of the self-insured fleet market is challenging although it is likely to involve 
business users. In December 2016, there were 31.8 million motor cars on the DVLA register 
(Department for Transport, 2017a), 9% (c. 2.8m) of which were company registered (Department 
for Transport, 2017b). In addition, there were a further 3.9 million light commercial vehicles 
registered of which 47.1% (c. 1.8m) were company registered (Department for Transport, 2017c) 
and 0.5 million heavy goods vehicles (Department for Transport, 2017d) which are probably all 
company registered and bring the total company registered vehicle population to in excess of 9 
million vehicles. Sadly, the population size doesn’t assist in quantifying the number of businesses 
operating those 9 million company registered vehicles or the number that might self-insure their 
vehicle fleet but while the size of the self-insured market may be enlightening, it was not an 
objective of the research. Nonetheless, the two sectoral case studies which did form part of the 
research highlight the experiences of two different sectors each with significant and declared 
exposure to self-insured risks.  With 9 million cars, light commercial and heavy goods vehicles 
registered to companies, a propensity for some corporate fleet operators to self-insure is high.  
N4 is a solicitor managing claims for clients that include car-hire companies and large publicly 
owned businesses, as well as a number of government agencies. Some of his clients carry policy 
excesses of £1 million and one has an excess of £5 million before a background insurer become 
financially liable. Corporate fleets can be very active and N4 referenced a client operating 48,000 
vehicles “covering over 100 million miles a year”.  His exposure to road accidents embraces 
“everything from the driver phoning up at the roadside and saying, ‘I’ve had an accident’ to the 
capture element28 and the resultant claim that goes right up to any level deductible … effectively we 
do everything for the vast majority of our clients including pre and post repair.” It also involves the 
identification, investigation, rebuttal and potential prosecution of fraudulent claims:  
“it’s something we’ve always done. One of our best results came from one of the handlers.  
A driver made a comment that the third party was having a laugh at the scene of the 
accident, quite a serious accident.  The handler thought ‘something’s not right’ so we 
started an investigation. We proved that the total loss had been a total loss three other 
times all linked to different credit hire organisations and to different law firms as well with 
giant spider diagrams and the key fraud indicators exposing a massive fraud.” 
 
 
  
                                                             
28 Capture, or intervention: where the agent or insurer of the at-fault driver engages the innocent motorist taking 
control of his claim to exclude an agent acting for him and so limit the financial exposure of the at-fault driver. 
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Working with insurers  
N4 reported effective collaboration with each of his clients’ background insurers when dealing 
with issues pertinent to that client’s interest but a “generally unproductive” relationship where the 
relationship with the background insurer was absent, even though he might be investigating 
suspicious or fraudulent claims, “a genuine cancer from which honest claimants are suffering but a 
subject which insurers – big, disorganised and process driven - used too much for PR purposes”. He 
was critical of insurer’s approach to data sharing blaming paranoia and widespread concern with 
breaching data protection protocols an approach he felt that only benefitted the fraudster “who 
relies on their disorganisation”. He was also critical of the effectiveness of industry databases like 
CUE:  
“Netfoil claim they have 90% of industry claim data but I can point to over 200,000 records 
they don’t have … and CUE has a massive hole in it. They are not getting a feed from most 
large self-insured corporates ... and won’t open it up to the wider market. The big insurers 
have control of it but they forget that a lot of activity includes the corporates and missing 
so much data only gives the fraudster another advantage.” 
 
Like others he was critical of the reported cost of motor insurance fraud:  
“I don’t trust any of it … we’re asked for our fraud reports because we have to feed into all 
the insurance for each of our clients because as a mandatory insurance they still have those 
reporting obligations, but the way they ask for it to be presented is ridiculous.  There’s no 
way it can be accurate; some of them want it to be underplayed because they don’t want it 
to be seen that they have a fraud issue and some of them want it to be over played so they 
can show huge savings.   
 
It’s all just data but it’s also interpretation of fraud as well and that’s where we get into 
dispute with insurers. The vast majority of people will exaggerate an injury even if they were 
honestly injured in the first place.  So instead of a three-month whiplash it goes to six 
months.  We don’t class that as fraud, or record it as fraud, it has just become part of dealing 
with claims. Our identification of fraud is the more serious stuff it’s, you’ve got the lady on 
the bus claiming for injury when she wasn’t even on the bus, it’s that level of blatancy. If it’s 
somebody claiming that they’re in a wheelchair but they’re out doing a marathon, then that 
is fraud.   
 
We have to have a sensible definition in order to get the level from which we can measure 
success in terms of real savings generated otherwise we’d be like the insurers where 50 per 
cent or more of every claim is considered fraudulent ...”  
 
N4 identified being involved with 200 active files involving “provable and serious fraud” from 
7,500 claims his firm defended annually, a 2.6% run rate. He explained:  
“if we put every single exaggeration of a whiplash in there or every single person trying to 
get an extra scratch on their car fixed or people who found they could get a repair done 
within the terms of their excess so withdrew their claim … well, we don’t, but most insurers 
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would push all of that into their reporting to get the stats up and to make things look really 
scary.”  
IFED, the Police and the Judiciary 
The police response to fraudulent claims reported by N4 was consistent with that reported by 
N1 as well as those responding on behalf of the credit-hire sector:  
 “We’ve had a case in Wolverton, a big Asian community. I went down there to try and track 
this guy down that was making this injury claim to see whether he was genuinely injured. I 
was just being nosey really.   
 
I turned up at his house and there were suitcases all lined up outside the front of it.  So, I 
thought we’ll spend a couple of days and get the house watched.  It turned out it was a 
halfway house for immigrants coming in; they’d come in, be told how to stage an accident, 
get all their paperwork sorted out and then these guys were buying the claims off each of 
these immigrants, paying them a thousand pounds and saying, ‘right, all you’ve got to do is 
turn up for the medical’.  Then they’d get put on to benefits.  The through traffic of people 
was ridiculous.  There were probably 30 or 40 people in the house at any one stage, sleeping 
in there for two or three days.  Then they’d do what they were paid to do and get carted off 
to somewhere else and start off again.  Unbelievably well organised.  
 
We reported it to the police and never heard a thing.  We repudiated the claims but it’s 
really frustrating. You sit there knowing what’s going on but the police won’t do anything 
about it.  They eventually told us that they might get immigration involved but none of the 
suspects were illegal.  They were Europeans here justifiably.  
 
If you take the 60,000-foot view on this you have to ask why IFED would not want to be 
involved. It is clearly organised crime with cross-border implications which leads to drugs, 
prostitution, people trafficking, firearms, terrorism and all the other issues. The local police 
… gave us no support at all and we often have the same experiences when we’re just 
redirected through to, you know, there’s now this insurance based cell called IFED and you 
should make contact with them. 
 
I’m a big fan of the police but they are massively under resourced.  I think, and I’m not 
defending IFED either, but again those guys are massively under resourced as well. You’ve 
got to get the insurers to part with more cash, haven’t you but if they’re paying, nobody 
else gets a look-in? And you can’t get the insurance industry to work together at the best of 
times so imagine trying to get them to do it on any scale; it’s impossible!”  
 
 On IFED he said: 
“we’ve tried to get files put though our background insurer to go into IFED but we haven’t 
had any success … they say they want the fraud rings and not individual cases which just 
leaves us back with the police who really don’t have the resource or inclination.”  
 
When asked about the insurer response, he literally shrugged his shoulders:  
“they say there’s just too much fraud and too little resource. Our corporate clients get 
frustrated and the bigger ones will try and use their size to push the insurer but they get the 
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same response; your case is one of thousands and it’s not up there on the most serious list 
or involving a fraud ring.”  
 
N4 narrated his experience of resisting claims by alleging fraud in the defence in any 
proceedings. He also explained about his approach to civil actions alleging contempt of court where 
the claimant was acting fraudulently:  
“we’ve done it on a couple of cases … it’s just really expensive. Most clients agree to start 
the process but when they realise how much it’s going to cost they just drop it.  We’ve had 
success in a couple of cases where they’ve gone through and the judge has asked the Crown 
Prosecution Service (“CPS”) to take it to the next stages, but it’s all cost and in the vast 
majority of the cases, even when we win, we actually lose financially because they’ve got 
no assets.  Most of these guys are so well organised that they get their house put in 
somebody else’s name and they don’t have a car.  They drive round and live quite a lavish 
lifestyle and yet they own nothing and that’s where we really struggle. It’s ironic, it’s very 
organised but of no interest to IFED because there is no insurer championing the issue and 
the offences aren’t big enough.” 
 
In terms of the judiciary:  
“historically a bit pointless although we’re starting to see a change and most judges, if they 
think that something’s up, will kick the entire case out whereas in the past they’d say, ‘right, 
you’ve been naughty on that bit but let’s give you a load of money here’ which sent the 
wrong message to the police as well but we are now seeing the courts starting to get 
harsher on people although it seems to be a bit regional.  
 
We see a harder line south of Birmingham but not so much in Liverpool, Warrington, 
Birkenhead, the kind of places we’re not seeing a great deal of success at the moment.  I 
think that’s because a majority of the judiciary there have come through claimant solicitor 
group leading to a little bit of claimant bias although there is an improving trend. The best 
defence we currently have is resisting claims whilst we investigate them thoroughly and 
make it difficult for Claimant’s where we suspect fraud.” 
 
Asked whether IFED had made it harder for self-insured entities to access justice he said:  
“I don’t think they’ve made it any harder but they haven’t made it any better either.  I just 
think it is hard for self-insured entities to get access to justice. I think First Group, the bus 
company, managed to get a couple through because of the big exposure they had to 
multiple claimants but I’m not really aware of any corporates, or the people who work for 
the corporates, that have had much success. And whilst ever the local police forces can point 
to IFED as the specialist resource I don’t think things will improve.”   
 
Civil private prosecutions 
A lack of appetite for, and poor resourcing of, public prosecutions in fraud cases, has resulted 
in certain species of fraud having become almost decriminalised both in terms of public perception 
and the likelihood of those involved in such activity facing a criminal sanction. Privately brought 
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criminal prosecutions are one route by which defrauded commercial entities have been able to 
apply for a criminal sanction against offenders where the police have been disinclined to engage. 
High profile cases such as Regina (Virgin Media Ltd) v Zinga [2014] EWCA Crim 52, demonstrate 
that private prosecutions, when conducted properly, can achieve the private aims of the prosecutor 
whilst remaining in the public interest. In the Zinga case, Virgin conveyed a strong message to the 
public that it would deal robustly with breaches of its IP rights whilst at the same time achieving 
long custodial sentences and a substantial confiscation order against the defendants. In the right 
cases, and properly conducted, a private prosecution can have a number of advantages over action 
in the civil courts: 
• availability of tough sanctions including suspended, or immediate custodial sentences 
for fraud cases of moderate value/seriousness and above; 
• deterrent effect; both in respect of the defendant and his associates and the wider 
criminal fraternity; 
• availability of measures for compensation/confiscation; backed by custodial sentences 
in default; 
• positive publicity - a message to the market that fraud will not be tolerated; and 
• costs recovery from convicted defendant, or public funds; the latter even if 
unsuccessful. 
A number of organisations have evolved to fill the lacuna facing corporate victims of fraud but 
the process for executing a successful private prosecution is involved (Button, Lewis, Brooks, 
Shepherd, & Wakefield, 2014, p. 11; Edmund & McMahon, 2014). 
The law 
CF1 shared an advice from counsel which clarified the basis on which private prosecutions can 
be pursued. The Prosecution of Offences Act 1986, created the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) 
and, specifically, retained the right of an individual, corporate or interested party, to conduct a 
private prosecution qualified by the power of the Attorney General who may take no active role, 
may allow the prosecution to continue with the CPS taking over conduct, or may discontinue it. 
Criminal proceedings brought privately differ from the pursuit of a defendant in the civil courts in 
a number of significant ways, the most significant of which is that whilst in a civil case the primary 
duty of the legal team will be to protect the best interests of its client (subject to duties not to 
mislead the Court etc.), a private prosecutor must serve the public interest in preference over the 
interests of its client. This obligation manifests itself in three areas as set out below: 
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• An investigator involved in evidence gathering for a prosecution must, within reason, 
follow up all lines of enquiry, whether they point to the guilt or innocence of the 
suspect.  
• A prosecutor is under a duty to disclose all material that undermines its own case, or 
may assist the defence case. This is an absolute requirement and does not depend on 
client instructions. 
• If the prosecutor is an individual and a witness in the proceedings, they must not have 
their evidence contaminated by other evidence relied upon in the case. There is 
accordingly likely to be material that the prosecutor’s representatives are aware of, but 
about which they cannot inform their client.    
Private prosecutions remain sufficiently rare that defence teams will make objection to them 
in principle. Defendants will attempt to establish that the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the 
Court’s process or that it is being pursued to further private interests, which would be more suited 
to the civil courts, or that it has been handled in an unfair or partial manner. These are all arguments 
that might receive a sympathetic hearing from a traditional judge accustomed to criminal 
prosecutions being initiated by the police and prosecuted by the CPS. Because of this, it is expected 
that a private prosecutor will seek to abide by the Code for Crown Prosecutors, the Attorney 
Generals Guidelines and other guidance for public prosecutors. Finally, when assessing costs risk, 
under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 the prosecutor can recover from public funds those 
costs deemed “reasonably sufficient” to compensate for expenses incurred in proceedings for an 
indictable offence even if the prosecution (if properly brought) results in acquittals. 
The test for prosecution 
When determining whether an allegation of criminal behaviour is suitable to be prosecuted, 
the CPS applies the Full Code Test which consists of two elements, the evidential test and the public 
interest test: 
• There must be enough evidence for a reasonable prospect of a conviction in respect of 
the charge contemplated. This involves the prosecutor making an objective assessment 
of the available evidence, including any defences that the suspect has, or might 
advance. This should include consideration of the admissibility and reliability of the 
evidence, as well as the credibility of witnesses. 
• Public interest factors in favour of prosecution must outweigh those against. It is 
necessary to weigh such factors as the seriousness of the offence(s) alleged, the extent 
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of the suspect’s culpability, the harm caused to the victim, any impact on the 
community at large and whether prosecution will be a proportionate response.  
N4 emphasised that it was vital that a private prosecution is not contemplated unless the two-
stage test can be demonstrated to be met and comfortably exceeded. One of the first steps a 
defence team are likely to take will be to inform the CPS that the prosecution is on-going and invite 
them to discontinue it. For this reason, it is often in the interests of a private prosecutor to liaise 
with the CPS prior to laying Information in order to pre-empt and deal with any issues that might 
otherwise be raised during the proceedings. However, N1 and N4, on behalf of his corporate clients, 
were reluctant to prosecute because of the cost involved in funding an investigation to the point of 
launching the prosecution and because of the perception that the judiciary were not as supportive 
as if the prosecution followed a police investigation. There is evidence that on both grounds their 
assessment is incorrect. Insurers have reported successes in bringing private prosecutions in cases 
where IFED had declined to act. In 2014, AXA Insurance reported having secured a conviction for 
fraud against Paul Gustar following his attempt to claim £100,000 damages for an injury allegedly 
sustained at work (2014). Gustar received a suspended three-year prison sentence and HHJ Harvey 
Clarke remarked  
“This insurance company is entirely justified in bringing this prosecution [and] its purpose 
has been to deter insurance fraud. I must pass sentence in recognition of this ... I want the 
message to go out – that it was appropriate and the insurers acted entirely properly in 
bringing this prosecution against you … you are a fortunate man. Leave with your wife. Next 
time I shall show no mercy.” 
 
Some of the energy driving the use of private prosecutions has been the realisation from a 
number of solicitors that their costs for bringing such a prosecution may be awarded by the trial 
judge out of the public purse. CF1 provided an example where Hill Dickinson Solicitors worked with 
the CHO, the insurer and a rental company to pursue a successful private prosecution against 
Offenders 8 and 9 (Accident Exchange Ltd, 2017; Rose, 2017b). Having pled guilty to fraud by false 
representation at Snaresbrook Crown Court, Offender 8 admitted that on 12th September 2014, 
he crashed his Toyota MR2, which was dressed up to look like a Ferrari F430, into his friend’s hired 
Audi A1. Offender 8 and his accomplice, Offender 9, convinced his insurer to pay out £29,000 after 
claiming his car had broken down on a bend before being hit, and that he did not know the driver. 
As the at-fault vehicle was insured by a hire company, Offender 9 would incur no personal cost by 
accepting liability for the accident and could split the insurance pay-out with Islam. Already in a 
replacement hire car organised by his accomplice following the accident, Offender 8 tried to claim 
for another credit hire car from a separate company which was detected by Hill-Dickinson’s Netfoil 
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database and was his undoing. The accomplice, Offender 9, received a 12-month custodial sentence 
suspended for two years, and was ordered to compensate the victims more than £10,000. Offender 
8 was sentenced to 8-months imprisonment. HHJ Dawson commented on the private prosecution, 
saying:  
 “If it wasn’t for the investigation by one of the companies, it [the fraud] may well have been 
missed. Almost immediately after the crash, you both launched into a sophisticated fraud. 
This is not a victimless crime; we all end up paying more for car insurance. It also undermines 
the trust from insurance companies in the public, which causes delay in genuine payments. 
More fraud makes it more difficult for honest people to be paid.” 
 
The judge ordered that prosecutor be awarded its costs from central funds in the sum of 
£17,062 as the sum that properly reflects what is involved in both prosecuting and investigating. 
Fraud and the links to organised crime  
Insurance fraud committed against bus and fleet operators usually crystallises a pecuniary loss 
measured in terms of the damages paid for repairs, hire charges or personal injury. This is 
somewhat different to the losses incurred by CHCs and the insurance industry because bus and 
fleet operators will rarely, if ever, be exposed to the theft of their own vehicle as a direct 
consequence of a fraudulent motor insurance claim. In the hire sector, however, theft by 
conversion is a constant risk. It happens when somebody hires a car legitimately, or at least with 
the appearance of legitimacy, but doesn’t return it at the end of the hire in accordance with the 
contractual obligation in the hire agreement.  
CF2 described himself as a ‘Bounty Hunter’ although a more accurate descriptor would be an 
investigator. His primary role is recovering vehicles stolen by conversion from hire companies 
where the theft liquidated an expensive asset that could fund other forms of crime. He explained 
the economic dynamic and why he felt fraud involving the theft of motor-vehicles from car-hire 
companies had become endemic:  
“I saw that you’ve got a Range Rover Sport outside worth about £65,000 … it’s worth about 
£5,000 to a criminal paid to steal it to order.  
 
He might have started as a joyrider but he’s moved up the hierarchy now and worked out 
how to turn his hobby into a lucrative career. He wont’s be on his own; whoever he is 
working for will know that he has a market for your Range Rover and will pay another 
£1,000 to somebody to doctor some paperwork and then will probably pay another £25,000 
to put the car in a container, ship it half-way round the world, bribe the staff at the dockside 
in order to get the import paperwork right and then use the balance to pay the import duty 
as if it was a legitimate import …  
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The car will cost the criminal gang, because that’s how these things are organised, about 
£30,000 all in to steal and he’ll sell that Range Rover in a country where the import duties 
are prohibitive or supply is impossible, for between £75,000 and £100,000, making himself 
a good return … and it all links to organised crime or to terrorism. The money paid for the 
car is probably the proceeds of crime and the eventual purchaser is probably part of a 
criminal organisation in Africa, the Middle East, Romania or Turkey.   
 
One thing with vehicle crime is there’s always a build-up of vehicles or movement of vehicles 
before any sort of terrorist explosion and we’ve seen that over the years; Madrid, flurry of 
vehicles going down there, 7/7 - you just can’t get it across to people, you know, the 
expensive vehicles that were going out to East Africa to be re-cycled into funding for 
terrorism.  
 
People think that vehicle theft is opportunistic, and some of it might be, but the real threat 
is targeting expensive cars, usually owned by hire companies who won’t have any form of 
telematics installed because they have so many cars on fleet and change them so often.”  
 
N2 was the insurance lead for an international hire-company who confirmed “a relentless 
battle” fought with customers hiring a vehicle who then report the vehicle stolen, complete with 
the keys, or who simply disappears along with the car. He frequently instructed the Bounty Hunter 
when the police refused to do anything other than record the vehicle as stolen. He reported that 
geography was a problem for hire companies because of their national, and sometimes 
international, footprint where it was possible to hire a car in Burnley and return it in Berlin. Dealing 
with the challenge of fraud was difficult and he described fraudsters as “almost entrepreneurial … 
chameleon like in the way their methods of obtaining the vehicles changed to avoid detection.”  
CF2 highlighted the problems of a deficit of intelligence and the challenge of geography:  
“It’s hard enough getting the Police to take an interest in crime reported in Warwickshire 
when the asset has been spotted in Staffordshire – they call that a cross border challenge. 
But it’s harder still when there is just no police resource available.  
 
Imagine this scenario; someone hiring a car for a week from Hertz at Gatwick Airport just 
flown in from Poland. A week later, the car isn’t returned, the identity of the hirer proves to 
be false and the credit card used to pay for the transaction was stolen. Which police force 
would be interested in having that on their books as a crime to investigate knowing the car 
could be anywhere in Europe or beyond and they see Hertz as a big company with deep 
pockets who can stand the loss.  
 
If you can link the theft to organised crime then you might get a Regional Organised Crime 
Unit interested but there’s always a patsy being paid £5,000 to steal the car and get it 
through the channel tunnel and then a handoff to Mr Big which makes the intelligence 
difficult to co-ordinate unless there’s an arrest. And that’s where it all falls down. Not 
investigating cases that might lead to an arrest which might expose a major criminal ring is 
a hopeless response to the challenge from international organised crime when acquisitive 
vehicle crime involving fraud is such a money-spinner.” 
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There is some support in the literature for his pessimistic assessment about the impact of 
organised crime in recent years. In 1995, an international police congress opened with an overview 
of the emergence of organised cross-border crime networks and the challenges for providing a 
coherent solution “when the police response to cross-border organised crime networks would 
inevitably involve the creation of cross-border police networks, challenging existing legal structures 
in the area of admissibility of evidence and creating a demand for extraterritorial police powers.” 
One of the risks identified was “the greater prospects for white collar crime and fraud, as it was 
low-risk and high profit” (Tupman & Zabyelina, 2015, p. 134). Twenty years on, organised crime 
features prominently in most countries political and criminal justice agendas in recognition of the 
threat it poses to public order, national security or economic stability (Sergi, 2015, p. 182). The UK 
government (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011, pp. 9–10) estimated around 6,000 
criminal groups in 2011 comprising “38,000 organised criminals impacting on the UK … highly 
adaptive, exploiting every available opportunity, system and technology to invent new or varied 
forms of crime” and who operate across boundaries, both in terms of crime type and geography, 
and who engage, inter alia, “in fraud, acquisitive and economic crime … which can be used to fund 
and enable other serious and organised criminality”.  Cohen (1977, p. 103) saw organised crime in 
terms of a set of criminal actors and a set of structured criminal activities, all regulated by the 
organisation generating the criminal behaviour “simultaneously engaged in coping with problems 
of resource procurement and allocation, personnel recruitment and socialisation, solidarity, 
discipline, disposal of outputs, legitimacy, reconciliation of conflicting goals and interests, and so 
on”. Ernst (2015, pp. 137–138) regarded organised crime as an economic activity empowered by 
rationally constructed criminal enterprises pursuing profit where “the chain of activities … is boiled 
down to immediate working steps involved in the generation and processing of illicit proceedings”. 
Cornish (1993, p. 31) had suggested earlier that organised crime should be analysed as end products 
or outcomes of a causal chain of separate actions “moves ‘strung out along an axle, rather as kebabs 
are skewered on to a stick’” and Tremblay et al (2001, p. 561) analysed  permanent retention motor 
vehicle thefts as involving “a sequence of moves (theft of the vehicle, concealment, disguise, 
marketing and ultimate disposal), each move having a specific mix of casting, location and props 
requirements [where] participants can play each move or scene in a variety of ways: cars may be 
stolen in parking lots or obtained by providing rental agencies with stolen identities. Vehicle 
identification numbers may be altered or their chassis transferred from a crashed vehicle to a stolen 
one (‘body switching’) … and ‘rehabilitated’ vehicles may be sold to a foreign dealer, a local garage 
shop or advertised in local newspapers”. Levi (2007, p. 612) summarised the organization of crime 
results from the interaction of opportunity, offender and potential offender motivation, skills, 
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incentives and the network for committing crime ranged against the potential for detection or 
disruption created by the police or criminal law. He saw it as “a dynamic process that evolves as 
offenders adapt (or fail to adapt) to their changing environment” and highlighted Gannon and 
Doig’s (2010) critique of the investigation of fraud between 1998 and 2008  and the reality that 
forces will move ever-declining resources “away from work other than ‘front-line policing’ and 
‘signal crimes’ such as homicide and phone hacking associated with News International”  (Levi, 
2007, p. 612). It is against this backdrop, the acceptance of the propensity for insurance related 
fraud involving non-insurer victims, the nature of the harm created and the ineffective response to 
the threat, that the final case study is concerned. 
Case Study – the links to organised criminality  
Talking about Operation Navigate CF1 said:  
"this is the first time an operation has been run involving such a level of International and 
cross agency co-operation and it is a real example of how private industry, leading edge 
technology and investigative expertise can assist law enforcement. It should set the 
template for future operations targeting organised criminals that are intent on stealing 
mobile assets.” 
 
A total of twelve insurers, including Admiral, Allianz, Aviva and Zenith, and two hire companies 
were victims of the organised crime ring responsible for the theft of vehicles collectively valued in 
excess of £1 million in 2015.  The resulting operation with the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) is an 
example of the positive outcome from a ‘joined up’ response between victim, police and security 
services, but is also an indictment of the current response mechanism where the police repeatedly 
declined the opportunity to investigate an offence which subsequently resulted in the dismantling 
of a criminal network importing stolen cars from the UK into East Africa. 
The Catalyst for the investigation 
In April 2015, APU received an alert that a high value Lexus motor vehicle being tracked and 
protected by them had left the UK. APU provides security and recovery services for a number of 
corporate operators and car-hire organisations and for all of the vehicles owned by AX. On this 
occasion, the hire care had been provided to an individual whilst his own car was being repaired, 
the hirer having claimed to be the not at-fault victim in a collision. He had claimed to be a director 
of a business with details that appeared to be correct and had also offered confirmation of 
insurance cover for his damaged vehicle which appeared to be legitimate. Subsequent 
investigations, after the APU alert was triggered, revealed the claim was fraudulent. CF1 explained:  
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“We reviewed the tracker logs to see where the vehicle went after it was delivered … We 
identified that it had been taken straight to a container yard and that it had remained there 
until it had been transported to the port before leaving the country.  It was obviously put 
into a container and whilst we suspected the worst, the vehicle was fitted with our own 
security system which allowed us to track the vehicle at all times, wherever it was and even 
if it was in a container.  
 
We obviously reported the theft of the vehicle to our insurer who said they wouldn’t involve 
IFED because it appeared to be just a single incident of theft. So, we reported the crime to 
the Metropolitan Police, or at least we tried to ... Increasingly we have found that the police 
won’t take reports of vehicle crimes from hire companies and we’ve been left to … carry out 
our own investigations. On this occasion, the Met would not accept our report. We had a 
relationship with NAVCIS and so I contacted them for assistance. They eventually wrote to 
me [14th May 2015] and I was slightly gobsmacked ...”  
 
NAVCIS were prepared to record the theft and enter the vehicle as LOS (lost or stolen) on the 
PNC and forward the crime report to the local force for a fee calculated at 21% of the value of the 
vehicle, approximately £9,000, if recovery was made.  CF1 declined the offer but then explained:  
“several weeks later, after a lot of persistence from one of my team, the Met agreed to take 
the report when we told them the vehicle had landed at a container port in the Middle East. 
That said, they told us they couldn’t do anything about it and suggested we fly to Oman and 
recover the vehicle ourselves. 
 
I spoke to NAVCIS again and they directed me to the UK Ports Authority suggesting that I 
might find out who had shipped the container containing the Lexus. That way we could 
identify the consignment number and track that to the ship on which it had been loaded to 
alert the authorities in Oman who could seize the container. We shared that information 
with the NAVCIS intelligence team at the Port, and shortly afterwards the NCA made 
contact. It was a case right place and right time really.”  
 
The De-Briefing  
At the Operation Navigate de-briefing29 it was reported that under the UK National Control 
Strategy, Organised Vehicle Crime had been escalated to Priority Threat status because, since 
Autumn 2014, there has been a large increase in the number of expensive vehicles stolen and not 
recovered. During Q1 2015, conservative estimates valued the loss at over £100 million with keyless 
theft and car-key burglary the main modus operandi. Incidents had clustered around wealthy areas 
of London/South East and a significant number of vehicles were believed to have been exported to 
Cyprus from Southampton docks. A high number were also exported to Eastern Europe using an 
overland route but Africa remained the prominent export location, particularly Uganda, Kenya, the 
                                                             
29 16/07/2015; NCA, London with representatives from APU, NCA, NAVCIS, Interpol, Metropolitan Police, Home 
Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
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Democratic Republic for Congo and Tanzania. Apparently, pressure had been exerted on the Mayor 
of London, based on the volume of high value 4x4 vehicles being stolen with residents concerned 
that:  
• detection rates were poor;  
• insurance premiums were rising;  
• vehicle security systems were ineffective;  
• residents had personal security concerns; and 
• the inadequate police response was unacceptable when criminals appeared aware they 
had little risk of arrest and prosecution.  
50% of vehicles reported stolen were stolen from the MET force area and pressure from the 
Mayor’s office was pushed downstream to the MET and upstream to the Home Office. It was 
disclosed that no UK Police Force had vehicle crime as a priority with their focus and resource being 
directed towards child sexual exploitation and cyber-crime, an extension of the conclusions reached 
by Ganon and Doig (2010) and Levi (2007) that forces will move ever-declining resources “away 
from work other than front-line policing and signal crimes”. The Home Office representative at the 
debrief was concerned about the failure of the police to regard the threat as a priority crime and 
the Foreign Office representative signalled concern about how the economies of East African states, 
diplomatic and political partners of the UK, were being destabilised by the emergence of high value 
organised crime for which the UK was doing little to stop. The export of stolen vehicles from the UK 
to Uganda was referenced as an historic problem. In 2014, five cars stolen from the UK were 
recovered in Kampala by Ugandan Police but efforts made by them to have the vehicles repatriated 
to the UK were unsuccessful. The police investigations had been filed in Uganda, owners had been 
compensated by insurance companies in the UK and there was no single agency responsible for 
investigating the thefts. The Home Office were surprised at the evidence of insurance companies 
failing to recover stolen vehicles where compensation had been paid in circumstances where the 
net result was increased future insurance premiums for policyholders, an expense that could have 
been mitigated if the vehicles had been repatriated.  
In March 2015, officers from the NCA met with Interpol and NAVCIS to discuss the East Africa 
problem and the three agencies agreed to work together on a project focusing on exported stolen 
vehicles headed to East Africa. The theft of the Lexus was opportune and when the vehicle arrived 
in Oman and CF1 had spoken with the port intelligence officer in the UK, the NCA approach had 
been triggered. They had identified an opportunity to carry out an operation using the Lexus and, 
with APU’s co-operation (and their security technology) saw an opportunity to develop their 
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understanding about how the illegal activity was facilitated and to identify and disrupt the criminal 
networks responsible. CF1 explained:  
“we agreed to support Operation Navigate and provided intelligence on the movement of 
the vehicle throughout the operation. The vehicle was traced from the Middle East to 
Mombasa and the NCA Liaison Officer, using trusted Kenyan and Ugandan police and 
security services personnel, monitored the container as it passed through customs controls 
... certain customs officials were complicit in the offence and facilitated the movement of the 
goods into the country. In Kenya, the goods were partly declared as furniture to avoid paying 
duty. At the border in Uganda, the goods were described as motor vehicles but the bill of 
lading didn’t mention the country of origin.”  
 
The path of the vehicle is shown at Figure 5.1 below:  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Operation Navigate - target vehicle movement 
After clearing the Ugandan border, the vehicle was finally tracked to Kampala, Uganda, where 
the syndicate ring-leaders were arrested and the container carrying the Lexus was seized. However, 
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the operation had also unearthed a substantial vehicle crime hub, leading to a compound 
containing 36 stolen vehicles including Range Rovers, Audi Q7s and BMW X5s collectively worth 
more than £1 million. CF1 was asked by NCA to travel to Uganda with a team to fit APU security 
devices to each of the recovered vehicles to safeguard their repatriation to the UK such was the 
concern that the vehicles would be ‘stolen back’ on the journey from Kampala to Mombasa. He 
said:  
“this case is a feather in the cap for APU … but also very pleasing that all parties involved 
were able to achieve some tangible success despite being led thousands of miles across the 
world in what was considered an impossible task by the Police. The failure of the 
Metropolitan Police to record the vehicle as stolen when first reported and the suggestion 
by NAVCIS that we should pay £9,000 for the privilege were disappointing … it was also 
disappointing that the insurers involved had simply given up and declined to assist in the 
repatriation exercise … we’re told that, at least for the time being, the criminal network 
behind the syndicate has been dismantled and Uganda, previously one of the primary 
destinations for cars stolen from the UK, has been effectively shut down.”  
 
There were no criminal prosecutions arising from the investigation in the UK and none are 
outstanding in Africa.  
Vehicle manufacturers 
An unexpected revelation from the debriefing was the ability of vehicle manufacturers to assist 
in the recovery of vehicle assets. DF4 is an expert in the interpretation of vehicle movement based 
on the analysis of vehicle telemetry data. He has assisted several police forces and provided expert 
evidence in serious or fatal road accidents where he has reconstructed the events leading up to the 
collision using data. He assisted in tracking the sting vehicle in Operation Navigate and subsequently 
identified that the manufacturer of one of the stolen vehicles has evolved, over the period since 
2014, a data warehouse containing all of the vehicle movement data for all newly registered 
vehicles of that brand, including a number of those recovered in Kampala. He discovered that, not 
only were the manufacturer able to identify the exact location of each vehicle at any time since 
manufacture, but they were also able to identify when replacement keys were provided by a dealer, 
even in Uganda, and on what date, and on whose authority, and why those replacement keys were 
supplied. It was DF4’s opinion that all manufacturers of high value prestige vehicles have access to 
similar tracking data which has, historically, not been made available to police forces, insurers or to 
their customers to facilitate a more effective recovery of stolen vehicles because of:  
• data protection restrictions, which vary in the territories in which their vehicles are sold 
or operate, make use of the data problematic (echoing the cross-border concerns of 
Tupman and Zabyelin (2015)); 
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• a reluctance to disclose the existence of this facility because of the negative ‘big-
brother’ connotation for customers; and 
• simple economic reasons - manufacturers will generally sell a new vehicle every time 
one is stolen from a customer after the insurance company pays out if the stolen 
vehicle is not recovered.  
DF4 said in interview:  
“We all know that retro-fit telematics devices have become quite common place with 
insurance companies using the data to try to control the driving behaviour of young drivers 
or to reconstruct accident circumstances but the idea that a vehicle manufacturer can locate 
the whereabouts of a stolen 4x4 in Kampala when it was originally sold and registered in 
Central London, that they will allow it’s Uganda based dealer to request and will then issue 
a replacement key for the vehicle, even though it was stolen in the UK, and yet they do 
nothing with that data to assist the owner, the insurer or the police is just beyond words.” 
 
CF1 reported that as a consequence of Operation Navigate, a working group was established 
with representatives of the police, government and the Society of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
and Traders to oversee and implement action around sharing information and best practice, local 
policing responses, technical opportunities and what the response should be in relation to advances 
in technology aimed at overcoming the security of vehicles and assisting criminals30.  
Conclusions 
This chapter extended the analysis of the experience of non-insurance victims of insurance 
fraud to large fleet operators, specifically bus companies and businesses, operating large vehicle 
fleets where the motor insurance risk is predominately self-insured using two further cases studies 
that highlighted how those sectors engaged with fraud and with insurers and the police where they 
had been the victim. The case studies exposed the link between insurance fraud, specifically where 
vehicle acquisition was involved, and organised crime and a further case study explored the issue 
in more detail. It addressed a fraud, committed against a CHC, which the police refused to record 
as a crime but which became the focal point of an investigation into an organised crime ring 
exporting high value prestige vehicles to East Africa. The debrief from the concluded NCA operation 
highlighted the inherent deficiency by which vehicle crime, in circumstances where insurance fraud 
was an enabler of the offence, were addressed by the police. Whilst the output from a single case 
study is never sufficient to mandate change, this study does demonstrate the consequences of 
                                                             
30 Source: NCA, July 2015 
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offences including acquisitive vehicle crime as their aim, however, the vehicle was acquired. It also 
demonstrated the consequences for a victim based on the attractiveness of the offence to the 
investigating authority when:  
• accepting a report of the theft of the CHCs car was a burden to the MET possibly 
consequent upon the lack of resources to investigate an unsolvable crime; 
• IFED were never likely to be engaged even though the offence was part of a fraudulent 
insurance claim, either because the offence was not one identified by a supporting 
insurer or because they could not have anticipated the extent and scale of the fraud;  
• for NAVCIS, their engagement motivation was entirely financial; £9,000 for recording 
the entry on the PNC, filing a crime report and sending it to the MET, and, 
• in the case of the NCA, their appetite to investigate was entirely coincidental on the 
report of an expensive 4x4 motor vehicle headed for East Africa fitting the remit of the 
investigation commenced by NAVCIS, Interpol and the NCA in March 2015.  
More than anything, the case study identified a theme that has emerged throughout the 
research, that the prospects for the criminal are far more favourable than for the victim who only 
avoided disenfranchisement by a matter of coincidence. Sergi (2014, pp. 71–72) also articulates the 
tension between the availability of resources to deal with a national threat which is part of 
organised activity but committed at a local level and the need to synchronise national and local 
policing strategies and ventured that the NCA may yet be “another exploitation of the rhetoric 
around organised crime for political interests” (Sergi, 2011). Whether similar political interests 
drove the formation of IFED is a topic covered in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 6 Making a Crisis 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, five ‘constituencies’ were identified as central to the research question. They 
were: 
• motor insurers, communicating predominantly through the collective voice of their 
trade body, the ABI; 
• the police;  
• non-insurer victims of insurance fraud; 
• the Establishment (parliament and the government acting through its various 
administrative and regulatory agencies); and 
• the media.  
The thesis has, so far, considered three of those constituencies and intimated the power that 
resides in the media but has yet to address the role the Establishment played in the creation of IFED 
and more importantly, the relationship that insurers cultivated with government in order to 
advance their agenda. How the findings from the topics addressed so far intertwine and impact 
upon the research question is a matter discussed in Chapter 7. Before proceedings it may be helpful 
to review some of the temporal landmarks identified so far: 
• Policing before the 18th century was in the hands of the community and afterwards was 
marked by a period when the expense of prosecution saw local businesses and trade 
organisations club resources to investigate offences and prosecute the offenders. 
• Historically, the Police have accepted payment for services but usually for supplying 
‘additional constables’ or officers to police a specific event or for investigative roles. 
• The Police Act 1966 allowed Chief Constables to solicit sponsorship for policing 
activities. 
• Motor insurance has been unprofitable since at least 1995.  
• In 1999 Legal Aid for the pursuit of personal injury claims was replaced by the ability of 
solicitors to act for claimants on a ‘no win, no fee’ basis and to recover uplifted costs 
for sharing the risk of recovery with the claimant. Claim volumes may have increased 
as a result. 
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• The Government accepted the conclusions from the Fraud Review in 2006 that fraud 
was a serious problem requiring a collaborative approach to find, and fund, a solution. 
• Insurers have contended with fraud for decades largely accepting the loss incurred 
through fraud as an unavoidable cost of doing business.  
• In their submissions to the Fraud Review, insurers had expressed  
o disquiet about the lack of police engagement and the unwillingness of the CPS 
to prosecute offences they had detected and avoided, and 
o unease with funding police investigations because it would mean they were 
paying twice for the same service and was, in any event, something the Courts 
had criticised in 2005. 
• The Police have been challenged by multi-lateralisation from a neo-liberal impetus to 
shrink the state. 
• DCPCU was held out by the Government as an example of a privately-funded public-
police partnership delivering value for the business sector and the state whilst 
providing the capacity for the police to focus on offences that might not ordinarily be 
investigated. 
• The recession in 2008 prompted a prolonged period of austerity with significant 
implications for business, consumers and public services. 
• Fraud has evolved, in both frequency and cost, stimulated by the impact of the 
recession on consumers. 
• The imperative of shrinking the state was given fresh impetus by the size of the national 
debt. 
• At the same time, motor insurers were caught in a perfect storm  
o investment returns which ordinarily supplement their premium income, 
plummeted, and  
o price aggregators which were originally perceived as a better route to market, 
had made the market competitive and driven motor premiums down to 
unsustainable levels.  
• Policing was impacted by budget cuts experiencing a reduction in the workforce over 
the period of the recession. Fraud was not a priority and insurance fraud even less so. 
• In 2009 the ABI issued a first report containing a number of uncorroborated estimates, 
highlighting their exposure to detected and undetected fraud. 
This chapter now proceeds to address how insurance claims are made and how they became 
central to increases in the cost of insurance premiums and affected insurer profitability. It explores 
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the dialogue between the insurance industry and the Establishment and considers how the ABI 
inspired regulatory change not just in respect of fraud but for other costs in the claims eco-system 
e.g. solicitor fees, damages for personal injury and the cost of credit-hire claims. Much of the 
research for this chapter was desktop driven and part of the output is a narrative of events from 
2004 to late 2011, when the launch of IFED was announced.  However, the engagement by insurers 
with government continues to evolve beyond the date of this thesis. The research identified that 
the CLP drove the case for IFED and that insurer representations on fraud coalesced with other 
more economically significant issues to create what Cohen (2002) had defined as a moral panic, 
what Hubbard (2006, p. 438) saw over 40 years in the USA as “repeat players on the defence side 
of tort litigation” seeking to reform tort doctrine in their favour to reduce their operating costs and 
which Feinman (2005, p. 19) claimed was a critical element by which insurers attacked the civil 
justice system and changed rules of law, by influencing public perceptions through  “political 
influence, power lobbying, aggressive litigation and production of an elaborate pubic campaign of 
misinformation that convinces people that reducing their rights is actually in their own interest.” 
This chapter considers the evidence in light of those arguments, and challenges whether crises 
around insurance fraud may have been part of a wider imperative to improve insurer profitability 
by depriving consumers of their common-law rights to legal redress in tort. Whilst not part of the 
original research objective, the evidence revealed the issues around fraud were so intertwined with 
the issue of insurer profitability driven by costs associated with personal injury claims that the 
breadth of submissions to government could not be ignored. 
The right to compensation  
It is enshrined in common law that an injured party has a right to pursue a claim for 
compensation for losses sustained following an act of negligence. It is a compulsory EU requirement 
for drivers to have motor insurance in force that provides protection for the innocent victim seeking 
to claim those compensatory damages.  The 1988 Road Traffic Act and European Community 
directives require an insurer to satisfy, on behalf of their policyholder, any judgement for damages 
awarded by a court where the tortfeasor is determined to have been so negligent31. For insurers, 
paying damages for bodily injury claims represents a significant cost although, if they consider any 
claim to be spurious or fraudulent, they can test their conviction by inviting the injured party to 
litigate. The innocent party has the evidential burden of establishing, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the other driver was negligent. If liability is accepted or proven, then an 
                                                             
31 Consolidated and codified into the 6th Motor Directive 2009/103/EC 
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independent medical expert will confirm the injury, opine whether it is consistent with the accident 
circumstances and give a prognosis for recovery. Whiplash is a common injury for which damages 
are claimed. It is caused by an abnormal flexion-extension motion or force applied to the neck 
causing movement beyond the neck's normal range that pulls and strains the neck muscles and 
ligaments (E-medicine Health, 2016). It is a real phenomenon estimated to cost the NHS £8 million 
a year to treat (ABI, 2011b; Straw, 2011), a relatively small sum compared with the additional work-
load claimed by the British Medical Association32 and reported by one insurer from diagnosing and 
treating whiplash injuries (LV= Liverpool Victoria, 2015). Whilst it can cause short-term discomfort 
it can also have serious long-term consequences but there is an absence of authoritative medical 
guidance in respect of diagnosis and treatment of the condition. Suffering through whiplash is 
difficult to disprove and the cost of litigating a challenge can be more expensive than the cost of 
paying compensation as indicated by N1 in the previous chapter.  Despite stories of opportunistic 
claimants routinely exploiting the challenge insurers face in verifying such claims there is no 
published evidence attributing any increase in the level of claims to the actions of fraudsters. 
Nonetheless, the IFB’s disapproval may be why the ABI later categorised the condition as ‘the fraud 
of choice’ (2014g).  
Conditional Fee Agreements (no win – no fee) 
Some of the reported increase in soft-tissue injury claims were probably driven by regulatory 
change introduced in 1999 after which insurers encouraged their innocent policyholders to make a 
claim as a means to generate non-premium referral income from solicitors. Before then, claimants 
could access legal aid to pursue personal injury claims. In 1999, the government amended the 
process allowing a winning claimant to recover a success fee, an uplift to their solicitor’s costs in 
addition to the recoverable standard costs33 as well as the cost of an ‘After the Event’ (“ATE”) 
insurance policy, which indemnified the claimant for costs if their claim failed. ATE policies were 
marketed by solicitors and these incremental recoverable costs became integral to the ‘no win – 
no fee’ Conditional Fee Agreement (“CFA”) between a claimant and his solicitor. They were 
intended to ensure that, absent legal aid, legal advice and the ability to access justice and pursue a 
claim for damages would remain open to consumers.  
 
                                                             
32 According to figures from the BMA (July 2014) GPs spend 1.72 hours on average seeing patients they suspect of 
inventing or exaggerating an injury to claim compensation every month equating to 887,520 hours a year (close to one 
million). 
33 Access to Justice Act 1999 
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The agenda for change 
Eventually, an argument emerged that the permitted increase in recoverable solicitor costs had 
a motivational effect on solicitors, and others associated with accidents, to generate increased 
claim volumes predominantly involving whiplash related injuries. In October 2011, in evidence to 
the TSC (2011b, p. 38), Jonathan Djanogly MP34, claimed  
“one individual indicated that, in 1999, claimant’s solicitor’s costs were awarded at 56%. By 
2010, the average claimant costs represented 142% of the sums received by the injured 
victims. The same person said that, whilst average damages paid increased since 1999 by 
33%, average claimant costs paid had increased by 234%.”  
 
Djanogly was correct. CFAs did create favourable economic outcomes for solicitors 
championing a consumer’s rights to compensation but it had become increasingly destabilising for 
insurers. Djanogly said “the problem is that, if you are a claimant and you have no chance of losing, 
then you are almost obliged and you are almost crazy not to sue” (ibid. p.38). 
Motor insurance has been unprofitable since 1995 (ABI, 2011a), and Djanogley highlighted the 
increased frequency of injury claims and the growth in associated claimant costs from 1999 to 2010, 
as part of a systemic problem. He inferred the resulting cost burden imposed on insurers was driven 
by the compensation culture rather than a legitimate entitlement to compensation. In response, 
Andrew Dismore of the Access to Justice Group (“AJAG”) cautioned against conflating whiplash 
with fraud highlighting that insurers don’t pay meritless or dishonest claims (Transport Committee, 
2011b, p. 29), an argument made several years earlier by the ABI (2004, p. 1), and validated in 2013 
when they reported 59,899 incidents of detected motor insurance fraud in which insurers had 
declined payment, so avoiding potential fraud losses estimated at c.£811.3m (ABI, 2014c).  
Locating the trigger points which stimulated support for regulatory change favouring insurers, 
including the eventual creation of IFED, required desktop investigation to identify tactics and/or 
strategic initiatives promoted by insurers. Those were found, predominantly, by reviewing the 
content of messaging to consumers and the Establishment, and by also considering the hidden 
lobbying of government. Research sources included: 
• the evolving messaging from 62 ABI press releases issued during the review period 
(Appendix D); 
• publicly available empirical data35; 
                                                             
34 Under-Secretary of State, MOJ 
35 including claim data published, and sold, by the ABI 
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• written submissions to government, parliament and various regulatory enquiries including 
the CMR, ITF, TSC, OFT, and CMA and oral submissions to the TSC and CMA; 
• evidence of support from associated undertakings – consultants, brokers, solicitors or 
advisers; 
• the semi-structured interviews conducted in 2015; and 
• e-mails between the ABI, Keoghs and the MOJ identifying ‘hidden lobbying’ conducted in 
furtherance of the ABIs commercial objectives. 
The results of the investigation revealed that the creation of IFED was one of a number of 
connected outcomes from a range of economic and regulatory issues being canvassed by insurers 
and which extended beyond the scope of tackling organised insurance fraud. In their media releases 
the ABI characterised claimants, solicitors, claims management companies, medical experts, motor 
engineers, repairers and CHCs in pejorative terms like “the compensation cowboys” (ABI, 2015g) or 
those “firms and lawyers who drive up unmeritorious claims” (ABI, 2015f) and the interaction 
between press releases and the resultant newspaper coverage merits consideration. Halton and 
McCann (2004, pp. 175–176) described the law in the United States as “virtually eviscerated” by 
sponsored media stories of legal disputes where the press “artificially equalise relationships 
between parties that are often highly unequal in material resources and social power … with the 
damage, pain, anguish and costs of injuries suffered by ordinary people” either de-emphasised or 
ignored. They saw this “effacement of injury” as something that reduced sympathy for claimants, 
obscured the proper foundation of their claims and had the effect of reversing the narrative logic 
where the party at fault for the injury, or their insurer, is wrongly portrayed as the “real victim” of 
the acts of deceitful claimants and their solicitors. They also saw it as invidious that dominant media 
brands were able to deliver what purported to be “knowledge in print” encountering few challenges 
to the content from less critical minds as the messages, subtly but steadily, seeped into reader’s 
consciousness (ibid. p.178). Mud sticks, even if the justification for flinging it is dubious (Oliphant, 
2016, p. 20) and as Haltom and McCann point out, “purported rebuttals never gain the same 
currency” (2004, pp. 104–106)  and the result, is an ignorant public, who are “helpless targets of a 
one-way flow of carefully filtered and orchestrated communication” (Neuman, Marion, & Crigler, 
1992). The desktop research identified that the ABI’s press releases featured regularly as articles in 
the mainstream media. Whether the intention was to use the media to instil the public with a sense 
of panic from the threat of the uncontainable risks from insurance fraud and that something must 
be done, or whether they were just part of the mood music is debatable but a schedule of 62 
releases that were reviewed appears at Appendix D and a summary of the more emotive straplines 
under which those releases were deployed is at Figure 6.1 below. 
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Figure 6.1: Sample of ABI Media Releases; Nov 08 to Jan 16 
In Cohen’s analysis (2002, pp. vii–viii), moral panics are “lying dormant but hard to recognize - 
invisibly creeping up the moral horizon; they are damaging in themselves – but also merely warning 
signs of the real, much deeper and more prevalent conditions. They are transparent (anyone can 
see what’s happening) – but also opaque: accredited experts must explain the perils behind the 
superficially harmless.” For the ABI, the flow of orchestrated communication was synchronised with 
government and regulatory announcements and expounded by “accredited experts” including 
political lobbyists, analyst, solicitors and industry leaders to ensure the message was not lost. But 
it was about more than just the media. 
About lobbying 
Every UK voter can lobby their MP to try to communicate their position on issues as part of the 
democratic process, however ineffective it might prove. Corporate lobbying however, typically 
funded by large commercial organisations or industry trade bodies, is a different proposition. Harris 
and Lock (1996, p. 314) characterised corporate lobbying as an extension of marketing and public 
and media relations.  Van Schendelen (1993, p. 3) draws a slight distinction between corporate 
lobbying and commercial political campaigning defining the former as “the informal exchange of 
information with public authorities, as a minimal description on the one hand, and as trying 
informally to influence public authorities on the other.” He defines commercial political campaigning 
as more extreme, “mobilising opinion to exert pressure on public authorities for commercial gain or 
competitive advantage.” Cave and Rowell (2014, p. 80) observed that the influence of lobbyists 
ABI	Media	Releases		-	Month	of	Issue	and	Title
2008/11	-	ABI	reveals	whiplash	epidemic
2008/12	-	Rise	in	front	end	fraud	putting	insurance	cover	in	jeopardy	warns	the	ABI
2009/03	-	National	fraud	crackdown	must	end	the	victimless	crime	myth	says	the	ABI
2009/04	-	Recession	Britain	insurers	detecting	record	amounts	of	fraudulent	claims	ABI
2009/07	-	Deception	Exaggeration	and	Invention	ABI	publishes	report	on	the	rising	cost	of	insurance	fraud	ABI
2010/01	-	Zero	tolerance	policy	towards	fraud	now	needed	says	the	ABI
2010/07	-	Bogus	Britain	insurers	expose	over	2300	fraudulent	claims	every	week
2011/05	–	Britain’s	pain	in	the	neck	culture	must	be	reduced	says	the	ABI
2011/07	-	No	hiding	place	for	cheats	as	drive	to	reduce	insurance	fraud	moves	up	a	gear
2011/07	-	You	could	not	make	it	up	but	some	did	Insurers	detecting	more	fraudulent	claims	than	ever	over	2500	worth	18	million	every	week
2011/09	–	Tackling	the	compensation	culture
2011/09	-	Leading	retailers	and	business	groups	join	forces	with	the	ABI	in	calling	for	an	end	to	the	have	a	go	compensation	culture
2012/04	-	The	UK’s	pain	in	the	neck	culture	must	end	says	the	ABI
2012/09	-	ABI	lifts	the	lid	on	the	1	billion	a	year	insurance	fraud	industry	as	the	insurance	fraud	register	is	launched
2012/09	-	Insurance	Fraud	exposed
2012/09	-	Phantom	passengers	and	phoney	injuries	behind	record	rise	in	motor	insurance	fraud	says	the	ABI
2012/12	-	Government	on	the	right	road	to	tackling	the	UK	whiplash	epidemic	says	the	Association	of	British	Insurers
2013/03	-	Fair,	independent,	objective	–	ABI	publishes	proposals	to	curb	the	UK’s	whiplash	epidemic
2013/04	–	Brace	yourself	—	UK	is	the	biggest	pain	in	the	neck	in	Europe
2013/07	-	The	con	is	not	on	-	industry	clampdown	on	insurance	cheats	uncovers	frauds	worth	£21	million	every	week
2014/05	-	Insurance	cheats	feel	the	heat	–	value	of	fraudulent	claims	uncovered	by	insurers	hits	record	level
2014/09	-	Motor	insurance	application	fraud	backfiring	on	nearly	3,500	motorists	a	week	according	to	the	ABI
2014/11	-	Overhaul	in	assessing	whiplash	claims	set	to	put	the	brake	on	the	fraud	of	choice
2015/07	-	You	could	not	make	it	up,	but	they	did.	Savings	for	honest	customers	as	insurers	expose	£3.6	million	worth	of	insurance	frauds	every	day
2016/01-		Insurers	will	do	whatever	it	takes	to	protect	honest	customers	against	insurance	fraud
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increases when lobbying happens quietly which, ironically, makes it harder to identify those 
occasions when policy change has been aligned to hidden commercial political campaigning and 
where the aim of the lobbyist is commercial advantage. They also argue that there is a darker side 
to lobbying, “one that involves a selective approach to the truth, media manipulation, the 
undermining of opponents and other dubious practices” and all of it hidden from view (ibid. p. x.). 
Because lobbyists are rarely seen at work, it is difficult to assess whether, and to what extent, any 
particular lobbying effort has benefited the sponsor by impacting government policy. Van 
Schendelen (1994, pp. 3–22) divides lobbying tactics into direct and indirect methods, a distinction 
that allows any evidence to be assessed as to whether it is synonymous with the characteristic 
below. He identified direct methods as:  
• personal visits,  
• personal letters,  
• phone conversations,  
• informal contacts, and 
• participation in hearings or public action groups. 
He identified indirect methods as: 
• developing friends inside the system,  
• accessing assistants of decision-makers,  
• targeting mid-level civil servants,  
• participation in or production of studies and reports,  
• using brokers or consultants,  
• building affiliations with interest groups to widen the support for the agenda, 
• supporting political party’s election campaigning, and 
• using the media and other publicity to build the message.  
There is an ironic parallel between identifying the outcome achieved by lobbyists and the 
challenge of proving an allegation of fraud in court. In the latter, a suspicion may only be supported 
by circumstantial evidence of several disconnected events and so counsel will present an argument 
inviting the judge to draw an inference from his narrative that the only logical conclusion from all 
of the (limited) evidence is one of fraud. Inference is often necessary with lobbying too because 
“lobbyists are a bit like Borrowers: they leave their footprints all over government policy but are 
hidden from sight” (Cave & Rowell, 2014, p. xi).  Helpfully, evidence of how the ABI lobbied 
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government was available to the Researcher36 allowing inference to be drawn about the path 
trodden and the previously well-hidden footprints of the ABI. All of Van Schendelen’s direct and 
indirect lobbying tactics were present from the combination of previously hidden documents and 
publicly available material and demonstrated the intimate engagement between the ABI and 
government. They expose a persistent focus by insurers, certainly up to the end of the period 
covered by this thesis, determined to eradicate regulatory and statutory impediments in order to 
improve profitability by deploying: 
• uncorroborated and unchallenged evidence of the magnitude of insurance fraud, with 
• a media campaign focused on the perils of “a whiplash epidemic” fuelled by 
“compensation cowboys” bringing “fraudulent whiplash claims” for “cheats” as part of 
“the UK’s pain in the neck culture”, and  
• hidden lobbying to build government support for regulatory change.   
The conclusion that government relied upon untested evidence and partisan submission to 
inform policy decisions and develop regulation, legislation and fundamental change to common law 
gives force to Cameron’s (2009) admission that “secret corporate lobbying goes to the heart of why 
people are fed up with politics”.    
How did the ABI see things?  
I6, a former ABI employee, referred to the three pillars of lobbying; “a really good evidence 
base, a good story to tell from the evidence and a message that provides clarification that everyone 
is paying for the problem identified.” The second pillar, the need to find a good story to tell, is 
essential in creating a moral panic if, as Cohen (2002, p. 1) argues, it is to be “presented in a stylised 
and stereotypical fashion by the mass media” so that “editors, bishops and politicians and other 
right thinking people” can man the barricades. The assertion that industrial scale insurance fraud 
was costing the industry £billions whilst threatening the continued supply of motor insurance at an 
affordable price was the panic that insurers created to attract the media, and then the government, 
to accept the warning messages that insurers could not solve the problem of the incidence and cost 
of whiplash claims alone. According to Paul Evans of AXA Insurance (Transport Committee, 2011b, 
sec. Ev 5), an accredited expert capable of explaining the perils,  “we have to ask Government to 
help us to solve the problem … it is just too big“. That the story was not supported by a good 
evidence base, I6’s first pillar, was irrelevant. The ABI data was unchallenged and so, ipso facto, it 
                                                             
36 Supplied to the Researcher by N3 pursuant to an FOI request 
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assumed its own authoritative provenance. But there was a bigger imperative behind the fraud 
headline for the ABI, one aimed at driving the government towards structural and commercial 
change by eliminating certain common-law rights and marginalising, to the extent they were 
eliminated from any debate, those in the supply chain that were supporting consumers and 
impacting the insurer’s economic model.  
John Parker became the ABI’s head of general insurance in 1994 and in 2003 claimed that “well 
over 60% of the ABI’s time is spent lobbying ... to influence the government and the media, while 
adding value for our members” (“John Parker - Lobbying for industry change,” 2003). He saw 
lobbying as an effective tool because “you can’t just turn up and talk to a government 
department…you have to build good long-term relationships with stakeholders.” Cave and Rowell 
agreed (2014, p. 8): 
“politicians rely to a great extent on lobbyists to do their job. Coming up with good, 
workable policy is a costly process that requires research and detailed knowledge, time 
consuming activities that the civil service is increasingly hard pushed to provide, but in which 
the lobbyist is willing to invest. Lobbying, seen from this angle, looks positively public 
spirited”. 
 
In 2003, Parker was focused on legal costs, something that he said accounted for 40% of the 
value of a claim paid. Perversely, and highlighting the perils of uncorroborated data, his figure was 
substantially lower than the figure later relied on by Djanogly in 2011 when he reported that costs 
accounted for 56% of the value awarded in 1999 (Transport Committee, 2011b, p. 38 Ev 12).  
Motor insurance is the only compulsory insurance product, one that Jack Straw MP (ibid. p. 29 
Ev 8) characterised as a product where parliament “gives insurers a profit – that is the idea – in 
return for delivering not a private good but a public good”. Straw supported the insurer contention 
that the uncontrollable costs of motor claims, and specifically claims for bodily injury, had 
generated substantial premium increases for the law-abiding motorist for no public benefit. He 
identified that whilst increasing premiums to counter substantial recurring losses was an emerging 
trend, it would, inevitably, “price people out of the ability to follow the law.” If that argument was 
meant to attribute a change in market forces in 2010 to be the cause for insurer losses, it was 
weakened by an ABI press release (2011a) highlighting that the motor insurance sector had not 
been profitable since 1995. When commercial entities remain in markets with unattractive financial 
outcomes and capital flows that are harmed by recurrent losses there is usually another motivation 
for not exiting in favour of generating a return on capital elsewhere. It may be, for example, that 
structural and endemic market issues, such as the legal costs problem highlighted by Parker in 2003, 
might be transformational for the sector if they were resolved by regulation. 
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Government focus on organised crime 
Unrelated to any insurer intervention, in 2004 (Home Office, 2004, p. 15) the Government 
identified a range of fraud offences committed by organised criminals and resolved to identify 
instances where businesses were vulnerable in order to develop a combined strategic reaction to 
tackle the problem. Insurance fraud did not feature in the document. At the same time, the Home 
Office outlined a plan to improve the performance of local police forces and their focus on fraud. 
Initiatives included the CLP working more closely with the SFO and what was described as an 
innovative approach to expanding the CLPs remit to the South-East region with a combination of 
money from Government and from the City of London (ibid. p.16). Business fraud was highlighted 
as a candidate for new opportunities between the public and private sector and the important 
precedent of the DCPCU was emphasised whereby the banking industry had contributed to the cost 
of law enforcement “because success from effective law enforcement fed directly through to the 
bank’s bottom line” (ibid. pp. 15-16). The warnings of Hay and Snyder (1989, pp. 27–29) and Hope 
(2001, p. 212) as to how privileged access to justice by some, at the risk of it being denied to others, 
appeared absent from government thinking as they advocated policing as a club good.  The ABI 
(2004) welcomed the government’s approach, highlighting the lack of police resource and their 
appetite for dealing with fraud as the principle obstacle faced by insurers. They acknowledged their 
own investment in counter-fraud activities, and the ultimate sanction of the right to reject 
suspicious claims, but the ABI were concerned at the lack of deterrents and criticised the rarity of 
prosecutions and the missed opportunities to identify more widespread criminal activity. They 
advocated that any increased police resources should, in part, be directed to prosecuting insurance 
fraud and to assist insurers sending a message that fraud is unacceptable. More significantly in light 
of the research question addressed in this thesis, the ABI (ibid. p. 2) urged Government to develop:  
“an integrated national plan to combat fraud … across public and private sectors, in a way 
that would, to some degree, mirror the strategic approach to money laundering by 
disrupting criminal activity through recognising the benefits of sectors working towards a 
common goal”. 
 
By employing indirect lobbying tactics to build relationships inside the system, suggest 
affiliations with interest groups to widen the support for the agenda and using the media to build 
the message, the ABI was informally seeking to influence both government and the police to 
provide greater resources in areas they felt would be more effective. They were explicit in 
proclaiming that insurance fraud was a crime which, they said, on personal household and motor 
policies alone, had an estimated cost of £1 billion with c. 40-50% of that sum related to deliberate 
premeditated attempts to commit fraud usually by fabricating the circumstances of a claim, many 
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of which they said linked to “organised criminal gangs involved in other types of serious criminality” 
(ibid. p. 1). The ABIs use of a large and uncorroborated estimate is unhelpful for academic 
researchers. Their published statistics for detected (and avoided) motor insurance fraud revealed 
that insurers avoided £78.9 million in proven or suspected dishonest claims in 2004 (ABI, 2012a) 
leaving an unexplained delta of £921 million37. In 2005, the ABI (2012a) reported detected motor 
insurance fraud had more than doubled to £181.66 million. When questioned on the integrity of 
that data, I6 said that the focus on fraud was, at that time, “an issue in a slightly undefined type of 
way” and “not really supported by any robust industry data”. At around the same time, the insurer’s 
experience with police fraud investigations and their disposition to fund a police response was 
evolving.  The Court of Appeal judgement in the Hounsham case had criticised the insurer involved 
and influenced insurers who, when the ABI made their submission to the Fraud Review (ABI, 2006), 
advocated the effectiveness of current expenditure “would be significantly improved if law 
enforcement agency priorities and resources were based on an accurate assessment of the risk of, 
and harm caused by, fraud”. By 2006, the ABI estimate of the undetected insurance fraud risk had 
grown from £1 billion to at least £1.5 billion and they recommended (ibid. p. 5):  
“the establishment of regional anti-fraud squads along the lines of the City of London 
Police… (representing Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Northern and Southern England) 
housed within a local police force… with local expertise”.  
 
More importantly, the ABI rejected private sector funding of police investigations because:  
• the industry already invests significantly in fraud detection and investigation; 
• insurers are invested in the IFB, a private sector response to organised insurance fraud; 
• prosecution is a public interest issue and should not depend on the ability to pay; and 
• according to the Court, private sector funding is not good practice. 
I6 added some colour to the reluctance of insurers to privately fund explaining that “the 
government are always saying to the ABI, ‘you benefit from it so why don’t you pay for it?’  … whole 
swathes of things, flood defences … Fire and Rescue Service …?” 
Change the way you look at things and the things you look at will change 
In 2006 (ABI, 2012a), just £206.9 million (prior year £181.66 million) of the £1.5 billion of 
claimed exposure to fraud was identified as detected insurance fraud  leaving £1.3 billion of the 
                                                             
37 In subsequent references to detected claims, the research assumes that the sums identified relate to potential 
losses that were detected and avoided and so did not constitute a loss incurred through fraud. 
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exposure unaccounted for. I6 indicated concern from industry chief executives that insurers were 
identifying avoided fraudulent claims but the police were not responsive and recalled the ABI were 
keen to “create more publicity around fraud” but lacked the data to make their argument to 
government for “a real case for change.” Fraser, cited by Harris and McGrath (2012, p. 77) 
summarised the challenge that was soon to focus the ABI: 
“selling the policy issue in the government marketplace is parallel to selling a product or 
service. It is essential to plan, package and present the issue to convince the decision maker, 
often a legislator or government policy maker. The most cost-effective technique is to show 
the number of supporters (and voters) on your side.” 
 
In terms of packaging the message, the ABI (Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2006)  started by 
sponsoring the creation of the IFB as a means to highlight the scale of insurance fraud and to 
provide insurers with the first iteration of empirically generated but still partly estimated data for 
organised fraud. With software developed by BAE Applied Intelligence it used meta data analysis 
to detect cross-industry motor insurance fraud activity and then applied an imputed value per 
incident to produce an estimate of the likely value of claims arising from crash for cash incidents38. 
To assist the delivery of the message the ABI (2008b) also published “a consumer factsheet to help 
consumers reduce their risk” which highlighted an increase in whiplash claims despite the 
Government’s casualty statistics suggesting that British roads were getting safer. It included a 
statement from their Director-General (ABI, 2008a) and signalled, for the first time, the 
unquantified connection between whiplash,  fraud, and costs, a message destined to evolve and 
shape the nascent media and policy debate. The ABI had also commissioned the ABI Research Brief 
(discussed in Chapter 2) which confirmed their estimate of undetected general insurance fraud was 
now £1.9 billion. Detected fraudulent claims were claimed to be £730 million of which £353 million 
related to motor claims. These figures are breath-taking. The volume of criminal activity detected, 
even if it relates just to £353 million of detected motor insurance fraud, is difficult to comprehend. 
Referencing the work of the IFB, and also cognisant of the government focus on organised crime 
following the Fraud Review, the ABI Research Brief cited £200 million as the aggregate estimated 
value of identified organised fraud (Goss & O’Neill, 2009, p. 3). This figure equated to 10.5% of the 
ABI estimate for undetected general insurance fraud (ibid. p. 1.) but just 0.5% of the 2004 Home 
Office estimate for the “losses and harms caused by all forms of organised crime” (Home Office, 
                                                             
38 Source: Interview with I2 
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2004, p. 15). The ABI may have been punching above their weight39 considering the quantum of 
claimed exposure to organised fraud or they may have anticipated the government’s direction of 
travel at a time when the Home Office agenda was focused on the potential for business 
partnerships of sectors characterising themselves as victims (Green, 2007, p. 453) and extending 
police initiatives like DCPCU. I6 thought the Government recognised in 2009, “in headline terms 
rather than speeches” that “the insurance industry would benefit from tackling insurance fraud, so 
why doesn’t it pay for it” and chief executives concluded that, without funding, “insurance fraud 
was not going to be investigated”.  
The economic prognosis for insurers in 2009 was, however, more perilous than their estimated 
exposure to undetected fraud and 2010 was set to mark a watershed moment. The General 
Insurance Communications Committee of the Actuarial Profession (2010, p. 4) reported that motor 
insurance results were “worse than feared” with 2009 one of the least profitable years on record. 
They blamed: 
• higher personal injury claims and associated costs;  
• customer facing claim management companies and solicitors; 
• the recession; 
• reduced investment returns and worsening economic outlook; 
• eroding reserves; and  
• price competition from comparison web-site aggregators. 
They signalled an urgent need for insurers to raise motor insurance premiums by 20%, a 
difficult, almost unimaginable outcome, during a recession which, according to Pettinger (2017), 
was  characterised by 
• rising unemployment;  
• low/negative economic growth;  
• illiquidity in the banking sector leading to reduced lending;  
• falling house prices leading to negative wealth effects; 
• reduced consumer and business confidence; and 
• falling GDP compounded by fiscal austerity.  
                                                             
39 In the 2017 AFI (Button et al., 2017, p. 8) the authors classified confidence in the industry data for general 
insurance fraud as ‘Bronze’ which is “met when an attempt at identifying the cost of fraud has been made, but there may 
be limited confidence in its credibility.” 
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Raising any consumer cost by 20% against such a harsh economic backdrop was an unattractive 
commercial proposition but with price comparison aggregators challenging attempts by insurers to 
raise premiums, the recession gave insurers “fresh impetus at the same time as the industry was 
burning up the last of its surplus reserves” (The Actuarial Profession, 2010, p. 4). Another actuarial 
report from EMB Consultancy Limited (“EMB”)40 (2010) offered a similar analysis but, curiously, 
neither of the two reports identified fraud as a component of the deteriorating economic position 
confronting insurers though EMB (Read, 2010) later rectified the omission, ascribing the surge in 
insurance premiums (rather than the losses sustained by insurers) to:  
• historically and artificially low premiums from fierce competition leading to low 
industry profit; 
• a huge increase in fraud especially crash for cash;  
• the impact from price comparison web-sites; 
• an increase in uninsured drivers; and 
• increased personal injury claims. 
There are some anomalies with EMB’s claims. For example, the reference to an increase in 
uninsured drivers is at odds with the Motor Insurance Bureau’s (“MIB”) (cited by the ABI in their 
submission to the TSC (Transport Committee, 2011a))  
“uninsured drivers are more likely to get caught now than ever before: improved detection 
techniques and enforcement of the law has resulted in a reduction in uninsured driving in 
the UK in the last four years. Since 2005 real progress has been made with more than 
600,000 vehicles seized for no insurance, contributing to an overall 20% reduction of the 
number of claims from uninsured and untraced motorists.” 
 
In addition, EMB’s reference to a ‘huge’ increase in crash for cash related fraud can only have 
been inspired by the IFB estimate, no other data having been issued on the phenomenon and a 
figure that may well have been avoided by insurers in any event thus having a limited impact on 
costs. Nonetheless, in 2010, the picture appeared bleak; motor insurers were in a beleaguered 
market in need either of re-financing or a different solution. Simon Lamble, the motor insurance 
product director at Confused.com (Read, 2010) said:  
“Zurich publicly announced in January it was looking to increase prices by up to 20 %. This 
signalled the action the industry has taken in a bid to get back to profit. Increasing claims 
                                                             
40 EMB Consultancy assisted 19 of the top 20 UK motor insurers in product pricing (Transport Committee, 2011a, p. 
76) 
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costs, more injury pay-outs and fraud have created a situation where providers are not 
making any money."  
 
Lobbying; we all know how it works (Cameron, 2010)  
The ABI were definitely lobbying government by June 2010. The Guardian (Ramesh, 2012) 
revealed in January 2012 how insurers were given extensive access to civil servants drafting the bill 
that would become LASPO and which would benefit insurers materially. They identified that 
“Robert Wright, the head of civil litigation funding and costs at the MOJ and the official in 
charge of the controversial reforms, and his team gave the ABI, regular information on their 
plans with officials pressing Ken Clarke, the justice secretary, to attend insurance industry 
events with emails telling the ABI that they were "working on" getting ministers to attend 
events before the Tory party conference last year. 
 
In May 2011, the government was in talks with the insurance industry over controversial 
plans to force defendants to pay their costs even if they win a case – a change known as 
"qualified one-way cost shifting". The Civil Justice Council, the body tasked with 
investigating these proposals, was only informed by ministers in July. 
 
On 8 September 2011, Wright sent the ABI a press release outlining the proposed ban on 
referral fees – payments for finding victims of road accidents who could sue for 
compensation, which the industry had long advocated – the day before it became public. 
Twenty minutes later, the ABI returned the favour, sending the MOJ its press release, adding 
it had briefed the BBC's Today programme and they would use the information "as a basis" 
for interviewing the minister. 
 
The 118 pages of official papers, record discussions between insurers, their lawyers and 
government officials working under Djanogly, the justice minister. Djanogly gave up 
regulating parts of the industry after a Cabinet Office investigation into his personal 
insurance holdings in October. 
 
The legal aid bill is being debated in the Lords until Monday. Financial firms with insurance 
interests have given the Tories £5.4m in the last decade, £4.9m of that since David Cameron 
became leader in December 2005. 
 
The prime minister has invited the chief executives from the insurance industry into 
Downing Street to discuss how to deal with the burgeoning costs of civil litigation. 
 
Lord McNally, the Lib Dem peer piloting the bill through the upper house, had insisted 
ministers "will not pander to or give special access to 'vested interests' such as the Law 
Society and the Bar Council". 
 
Desmond Hudson, the Law Society's chief executive, said: "This looks like being legislation 
for the insurance industry, by the insurance industry. It is an unusual and unsatisfactory 
notion of democracy when insurers can write the laws of the land. The Law Society has 
campaigned and lobbied for changes in the interests of access to justice ... the government 
must be even-handed with all interested parties of the bill." 
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But a spokesperson for the ABI said: "We have not said anything in private that we have not 
said in public and we have nothing to hide. We make no apology for providing evidence to 
policymakers to tackle the compensation culture and help reduce motor insurance 
premiums. The ABI, unlike the claimant lawyer lobby, has provided the evidence and 
analysis to support our public policy positions rather than rely on rhetoric and anecdote." 
 
An MoJ spokesman denied that the insurance industry had been given privileged access to 
the ministry. "Ongoing dialogue between government and stakeholders is an important 
part of policymaking. It is normal business to listen to a range of views."  
 
The e-mails at Appendix F41 show a clear engagement on the imperative of reducing the costs 
recoverable by solicitors in bodily injury claims. A more accessible summary of the key interactions 
appears at Appendix E. The emails are silent on the issues of fraud, organised or otherwise. Of 
course, there may be other hidden communications but, when considered with the publicly 
available submissions, those e-mails evidence that all of Van Schendelen’s (1994, pp. 3–22) indirect 
method of lobbying were deployed by the ABI. They suggest a degree of familiarity, almost 
conspiratorial intimacy, between the ABI and MOJ with the MOJ attaching an uncritical reliance on 
the veracity of data and legitimacy of opinion supplied by the ABI. For example, at the MOJ’s 
request, the ABI provided raw data from work conducted by Frontier Economics 42  (F 292) 
supporting conclusions previously reached by government that the processes and costs involved in 
making a personal injury claim are disproportionately high, particularly in lower value claims 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007, p. 15).  Prior to that request, and following extensive 
consultation, Sir Rupert Jackson had completed a report in which he proposed reforms to costs and 
the rules surrounding the case management of civil claims43. Whilst his proposals on setting the 
level of costs recoverable in litigated claims were being considered, the MOJ asked the ABI to seek 
permission from Frontier Economics to access the underlying data from their research work and for 
other ABI members to provide them with “anything they can let us have … on a no names basis” as 
part of the work the MOJ were performing in a public consultation (F 298).  Significantly, for reasons 
that will become evident below, the MOJ confirmed they were looking for data that included the 
total number and value of: 
• personal injury cases dealt with,  
                                                             
41 The syntax ‘F number’ references the page of the document referenced in Appendix F 
42 (dated 1st April 2007 and presumably covering claims for 2005 to April 2007 per the Frontier Economics report) 
43 Jackson LJ reviewed civil litigation costs in the context of their effect on access to justice. The report was presented 
to Jack Straw, as Lord Chancellor, in January 2010. Most of Jackson’s recommendations were enacted under the coalition 
government post May 2010 through enabling legislation (LASPO). 
 
 
  
 
188 
• claimant’s costs paid out,  
• defendant’s costs incurred, and  
• damages paid.  
In Chapter 2, the ABI’s parallel referencing of its own unsubstantiated data was suggested as 
the basis on which undue credibility was given to their estimate of undetected insurance fraud. The 
criticism was made because the figure reported by the NFA claimed reliance on data supplied by 
the ABI and IFB (National Fraud Authority, 2013, p. 48). Subsequently, the ABI, and the IFT, both 
referenced the NFA as authority for the quantum of undetected insurance fraud on which their 
arguments were based. This criticism of parallel referencing is re-made here because, two months 
after providing the Frontier Economics research data to the MOJ, in a speech given by the ABI to 
the North East Regional Group of Insurance Institutes (F294) there was a reference to the extent of 
the problems facing insurers: 
“The estimated total cost of claims made to the insurance industry in 2009 is approximately 
£14 billion. This is twice the amount paid only 7 years earlier in 2002! Unless motor injuries 
are twice as bad as they were ten years ago there are flaws in our compensation system 
that need to be addressed.  
 
These are not self-interest figures generated by the insurance industry – they are the 
government’s figures. And although they are now somewhat dated in that they are four 
years old (2006), I am sure the figures have only become worse since then.”  
 
The salient point was the reference in the speech to the figures not being “self-interest figures 
generated by the insurance industry” but being “government figures”, an odd statement in light of 
the evidence that the raw data relied upon by the MOJ was likely provided by the ABI in July 2010. 
It appears, therefore, more likely that the figures were “self-interest figures” but that they were 
instantly given an air of independent authority by attributing them to the government. The issue of 
fraud was also addressed with the speaker announcing £840 million of detected fraud for 2009, a 
figure which he related to savings made by insurers that was not an additional cost suffered by 
them. The speaker also confirmed, from work carried out by the IFB, that 30,000 detected staged 
accidents had cost insurers c £350 million in 2009 with crash for cash something that “was a crime 
that increases premiums for the honest motorist”.  Whilst claiming that insurers “have no problem 
in paying genuine whiplash claims” the speaker also highlighted the connection between whiplash 
and fraud, first made in 2008 in an ABI report (2008b) leading the speaker to assert in 2010 that 
“British necks seem to be weaker than elsewhere in Europe”.  
In September 2010, in a move more than likely designed to build affiliations and widen the 
support for their agenda, the ABI worked with the MOJ and Lord Hunt to facilitate a lunch in the 
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House of Commons “for key stakeholders to discuss the recent changes and the possibility of future 
reforms to the personal injury compensation system” (F 302). Invitees included interested MPs 
including Ken Clarke44 and Djanogly, interested members of the House of Lords, representatives 
from ABI member companies and “other interested organisations”. 80 people  were invited to the 
lunch which was held on 27th October 2010 (House of Commons Banqueting Office, 2011) although 
the attendee list was not published. According to the parliamentary register of interests45, Lord 
Hunt was non-executive chairman of the British Insurance Brokers’ Association (“BIBA”), as well as 
a practising solicitor, non-executive director of GRP MGA Holdco Limited (involved in specialty 
insurance acquisition and development) and, as mentioned previously, a partner in DAC, which acts 
for insurers in defending motor claims whilst also claiming significant lobbying credentials including 
“unrivalled knowledge of the workings of Westminster” (Cave & Rowell, 2014, p. 58). 
The Transport Committee investigation 
It may have been merely coincidental but, on 19th October  2010, concerns about the rising cost 
of motor insurance had become an issue that the TSC determined it wanted to explore (2010). In 
an investigation that ran between late 2010 and 2015, and morphed into an investigation into the 
impact of whiplash on the cost of motor insurance, they initially received written evidence from 16 
organisations and heard oral evidence from 19 witnesses, including the Researcher (Transport 
Committee, 2011a). The investigation was focused on the cost of motor insurance and the 
accessibility of insurance for young drivers. The incidence and cost to the insurance industry from 
increasing volumes of personal injury claims dominated the evidence. 
EMB informed the committee that annual bodily injury claims inflation was running at 30% in 
2010 with the associated costs of those injury claims representing 50% of UK motor insurance claim 
costs. These were significant indicators of a dysfunctional system but the provenance of the data 
on which EMB’s evidence was based was cited as “their representative on a working party” of the 
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (“IFA”) “which had unprecedented access to data supplied by 
companies making up almost 90% of the UK motor insurance market”. They attributed a third of 
the reported claims inflation to a higher number of bodily injury claims and the remainder to the 
higher average cost of settling claims. No support was given for the estimate that associated costs 
accounted for 50% of motor insurance claims but there was, again, evidence of parallel referencing. 
EMB cited claims fraud as a driver of the 50% increase because “the ABI valued the cost of 
                                                             
44 Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor 
45 (http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/lord-hunt-of-wirral/994/register-of-interests) 
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fraudulent insurance claims at £840 million … and it estimated that motor insurance fraud 
accounted for £410 million” (ibid. p.75). £840 million had already been acknowledged by the ABI in 
their speech to the North East Regional Group of Insurance Institutes as “savings made by detecting 
fraud” and not therefore, an increased cost and so EMB’s use of that figure appears wrong. In 
addition, EMB’s estimate of bodily injury claim inflation at 30% is incapable of corroboration from 
the limited publicly available ABI data (2015e) which is reproduced in Table 6.1 below46. Between 
2008 and 2009 the ABI data indicates that bodily injury claims were lower by 10.21%, the average 
pay-out amount increased by 9.9% but the movement in gross payments was down by 1.3%. 
Nowhere can a figure of 30% be extrapolated. 
 
Table 6.1: Annual personal motor claims; 2008-2010 (Source: ABI 2015) 
The Researcher observed that the ABI also relied upon EMB’s estimates in their submission to 
the TSC (parallel sourcing again) offering no explanation as to why it was preferred over their own 
published data. They did clarify one statistic which was that in a review of 50,000 claims where the 
compensation paid was less than £5,000 that for every £1 of damages, £0.87 of claimant solicitor 
costs was paid, a statistic that might support EMB’s estimate that the associated claims settlement 
costs are 50% of UK motor insurance claim costs. However, even that argument is questionable 
since it ignores the significant volume of claims where no injury is involved, and so there are no 
associated costs even though damages are still paid in respect of other uninsured losses. It also 
ignores those claims where damages are above £5,000 and the costs may represent a lower 
percentage of the damages paid (Transport Committee, 2011a, p. 82). Relying on third party data 
from consultants may have helped widen the support for the ABI agenda, an indirect method of 
lobbying identified by Van Schendelen, or simply allowed the ABI to avoid direct scrutiny of their 
own figures.  The ABI did draw the committee’s attention to the proliferation of claim management 
companies in recent years (ibid. p. 82), a concern also highlighted by the AA who accused those 
companies of using direct marketing techniques to generate claims that accident victims would not 
otherwise have made, or to make claims for injuries that had not been suffered and which, they 
                                                             
46 the columns headed ‘Annual Movement’ were calculated by the Researcher 
Year Bodily	injury	(BI)	
claims	notified
Annual	movement	
in	BI	claims	
notified
Average	BI	claims	
payment	amount
Annual	movement	
in	BI	payment	
amount
Gross	BI	payment
Annual	movement	
in	gross	BI	
payment
2008 253,000 17.10% £3,512	 16.20% £888.54	m
2009 227,000 -10.21% £3,863	 9.90% £876.90	m -1.30%
2010 254,000 11.80% £3,565	 7.70% £905.50	m 3.20%
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felt, “may be fraudulent” (ibid. p. 93). The Lloyds Market Association (“LMA”), identified the cost 
of settling personal injury claims as one of the principal factors that have “illegitimately increased 
insurer’s claim-spend” citing referral fees paid by solicitors, the impact on costs of ‘after the event’ 
insurance policies and ‘no win, no fee’ arrangements (ibid. p. 79).  
BIBA were more critical of insurers. They claimed to have foretold the need for premium 
increases for some time, pointing out that insurers had incurred significant underwriting losses for 
successive years and that the soft market could not continue forever because of the reduction in 
investment income, the growth in the number of claims, and the intense competition and 
unsustainable rates from comparison sites. Those factors, together with the unquantified 
consequences of illegal activities including fraud and uninsured driving, led BIBA to conclude the 
bubble had finally burst for the insurance industry (ibid. p. 101).  
On the topic of fraud, a number of organisations, including EMB (ibid. p. 75) and the AA (ibid. 
p. 95), referenced the data published by the ABI who simply re-stated their estimate that there was 
£930 million of undetected motor insurance fraud in 2009 (ibid. p. 84). Confused.com, an 
aggregator and subsidiary of Admiral, made similar points about the levels of undetected fraud 
suggesting the offence was more probable in recessionary times (ibid. p. 90) whilst the LMA cited 
data from the IFB with an anecdotal reference to one LMA member having reported that the 
number of fraudulent claims investigated had increased by 54% in 2009 compared with 2008 (ibid. 
p. 80). No reference was made by any contributor as to whether the increased number of 
investigations into suspicious claims had impacted the incidence of detected fraud.  
The oral evidence followed the general thrust of the written submissions although the 
testimony of Nick Starling, a former Director at the ABI, and Ashton West, Chief Executive of the 
MIB were noteworthy (ibid. pp. 44-52). West conceded the MIB could not “put a figure on what we 
don’t know [and] just in case there is any misunderstanding, I am not saying that all whiplash claims 
are fraudulent or anything like that.”  
Starling was more explicit: 
We’ve done a lot of work on undetected fraud [although] by definition, there’s a sort of 
“Rumsfeld” element to it. We reckon that undetected fraud across the insurance industry is 
about £1.9 billion, of which about half is motor. It is on quite a spectrum. At one end you’ve 
got the really lethal stuff which is around staged motor accidents, where a whole lot of 
fraudulent behaviour is involved of fraudulent doctors, fraudulent solicitors, fraudulent 
witnesses, everything. There is a big, big problem at that end around the staged accidents.”  
 
He also condemned the system for making claims which he said was:  
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“…essentially dysfunctional. If you are unfortunate enough to have someone run into the 
back of you it is quite astonishing what then happens. You are an extremely valuable 
property. People want to get at you and sell their services, whether it be claims 
management companies, whether it be mending the vehicle or whether it be supplying a 
vehicle for you to use while your car is out of action. If you are the victim of an incident 
which is not your fault, huge temptations are put in your way. You are constantly 
encouraged to apply for a personal injury claim. It’s quite understandable that particularly 
people who might be in difficult economic circumstances might respond to that.”  
 
The right to claim compensation for damages arising from the negligence of another is trite law. 
In two conjoined appeals before the House of Lords in 1993 (Giles v Thompson and Devlin 
Baslington HL/PO/JU/18/253), Lord Mustill remarked upon the challenge then brought by insurers 
to defeat the Claimant’s right to lawful damages:  
“there are many motorists who lack the inclination or the ready cash to hire a substitute on 
the chance of recovering reimbursement from the defendant's insurers. Thus, there exists 
in practical terms a gap in the remedies available to the motorist, from which the errant 
driver, and hence his insurers, frequently profit”  
  
Almost 20 years later, Starling’s criticism that innocent victims might seek legal advice in 
response to the government’s determination in 1999 to make legal services more accessible is 
understandable but perhaps only justifiable to the extent that insurers have failed to resist 
illegitimate claims. The linkage between the “huge temptations” he referred to with the increase in 
bodily injury claims and the claimed increase in fraudulent claims appears unsavoury when insurers 
were themselves benefitting from encouraging their own customers “to apply for a personal injury 
claim” in order to participate in referral fees. When asked if insurance companies were receiving 
referral fees, which the ABI later conceded to the MOJ had a value of up to £900 or £1,000 for a 
low value motor claim (F 348), Starling responded that:  
“it is a dysfunctional system and people have to play the system as it exists [but] we have 
accepted as an industry that referral fees will have to go as part of the whole package of 
reform.”  
 
The reference to the “whole package of reform” may have been a marker of the private 
discussions taking place between the MOJ and the ABI. No evidence was given to the committee 
detailing the extent to which insurers may have distorted their own cost base as a consequence of 
‘playing the system’ and nor has any economic analysis ever been released to indicate the extent 
to which the insurer’s incurred motor losses may have been lower had they not done so. However, 
when asked to identify the most important measure to bring the cost of motor insurance premiums 
down while still maintaining insurance, the ABI did not focus on fraud, the undetected element of 
which Starling had claimed to be costing insurers £1.9 billion annually. Instead, he said “sort out 
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personal injury and do something real and fundamental about young drivers” (Transport 
Committee, 2011a, p. 52) 
Between November 2010 and March 2011, activity appeared limited although behind the 
scenes, and as Christmas approached, the ABI wrote to Robert Wright at the MOJ (F 314) 
confirming, “great working with you this year and looking forward to us working together again in 
2011.” And then, shortly after Christmas (F318) Keoghs wrote to the MOJ in respect of a meeting 
they had arranged and which included Djanogly attending: 
“Further to our conversation of yesterday evening, I promised to provide you with details of 
those who have committed to our morning meeting on the 19th in Westminster. The venue 
is to be One Whitehall Place. The attendees will be [redacted]. 
 
All the above are highly engaged in the process, have been for some years, and will have a 
lot to say to the Minister. I have a longstanding relationship with Beachcroft and have 
worked with Lord Hunt and [name redacted] over a number of years and would be happy 
to co-ordinate with them.”  
 
The TSC reported in March 2011 (Transport Committee, 2011a). The subtlety of the 
phraseology used in their summary suggests the insurer messaging was succeeding. The issues of 
access to justice, the right to fair compensation for post-accident damages and the rise in claimed 
insurance fraud had become fused into one sound bite as the committee concluded:  
“increased premiums arise from increased personal injury claims with associated increased 
costs and despite that being a lawful outcome it deplores the risk of fraudulent claims for 
non-existent or pre-existing injuries which they believe the police should tackle by way of a 
dedicated police unit for insurance fraud”  
 
The ABI (2011d) were dissatisfied with the response, nailing their colours to the mast and 
issuing a press release claiming the TSC had missed the point:  
“The Committee has failed to recognise that the main cause of the recent increases in motor 
insurance premiums is ever-increasing personal injury claims and spiralling legal costs. 
These are often driven by claims management firms … Legal costs alone now add an extra 
£40 a year to the average motor premium, and motorists should not have to foot the bill for 
our cost-ridden compensation system.” 
 
On fraud, they gave a more muted response claiming that insurers were working hard to 
combat insurance fraud, including funding the IFB, which was working closely with the police in 
investigating organised motor insurance fraud.  
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Behind the scenes, the meeting arranged by Keoghs had taken place. A response to an FOI47 
request (Justice Policy Group, 2011) confirmed a total of at least 9 such meetings during 2011 which 
are listed in Figure 6.2 below.  The MOJ deemed the content of those meetings to be information 
it was “not obliged to provide” relying on the statutory exemption that the information exchanged 
in the meeting related to the formulation of government policy. Moreover, having considered 
further whether it would be in the public interest to provide the information, the MOJ concluded 
that “the public interest favours withholding the information”. It is difficult to reconcile that 
statement objectively when the results of the lobbying included proposals to eliminate certain 
common law rights.  
 
Figure 6.2: Schedule of Meetings Jonathan Djanogly MP and others 
Part of the content of one of those meetings was subsequently leaked by Tom Harris MP in a 
question of Paul Evans of AXA Insurance at a TSC hearing (Transport Committee, 2011b, p. 32) about 
referral fees and AXA’s unilateral announcement of a ban, Harris asked:  
“Was that influenced at all by an internal strategy document by the ABI which said: “Our 
sense is that it would help greatly if one insurer announced publicly that it would stop 
receiving referral fees and if others followed suit. This would give our lobbying efforts more 
credibility. The current ABI position that we want a ban while our members continue to 
receive these fees is not ideal and leaves the industry open to allegations of hypocrisy”?” 
 
Evans pleaded ignorance but the ABI later wrote to the committee (ibid. p. 41) confirming: 
“… this was not an ABI document. This information was from the minutes from a meeting 
Keoghs hosted with the MOJ which was attended by the ABI. The views expressed were 
those of a Keoghs representative and not an ABI position ...” 
 
As well as expressing publicly their dissatisfaction with the conclusions from the TSC, the ABI 
also sent an e-mail to the MOJ (F 320) in which they said:  
                                                             
47 Freedom of Information 
Schedule	of	Meetings	involving	Jonathan	Djanogly	MP	or	his	officials
Djanogly,	Keoghs	and	others	(19/01/2011)	
Djanogly’s	department	officials,	unnamed	insurance	company	and	other	stakeholders	(28/01/2011)
Djanogly’s	department	officials,	the	ABI,	Keoghs,	the	NHS	litigation	authority	and	unnamed	insurance	company	(12/05/2011)
Djanogly’s	department	officials	and	an	unnamed	insurance	company	(18/05/2011)
Djanogly’s	department	officials	and	the	ABI	(24/05/2011)
Djanogly	and	the	ABI	(04/07/2011)
Djanogly’s	department	officials	and	the	ABI	(09/08/2011)
Djanogly’s	department	officials	and	the	ABI	(29/09/2011)
Djanogly’s	department	officials	and	the	ABI	(10/10/2011)
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“I thought it was worth mentioning the ABI’s reaction to the recent Transport Select 
Committee report on the rising cost of motor insurance. We were disappointed to see that 
the Committee failed to recognise that the main cause of the recent increases in motor 
insurance premiums is ever-increasing personal injury claims and spiralling legal costs, part 
of which includes referral fees.  We plan to write to your minister in similar terms this week 
to highlight the issue with him”  
 
In April (F 327), the MOJ wrote to the ABI seeking clarification of their view on referral fees and, 
in particular, asking what the effect might be on the cost of legal expenses policies sold to 
consumers before an accident (“BTE”) if referral fees were outlawed. The ABI response was unclear 
but they did confirm that if a claimant was involved in an accident and sustained an injury that the 
claimant’s motor insurer “may sell on the details of the claimant to a claimant solicitor” who will 
pay them a referral fee or, if the legal expenses insurer received notification of the claim in respect 
of a BTE policy then that insurer would engage a solicitor who would pay a referral fee to the legal 
expense insurer as consideration. With the removal of referral fees, and on a pure mathematical 
assessment, BTE insurers would lose a significant revenue stream and would, therefore, have to 
charge higher premiums to consumers to insure against the need to appoint a solicitor if they were 
involved in an accident. Nonetheless, the ABI confirmed (F 328) “put simply, insurers want referral 
fees banned”. The agenda had, by this point, moved away from fraud, if ever that was the true focus 
for insurers, and it appeared motivated by a determination to reduce the incidence and associated 
cost of personal injury claims, dishonest or otherwise. In a later e-mail exchange (F 332) sent the 
day after a meeting between Djanogly’s officials, the ABI, Keoghs, and others, the ABI wrote to the 
MOJ encouraged that there was “an alignment of views on the claimant’s access to justice 
arguments and the ‘undesirable behaviours’ driven by claims management companies” and 
imploring the MOJ to look next at the issue of fixed fees and the hourly rate earned by solicitors 
dealing with litigated claims. In addition, the ABI wrote (F 332) “we are continuing with our effort 
to ensure that this message is not lost on members of the public.” Of interest is a throwaway line 
about referral fees claiming that “insurers make no secret that they receive these fees” despite only 
one insurer, RBS, having ever made public disclosure of the income such fees generated (Transport 
Committee, 2011b, p. 49).   
By now, the ABI messaging to the media was maturing (2011b; Slack, 2011; “‘UK “whiplash 
capital of Europe,”’” 2011) and, because whiplash had increasingly been linked with insurance 
fraud, included demands for a clampdown on the UK’s “pain in the neck culture” because “the 
activities of ambulance chasing lawyers and claims management firms, coupled with ‘crash for cash' 
staged motor accidents has increased the risk of fraudulent claims” and needs to be stopped to 
“reduce the unacceptable costs which whiplash currently imposes on individuals, businesses and the 
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state”. Responding to the assertion that the UK was the whiplash capital of Europe, Oliphant (2016, 
p. 20) argues that such claims by insurers were based on unreliable data and cherry picked to 
support specific reform agendas to address a largely illusory problem using: 
 “the power of simple slogans to colonise public debate about tort law, coined by those 
pursuing an agenda of tort reform and enthusiastically taken up by conservative 
commentators because they reinforce and provide tantalising new examples to illustrate 
more general narratives about declining standards of personal conduct and individual 
responsibility”.  
 
The principal support for the ABIs narrative was a study by the Comité Européen des Assurances 
(“CEA”) (2004). Oliphant’s criticisms of the report, and so his criticism of impact induced by the ABI 
by its deployment were manifold (2016, pp. 14–16): 
• The various national insurance associations that supplied the data were counting 
different things and the ‘whiplash capital’ claim relies on the CEA data, which might 
plausibly be interpreted as identifying a number of alternative ‘claims capitals’ but the 
research design and methodology are inadequate for the production of reliable data 
sufficient for the making of any claim of that nature. 
• The data shows that Italy has a stronger claim to be ‘the whiplash capital of Europe’, 
with 558,000 claims for minor cervical trauma (as compared with only 375,000 in the 
UK) at a total cost of €2,393 (more than double the €1,080 in the UK). 
• Data also shows that ‘Switzerland is the whiplash capital of Europe’: the average cost 
per claim linked to cervical trauma is €35,000, far higher than the €2,878 average 
reported for the UK – which was also behind the Netherlands (€16,500), Norway 
(€6,050) and Italy (€4,288) and perhaps other countries, like Spain, for which no data 
were available. 
• The ABI claim that the proportion of whiplash claims in the UK to bodily injury claims is 
‘twice the European average’ (2008b, p. 4) appears to be based on a simplistic 
aggregation of data from nine countries and an average calculated without reference 
to population size or number of vehicles. 
• Despite the inference the survey was pan-European (to support the anointing of a 
European capital), no country in Central or Eastern Europe was included and certain 
Western European countries, including Austria, Luxembourg and Portugal, were 
excluded whilst the data for Spain was incomplete. 
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• The report was silent on the methodology utilised by those organisations supplying the 
data and how divergent data may have been interpreted to cater for variants in clinical 
definitions of cervical trauma. 
Oliphant’s criticisms were made with the benefit of hindsight in 2015 but the deficiencies did 
not stop David Cameron using the phrase when issuing a statement (2012) in support of the ABI’s 
agenda for change following an Insurance Summit held in Downing Street. In addition, he pledged 
to  
• tackle the compensation culture;  
• identify effective ways to reduce the number and cost of whiplash claims; and  
• reduce legal costs by committing to reduce the £1,200 fee that lawyers can earn from 
small value personal injury claims.  
In return, insurers committed to “pass savings made on to consumers” (ibid.).  
Moving back in the timeline, a further meeting between Djanogly’s department officials and 
the ABI was held on 24 May 2011. The agreed draft agenda (F 341) revealed that the ABI had, by 
now, become complicit in policy formulation. It included:  
• the ABI’s call for a referral fee ban backed by other compensators; 
• addressing the recommendation from the TSC report (Transport Committee, 2011a) 
which (embarrassingly, perhaps) called for greater disclosure of referral fees earned by 
insurers; 
• practical issues re: banning or capping referral fees; 
• insurer concerns about QUOCS (a costs recommendation from Jackson); 
• the handling of the Bill to introduce the Jackson changes to outlaw referral 
commissions; and 
• the ABI’s view of the calibrated assessment of damages and predictable damages. 
Following the meeting, the ABI confirmed (F 340) that they were “very supportive” of the MOJ’s 
reforms and would continue to voice their support for government when the draft Justice Bill was 
released.  They also expressed their desire to provide data and input in the more detailed 
implementation work and looked forward “to keeping our dialogue open” and to setting up a date 
to meet with Djanogly which was subsequently arranged. On the issue of referral fees, the ABI had 
probably not anticipated, or possibly they had on the basis of their previous concessions to the TSC 
and MOJ, an editorial from Jack Straw published in The Times (2011), attributing a significant 
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element of the growth in personal injury claims to the actions of insurers selling policyholder details 
to claims management companies: 
“I went to see the Association of British Insurers and senior executives of two of Britain’s 
largest motor insurers and asked them. A long pause, a look of embarrassment, then one 
of the executives said: “This is the industry’s dirty secret. It’s we, the insurance companies, 
who sell on this personal information.” Referral fees are now a crucial part of all insurance 
companies’ revenue streams.” 
 
Something of a conundrum that nobody has sought to resolve is whether the alleged increase 
in bodily injury claims was attributable more to insurer behaviour than opportunistic or organised 
criminals. That aside, the absence of any run-on media coverage following the editorial in The Times 
suggests insurers may have already extricated themselves from embarrassment with government 
by virtue of the earlier concession communicated by Starling in his oral evidence to the TSC. The 
ABI messaging was subsequently refocused to address the fraud agenda. Having been accused by 
Straw of being part of the problem, the three pillars approach demanded a re-boot of the messaging 
and, in July 2011, in a release highlighting that insurers were detecting fraudulent claims worth £18 
million every week, Starling provided the revised message claiming “insurers are working harder 
than ever to protect honest customers against fraud. The savings made by weeding out fraudulent 
claims would otherwise end up being paid for by honest policyholders through higher premiums” 
whilst making the announcement that “the first ever national police insurance fraud investigation 
unit” would begin its operations early next year  (ABI, 2011e). That announcement was not trailed 
beforehand and the nature of the negotiations between CLP, government and the ABI are not in 
the public domain. However, I6 did narrate the discussions leading to this point emphasising that it 
was the Police who sold the concept to insurers rather than insurers looking to subscribe: 
“What took everyone aback was that the City of London Police went about it with a, sort of, 
enthusiasm that I think none of us really expected. The detailed case was built up by them; 
they effectively said to us, we can build whatever sort of unit you want, obviously there is a 
minimum size, but we can build anything you want … it’s up to you to set out what you think 
... the commissioner even came in to the ABI and presented to the CEOs.   
 
I have to say they presented extremely well … they played a blinder really, they knew how 
to impress the CEOs and I really remember [DCI] Dave Wood giving some descriptions of 
how they’d done raids and the CEOs just loved it.  So that is essentially the history of how it 
was set up and why, and after a great deal of discussion, IFED was born.” 
 
There is no public material about which factors precipitated the arrangements with IFED but 
the ABI’s representations about the scale of insurance fraud, as well as the evolving compensation 
culture they claimed was being polluted by opportunistic and organised fraudsters, probably made 
it hard for them to resist the initiative. For the CLP, the insurers may have represented an attractive 
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source of funding in similar vein to that generated by the banking industry with the DCPCU 
initiative. At launch, the annual costs for IFED were set at just £3 million (City of London Police, n.d.-
c) which, in value terms, should perhaps be measured against an insurance industry managing £1.8 
trillion of investments and, notwithstanding complaints about the inability of motor insurers to 
make profit, an industry profitable to the extent that it contributed over £10 billion in taxes to the 
exchequer (ABI, 2013d, p. 3). It should also be assessed in terms of the price of a solution to a 
problem that the ABI estimated, in 2014, exceeding £3 billion a year (City of London Police, n.d.-c). 
By any metric, spending £3 million for a dedicated private police unit to save up to £3 billion, whilst 
continuing to work with government to deconstruct consumer entitlement to compensation in tort 
claims, appears too low a price unless the true incidence of fraud was far lower than claimed.  
The ABI continued to rely upon the ‘whiplash capital’ claim remorselessly in media releases and 
in wider communications to government, regulators and MPs and member insurers followed their 
lead (ABI, 2011b, 2012b, 2012d, 2013a, 2013b; Button & Brooks, 2016; Post Magazine, 2012; Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2012; Transport Committee, 2013; “‘UK “whiplash capital of Europe,”’” 2011). In 
fact, Helen Grant MP48 (Ministry of Justice, 2012, p. 3), in her forward to the MOJ consultation 
document on reducing the cost and frequency of whiplash claims, referred to Britain as “the 
whiplash capital of the World” reporting the growth in whiplash claims and the Government sharing 
the widespread concern “that this growth may be linked to an increase in fraudulent and/or 
exaggerated claims.” Oliphant (2016, p. 20) argued that there is a lack of reliable evidence relating 
to the problems of fraud and exaggeration, and expressed a fundamental concern that unreliable 
data has been used to drive empirically unsustainable arguments to support the insurer agenda for 
profit. Helen Grant’s claim was reliant on the 2004 CEA study and support from the IFA (Transport 
Committee, 2013, pp. 14–15). It bears mention that the IFA were cited in the earlier TSC 
investigation into the cost of motor insurance in support of the contention that bodily injury claims 
inflation was running at 30% (Transport Committee, 2011a). In terms of the later TSC investigation 
into whiplash, when commenting on Grant’s claim, the IFA conceded (Transport Committee, 2013, 
p. 90) that whilst they “had not directly analysed whiplash claims” they felt it “likely” that the UK 
was the whiplash capital of the world based on a comparison with data for the US, even though 
“we have not been able to confirm the comparability” with UK data or UK motor insurance products. 
Their conclusion was reached because “given the high litigiousness which we see demonstrated in 
the USA as observed in other insurance products, we would have expected the USA to show more 
                                                             
48 Under-secretary of state, MOJ 
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whiplash claiming than any other country all else being equal”. They reported having used the ratio 
of the number of third party personal injury claims made to the number of insured accidents (as 
measured by the number of third party property damage claims which are made largely in respect 
of damage to third party vehicles) as a measure of the scale of whiplash, given that personal injury 
claim numbers are dominated by small whiplash type claims, and compared the computed ratios 
for cities in the UK with comparable sized cities in the USA. The results allowed the IFA to support 
Grant’s claim in spite of the fact that their analysis was deficient and had no evidence at all about 
the incidence of whiplash claims in the US. The TSC (2013, p. 15) also disagreed with Grant’s claim 
having considered the explanation of the IFA.  
“Any claim that the UK is the “whiplash capital of the world” cannot be conclusively proved 
or disproved from the international evidence which is available. It is surprising that the 
Government has brought forward measures to reduce the number of fraudulent or 
exaggerated whiplash claims without giving even an estimate of the comparative scale of 
the problem. 
 
There is considerable scope for the insurance industry to provide clearer data about the 
number of whiplash (and other personal injury) claims which it is confident are genuine and 
those which give cause for concern, ranging from the out-and-out fraudulent to those where 
symptoms may have been exaggerated. Industry-wide agreement about how to classify 
claims and the collection of data by the ABI would strengthen the case for the Government 
to act.  
 
We recommend that the Government press the ABI to provide better data about fraudulent 
or exaggerated personal injury claims, so that there is a stronger evidence base for policy 
decisions.” 
 
Whatever ensued, the effect of the increased cost of claims settlement was a clarion call in an 
insurer agenda which would, by November 2017, benefit from:  
• Insurer lobbying to shape government policy; 
• An investigation by the TSC (2011a) into the cost of motor insurance and the incidence 
and cost of whiplash claims;  
• Consistent, above inflation, increases in motor insurance premiums (ibid. p. 7); 
• The creation of a privately funded police unit available only to insurers (City of London 
Police, 2011c);  
• The demonisation of those entities supporting innocent injured victims (ABI, 2011b). 
• The passage of LASPO, outlawing referral fees for personal injury claims; 
• An OFT market study leading to a two-year investigation into the private motor 
insurance market by the CMA (2014);   
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• A review by the CMR into Claim Management Companies and whiplash claims (Ministry 
of Justice, 2015);  
• A series of regulatory measures threatening the viability of claimant solicitors (Rose, 
2015); 
• An intention to remove a victim’s common law right to compensation for whiplash and 
mobility after an accident (ibid.); 
• Renewed focus on eliminating CHCs (Rose, 2017a);  
• By s57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, the requirement for Courts to 
dismiss claims for personal injury where fundamental dishonesty is established.   
 
Conclusions 
This chapter noted the loss-making record of the motor insurance industry over 16 years and, 
from changes introduced by government in 1999, identified the increasing presence of solicitors 
and other organisations (including insurers) engaged with accident victims to further their 
economic interest in the conduct of personal injury claims driven predominantly by the incentives 
that followed the 1999 Access to Justice Act. It also identified the role that lobbying had occupied 
within the ABI since at least 2003 and then chronicled how that effort was energised between 2006 
and 2012 to persuade government that fundamental structural changes were required to protect 
the viability of motor insurers in the face of increasing levels of insurance fraud and escalating costs 
associated with personal injury claims. Whilst there was evidence that some of the fraud was 
attributable to organised criminals, the topic that government had been energised about in 2004, 
the majority of fraudulent claims relate to simple whiplash claims, the ‘fraud of choice’ that insurers 
asserted were driven by a ‘pain in the neck society’ inspired by ‘compensation cowboys.’   The 
chapter summarised a review of the public message from the ABI, an analysis of submissions 
responding to a number of government and parliamentary calls for evidence, and focused on a 
series of e-mails passing between government and the ABI which identified a parallel process of 
hidden lobbying seemingly intent on persuading government of the imperative for change. The 
Researcher also suggested in the chapter that tactics practised by insurers may well have been 
motivated by a preliminary desire to create a ‘panic’ amongst the establishment in order to drive 
some of their proposed changes in regulation and criminal justice policy. Data presented as 
evidence of the estimated size of the fraud problem (and how much of that was not a cost because 
it was detected and avoided) was scrutinised. In addition, the evolution of the definition of 
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insurance fraud, from organised crash for cash to the effective stigmatisation of almost anybody 
that might have presented a claim for damages for a whiplash injury, was considered.  
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Chapter 7 Discussion  
Summary 
At the outset of the thesis, the Researcher declared his former professional interests. He had 
expected the results of the study to suggest that the creation of IFED had negatively impacted non-
insurer victims of fraud but that was not the entire outcome. In fact, those engaged in the car-hire, 
bus and fleet sectors were ad idem that IFED had made no difference to their prospects of dealing 
with fraudulent claims, all of them conceding they currently had limited faith in the ability or 
willingness of the police to engage in investigating allegations of fraud and so had developed self-
help measures to avoid or resist dishonest claimants. The response from the credit-hire sector 
suggested that, following the creation of IFED, the local police response had deteriorated. However, 
none of those surveyed were able to provide many instances of a more engaging pre-IFED response 
and there was no comparable data available to review against the current position, this issue not 
having benefitted from any published prior research. In addition, the Researcher cautions that the 
articulated antipathy to IFED may have ensued because they were seen as merely an extension of 
the insurance industry and a mechanic by which the legitimacy of the credit-hire industry could be 
attacked.  
Several CHC respondents had invested in telemetry, data sharing, counter fraud initiatives and 
reliance on entities like the Bounty Hunter. Ironically, telemetry data had proved a powerful 
weapon in the CHO response to fraud and the inability of IFED to conceive a basis to engage, let 
alone work with the credit-hire industry represents, in the Researcher’s view, a manifest failure to 
acquire intelligence that could expose systemic and organised criminal activity. Accordingly, an 
overarching conclusion from the research was that whilst the Police had, prior to the Fraud Review 
and the creation of IFED, demonstrated limited enthusiasm for investigating allegations of fraud 
irrespective of the sector from which the complaint arose, the existence of IFED, accompanied with 
the effects of austerity measures on policing, has had a meaningful and detrimental impact on the 
ability of certain non-insurers to deal with insurance fraud relative to the protection available to 
insurers; the identity of the victim did make a difference as insurers pursued a hegemonic notion 
of victimhood (Coleman, 2004; Hopkins, 2016; Sim, 2004) having ideologically positioned 
themselves as not simply always the victim but, in respect of insurance fraud, the only victim.  
Further, the partisan and blinkered approach to a single victim-set may be a contributory factor 
in the growth of insurance fraud facilitated by organised criminals, enhancing the prospects of 
impunity for offenders committing acquisitive vehicle offences involving insurance fraud against 
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the car-hire and credit-hire sectors in circumstances where IFED declined to engage. Cornish (1993, 
p. 31) saw organised crime as outcomes of a causal chain of “moves ‘strung out along an axle, rather 
as kebabs are skewered on to a stick’” and Tremblay et al (2001, p. 561) analysed permanent 
retention vehicle thefts as “a sequence of moves (theft of the vehicle, concealment, disguise, 
marketing and ultimate disposal), each move having a specific mix of casting, location and props 
requirements [where] participants can play each move or scene in a variety of ways: cars may be 
stolen in parking lots or obtained by providing rental agencies with stolen identities. The UK 
government (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011, pp. 9–10) estimated around 6,000 
criminal groups in 2011 comprising “38,000 organised criminals impacting on the UK … highly 
adaptive, exploiting every available opportunity, system and technology to invent new or varied 
forms of crime” and who operate across boundaries, both in terms of crime type and geography, 
and who engage, inter alia, “in fraud, acquisitive and economic crime … which can be used to fund 
and enable other serious and organised criminality”. In terms of the consequences for the offender 
from an asymmetric response limited by victim-identity, the probability is that offenders are 
entrepreneurial, and as Levi (2007, p. 612) said part of “a dynamic process that evolves as offenders 
adapt (or fail to adapt) to their changing environment.” They appear to appreciate the reduced 
detection risk from crimes against non-insurer entities or, more accurately, the increased detection 
risk where an insurer is involved. The research highlighted an emerging propensity for offences, 
associated with insurance claims, but committed against credit-hire and car-hire companies to 
facilitate acquisitive vehicle offences because of the speed with which the asset can be liquidated 
and limited prospects of detection. Both of the offenders in the first two case studies engaged 
repeatedly against credit-hire companies but whilst Offender 1 targeted the insurer to profit from 
his deceit, Offender 2 used insurance fraud to defraud credit-hire companies as a means for 
acquiring expensive vehicle assets. The same routine was evident in the organised export of stolen 
vehicles to Uganda and, in the ‘crash for ready cash’ cameo, the fraudster demonstrated a 
chameleon-like ability to avoid engaging the critical interest of an insurer, and hence the police, by 
repeatedly targeting victims for low value amounts that would never trigger an insurance claim but 
would leave the motorist a defenceless and unsupported victim of highway-robbery.  
One issue considered when framing the research question was whether the police would co-
operate. Unhelpfully, only one serving and two retired police officers participated in the study and 
none of those were, or had previously been, engaged with IFED or the CLP.  Whilst the study would 
have benefitted from the CLP’s engagement and contribution, their reluctance to participate was 
perhaps apposite - indicative of the chasm separating IFED from non-insurer victims of fraud – but 
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did not impact the outcome of the research which was focused primarily on the victims and 
offenders rather than the operation of IFED.   
Two issues that were not considered but became relevant retrospectively were the effects of 
austerity and shrinking police resources which may have degraded the response given to victims of 
insurance fraud irrespective of IFED’s creation. Equally, and because the research was 
predominantly undertaken through qualitative investigation, there was no control mechanism to 
validate the level and quality of service provided by the police pre-IFED in order to measure the 
difference in the level of police response afterwards.  Those issues aside, the aim of the research 
was to explore the topic of motor insurance fraud through a number of different perspectives 
across five constituencies49. Those perspectives are repeated below and a summary of the relevant 
findings follows: 
• Identify how each constituency interacts to influence the outcome for an insurance claim. 
• Chronicle the interplay between insurers, government and the police, identifying their 
respective roles in the changing social, economic and political environment.  
• Explore how the insurance industry procured direct access to its own dedicated police 
resource.  
• Investigate other sectors with exclusive access to a police resource for their own 
commercial advantage. 
• Consider the growth of ‘multi-lateralised policing’ where non-governmental entities have 
either agreed to provide security services or assumed responsibility for their own 
protection consequent from the changing role of the police.  
• Evaluate the opportunities, risks and consequences for stakeholders and victims of private-
police partnerships. 
• Consider the position in the USA where insurers have publicised ‘industry crises’ to reduce 
the ability of victims to obtain compensation.   
Research findings and contribution to knowledge 
In relation to the interaction amongst each constituency to influence the outcome for an 
insurance claim, the engagement was poor. Chapter 2 addressed the nature, and challenged the 
reported quantum, of motor insurance fraud offences claimed by the insurance sector as well as 
offering a detailed critique of the methodology used by the ABI to report on levels of fraud where 
                                                             
49 Motor insurers and the ABI, the Police, non-insurer victims of fraud, the establishment and the media. 
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the methodology by which the scale of undetected fraud was calculated required an estimate 
reliant on the cost of detected fraud. The research identified that the detected fraud figure was 
composed largely of suspicious or rejected claims on which no payment-out was made and the 
value of claims where a payment-out was actually made was far smaller than the quoted headline 
figure. The researcher concluded that obfuscation at worse, or lack of clarity at best, allowed the 
ABI to influence the media and the political agenda resulting in the formulation of policy and 
regulation supportive of the insurance industries commercial objectives.  The chapter also narrated 
some of the investments in people, processes, skills and counter-fraud initiatives from insurers and 
highlighted industrywide initiatives, such as the IFR, IFB, MID and CUE, but also noted that insurers 
remain disconnected from others, including self-insured entities and the credit-hire industry. 
Insurers were reported to have, and did concede, even amongst themselves, a disinclination to 
share intelligence or to work collaboratively with other insurers or other sectors even where there 
is a clear and pro-active approach to tackling fraud. These issues were exposed through the self-
completion questionnaire, semi-structured interviews and the case studies in Chapters 2, 4 and 5. 
Some insurer respondents felt that some insurers used their competence for detecting and resisting 
fraud, or their relative maturity in the space, as a competitive advantage that they did not wish to 
share or allow a competitor to leverage to their advantage. Equally, a number of insurers felt that 
the credit-hire industry was a threat to their overall profitability and would welcome the demise of 
the industry as a means to avoid the current annual net costs of credit-hire of c £500 million. From 
many of the interviews there was accord that there were dishonest credit-hire companies operating 
but insurers were reluctant to adopt a multi-tier approach by isolating the least well-regarded and 
collaborating with the trusted suppliers irrespective of the potential ability to utilise better 
relationships to reduce the incidence of insurance related fraud.  
The interplay between insurers and government in the evolution of insurer-friendly policy was 
reliant on a mixture of messaging, relatively broad adoption of the message by the media, 
increasingly sensational reports of the quantum of insurance fraud, a challenged insurance sector 
dealing with austerity and a competitive market and the belief, unchallenged by government, that 
the arguments and data proffered by the ABI were unimpeachable. Exploring how the insurance 
industry procured direct access to its own dedicated police resource. Interviews with I1 and I6 
revealed that, in spite of purportedly breath-taking losses from fraud, the ABI had not felt it worth 
the expense to update the earlier research. More significant was the concession made to the 
Researcher that the data was produced to build a good case for government who “are always 
incredibly keen to get hold of insurance company data”. Latterly, the ABI used its data to express a 
link between the number of whiplash claims received by insurers and the assertion that many were 
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fraudulent. The problem eventually constituted a national calamity with the ABI anointing Britain 
as ‘the whiplash capital of Europe’ (ABI, 2011b; Prime Minister’s Office, 2012), a plaudit that the 
Government (Ministry of Justice, 2012, p. 3) subsequently elevated by confirming the country to be 
‘the whiplash capital of the World’.  The support for both accolades was debunked by the 
Researcher in Chapter 6, by the TSC (2013, p. 3) and, subsequently, by academics  (Oliphant, 2016). 
Chapter 6 also explored how the establishment response to insurance fraud was a result of insurers 
conflating the two terms ‘fraud’ and ‘whiplash’ and then having blamed the increase in fraudulent 
whiplash claims on the legal changes introduced to the Legal Aid system in 1999 by which solicitors 
had been lawfully permitted to accept claims on a ‘no win, no fee’ basis. The objective for insurers 
became reducing costs and not necessarily reducing fraud because, in addition to their lobbying 
and media campaigns, insurers had already improved, and continue to improve, their resilience to 
fraud. For insurers, fraud has now become more of an avoidable threat carrying a cost of prevention 
than a genuine loss where money is lost having paid out for dishonest claims. The thesis provided 
a critique of the publicly available data to demonstrate that claims that Britain was the whiplash 
capital of Europe, and then of the world, were without proper foundation but became widely 
quoted by insurers, media and government and fuelled the case for regulatory and statutory 
change.   
The Researcher concluded that it would be beneficial to the insurance industry, and for policy-
makers, to publish a more empirically reliable and independently audited data set, especially since 
the ABI utilised the 2008 data and subsequent estimates as collateral support for media releases to 
highlight the scale of their victimhood and to stigmatise those innocent victims of road accidents 
seeking lawful compensation.  
Chapters 4 and 5 identified circumstances where non-insurer victims were as likely to be 
impacted by insurance fraud as insurers were. In doing so, the thesis provided a first study of the 
credit-hire sector, its members experience as victims of fraud and their relationship with the police, 
insurers, the Establishment and individual customers. It also outlined some of the pro-active 
defences employed by CHC’s, including counter-fraud databases and telemetry enabled vehicles. It 
demonstrated how the sector could assist in the identification and detection of fraudsters but 
identified that the intelligence generated was routinely ignored by insurers and the police and that 
there was a deficiency in the mechanism by which victim groups could interact predominantly 
inspired by mistrust from the insurance industry of the bona fides and credibility of other sectors.  
Measurement of the cost of motor insurance fraud to the credit-hire sector was a more difficult 
issue to resolve. It was originally envisaged that a survey might allow the losses suffered by the 
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respondents to be extrapolated for the credit-hire sector in order to provide some empirical data 
capable of comparison with the level of fraud claimed by insurers. However, the composition of the 
sector, effectively the relative difference in size of its members as measured by turnover, fleet size 
or activity levels, with the larger entities being public companies and reluctant to disclose price 
sensitive information in the survey, meant that it was not possible to acquire a sufficiently robust 
data set to do so.  However, the thesis also provided a study of the impact of insurance fraud on 
the self-insured corporate sector and identified the unique challenges they faced, their experience 
with IFED and other police agencies and the emergence of private criminal-prosecutions as a means 
of addressing the lack of police response to those corporate victims.   
The Researcher sought to investigate the opportunities, risks and consequences for 
stakeholders and victims of private-police partnerships. Chapter 5 included a case study which 
highlighted the variability of outcome and the potential consequences for victims and upside for 
offenders of an asymmetric response to insurance fraud offences which involve acquisitive vehicle 
crime and, in the case of Operation Navigate involved cross-border organised crime. This was an 
important outcome from the research demonstrating the likelihood that criminals, especially those 
involved in more serious and organised criminal activity, will take the path of least resistance. It 
demonstrated the frailty of a silo mentality when the nature of the initial offence, as in the case of 
acquisitive vehicle crime where a credit-hire company is defrauded, may be entirely unrelated to 
the eventual contribution it makes to organised crime but if the offence is not attractive to IFED or 
other police agencies then there are consequences for society. The study also identified the 
proclivity of insurers to take a line of least resistance in circumstances where high-value stolen 
vehicles were not re-patriated on the basis that the insurance pay-out had been made and the 
financial loss would be recovered by way of compensatory increases in future premiums. If insurers 
wish to contend that insurance fraud is not a victimless crime, then they must accept that their 
policyholders are also victims in respect of the increase in future premiums. 
The research sought to investigate other sectors with exclusive access to a police resource for 
their own commercial advantage and consider the growth of ‘multi-lateralised policing’ where non-
governmental entities have either agreed to provide security services or assumed responsibility for 
their own protection consequent from the changing role of the police. Chapter 3 provided a study 
of the public-private police initiatives preceding the creation of IFED and identified an embryonic 
matrix for assessing the potential tension between the commercial objectives of its funders and the 
wider needs of victims plotting public-private police initiatives on a continuum where the BTP is 
closest to a publicly funded public police service and IFED at the other end of the continuum. It also 
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dealt with the police reaction to insurance fraud which was perceived as fragmented but improving. 
IFED did not contribute to the research and contributed less to the demands of the credit-hire 
industry when they had become victim of insurance fraud. This was explored through the Offender 
2 case study where multiple credit-hire businesses were repeatedly impacted with vehicles lost 
with a value exceeding £500,000. Certain insurers who had participated in the research identified 
that IFED were of limited use in pursuing allegations; insufficient resources and a preference to use 
intelligence to determine their tasking priorities rather than responding to immediate threats was 
given as a reason.  The response to fraud from provincial forces was considered unpredictable and 
dictated by local priorities and declining resources. Respondents to the survey and the 
questionnaire indicated assistance from provincial forces could be at both ends of the spectrum 
(helpful or otherwise) but generally constrained by funding, manpower, local priorities and often, 
just “striking lucky” in attracting a police response.   
In considering the position in the USA, where insurers have publicised ‘industry crises’ as a lever 
to reduce the ability of victims to obtain compensation, the Researcher felt this was probably the 
most compelling outcome of the research. The experience in the US with action on insurance 
related claims driven by the efforts of the US Tort Reform Movement and the similar initiatives 
subsequently engaged in the UK suggested a consensus view on the tools and strategic levers 
necessary to influence justice policy where the financial interest of insurers are impacted. Since 
2009, the ABI data has populated countless media releases in support of an insurer agenda to 
‘change the law’ and drive cost out of the claim system. Exploration of the US Tort Reform 
Movement, which had emerged to spearhead a reduction in tort claim costs, revealed similarities 
to the approach adopted by the ABI from 2008 using the media, lobbyists and the Establishment to 
influence and build government policy intent on reducing consumer’s common law rights. The 
thesis provided an insight into the role of lobbyists and the media in the UK and the Researcher 
identified six propositions that might have inspired insurers to behave as they did:  
• According to Greer (2010), the news media are a defining feature of the justice 
landscape providing “key indicators of the nature and extent of crime, the 
appropriateness and efficacy of criminal justice, and the wider state of the nation”. Hall 
et al. (1978) suggested that the media continually reproduce the ideas of the ruling 
class and that news production is oriented in the purported name of “journalistic 
objectivity and impartiality” to appeal first to the accredited experts who represent and 
command institutional power leaving powerful groups in a position to “establish an 
initial definition or primary interpretation of the topic in question” (ibid. p58) prompting 
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Greer (2010, p. 494) to observe that “once the primary definition has been established 
it is extremely difficult to override, and future debate is contained within a forum of 
‘controlled discourse’ governed by the primary definers”. Hall et al. (1978, p. 59) argued 
that “the media, then, do not simply ‘create’ the news; nor do they simply transmit the 
ideology of the ‘ruling class’ in a conspiratorial fashion. Indeed, we have suggested that, 
in a critical sense, the media are frequently not the ‘primary definers’ of news events at 
all; but their structured relationship to power has the effect of making them play a 
crucial but secondary role in reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged 
access, as of right, to the media as ‘accredited sources’. From this point of view, in the 
moment of news production, the media stand in a position of structured subordination 
to the primary definers.”   
 
• Whyte (2007) considered that some businesses have gained sympathy in government 
policy discussions by characterising themselves as a “victimised business” by reference 
to the economic losses they face which Green (2007, p. 453) argued had inspired a 
movement against business-crime on an unprecedented scale through the proliferation 
of government-business partnership. Hopkins (2016, p. 162) considered that by 
positioning themselves as they have, business has contributed to a more generalised 
hegemonic notion of victimhood where large corporate entities might ideologically re-
position themselves as “always the victim and never the victimisers” and Coleman 
(2004) claims “the clamour for more public-private sector resources to be diverted 
towards crime control grows, corporations are progressively empowered to dominate 
the law and order debate” and influence what should and should not be policed.   
• Haltom and McCann (2004, p. 11) argued that “alluring stories that circulate in the 
media about law often pervade and profoundly reshape – or distort – legal 
policymaking and ordinary legal practice itself … stories routinely produced, reproduced 
and reconstructed through the complex circuitry of mass-mediated culture.” Without 
doubt, if this was not an objective, the evidence in Chapter 6 shows that it was certainly 
indicative of the way in which the incessant communication flow generated an 
outcome for insurers from government and regulators.  
• Feinman (2005, p. 19), commenting on the success of the Tort Reform Movement in 
the USA attributed success partly to “an elaborate pubic campaign of misinformation 
that convinces people that reducing their rights is actually in their own interest.” Over 
ten years ago, Lord Levene, when Chairman of Lloyd's of London, complained that a 
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“deluge” of claims was “plundering the economy” and that "ignoring it and hoping it 
will go away is not an option.” He implored that people “just look across the Atlantic" 
where he criticised the existence of a “blame culture” as “pernicious, cancerous and 
ruinous” (Cave, 2004). Levene may have benefitted from focusing on the conclusions 
of the BRTF (2004, p. 15) which identified the total cost of claims in the UK at just 0.6% 
of GDP, lower than that of ten other industrialised nations, including Canada (0.8%), 
Australia (1.1%), Germany (1.3%) and the USA (1.9%): only Denmark spent less (2004, 
p. 15). That aside, the experiences of the US insurance industry working with the tort 
reform movement may have been a trigger for the ABI in the UK.   
• Van Schendelen (1993, p. 3) identified commercial political campaigning as an extreme 
form of lobbying, of which the use of the media message may be a component part. 
Van Schendelen saw the aim as, “mobilising opinion to exert pressure on public 
authorities for commercial gain or competitive advantage” and has resonance 
donations from businesses with insurance interests have donated £4.9m to the 
conservative party in the period from 2005 to 2011 when David Cameron was Prime 
Minister (Ramesh, 2012).  
• Finally, Cohen (2002) and the possibility that insurers may have been keen to create a 
form of moral panic, but with government and the regulators rather than members of 
the public, in order to highlight the threat society was facing through the risk that 
motorists could be priced out of insurance and so lose the ability to follow the law 
(Transport Committee, 2011b, sec. Ev 3) to influence the evolution of justice policy and 
regulation aligned to their commercial interest.  
Recommendations 
With the current de-funding of the police and the neo-liberal approach to multi-lateralisation, 
the benefit of funding initiatives, such as DCPCU, was recognised “as an example of an area where 
business has contributed to the cost of law enforcement because law enforcement success can feed 
directly through to business’ own bottom line” (Home Office, 2004, p. 15). Chapter 5 identified that 
at least one vehicle manufacturer has telemetry and data acquisition capabilities which could 
evolve to form a more robust method of vehicle protection than existing technology which could 
have material advantages to the cost of insurance and, importantly, the reduction of acquisitive 
vehicle crime as a staple of organised criminal activity. This opportunity merits further exploration. 
In addition, other sectors might benefit from privately-financed police partnerships but there is no 
objective methodology for scoring their economic, societal or criminological validity. Several 
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insurer respondents felt that IFED would benefit from greater funding or co-location with provincial 
forces whilst non-insurer respondents called for a more honest appreciation of the victim and an 
agenda aimed at crime-reduction. Chapter 3 set out the embryonic basis for a scoring methodology 
which the Researcher believes is worthy of further investigation. Even to the extent that insurers 
are funding the cost of IFED, it is impossible to know, without accurate data relating to the threat-
level, whether IFED are under or over resourced or whether finding a solution is under or over 
invested. If the fraud threat to the UK insurance industry is measured in £ billions, then government 
should look to provide statutory certainty on which, and for what period, IFED is governed and 
funded so that it avoids any possibility that the CLP are acting partially to secure an extension of 
the current short-term funding arrangement. In addition, the ABI should be compelled to make the 
investment in updating their current estimate of insurance fraud agreeing to publish the definitions 
and methodology by which the data is compiled. And, finally, consideration should be given to 
extending participation in the IFED initiative to other corporate non-insurer entities impacted by 
insurance fraud.  
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Appendix A – Cross-sectional survey: invitation, consent and content 
  
	
								 	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	
				St	Georges	Building	
Portsmouth	
PO1	2HY	
				 	 Tel:	023	92843923	
Researcher:	Steve	Evans	stephen.evans@port.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	Professor	Mark	Button	mark.button@port.ac.uk	
Study	Title:	The	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	
insurance	related	fraud	
REC	Ref	No:		14/15:29	
SURVEY	QUESTIONAIRRE	
Dear	[Name]	
I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	take	part	in	my	research	study	by	completing	a	web-based	questionnaire.	Participation	is	
voluntary	but	your	responses	would	be	valued.	You	have	been	identified	as	a	potential	respondent	because	you	are	involved	
in	the	credit-hire	industry	and	may	have	experience	of	incurring	a	loss	through	insurance	fraud.		
My	study	is	part	of	my	PhD	research	looking	at	the	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	
the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	insurance	related	fraud,	like	credit-hire	companies.	I	do	not	need	your	name	or	any	identifying	
details;	the	questionnaire	can	be	completed	anonymously	and	all	reasonable	steps	will	be	taken	to	ensure	confidentiality.	
Responses	from	completed	questionnaires	will	be	collated	for	analysis.	Once	this	is	complete	and	my	thesis	has	been	
submitted	then	the	questionnaires	will	be	destroyed.		Up	to	this	stage,	completed	questionnaires	will	be	stored	electronically	
in	a	database	on	my	personal	computer.	I	will	write	and	let	you	know	when	my	thesis	is	submitted	so	that	you	may	learn	
more	about	the	results	of	the	research	if	you	wish.		
You	can	access	the	questionnaire	at	https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/7G73NQ2	and	I	look	forward	to	your	support.	If	you	
have	any	concerns	regarding	this	research	please	contact	me,	or	my	supervisor,	in	the	first	instance.	
Yours	sincerely	
	
Steve	Evans	
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								 	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	
				St	Georges	Building	
Portsmouth	
PO1	2HY	
				 	 Tel:	023	92843923	
Researcher:	Steve	Evans	stephen.evans@port.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	Professor	Mark	Button	mark.button@port.ac.uk	
Study	Title:	The	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	
insurance	related	fraud	
REC	Ref	No:		14/15:29	
SURVEY	CONSENT	FORM	(appearing	as	the	splash	screen	of	the	web-based	survey)	
	
Thank	you	for	taking	part	in	my	research	study	and	agreeing	to	complete	a	web-based	questionnaire.	Participation	is	
voluntary	but	your	responses	are	valued.		
My	study	is	part	of	my	PhD	research	looking	at	the	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	
the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	insurance	related	fraud,	like	credit-hire	companies.		I	am	a	student	of	the	Institute	of	Criminal	
Justice	Studies	at	the	University	of	Portsmouth	(Telephone	023	92843923).	
You	will	not	be	asked	for	your	name	or	any	identifying	details;	the	questionnaire	can	be	completed	anonymously	and	all	
reasonable	steps	will	be	taken	to	ensure	confidentiality.	Responses	from	completed	questionnaires	will	be	collated	for	
analysis.	Once	this	is	complete	and	my	thesis	has	been	submitted	then	the	questionnaires	will	be	destroyed.	Up	to	this	stage,	
completed	questionnaires	will	be	stored	electronically	in	a	database	on	my	personal	computer.	I	will	write	and	let	you	know	
when	my	thesis	is	submitted	so	that	you	may	learn	more	about	the	results	of	the	research	if	you	wish.	If	you	have	any	
concerns	regarding	this	research	please	contact	me,	or	my	supervisor,	in	the	first	instance.	
My	e-mail	address	is	stephen.evans@port.ac.uk	and	my	supervisor,	Professor	Mark	Button,	can	be	contacted	at	
mark.button@port.ac.uk		
By	moving	to	the	next	screen,	you	signify	your	agreement	to	participate	in	the	survey.	
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Online	Survey	Questionnaire	–	questions	and	responses	
Survey	length:	10	minutes		
You	can	take	part	in	my	research	study	by	completing	this	web-based	questionnaire.	Participation	is	voluntary	but	your	
responses	would	be	valued.		
My	study	is	part	of	my	PhD	research	looking	at	the	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	
the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	insurance	related	fraud,	like	credit-hire	companies.		I	do	not	need	your	name	or	any	identifying	
details;	the	questionnaire	is	completed	anonymously	and	all	reasonable	steps	will	be	taken	to	ensure	confidentiality.	
Responses	from	completed	questionnaires	will	then	be	collated	for	analysis.	Once	this	is	complete	and	my	thesis	has	been	
submitted	then	the	data	derived	from	the	questionnaires	will	be	destroyed.		Up	to	this	stage,	completed	questionnaires	will	
be	stored	electronically	in	a	database	on	my	personal	computer.		
If	you	have	any	concerns	regarding	this	research	please	contact	me	(stephen.evans@port.ac.uk),	or	my	supervisor,	Professor	
Mark	Button	(mark.button@port.ac.uk).		
By	moving	to	the	next	screen,	you	signify	your	agreement	to	participate	in	the	survey.	
	
<NEXT	SCREEN>	
	
	
  
 
260 
 
  
Section Question Response Next	Step
Question	1 a)	Yes a)	Go	to	Q2
Is	your	organisation	a	member	of	
The	Credit-hire	Organisation
b)	No b)	Go	to	Q2
Question	2
a)	A	credit-hire	operator	which	
owns,	leases	or	sub-hires	vehicles	
and	then	rents	them	to	accident	
victims	as	part	of	a	credit-hire	
transaction
a)	Go	to	Q3
Please	identify	whether	you	are	
responding	to	this	survey	as
b)	A	solicitor	acting	for	a	credit-
hire	operator	who	does	not	own,	
lease	or	sub-hire	rental	vehicles	
but	acts	in	the	recovery	of	
uninsured	loss	claims	pursuant	to	
a	credit-hire	transaction
b)	Go	to	Q6-Q13
c)	None	of	the	above c)	Go	to	End	Message	1
Question	3
What	was	the	average	size	of	your	
rental	fleet	over	the	last	12	
months?	(If	you	sub-hire	some	or	
all	of	your	fleet	please	count	these	
vehicles	in	your	answer	as	if	they	
were	owned.
Question	4
Looking	at	the	same	12-month	
period	what	was	your	combined	
credit-hire	and	intervention	rental	
turnover?
Question	5
Looking	at	the	same	12-month	
period	how	many	individual	claims	
or	hire	transactions	did	your	
organisation	process?
Go	to	Q5
Enter	financial	value	between	£1	
and	£250	million
A
Go	to	Q4
Enter	numerical	value	between	1	
and	99,000
A
Go	to	Q6
Enter	numerical	value	between	1	
and	250,000
A
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Section Question Response Next	Step
Question	6
Over	the	last	12	months	
approximately	how	many	claims	
did	insurers	reject,	or	seek	to	
reject,	because	they	alleged	that	
your	client’s	claim	was	
fraudulent?
Question	7
Of	the	number	of	rejected	claims	
identified	in	your	answer	to	
Question	6,	how	many	of	those	
claims	were	actually	determined	
to	be	fraudulent?
Question	8 a)	Yes
Would	you	say	that	insurers	
delayed	the	settlement	of	claims	
alleging	that	more	of	your	claims	
involved	fraud	in	the	last	twelve	
months	than	they	did	in	the	
previous	12	months?
b)	No
Question	9
a)	They	raise	the	issue	of	fraud	
with	you	after	the	hire	has	
terminated	allowing	you	no	
opportunity	to	act	to	reduce	any	
exposure	you	may	face	to	
irrecoverable	hire	charges	if	the	
claim	is	fraudulent.
On	those	occasions	were	an	
insurer	alleged	a	claim	presented	
by	your	firm	to	be	fraudulent	
which	of	the	responses	below	
would	you	select	as	the	most	
usual	means	of	communication?
b)	They	provide	a	late	alert	to	you	
(nearer	to	the	end	of	hire	than	the	
start)	which	means	that	the	
potentially	irrecoverable	hire	
charges	incurred	may	be	higher	
than	they	should	have	been	and	
the	insurer’s	determination	to	
avoid	payment	of	your	bill	will	be	
greater.	
c)	They	provide	an	early	alert	to	
you		(nearer	to	the	start	of	hire	
than	the	end)	in	order	that	you	
can	decide	whether	to	cease	any	
hire	in	order	to	avoid	incurring	
irrecoverable	hire	charges	and	so	
that	you	can	reduce	the	risk	of	
your	own	vehicle	being	damaged	
or	stolen.
d)	They	provide	full	and	early	
disclosure	to	you	setting	out	the	
allegation	of	fraud	in	order	to	
allow	a	proper	investigation	to	be	
carried	out	with	your	support.	
e)	None	of	the	above
Q7
Enter	number	between	1	and	
50,000
A
Q10B
Q9B
Q8
Enter	number	between	1	and	
50,000
A
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Section Question Response Next	Step
Question	10 Strongly	Disagree
“Insurers	engage	with	members	of	
the	credit-hire	industry	to	share	
intelligence	to	reduce	the	
incidence	of	insurance	fraud”
Disagree
Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree
Agree
Strongly	Agree
Question	11 Strongly	Disagree
	“The	combination	of	the	ABI	and	
IFED	has	promoted	a	negative	
view	of	the	credit-hire	industry.”
Disagree
Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree
Agree
Strongly	Agree
Question	12 Strongly	Disagree
“It	has	become	harder	for	credit-
hire	companies	to	engage	the	
police	to	investigate	fraudulent	
claims.”
Disagree
Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree
Agree
Strongly	Agree
Question	13 Strongly	Disagree
“The	ABI	relationship	with	IFED	
benefits	insurers	to	the	detriment	
of	the	credit-hire	industry.”
Disagree
Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree
Agree
Strongly	Agree
Question	14
How	many	instances	have	you	
suffered	in	the	last	twelve	months	
where	your	rental	vehicle	has	
been	stolen,	used	in	a	criminal	
offence	whilst	on	hire	or	has	been	
recovered	because	you	suspect	
your	client	to	have	been	involved	
in	a	fraudulent	event	such	that	
you	have	suffered	a	loss?	
Question	15 a)	Yes a)	Q16
If	you	did	suffer	a	loss	as	a	result	
of	an	event	as	described	in	Q14	
above	(your	rental	vehicle	has	
been	stolen,	used	in	a	criminal	
offence	or	has	been	recovered	
because	you	suspect	your	client	to	
have	been	involved	in	a	
fraudulent	event	such	that	you	
have	suffered	a	loss)	did	you	
report	the	offence	to	the	police?	
b)	No b)	Q19
Question	16 a)	Yes a)	Q17
From	your	experience,	would	the	
police	accept	your	report	of	an	
offence	and	investigate	it?
b)	No b)	Q18
Q13B
Q12B
Q11B
C
C
Q15
Enter	numerical	value	between	1	
and	10,000
C
Q14B
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Section Question Response Next	Step
Question	17
From	previous	experience	where	
the	police	have	accepted	your	
report	of	an	offence	and	agreed	to	
investigate	in	how	many	cases	has	
an	arrest	followed	and	a	
prosecution	ensued?	
Question	18
a)	They	said	it	was	a	civil	matter	
and	you	should	sue	the	hirer	for	
damages
Why	would	the	police	not	accept	
the	report	of	your	offence	(tick	as	
many	factors	as	are	relevant)?
b)	They	say	we	should	make	a	claim	
on	our	insurance	policy	to	recover	
any	losses
c)	They	say	they	do	not	have	the	
resource	to	investigate	insurance	
related	claims
d)	They	referred	me	to	IFED
e)	They	referred	the	offence	to	
IFED	who	declined	to	accept	it	for	
investigation
f)	They	say	that	insurance	fraud	is	
not	a	force	priority	
g)	They	say	there	is	insufficient	
evidence	on	which	to	investigate	
and	secure	a	conviction
h)	They	advised	me	of	the	need	to	
secure	further	evidence	and	invited	
me	to	return	when	I	have	it
i)	They	would	make	a	report	for	
insurance	purposes	in	order	that	I	
can	make	a	claim	but	will	not	
investigate	the	offence	for	any	of	
the	above	reasons
j)	They	say	that	the	offence	
complained	of	occurred	in	another	
force	area	and	I	should	attempt	to	
report	it	there
Question	19
a)	It	is	a	civil	matter	and	I	can	
pursue	the	hirer	for	damages
Why	would	you	not	report	the	
offence	to	the	police	(tick	as	many	
as	are	relevant)?
b)	I	can	claim	on	my	insurance	
policy	for	any	losses
c)	The	police	do	not	have	the	
resource	to	investigate	insurance	
related	claims
d)	They	will	refer	me	to	IFED	who	
only	take	instructions	from	ABI	
insurers
e)	They	will	refer	the	offence	to	
IFED	who	will	decline	to	accept	it	
for	investigation	because	it	does	
not	come	from	an	ABI	insurer
f)	Insurance	fraud	is	not	a	force	
priority	and	so	it	will	not	be	
investigated
g)	There	is	insufficient	evidence	on	
which	to	investigate	and	secure	a	
prosecution
h)	They	will	only	advise	me	of	the	
need	to	secure	further	evidence	
and	to	return	when	I	have	it	and	I	
do	not	have	the	resources
C
End	Message	2C
End	message	2Enter	number	between	1	and	1,000C
  
 
264 
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								 	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	
				St	Georges	Building	
Portsmouth	
PO1	2HY	
				 	 Tel:	023	92843923	
Researcher:	Steve	Evans	stephen.evans@port.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	Professor	Mark	Button	mark.button@port.ac.uk	
Study	Title:	The	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	
insurance	related	fraud	
REC	Ref	No:		14/15:29	
Dear	[Name]	
Further	to	our	recent	telephone	conversation	I	would	like	to	confirm	your	agreement	for	[NAME]	to	participate	in	a	research	
study	that	I	am	engaged	in	as	part	of	a	PhD	research	project	into	motor	insurance	fraud.	My	research	relates	to	the	impact	of	
the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	(IFED)	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	insurance	related	fraud	and	I	
am	keen	to	interview	[NAME]	for	my	research	as	one	of	25	respondents	as	set	out	on	the	attached	information	sheet.	
Participation	in	my	research	is	entirely	voluntary	and	I	anticipate	that	[NAMES]	involvement	will	only	require	60	minutes	of	
their	time	in	an	interview	that	I	will	conduct	at	a	time	and	place	of	their	choice.	Withdrawal	from	the	research	is	possible	at	
any	time	prior	to	the	data	I	am	collecting	being	analysed	but,	in	any	event,	the	contribution	to	my	research	will	be	in	confidence	
and	references	in	my	final	published	research	will	be	anonymous.	The	information	sheet	provides	greater	clarification	on	this	
issue	and	I	will	ask	[NAME]	to	complete	a	consent	from	when	we	meet.	
You	may	contact	me	at	the	University	at	the	postal	or	e-mail	address	above	or	by	telephone	on	08700	116719.	If	I	could	ask	
you	to	confirm	in	writing	to	me	your	agreement	that	I	may	approach	[NAME]	I	would	be	very	grateful.	
Yours	sincerely	
	
Steve	Evans	
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								 	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	
				St	Georges	Building	
Portsmouth	
PO1	2HY	
				 	 Tel:	023	92843923	
Researcher:	Steve	Evans	stephen.evans@port.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	Professor	Mark	Button	mark.button@port.ac.uk	
Study	Title:	The	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	
insurance	related	fraud	
REC	Ref	No:		14/15:29	
Dear	[Name]	
Further	to	our	recent	conversation	I	would	like	to	confirm	your	agreement	to	participate	in	a	research	study	that	I	am	
engaged	in	as	part	of	a	PhD	research	project	into	motor	insurance	fraud.	My	research	relates	to	the	impact	of	the	insurance	
industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	(IFED)	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	insurance	related	fraud	and	I	am	keen	to	
interview	you	for	my	research	as	one	of	25	respondents	as	set	out	on	the	attached	information	sheet.	
Participation	in	my	research	is	entirely	voluntary	and	I	anticipate	that	your	involvement	will	only	require	60	minutes	of	your	
time	in	an	interview	that	I	will	conduct	at	a	time	and	place	of	your	choice.	Withdrawal	from	the	research	is	possible	at	any	
time	prior	to	the	data	I	am	collecting	being	analysed	but,	in	any	event,	your	contribution	to	my	research	will	be	in	confidence	
and	references	in	my	final	published	research	will	be	anonymous.	The	information	sheet	provides	greater	clarification	on	this	
issue	and	I	will	ask	you	to	complete	a	consent	form	when	we	meet.	
You	may	contact	me	at	the	University	at	the	postal	or	e-mail	address	above	or	by	telephone	on	08700	116719.	
I	look	forward	to	seeing	you	on	[DATE]	in	[LOCATION]	at	[TIME].	
Yours	sincerely	
	
Steve	Evans	
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								 	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	
				St	Georges	Building	
Portsmouth	
PO1	2HY	
				 	 Tel:	023	92843923	
Researcher:	Steve	Evans	stephen.evans@port.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	Professor	Mark	Button	mark.button@port.ac.uk	
Study	Title:	The	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	
insurance	related	fraud	
REC	Ref	No:		14/15:29	
HOST	ORGANISATION	INFORMATION	SHEET	
Dear	[Name]	
Further	to	our	telephone	conversation,	I	write	to	confirm	that	I	would	like	a	member	of	your	organisation	to	take	part	in	my	
research	study	and	I	would	like	you	to	understand	why	the	research	is	being	done	and	what	it	will	involve	for	your	employee	
and	your	organisation.	Please	feel	free	to	talk	to	others	about	the	study	if	you	wish	and	do	not	hesitate	to	ask	if	there	is	
anything	that	is	not	clear		
The	research	is	focused	on	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	the	Insurance	Fraud	Enforcement	Department	(“IFED”),	a	
police	unit	within	the	City	of	London	Police,	dedicated	to	address	high	volume	and	organised	criminality	whilst	working	
closely	with	the	insurance	industry	on	its	strategic	priorities	to	change	the	public	perception	of	insurance	fraud.	Specifically,	I	
am	investigating	the	impact	that	IFED	may	have	had	on	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	motor	insurance	related	fraud,	including	
credit-hire	companies,	in	so	far	as	a	dedicated	policing	unit	funded	by	insurers	(a)	may	impact	their	ability	to	gain	access	to	
the	police,	or	(b)	whether	their	susceptibility	to	economic	and	commercial	harm	may	have	increased	as	a	result	of	IFED.		 	
	
What	is	the	purpose	of	the	study?		
In	terms	of	outcomes,	I	hope	to:	
• Establish	an	objective	measure	of	the	extent	of	detected	and	undetected	motor	insurance	fraud	for	the	credit-hire	
industry,		
• Review	the	existing	empirical	data	relating	to	the	measurement	of	detected	and	undetected	motor	insurance	fraud	
for	the	insurance	industry,		
• Generate	narrative	data	on	the	effectiveness	and	appropriateness	of	an	insurer	sponsored	and	dedicated	police	
resource,	and	
• Document	the	most	recent	incarnation	of	a	privately	sponsored	public	police	unit,	IFED.	
I	also	hope	to	evolve	fraud	and	crime	theory	and	develop	hypotheses	for	further	testing	as	well	as	highlighting	specific	policy	
and	operational	recommendations.	It	is	intended	that	the	research	should	provoke	a	number	of	journal	papers	and	summary	
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reports	for	dissemination	to	policy	makers,	insurers	and	non-insurers	impacted	by	motor	insurance	fraud,	counter-fraud	
bodies	and	the	police.	
Why	has	your	organisation	been	invited?		
The	primary	technique	for	the	research	will	be	twenty-five	semi-structured	interviews.	The	interviews	are	planned	with	
representatives	of	seven	targeted	groups	comprising	representatives	of	the	media,	the	insurance	industry	and	ABI,	those	
providing	counter	fraud	support	for	the	insurance	(defendant)	industry,	those	providing	the	same	services	for	the	credit-hire	
(claimant)	industry,	members	of	the	credit-hire	industry,	other	non-insurer	victims	or	potential	victims	of	fraud	and	a	
number	of	middle	ranking	police	officers.	Your	organisation	falls	within	those	groups	and	I	believe	that	one	of	your	
employees	had	particularly	relevant	knowledge	of	the	issues.	 	
	
Do	you	have	to	take	part?		
It	is	up	to	you	to	decide	if	you	will	allow	me	to	approach	your	employee	to	ask	him	to	join	the	study.	When	we	meet	I	will	
take	them	through	the	study,	explain	the	contribution	they	will	be	asked	to	make	and	then	I	will	then	ask	them	to	sign	a	
consent	form	if	they	wish	to	proceed.	Before	then	I	need	to	discuss	the	nature	of	the	information	that	may	emerge	from	that	
discussion	with	your	employee.	
What	will	happen	to	my	organisation	if	we	agree	to	allow	our	employee	to	take	part?		
I	would	like	to	conduct	an	interview	with	your	employee	that	will	take	approximately	60	minutes.	Subject	to	their	consent	I	
will	make	an	audio	recording	of	the	interview	and	will	later	transcribe	that	so	that	I	can	compare	and	analyse	the	various	
responses	from	all	of	the	interviews	I	will	conduct.	Whilst	the	interview	will	be	stored	with	a	reference	to	help	me	identify	
your	employees	name,	after	the	data	has	been	analysed	and	if	the	data	appears	in	my	final	thesis,	it	will	be	entirely	
anonymous	both	in	terms	of	your	employee	and	your	organisation.	I	expect	that	my	research	will	take	a	number	of	years	to	
conclude	but	your	employee’s	involvement	will	be	limited	to	the	60	minutes	whilst	I	conduct	the	interview.	You	should	be	
aware	that	your	employee	may	divulge	information	of	a	sensitive	or	confidential	nature	or	which	concerns	details	of	specific	
instances	of	fraud	although	I	have	targeted	those	employees	who	ordinarily	manage	this	type	of	information	and	will	be	
aware	of	the	sensitivity	of	it.	I	will	not	be	asking	for	any	confidential	data	or	details	about	current	or	planned	criminal	
investigations	or	prosecutions.	
What	will	my	employee	have	to	do?		
I	have	a	schedule	of	about	ten	questions	and	I	am	interested	in	their	responses,	opinions	and	attitudes	to	the	questions.	
They	relate	to	motor	insurance	fraud	and	do	not	require	any	specialist	knowledge	beyond	that	which	they	possess	by	reason	
of	their	current	or	prior	position.	They	will	not	be	asked	to	provide	any	information	which	is	confidential	or	which	would	
embarrass	them	or	your	organisation	professionally	or	constitute	a	breach	of	confidentiality	or	breach	of	fiduciary	duty.	If	I	
suspect	that	any	information	provided	in	the	interview	represents	such	a	breach	I	will	pause	the	interview	to	ensure	that	my	
research	does	not	rely	on	information	provided	in	error.	 	
What	are	the	possible	disadvantages	and	risks	of	taking	part?		
Your	employee	will	be	inconvenienced	for	60	minutes	and	may	divulge	information	that	you	would	not	wish	him	to	divulge.	I	
cannot	envisage	any	other	disadvantage	or	risk.		
What	are	the	possible	benefits	of	taking	part?		
There	will	be	no	financial	reward	for	participation	but	you	and	your	employee	may	well	benefit	from	the	knowledge	that	you	
are	contributing	to	research,	which	may	advance	or	improve	the	fight	against	insurance	fraud,	stimulate	further	educational	
research	or	generate	policy	documents	or	greater	awareness	of	a	problem.	
Will	my	employee	taking	part	in	the	study	be	kept	confidential?		
When	your	employee	joins	the	study,	it	is	possible	that	some	of	the	data	collected	will	be	seen	by	authorised	persons	from	
the	University	of	Portsmouth	or	by	those	engaged	by	regulatory	authorities.	Because	my	research	is	supervised,	others	may	
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look	at	the	data	to	check	that	the	study	is	being	carried	out	correctly.	All	of	those	people	will	have	a	duty	of	confidentiality	to	
you	as	a	host	organisation	and	to	your	research	participant	and	will	do	their	best	to	meet	this	duty.		
In	any	event,	your	confidentiality	will	be	safeguarded	during	and	after	the	study.	The	interview	will	be	audio	recorded	(with	
your	employee’s	consent)	and	then	transcribed	and	analysed	using	a	software	programme	called	NVivo.	At	all	times	the	data	
will	be	stored	securely	and	it	will	be	retained	only	until	the	final	thesis	is	approved.	At	that	point	it	will	be	destroyed.	At	any	
time	before	destruction,	my	research	supervisor	may	review	the	data	to	ensure	the	study	is	proceeding	correctly.	
What	will	happen	if	my	employee	doesn’t	want	to	carry	on	with	the	study?		
Your	employee	may	withdraw	from	the	study	at	any	time	prior	to	providing	consent	and	until	the	data	from	any	interview	
has	been	analysed,	at	which	time	it	will	be	anonymous	but	may	have	been	integrated	with	other	responses	from	other	
interviewees	and	so	will	be	difficult	to	exclude	from	the	study.		
What	if	there	is	a	problem?	
If	you	have	a	concern	about	any	aspect	of	this	study,	you	may	speak	with	me	or	write	or	speak	to	Professor	Mark	Button,	my	
supervisor.	We	will	both	do	our	best	to	answer	your	questions.	Professor	Button	can	be	reached	by	e-mail	at	
mark.button@port.ac.uk	or	by	telephone	on	023	92843923.	If	you	remain	unhappy	and	wish	to	complain	formally,	you	can	
do	this	by	writing	to	Dr	Phil	Clements,	the	Head	of	Department	who	can	be	reached	at	phil.clements@port.ac.uk.		
What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	research	study?	
I	will	notify	you	when	my	thesis	is	published	although	it	will	be	several	years	before	the	research	is	complete.	Your	
organisation	will	not	be	identified	in	any	report/publication	unless	you	have	given	your	consent.	
Who	is	organising	and	funding	the	research?		
The	University	of	Portsmouth	is	sponsoring	my	research.	
Who	has	reviewed	the	study?	
Research	in	the	University	of	Portsmouth	is	looked	at	by	independent	group	of	people,	called	a	Research	Ethics	Committee,	
to	protect	your	interests.	This	study	has	been	reviewed	and	given	a	favourable	opinion.	
Concluding	statement	
Thank	you	for	taking	the	time	to	read	this	information	sheet.	
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								 	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	
				St	Georges	Building	
Portsmouth	
PO1	2HY	
				 	 Tel:	023	92843923	
Researcher:	Steve	Evans	stephen.evans@port.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	Professor	Mark	Button	mark.button@port.ac.uk	
Study	Title:	The	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	
insurance	related	fraud	
REC	Ref	No:		14/15:29	
PARTICIPANT	INFORMATION	SHEET	
Dear	[Name]	
You	have	agreed	to	take	part	in	my	research	study	and	I	would	like	you	to	understand	why	the	research	is	being	done	and	
what	it	will	involve	for	you.	Please	feel	free	to	talk	to	others	about	the	study	if	you	wish	and	do	not	hesitate	to	ask	if	there	is	
anything	that	is	not	clear		
The	research	is	focused	on	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	the	Insurance	Fraud	Enforcement	Department	(“IFED”),	a	
police	unit	within	the	City	of	London	Police,	dedicated	to	address	high	volume	and	organised	criminality	whilst	working	
closely	with	the	insurance	industry	on	its	strategic	priorities	to	change	the	public	perception	of	insurance	fraud.	Specifically,	I	
am	investigating	the	impact	that	IFED	may	have	had	on	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	motor	insurance	related	fraud,	including	
credit-hire	companies,	in	so	far	as	a	dedicated	policing	unit	funded	by	insurers	(a)	may	impact	their	ability	to	gain	access	to	
the	police,	or	(b)	whether	their	susceptibility	to	economic	and	commercial	harm	may	have	increased	as	a	result	of	IFED.		 	
	
What	is	the	purpose	of	the	study?		
In	terms	of	outcomes,	I	hope	to:	
• Establish	an	objective	measure	of	the	extent	of	detected	and	undetected	motor	insurance	fraud	for	the	credit-hire	
industry,		
• Review	the	existing	empirical	data	relating	to	the	measurement	of	detected	and	undetected	motor	insurance	fraud	
for	the	insurance	industry,		
• Generate	narrative	data	on	the	effectiveness	and	appropriateness	of	an	insurer	sponsored	and	dedicated	police	
resource,	and	
• Document	the	most	recent	incarnation	of	a	privately	sponsored	public	police	unit,	IFED.	
I	also	hope	to	evolve	fraud	and	crime	theory	and	develop	hypotheses	for	further	testing	as	well	as	highlighting	specific	policy	
and	operational	recommendations.	It	is	intended	that	the	research	should	provoke	a	number	of	journal	papers	and	summary	
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reports	for	dissemination	to	policy	makers,	insurers	and	non-insurers	impacted	by	motor	insurance	fraud,	counter-fraud	
bodies	and	the	police.	
Why	have	I	been	invited?		
The	primary	technique	for	the	research	will	be	twenty-five	semi-structured	interviews.	The	interviews	are	planned	with	
representatives	of	seven	targeted	groups	comprising	representatives	of	the	media,	the	insurance	industry	and	ABI,	those	
providing	counter	fraud	support	for	the	insurance	(defendant)	industry,	those	providing	the	same	services	for	the	credit-hire	
(claimant)	industry,	members	of	the	credit-hire	industry,	other	non-insurer	victims	or	potential	victims	of	fraud	and	a	
number	of	middle	ranking	police	officers.	 	
	
Do	I	have	to	take	part?		
It	is	up	to	you	to	decide	to	join	the	study.	When	we	meet	I	will	take	you	through	the	study,	explain	the	contribution	you	will	
be	asked	to	make	and	then	I	will	then	ask	you	to	sign	a	consent	form	if	you	wish	to	proceed.	
What	will	happen	to	me	if	I	take	part?		
I	would	like	to	conduct	an	interview	with	you,	which	will	take	approximately	60	minutes.	Subject	to	your	consent	I	will	make	
an	audio	recording	of	the	interview	and	will	later	transcribe	that	so	that	I	can	compare	and	analyse	the	various	responses	
from	all	of	the	interviews	I	will	conduct.	Whilst	the	interview	will	be	stored	with	a	reference	to	help	me	identify	your	name,	
after	the	data	has	been	analysed	and	if	your	data	appears	in	my	final	thesis,	it	will	be	entirely	anonymous.	I	expect	that	my	
research	will	take	a	number	of	years	to	conclude	but	your	involvement	will	be	limited	to	the	60	minutes	whilst	I	conduct	the	
interview.	
What	will	I	have	to	do?		
I	have	a	schedule	of	six	questions	and	I	am	interested	in	your	responses,	opinions	and	attitudes	to	the	questions.	They	relate	
to	motor	insurance	fraud	and	do	not	require	any	specialist	knowledge	beyond	that	which	you	possess	by	reason	of	your	
current	position.	You	will	not	be	asked	to	provide	any	information	which	is	confidential	or	which	would	embarrass	you	
professionally	or	constitute	a	breach	of	confidentiality	or	breach	of	fiduciary	duty.	If	I	suspect	that	any	information	provided	
in	the	interview	represents	such	a	breach	I	will	pause	the	interview	to	ensure	that	my	research	does	not	rely	on	information	
provided	in	error.	
What	are	the	possible	disadvantages	and	risks	of	taking	part?		
You	will	be	inconvenienced	for	60	minutes	but	I	cannot	envisage	any	other	disadvantage	or	risk.		
What	are	the	possible	benefits	of	taking	part?		
There	will	be	no	financial	reward	for	participation	but	you	may	well	benefit	from	the	knowledge	that	you	are	contributing	to	
research,	which	may	advance	or	improve	the	fight	against	insurance	fraud,	stimulate	further	educational	research	or	
generate	policy	documents	or	greater	awareness	of	a	problem.	
Will	my	taking	part	in	the	study	be	kept	confidential?		
When	you	join	the	study,	it	is	possible	that	some	of	the	data	collected	will	be	seen	by	authorised	persons	from	the	University	
of	Portsmouth	or	by	those	engaged	by	regulatory	authorities.	Because	my	research	is	supervised,	others	may	look	at	the	
data	to	check	that	the	study	is	being	carried	out	correctly.	All	of	those	people	will	have	a	duty	of	confidentiality	to	you	as	a	
research	participant	and	will	do	their	best	to	meet	this	duty.		
	
In	any	event,	your	confidentiality	will	be	safeguarded	during	and	after	the	study.	The	interview	will	be	audio	recorded	(with	
your	consent)	and	then	transcribed	and	analysed	using	a	software	programme	called	NVivo.	At	all	times	the	data	will	be	
stored	securely	and	it	will	be	retained	only	until	the	final	thesis	is	approved.	At	that	point	it	will	be	destroyed.	At	any	time	
before	destruction,	my	research	supervisor	may	review	your	data	to	ensure	the	study	is	proceeding	correctly.	
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What	will	happen	if	I	don’t	want	to	carry	on	with	the	study?		
You	may	withdraw	from	the	study	at	any	time	prior	to	providing	consent	and	until	the	data	from	any	interview	has	been	
analysed,	at	which	time	it	will	be	anonymous	but	may	have	been	integrated	with	other	responses	from	other	interviewees	
and	so	will	be	difficult	to	exclude	from	the	study.		
What	if	there	is	a	problem?	
If	you	have	a	concern	about	any	aspect	of	this	study,	you	may	speak	with	me	or	write	or	speak	to	Professor	Mark	Button,	my	
supervisor.	We	will	both	do	our	best	to	answer	your	questions.	Professor	Button	can	be	reached	by	e-mail	at	
mark.button@port.ac.uk	or	by	telephone	on	023	92843923.	If	you	remain	unhappy	and	wish	to	complain	formally,	you	can	
do	this	by	writing	to	Dr	Phil	Clements,	the	Head	of	Department	who	can	be	reached	at	phil.clements@port.ac.uk.		
What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	research	study?	
I	will	notify	you	when	my	thesis	is	published	although	it	will	be	several	years	before	the	research	is	complete.	You	will	not	be	
identified	in	any	report/publication	unless	you	have	given	your	consent.	
Who	is	organising	and	funding	the	research?		
The	University	of	Portsmouth	is	sponsoring	my	research.	
Who	has	reviewed	the	study?	
Research	in	the	University	of	Portsmouth	is	looked	at	by	independent	group	of	people,	called	a	Research	Ethics	Committee,	
to	protect	your	interests.	This	study	has	been	reviewed	and	given	a	favourable	opinion.	
Concluding	statement	
Thank	you	for	taking	the	time	to	read	this	information	sheet	and	for	agreeing	to	meet	with	me.		
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								 	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	
				St	Georges	Building	
Portsmouth	
PO1	2HY	
				 	 Tel:	023	92843923	
Researcher:	Steve	Evans	stephen.evans@port.ac.uk	
Supervisor:	Professor	Mark	Button	mark.button@port.ac.uk	
Study	Title:	The	impact	of	the	insurance	industry’s	funding	of	a	dedicated	police	unit	on	the	‘non-insurer’	victims	of	
insurance	related	fraud	
REC	Ref	No:		14/15:29	
CONSENT	FORM		
Dear	[Name]	
I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understand	the	information	sheet	for	the	above	study.	I	have	had	the	opportunity	to	consider	
the	information,	ask	questions	and	have	had	these	answered	satisfactorily.		
I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	am	free	to	withdraw	at	any	point	before	the	data	is	analysed	time	
without	giving	any	reason.		
I	understand	that	data	collected	during	the	study	may	be	looked	at	by	individuals	from	the	University	or	from	regulatory	
authorities.	I	give	permission	for	these	individuals	to	have	access	to	my	data.	
I	agree	to	my	interview	being	audio	recorded	and	to	take	part	in	the	above	study.	
Yours	sincerely	
	
Steve	Evans	
	
Name	of	Participant:	 	 	 	 Signature:	
	
Person	taking	consent:	Steve	Evans		 	 Signature:		
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Semi-structured	interview	script	 	
	
 
  
Stage Question Probe
Thank you for agreeing to take part in an interview in this project 
which forms part of my research for a PhD. I am conducting 
about 25 interviews. 
I have already written to you setting out the basis of my 
research and answering some frequently asked questions as 
well as giving you contact details for the University of 
Portsmouth and me should you have any further queries. In 
addition, you have signed a form today agreeing to participate. 
I would like to ask you for permission to audio record this 
interview. The main reason behind this recording is to have the 
set of accurate data – your responses – which will be transcribed 
by me to facilitate, later on, the analysis of the responses 
obtained from this and other interviews conducted throughout 
the course of the project. 
Your identity will remain anonymous at the time of publication 
of my thesis, although I will be able to identify your contribution 
and may discuss it with my supervisor at the University prior to 
publication. The recording and transcript will be destroyed after 
the publication of my thesis.
If you don’t have any further question I would like briefly to 
introduce you to the subject of this interview.
INTRODUCTION 
TO RESEARCH
I am researching motor insurance fraud and the insurance 
industry’s funding of the Insurance Fraud Enforcement 
Department (“IFED”), a police unit within the City of London 
Police. Specifically, I am investigating the impact that IFED may 
have had on ‘non-insurer’ victims of motor insurance related 
fraud, such as bus companies, self-insured fleet operators and 
credit-hire companies, in so far as (a) their ability to gain access 
to justice may have been impacted or (b) their susceptibility to 
economic and commercial harm may have increased.
INTRODUCTION
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Stage Question Probe
Question 3 Do you know the annual cost of motor insurance fraud?
Supplementary questions are:
• Do you know how that figure is determined?
• Do you thin it is a reliable figure?
If they don’t know supply the last published 
figure from IFED and ask the supplementary 
questions
Ascertain from where their perception of the 
topic has been drawn?
• Media
• Employer 
• Insurer 
• IFED
• Police
• Government
• Personal experience
Who do you think the real victims of motor insurance fraud are?
Test the range of possible responses:
• Nothing (why?)
• It’s a civil matter and best handled by the 
victim’s lawyers
• The police should investigate and prosecute
• The state should sponsor accredited private 
investigators to bring private criminal 
prosecutions
Question 4
Possible threads for discussion are
• Innocent policyholders by way of increased 
premiums
• Insurers because they absorb the added cost 
from profit
• Society because insurance fraud has become 
accepted as a victimless crime
• Other non-insurer victims
Seek to broaden the discussion by raising the 
question of self-insured motorists such as bus 
companies, rental companies and fleet 
operators.
Question 1 Could I ask you to outline what you do professionally and could I ask you to tell me what motor insurance fraud means to you?
Question 2 What do you think the state or police response should be to motor insurance fraud?
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Stage Question Probe
Question 7
Should IFED accept reports of insurance fraud from credit hire 
companies and investigate where the offences fit their standard 
acceptance criterion?
Identify whether
• Respondents believe they do or will accept 
reports
• Respondents believe they don’t but should 
Identify whether
• Respondents believe they do or will accept 
reports
• Respondents believe they don’t but should
• Respondent believe that IFED is an insurer 
only resource?
• There is any sense of ill feeling towards 
credit-hire companies which impacts their 
credibility
• If IFED shouldn’t or wont accept reports then 
where should those reports be made?
Question 6 What role do you think IFED play in the fight against motor insurance fraud?
Ascertain whether they know about
• Reported IFED successes
• IFED Funding
• IFED Governance
• Strategic Priorities
• IFED Acceptance criterion for investigation
• Relationships with IFB and IFIG
In addition
• Determine if they have had any contact with 
IFED, IFIG and IFB and the quality or success of 
the interaction
Question 8
Do you have any experience of reporting insurance fraud to IFED 
and/or to regional police forces and what was the result?
Would you be prepared to engage in a further meeting to 
discuss that case?
FOR POLICE RESPONDENTS THIS CHANGES TO
Do you have any experience of insurance fraud being reported to 
your force and, if so, how are such reports treated?
Ascertain insurance fraud in your force?
• In general terms how would you define the 
integrity of the credit hire industry? Are they 
offender, victim or both
• The acceptance criterion
• Acceptance rate
• Ease or difficulty of engagement
• Result of report
• Identify possible case studies pre and post 
IFED
• How does insurance fraud figure in your force 
priorities?
• Do you refer to IFED as the national lead?
• Is insurance fraud a ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’ 
problem
• What resource levels are available to deal 
with insurance fraud in your force?
• In general terms how would you define the 
integrity of the credit hire industry? Are they 
offender, victim or both
Question 5
Do you think non-insurers like credit hire companies or fleet 
operators with large policy excesses are ever victims of motor 
insurance fraud?
Areas to probe:
• Is non-insurer fraud ever reported?
• Is it ever quantified?
• Do insurers engage with credit hire 
companies or fleet operators against the 
fraudsters?
• Are credit-hire companies a part of the fraud 
problem or part of the solution?
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Stage Question Probe
CONCLUSION That’s all I wanted to cover; is there anything that you think I may have missed or that you would like to add?
If no other response then conclude the 
interview
Question 9 Do you think the Police have sufficient resources to be able to cope with the range of challenges they face?
Engage on the following:
• Attitude to reduced police budgets?
• Perception of what police priorities should 
be?
• Awareness of load shedding and reduction of 
responsibilities
• Definition of what the Police represent in 
today’s society?
Question 10 Should there be a greater ‘private’ response to motor insurance fraud?
Explore:
• Whether the problem is contained?
• Whether even the IFED response is running 
out of capacity to manage the issue?
• Whether there are risks of the private sector 
being involved either to justice or society?
• If not privatisation then what else; what 
should the future of policing motor insurance 
fraud look like?
• Is an industry led solution desirable?
• Consider FACT, RSPCA, BTP in the context of 
‘policing’ versus ‘the police’
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Semi-structured	interview	script	(Case	Studies)	
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Stage Question Probe
Thank you for agreeing to take part in an interview in this project 
which forms part of my research for a PhD. I am conducting 
about 25 interviews. 
I have already written to you setting out the basis of my 
research and answering some frequently asked questions as 
well as giving you contact details for the University of 
Portsmouth and me should you have any further queries. In 
addition, you have signed a form today agreeing to participate. 
I would like to ask you for permission to audio record this 
interview. The main reason behind this recording is to have the 
set of accurate data – your responses – which will be transcribed 
by me to facilitate, later on, the analysis of the responses 
obtained from this and other interviews conducted throughout 
the course of the project. 
Your identity will remain anonymous at the time of publication 
of my thesis, although I will be able to identify your contribution 
and may discuss it with my supervisor at the University prior to 
publication. The recording and transcript will be destroyed after 
the publication of my thesis.
If you don’t have any further question I would like briefly to 
introduce you to the subject of this interview.
INTRODUCTION 
TO RESEARCH
I am researching motor insurance fraud and the insurance 
industry’s funding of the Insurance Fraud Enforcement 
Department (“IFED”), a police unit within the City of London 
Police. Specifically, I am investigating the impact that IFED may 
have had on ‘non-insurer’ victims of motor insurance related 
fraud, such as bus companies, self-insured fleet operators and 
credit-hire companies, in so far as (a) their ability to gain access 
to justice may have been impacted or (b) their susceptibility to 
economic and commercial harm may have increased.
•      What was the offence?
•      How was it detected?
•      Who was it reported to?
•      What was the response from 
the police/IFED?
•      Did you receive co-operation 
from other entities (IFB, IFIG, ABI, 
counter-fraud operators?
•      How big 
(people/budget/offences) is your 
internal counter fraud operation?
•      What was the outcome of the 
investigation?
•      Did you perceive a difference 
pre and post IFED? If so what was 
it?
•      Do you think the ability to 
prosecute offenders has improved 
or deteriorated post IFED? In what 
way?
•      How supportive are those 
police forces where you have 
reported offences of fraud?
•      Has your organisation changed 
in the approach to insurance fraud 
as a consequence? How?
•      What would your preferred 
solution be to the detection and 
prosecution of insurance 
fraudsters?
•      How attainable is that?
•      How significant an issue is 
fraud to your organisation?
•      Would you pay to have fraud 
offences investigated by IFED?
•      Would you consider funding a 
private criminal prosecution?
Question 3 Is any of the information you have given me confidential or something you would prefer that I do not utilise in my research? Record details to be redacted.
FOR POLICE RESPONDENT ONLY
Do you have a view about the ABI involvement in policing fraud?
CONCLUSION That’s all I wanted to cover; is there anything that you think I may have missed or that you would like to add?
If no other response then conclude 
the interview
INTRODUCTION
Explore reduction in regional focus 
and impact on detection of 
organised crime
Question 4
If not, identify from whom and 
consider redacting or arranging 
interview with that person.
Is the information you have given me from your own 
involvement in the matter?Question 2
When we met last time you told me about the case of [NAME] 
and [NAME]. Could I ask you to tell me about the background to 
the two cases?
Question 1
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Appendix C – CHO statement of consumer rights 
  
Code of conduct 
	
The Executive Committee of The Credit Hire Organisation adopted 
the following code of conduct in 2014. 
The Credit Hire Organisation Limited Code of Conduct (the “Code”). 
Members must: 
§ Abide by the Code. 
§ Conduct their businesses in accordance with applicable laws and regulations to which they are subject. 
§ Act with integrity and behave in a way that maintains public confidence in the services credit hire 
companies provide. 
§ Run their businesses effectively and in accordance with proper governance and sound financial and risk 
management principals. 
§ Where relevant, take appropriate steps to protect any client money they may handle (eg customer 
insurance excesses). 
§ Acknowledge that credit hire companies, and their referral partners, may be the target of fraud and take 
appropriate steps to satisfy themselves that each claim is genuine. 
§ Take appropriate steps to ensure that customers understand the nature of the services they provide and 
respond to customer queries in a timely and appropriate manner. 
§ Treat all customers fairly. 
§ Ensure that the hire vehicles provided to customers are insured, safe, roadworthy and have been 
adequately maintained. 
§ Submit claims to insurers only after consideration that: 
§ The claim is genuine. 
§ The circumstances of the accident justified the hire of a replacement vehicle. 
§ The customer needed a replacement vehicle. 
§ The type of vehicle provided or claimed for is reasonable given the circumstances and the law. 
§ The length of hire is reasonable given the circumstances and the law. 
§ The amount claimed is reasonable given the circumstances and the law.  
Ensure their employees are adequately trained and that a specific person or group of people is 
responsible for keeping policies, procedures and documentation compliant with good practice, the law or 
any other regulation to which their business is subject. 
§ Keep customers informed as to the progress of the settlement of claims and provide appropriate support to 
customers (including, where relevant, facilitating access to legal advice) if claims are disputed. 
 
The Executive Committee of The Credit Hire Organisation can determine compliance with the Code, and may 
suspend or terminate any member’s membership of the The Credit Hire Organisation if it believes that any 
member has breached the Code or brought the integrity of the The Credit Hire Organisation into disrepute. 
Members agree to and accept this process of determination. Where membership is suspended or terminated, 
members will be notified of such and accept that there will be no refund of subscriptions and that following 
suspension or termination of their membership, they are not able to use the The Credit Hire Organisation logos or 
use any documentation which purports them to be a member of the The Credit Hire Organisation. 
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Appendix D – Summary of ABI press releases from the review period  
 
1. 2008/11 - Tackling Whiplash: Prevention, Care, Compensation 
2. 2008/11 - ABI reveals whiplash epidemic 
3. 2008/12 - Rise in front end fraud putting insurance cover in jeopardy warns the ABI 
4. 2009/03 - National fraud crackdown must end the victimless crime myth says the ABI  
5. 2009/04 - Recession Britain insurers detecting record amounts of fraudulent claims ABI 
6. 2009/07 - Deception Exaggeration and Invention ABI publishes report on the rising cost of 
insurance fraud ABI 
7. 2010/01 - Zero tolerance policy towards fraud now needed says the ABI  
8. 2010/07 - Bogus Britain insurers expose over 2300 fraudulent claims every week  
9. 2010/10 - Ministry of Justice’s Consultation Paper – Proposals for reform of Civil Litigation 
Funding and Costs in England and Wales (CP 13/10 
10. 2011/01 - Motorists cutting corners risk driving illegally warns the ABI  
11. 2011/03 - Transport Select Committee report on motor insurance misses the point says the 
ABI  
12. 2011/05 – Britain’s pain in the neck culture must be reduced says the ABI  
13. 2011/07 - No hiding place for cheats as drive to reduce insurance fraud moves up a gear  
14. 2011/07 - You could not make it up but some did Insurers detecting more fraudulent claims 
than ever over 2500 worth 18 million every week  
15. 2011/09 - ABI comments on Government response to Transport Select Committee inquiry 
into cost of motor insurance  
16. 2011/09 – Tackling the compensation culture 
17. 2011/09 - Leading retailers and business groups join forces with the ABI in calling for an 
end to the have a go compensation culture  
18. 2012/04 - The UK’s pain in the neck culture must end says the ABI  
19. 2012/05 - Address by James Dalton to the International Whiplash Conference  
20. 2012/09 - ABI lifts the lid on the 1 billion a year insurance fraud industry as the insurance 
fraud register is launched  
21. 2012/09 - Insurance Fraud exposed 
22. 2012/09 - Phantom passengers and phoney injuries behind record rise in motor insurance 
fraud says the ABI  
23. 2012/12 - Government on the right road to tackling the UK whiplash epidemic says the 
Association of British Insurers  
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24. 2012/12 - What next for whiplash 
25. 2013/01 - Fraudulent insurance policies  
26. 2013/03 - Fair, independent, objective – ABI publishes proposals to curb the UK’s whiplash 
epidemic  
27. 2013/03 - James Dalton speech at Claims Magazine Annual Conference  
28. 2013/04 – Brace yourself — UK is the biggest pain in the neck in Europe 
29. 2013/05 - Motor Insurance Costs 
30. 2013/07 - ABI responds to Transport Select Committee, Cost of Motor Insurance/ Whiplash 
report  
31. 2013/07-  Detected fraud statistics update  
32. 2013/07 - The con is not on - industry clampdown on insurance cheats uncovers frauds 
worth £21 million every week  
33. 2013/08 - ABI advice to help drivers avoid becoming the victim of 'flash for cash' scams  
34. 2013/10 - IFED investigation leads to 27 arrests over sale of fake car insurance policies  
35. 2013/10 - James Dalton speech at Infoline Motor Insurance Claims Forum  
36. 2013/11 - ABI supports national 'ghost broking' awareness campaign  
37. 2013/11 - Aidan Kerr keynote speech at Post Magazine Fraud Conference  
38. 2014/03 - ABI members committed to tackling insurance fraud with £11.7m investment in 
Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department  
39. 2014/03 - Mark Allen speech at the Marketforce Fraud Conference 2014  
40. 2014/05 - Insurance cheats feel the heat – value of fraudulent claims uncovered by insurers 
hits record level  
41. 2014/06 - ABI comments on new government plans to crackdown on insurance fraud and 
remove bogus claims  
42. 2014/06 - Fraud Conference 
43. 2014/07 - Insurers driving down unnecessary motor insurance costs – ABI responds to 
Transport Committee report on motor insurance  
44. 2014/09 - Motor insurance application fraud backfiring on nearly 3,500 motorists a week 
according to the ABI  
45. 2014/10 - Fraud data  
46. 2014/11 - Overhaul in assessing whiplash claims set to put the brake on the fraud of choice  
47. 2014/12 - ABI responds to Chris Grayling speech at the ABI Motor Conference  
48. 2014/12 - Chris Grayling speech at the ABI Motor Conference 2014  
49. 2015/03 - ABI comments on publication of The Insurance Fraud Taskforce interim report  
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50. 2015/03 - Huw Evans speech at the Experian Insurance Summit 2015  
51. 2015/03 - The ABI publishes report shedding light into the thinking of insurance cheats  
52. 2015/04 - Claimant solicitors urged to register to use askCUE personal injury service from 
5 May to prevent fraudulent claims  
53. 2015/04 - Motor insurance and civil justice reforms 
54. 2015/07 - Case studies/ detected insurance frauds  
55. 2015/07 - You could not make it up, but they did. Savings for honest customers as insurers 
expose £3.6 million worth of insurance frauds every day  
56. 2015/08 - Cutting corners to get cheaper motor insurance backfiring on thousands of 
motorists warns the ABI  
57. 2015/10 - Average cost of comprehensive motor insurance continues to rise  
58. 2015/10 - Fraud  
59. 2015/11 - Clampdown on the compensation cowboys 
60. 2015/11 - CMC 
61. 2015/11 - PI Fraud 
62. 2016/01-  Insurers will do whatever it takes to protect honest customers against insurance 
fraud  
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Appendix E – Extracts of correspondence between the ABI and the MOJ 
(ABI to MOJ – 29 September 2010) 
“The ABI is holding its periodical Legal Expenses Insurance Committee meeting next week… Do 
you think that there is anything you would like us to discuss with our members? If so it would be 
good to talk through it so I can add a point to our agenda?”  
(MOJ to ABI - 13 October 2010) 
“I just tried calling. I am sorry to say that neither Ken Clarke nor Jonathan Djanogly is able to 
attend the reception. As you will know we are keen to assist…but I am afraid it has not been possible 
this time.”  
(ABI to MOJ – 21st December 2010) 
“Great working with you this year and look forward to us working together again in 2011. All 
the best for the holidays.”  
(Keoghs to MOJ 7th January 2011) 
“Further to our conversation of yesterday evening, I promised to provide you with details of 
those who have committed to our morning meeting on the 19th in Westminster. The venue is to be 
One Whitehall Place. The attendees will be [redacted]. 
All the above are highly engaged in the process, have been for some years, and will have a lot 
to say to the Minister.”  
(ABI to MOJ – 29th March 2011) 
“I am sure you have had a busy couple of weeks but I just wanted to drop you a line to say we 
will read all the papers diligently over the next couple of days but I just wanted to let you know that 
the initial reaction is very positive. Our press statement is here…”  
(MOJ to ABI - 29th March 2011) 
“Thanks for this. It has indeed been quite busy recently. After tomorrow I am away for a while 
but it would be good to catch up after my return to the office on 13th April.”   
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(MOJ to ABI - 31st March 2011) 
“Have a good time. I will fix something up when you are back. If anything urgent crops up in the 
meantime, I shall of course be in contact.”   
(MOJ to ABI - 5th April 2011) 
Thanks for your reply. One thing we are keen to understand is how insurers use referral fees 
and in particular what the impact on the use of BTE insurance would be if referral fees were banned. 
Grateful for any light you may be able to shed on this.”  
(ABI to MOJ – 13th May 2011) 
“It was good to see you both yesterday morning and to talk through the items on our agenda. 
It was encouraging to hear we share the same vies on the claimant’s access to justice arguments 
and undesirable behaviour being driven by claims management companies… 
Thanks again for your time yesterday and do let me know if you have any further questions. As 
you mentioned yesterday Robert [other name redacted] and I have a meeting with you scheduled 
for 24th May and we look forward to seeing you (and hopefully you too, Jo) then.”  
(MOJ to ABI - 13th May 2011) 
“Thanks for this; it was good to see you and the others yesterday. I think you were going to 
send us your responses to the LSB consultation on referral fees. It would also be interesting to see 
what your response is to the Transport Committee Report as discussed – but we can talk about that 
on 24th.”  
(ABI to MOJ – 26th May 2011) 
“Good to see you again on Tuesday and talk through the issues below. As discussed we are 
supportive of the MOJ’s reforms and we will continue our messaging by voicing our support for the 
Justice Bill when the draft is released soon. 
We would welcome the opportunity to provide data and input into the more detailed 
implementation work that will take place over the coming months and we look forward to being 
engaged with this work and keeping the dialogue open. 
In the meantime, we look forward to hearing from you /or a colleague in relation to setting up 
a meeting with our new Director general to meet Jonathon Djanogly MP in the near future. 
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I will be in touch in a few weeks with a follow up. In any event I look forward to seeing you 
(Robert) at the FOIL (Forum of Insurance Lawyers) event on the Jackson reforms at St Pauls on the 
16th June where I notice you are one of the speakers. Looks like it might be an interesting and 
worthwhile event.”  
(MOJ to ABI - 26th May 2011) 
“Many thanks for this and for a very useful meeting with you and [name redacted]. We have 
been in touch with Jonathan Djanogly about a meeting; he agrees and we are looking to mid-June 
for that…”  
(ABI to MOJ – 28th May 2011) 
“As discussed I have attached various research reports which may assist you… I’ve looked at 
your question on damages but at first blush I don’t know if we readily hold that information.”  
 “Thanks for these and for your help generally. Very best wishes for the future; we will miss 
you!  
(ABI to MOJ – 24th June 2011) 
“Further to my e-mail below I attach two flowcharts which show how claims are typically 
bought and sold in two different types of claims… 
If you’d like to discuss this further or in more detail, I’d be happy to pop over to Petty France 
[the MOJ] sometime in the next couple of weeks if you are available (either before or after the ABI 
meeting with Jonathon Djanogly on 4th July). I can also update you with the work that we are 
currently doing with our member and wider stakeholders to support the Bill whilst it goes through 
the various parliamentary stages, as well as work on the other aspects of Jackson to be 
implemented that don’t appear in the Bill (e.g. QUOCS).”  
(MOJ to ABI - 14th July 2011) 
“Thanks for this which is helpful. As you know – and you will have seen PMQs yesterday – work 
is progressing on this. 
…it may be helpful to meet with you and [name redacted] over the next few weeks as things 
develop.”   
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(MOJ to ABI - 15th July 2011) 
“Further to this, I think [name redacted] is chasing the referral fee figures from Aviva. Also, 
when we meet it would be helpful to discuss BTE promotion etc. and developments since our last 
meeting.”   
(ABI to MOJ – 15th July 2011) 
“Lots to discuss and I agree that it would be useful to have a meeting soon; both [name 
redacted] and I am around over the next couple of weeks.”  
(ABI to MOJ – 19th July 2011) 
“Just received your voicemail – am around for most of the afternoon so hopefully can speak to 
you at some point. I assume you’ve spoken to [name redacted] following our conversation 
yesterday (confirming our meeting on 9 August)… 
On the point of referral fee figures form Aviva, the relevant member is on holiday this week but 
I am told the matter is in hand.”  
(ABI to MOJ – 31 August 2011) 
“I thought you might be interested to see the final version of the publication I mentioned at 
our last meeting. We have put a letter and a hard copy to your Minister in the post tonight. 
I would be interested to hear if you have any update further to our last meeting; happy to 
discuss over the telephone or I can pop over to petty France for a catch up sometime soon if that 
suits? I can also update you with progress on the BTE front further to our meeting with legal 
expenses insurers which was held at the ABI this afternoon.  
LETTER: 
Dear Minister [Jonathan Djanogly MP] 
I attach an advance copy of a publication that the ABI has produced in support of the steps 
taken to tackle the compensation culture in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Bill.  
This publication will be sent to all Parliamentarians on Monday 5th September to provide them 
with information on the problem with the current compensation culture, the costs of this to 
consumers and taxpayers and the solutions proposed by Lord Justice Jackson and included in the 
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Bill. It has been supported by a number of organisations representing a wide range of interests, from 
businesses to local authorities and lawyers, as well as the insurance industry.  
The publication aims to show that the measures adopted in the Bill will be a real benefit to all. 
I hope you will find it informative and helpful.”  
(MOJ to ABI - 8th September 2011 1745hrs) 
Copy of government release (Curbing Compensation Culture: Government to Ban Referral Fees) 
embargoed until 00.01 on 9th September provided to ABI  
(ABI to MOJ – 8th September 2011 1829hrs) 
Copy of press release issued in response  
(ABI to MOJ – 8th September 2011 1945hrs) 
“Don’t know if you are still at the office – have tried to call. One important point you need to 
be aware of. Call me if you can”  
(MOJ to ABI - 15th September 2011) 
“Thanks for this. I am trying to catch up after a rather hectic few days; apart from the 
announcement on Friday on referral fees (and Jack Straw’s Bill on Tuesday) we are also in the 
Commons Committee all day on the LASPO Bill on Tuesday. It would be helpful to discuss referral 
fees and BTE in more detail soon.”  
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Appendix F – Lobbying Correspondence - 28th June 2010 to 28th September 2011  
 
 
From: Ta
ylor, Jo L
Sent: 28
June 2010 12:44
To:
Cc: W
right, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject:
TRIM: FW: GHR - Publication of co
nclusions report
TRIM Dataset: LV
TRIM Record Number: D
10/301971
TRIM Record URI: 25
73720
please see the announcement by
the Master of the Rolls confirming
that the interim Guideline Hourly Rate
s
set for 2010 are now to be cons
idered final and the ‘Conclusions
report by the Advisory Committee o
n Civil Costs
which recommended this.
rnedia/general/gllldelrne-hrIv—rate.h
tmhr24o61o
You will note that in its report the
ACCC have invited such further
evidence and data as interested parti
es may wish to
submit for its further considerati
on.
Jo Taylor
Ministry of Justice
102 Petty France. London, SW1H
9AJ
Telephone:
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid>
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Sent: 28 May 2010 1249
To:
Cc: Taylor. Jo L:
Subject: RE: ABl Research
Thanks for these, and for your help generally Very best wishes for the future we vill miss you
Robert
From;
Sent: 28 May 2010 12:46
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Taylor, Jo L;
Subject: A81 Research
Robert,
As discussed, I have attached various research reports which may assist you. I have not been able to
track one of the Frontier reports down, and our research contact is away on AL, but I have left a
message with him and hopefully can pass this on in due course.
Jo,
I’ve looked at your question on damages but at first blush, I don’t know if we readily hold that
information. I’ll pass onto our stats team for follow up.
Best wishes,
Please cons der the nvironment before print ng th s emsil
Assocatonf9rfsh lrsi.iers 51 Gresnsv 5et EC2V 7HQ
• ‘ ‘
. :j
fW fl E r n r e f k y o n e tt fo ‘j r ther tin
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Page 2 ot2
te -tended rec p ent s prch bited If you recen.ed This n error plase contact the sender and deete the materaI from any computer
2 The Asscc at on f rtish ‘surers will ‘ot cc abe Th you or any other cerson or ert y cr ary statement rc!udng but not ‘‘n ted to defamatory
statements “ade by any empoyee acbng otsie :re procer course of their dut,es
S ms Thct’-oe conr’ns that :hs e”’aI message as Oeen sept by Webserse Hosted E Mat ‘at the presence of ,ruses and uracceptab’e or
oflense ‘nateral
T’e Assccaon asa scans at nccmrg ‘aI a’d ese’;es tre q”t to eect ard reti’ any “aferal whcn ‘s cons ered eTher to cc a securty rsk
or to carta n tace materal
T’his email sas receied from the INIERNET and scanned by the Goernment Secure Intranet anti
virus service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCfM
Certificate Number 2009 09 0052.) In case of pwblerns, please call your organisation’s If Helpdesk.
Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and/er recorded for legal
purposes.
“1 1
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Association of British Insurers
RESEARCH BRIEF January 2Q09
Analysis of personal injury legal costs
Introduction
This Research Brief summarises work conducted by Frontier Economics on behalf of the
ABI,
A quantitative analysis of legal fees
The MO] Consultation Paper finds that:
“The processes and costs involved in making a claim for personal
injury are often perceived as being disproportionately high,
particularly in the lower value claims. Costs can often exceed
compensation, sometimes by a considerable amount”.1
This statement is supported by Frontier’s findings which are based on data provided by
insurance companies. Frontier collected information on over 18,200 P1 claims with an
instruction date between March 2005 and April 2007.
The data contains information on:
• the breakdown of the legal costs claimed and paid in each case
• the type of personal injury claim (Motor, EL and PL)
• the amount of damages awarded
Frontier focused on closed cases (where both damages and legal costs have been paid)
with the damages falling within the proposed new track limits for P1 claims. To do this
Frontier removed all cases where the total damages awarded exceed £25,000 or fall
under £1,000 as well as all cases where the costs have not yet been settled. Motor claims
were also excluded if the accident occurred before October 2003 in order to focus on the
effect of predicable fees (the Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme (FRCS)).
After this “cleaning” Frontier were stilt left with a large dataset containing more than
15,000 observations. Below we summarise the main findings of the data analysis.
Paid versus claimed legal cost
comparison of legal costs paid and claimed (excluding VAT) shows that the claimed
costs are higher than the paid costs b.y approximately 30% (see figure one). Ths figure
shows average legal costs claimed and paid as well as average damages for each type of
claim (EL, PL and Motor). Despite the achieved reductions, the legal costs paid are still
higher than the damanes awarded in EL and PL cases (E3,821 versus £3,453 for EL
c!ams and £4,069 versus £3,813 or PL ciamsi. This s in hoe with the MO] finding cited
in he consultation document.
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Analysis of personal injury legal costs
Association of British Insurers 2008
Figure 1 Legal costs (claimed and paid) and damages awarded by
claim type
£5OCO
£4OOO
______
E3OOO
£2ooo
£1330
Employers LiabIlity
Legal Costs Claimed
Source: Frontier analysis of insurance companies’ claims data,
Decomposition of legal costs
The total legal bill presented by a claimant solicitor to an insurance compa
ny will include
the following components:
• Base costs (legal fees per se)
a Disbursements (such as costs of obtaining a medical report, GP’s record
s, etc.)
• Success fees - a success fee is awarded if the claim is fu
nded through a
conditional fee agreement (CFA) and the claimant wins
• “After-the-event° (ATE) insurance premium — ATE insurance covers th
e claimant’s
liability to pay the defendant’s legal costs if the claims fails
The data provides information on all these components.
Base costs
Figure two shows average base costs, disbursements, success fees and A
TE premium for
each type of claim. Base costs are on average:
a £2,069 for EL
• £2,257 for Motor
• £2,330 For PL claims
Base costs represent the largest share of total costs (55% for EL, 72% for
Motor and
59% for PL).
The e.s.timate of ba.se costs for Motor appears to be signific.antly hig.he
r than ftc
estimates obtaIned m other studies. in artcular 0 Fenn and Rickman (2007)
MonitorIng
the Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme’ (2007). They Fnd that base costs
recovered on
3’no P 3Prcon, ‘3. (2O’O7. ;4cr’tor”c tre Fed ‘covereb,e ‘L25tS 5cherr.
0
Legal Costs Paid Average total damages
Publtc/Products Lability
2
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low value (less than £10,000) non-litigated Motor claims in the post-FRCS period are on
average £1,593. The discrepancy in the estimates is partly explained by the fact that the
data also includes higher value claims (with damages between £10,000 and £25,000).
These claims are not governed by the FRCS and, in general, tend to be more expensive.
Moreover, the data does not allow litigated and non-litigated claims to be separated. The
former are, again, significantly more expensive.
Other costs
Of the other three cost components, disbursements appear to be relatively similar across
all claims’ types, in the range of £600-700 per claim, This represents between 15% and
22% of total legal costs paid.
Success fees and ATE premiums are only paid in CFA-funded cases. Most EL and PL
claims are CFA-funded, while Motor claims are mainly funded by “before-the-event”
(BTE) insurance. As a consequence of that, success fees and ATE premiums are not paid
in 70% of Motor cases. This is reflected in the averages:
• The average success fee and ATE premium across all Motor claims are low (E129
and £86)
• If only CFA-funded cases are included, the average success fee and ATE premium
are significantly higher - £422 and £404 respectively — in line with those for EL
and PL
Figure 2 Decomposition of legal costs paid (exci VAT)
£2,500
Source --s co-0-arces cs--ms
Where are the savings being made?
A comparison of the iegal costs claimed and paid by component allows an assessmeni.. of
where the savings have been made. As figure three below demonstrates, most of thEe
savinqs are made in base costs: 50% for EL, 75% for Motor and 45% for PL.
£2,000
£1,300
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Significant savings are also made in EL and PL success fees (40% and 43% of total
savings for EL and PL claims respectively). The reasons for that are the following:
• Success fees can only be claimed in CFAfunded cases and most EL and PL cases
are CFA-funded
• Success fees are usually proportional to base costs; hence, a reduction in base
costs leads to a reduction in success fees
Figure 3 Savings’ decomposition
Base Costs Success Pass tjDisbursemsnts QATE Premwm
Source Frontier analysis of insurance companies claims data.
Summary
Overall, the analysis shows that:
• Average legal costs are higher than damages in EL and PL claims
• Significant savings are made in total legal costs. There is a 30% average gap
between the legal costs claimed and paid
• These savings are mainly achieved in base costs and in success fees for EL and PL
claims
These findings support the view expressed in the MO) Consultation Paper that the legal
costs of ma•••king a P1 claim can be disproportionately high relative to damages. Moreover,
the claims’ proc...es••s appears to be••• quite ambiguous and open to various interpretations.
This is reflected in the significant differences between the legal costs claimed and paid.
Comparison of legal rates
Establishing appropriate hourly rates in this market is not an easy task... Three
•Itr•natives are assessed:
* FMCS Guid.eiine Rates
• hourly rates charged by defendant [avyers
• civil legal aid rates
Analysis of personal injury legal costs
© Association of British Insurers 2008
70%
60%
50%
1 P4
14%
10%
75%
30%
20%
10Co
0%
Employers Liability Motor Public/Products Liabdity
4
  
 
296 
 
 
 
Analysis of personal injury legal costs
© Association of British Insurers 2008
Below is a discussion of these alternatives in detail.
HMCS Guidelines Rates
When cost draftsmen assess legal costs claimed, they use the HMCS Guideline rates as
the benchmark. These rates were first issued in 1999 due to the requirement of the
Woolf reform that there be a summary assessment of the costs at the end of all fast
track cases and trials lasting less than one day. These rates were originally based on the
actual rates used by County Courts. The rates have been revised every two years (the
last two revisions inflated the 2003 rates by RPI), In 2003 geographical banding was
introduced: 3 bands for areas outside of London, along with 3 bands for areas within
London (see Table 1). The rates also vary by solicitors’ grade with Grade A (more than 8
years experience> being the highest and grade D (paralegals and trainee solicitors) being
the lowest.
Table 1 HMCS Guideline rates for summary assessment 2007
Grade A — Over Grade B — More Grade C Other Grade D -
8 years than 4 years solicitors Trainee
experience with experience with solicitors and
at least 8 years at least 4 years paralegals
litigation litigation
experience experience
HMCS Band 1 Areas include £195 £173 £145 £106
Liverpool, Bristol, Oxford, etc.
HMCS Band 2 — Areas include £183 £161 £133 £101
coventry, York, Plymouth, etc.
HMCS Band 3 - Areas include £167 £150 £128 £95
Devon, cornwall, South Wales, etc.
Outer London £210-246 £158-210 £152 £111
central London £292 £222 £181 £116
Cityof London £380 £274 £210 £129
Source: HMc5,
Defendant solicitors’ rates
An alternative source of information on Personal Injury solicitor rates is insurance
companies themselves, which enter into agreements with defendant solicitor firms. The
type of work performed by defendant lawyers is not dissimilar to claimant work. A lot of
work is in fact done in parallel, as has been acknowledged in the MO) consultation
document, if anything, defendant solicitor work tends to be more difficult, because
insurance companies usually employ solicitors only in complex/contentious cases,
undeft.aking all straightforward ork in-house..
Ottainin.g information on defend nt hourly rates is not straightforward as they are
bilaterally negotiated between insurance companies and solicitors’ firms and are not in
the public domain. However, in the course of Frontier’s interviews with insurance
companies, some of them disclosed their agreed rates. The rates usually vary by the
value of claim as more expensive claims require more. experience in the current system.
For example, the rates are typically lower for claims with damages below £4,999 than
those for claims with damages between £5,000 and £9,999. in principle, rates based on
damages can be translated into ra.tes based on grades or years of experience From the
discussions with• insure.rs, Frontier have estimated a set of defendant solici.tors’ rates for
e.ach grade (see Table 2 below).
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Table 2 Defendant solicitors’ average hourly rates
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D
Defendant soIidtors rates £155 £137 £115 £84
5ource Frontier calculations based on insurance cornpanies dota.
These rates are consistently lower than the HMCS Guidelines rates. However, one should
bear in mind that in exchange for lower rates, defendant lawyers are guaranteed large
volumes of work. So, in theory at least, they might still be better off even if they charge
lower rates.
That does not appear to be the case in practice. A comparison of profits per partner (PPP)
of a sub-sample of Top 100 solicitor firms, split into those doing predominantly (i)
claimant work and (ii) defendant work, suggests that claimant firms on average tend to
be more profitable (PPP up to 45% higher). Clearly, this analysis has its limitations
Indeed:
• it focuses only on larger firms and ignores a fringe of firms with lower ranking
(due to lack of data)
• some key players (notably Thompson) have not responded to the Lawyer 100
questionnaire and, therefore, are not part of the analysis
Given these limitations, Frontier cannot make a definitive conclusion that the results hold
for all firms, but they do provide some evidence that claimant firms tend to be more
profitable.
Hence, if the purpose of the reform is to encourage the industry to become more
competitive, lower rates, in line with those currently paid to defendant solicitors, may be
appropriate.
Legal aid hourly rates
Personal Injury solicitors’ rates can also be compared to civil legal aid rates. Legal aid is
provided by the Legal Services Commission (LSC). LSC pays for legal services for people
on low income who cannot afford private rates. Civil legal aid can fund:
a initial advice and assistance with any legal problem
• a solicitor who can speak on someone’s behalf at court hearings without formally
representing them
a legal representation in court proceedings
A wide. range of civil ieq.aI work (for example, fam.ily proceedings, inheritance, adoption,
clinical negligence, etc..) is not dissimilar in its na.ture to priva.tely funded pe.rsonal injury
work. Moreover, prior to 2000, P1 work was also funded by legal a.id.
Table 3 below shows the legal aid rates currently paid in care and family proceedings in
County courts or magistrates’ court for preparation work, for attending at the trla.l or
hearing with and ithout counsel and for preparing the bill: and completing the detailed
assessment.
6
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Table 3 Hourly rates paid for civil legal aid work
Item C
ounty court rate
Care proceedings Preparation work inctudng any work arising out of or
[64.90 per hour
incidental to the proceedings, nterviews with client, witnesses and other ([6820 in London)
parties; obtaining evidence; preparation and consideration of, and dealing
with, documents, negotiations and notices; dealing with letters and
telephone calls which are not routine
Care proceedings Attending without counsel at the trial or hearing
£71.50 per hour
Care proceedings — Preparing the bill and completing the detailed £35.75 £5695 per ho
ur
assessment
Family proceedings - Preparation work £64.80
per hour
([68,50 in London)
Family proceedings — Attending without counsel at the trial or hearing £64.80 pe
r hour
([68.50 in London)
Family proceedings - Preparing the bill and completing the detailed £35.70 £56.95 per
hour
assessment
Source: The LSC Manual, Volume 1. Part B.
7
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Authors:
Any queries about this report should be directed to the authors at
k an Alternatively, queries about this
report or other information available from the ABI can be directed to the Research
Helpdesk at r telephone
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Sent: 28 May 2010 12.46
To
Cc
Subject: ASI Research
Robert.
As discussed, have attached
various research reports which
may assist you have not been
able to track one of the Front
ier reports
down, and our research contac
t is away on AL, but have left a
message with him and hopef
ully can pass this on in d
ue course
Jo,
I’ve looked at your question on
damages but at first blush, I don’t
know if we readily hold that in
formation, lit pass onto our sta
ts team for
follow up.
Rest wishes,
‘,iw sbi org sic
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From:
Sent: 09 September 2010 15:51
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: Jackson speech
Attachments: NERG speech notes - FINAL pdf
Dear Robert
Please find attached FYI a speech I gave yesterday in Leeds covering Jackson.
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London EC2V 7HQ
Phon
Email
Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail.
* ******** * ******** * * ******** ** ****** ** * ****** * ********* *** ******** ***************** ** ********* ******* ************ ****** * *********
BOOK NOW FOR THE FOLLOWING ABI EVENTS:
INVESTMENT AFFAIRS CONFERENCE - 15 SEPTEMBER 2010 - GRANGE STPAUL’S HOTEL, LONDON, EC4A SAJ
BOOKINGS NOW OPEN TO VIEW THE FULL PROGRAMME AND TO REGISTER, VISIT www.abi.org.uk/investmentconference2010
Association of British Insurers, 51 Gresham Street, EC2V 7HQ
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SPEECH NOTES
Check Against Delivery
Address by to the North East Regional Group of Insurance Institutes, Leeds.
8 September 2010
The Changing Face of Personal Injury Claims
Introduction
Thank you for the invitation to speak to you this afternoon. The title of today’s seminar - the
Changing Face of Personal Injury Claims — is particularly well chosen. After many years of
false starts and lengthy debate, we are beginning to see the prospect of real change which is
welcomed by the insurance industry.
This afternoon, I will run through a number of recent developments which insurers see as
changing the nature of personal injury claims.
Firstly, I will talk through the nature of the problem and address the question: why are
personal injury costs increasing for insurers?
Without repeating what talked about earlier, I wanted to say a few words about the
RTA portal.
Then I will turn to the Jackson review — a critical set of proposals for reform which we see as
offering real benefits to insurers and claimants. Without going into too much detail, I will talk
though the recommendations for reform of the civil litigation system put forward by Lord
Justice Jackson in his review published in January.
I would like to say a few words about the ABI’s Code of Practice on Third Party Assistance.
And finally, I will touch on the issues of insurance fraud and what the industry is doing to
tackle this problem.
The Nature of the Problem
I don’t want to bore you with graphs and statistics but if we are to truly appreciate the nature
of the personal injury problem. I thought some numbers and trends might be useful. The fact
is that personal injury claims are expensive and that expense is increasing.
Sut, more importantly, the costs of claims are rising as well. As you can see in the bar charts
on the graph, for accidents occurring in 2002. the industry paid out approximately £7 billion
in personal injury claims, The different colours within each bar signify the numbers of years
taken for he 2002 c aims to he settled some of which have taken and extremely long
flreed The brown section at the top of the frst bar shows those c!airns from 2C02 that have
taken 8 years to sett e1 this is far too ong or claimants to receive the Compensation they
deserve
For the years 2003 onwards, some of the figures have had to be estimated. because there
are still claims from previous years that are yet to be settled. The opaque areas on the chart
shcw he estimated figures raid out by nsurers accord:rg to he trends in creious iears
TO] .v 3CC that tne total cost )f aims increases year by year For xample, tne estlrr3ted
total ,cst to the Ins irance industry of Jaims made in 2009 is approximately £14 hi lion This
s tWiçg the am”unt oa d ory 7 years ear1r n 2P02t
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This graph illustrates very clearly the nature of the problem befo
re us, The insurance
industry is focused on delivering compensation to all legitimate claim
ants fairly and quickly
and without incurring unnecessary cost. Unless motor injuries are twice
as bad as they were
less than ten years ago there are flaws in our compensation sys
tem which must be
addressed
Why are Personal Injury Costs Increasing?
There are two key reasons why personal injury costs are increasing.
Firstly and tragicafly, young drivers continue to cause carnage on Britain’s r
oads. Every day.
four people are killed or seriously injured in accidents involving young driv
ers.
A common misunderstanding is that motor insurance is designed to co
ver the repair costs of
a car involved in accident. Repair costs are far from the biggest cost
for motor insurers. The
main purpose of car insurance is to meet the cost of any claim brough
t against the driver by
a third-party for injury or damage to their property. Claims for injury to
another person can
run to several million pounds.
Many young driver accidents lead to very expensive personal injury
claims for insurers.
Some examples include:
• A young driver, aged 21, who turned his car over whilst carrying a
passenger who
was a budding sportsman. The latter has been left unable to walk and
with severe
brain damage. This was a £6.8m claim.
• A 17 year old driver hit a child pedestrian resulting in an £8m claim.
• An 18 year old driver killed himself and very seriously injured two pas
sengers in his
car resulting in a claim of over LiOm.
All of these cases are tragic. But this latter one demonstrates two key
trends. Firstly,
personal injury claims from young drivers are increasingly expensive. Sec
ondly, and more
generally, it demonstrates that one accident can often result in multiple
personal injury
claims.
The second reason insurers’ personal injury costs are increasing is the dis
proportionally high
legal costs associated with settling claims, Frankly, the personal injury com
pensation system
is dysfunctional and failing. It takes too long to get compensation to claim
ants and the legal
costs of doing so are too high. This just adds insult to a claimant’s injuries.
Again, without wanting to bombard you with numbers, a few statistics dem
onstrate this point.
On average, for every one pound paid in compensation to a claimant, an add
itional 42 pence
is paid in legal costs.
The problem is even more stark in lower value claims.
in claims under £5,000, for evenj £1 paid in personal injury compensation
, claimant lawyers
eceive an additional 88p in legal claims for motor claims. This rises to 93p f
or employers’
liability and public liability claims as the graph shows.
Imese are not seifinterested figures generated by the insurance industry - the
y are the
government’s figures. And although they are now somewhat dated in that t
hey are four years
old, I am sure the figures have only become worse since then not better
.
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One final statistic — I promise!! The International Underwriting Association has estimated that
10% of every motor insurance premium goes to the legal profession. This represents a
market worth over £1 billion.
With all of this in mind, I am going to focus on three developments — the RTA portal, Jackson
and Third party Assistance all of which the ABI believes will have a significant impact in
tackling this problem.
The RTA Portal
As explained earlier, the RTA portal went live on 30 April. Having moved from the
ABI’s European public affairs unit, I took over the team managing the portal’s delivery two
days later. As Ashley explained, and as I am sure many in this room are more than aware,
the portal did not get off to the best of starts. In fact, my first week in the job was spent
understanding what went wrong and fielding calls from claimant lawyers and insurers
frustrated with the new system. As one less charitable colleague said to me: “welcome to the
world of general insurance’.
My focus was to get the system functioning. The team from the MIB took over operational
delivery of the portal and went about fixing the problems. Although the transition to MIB’s
management may have resulted in some extra delays in registrations as the team came up
to speed on the system’s design, I stand by the decision to get the MIB involved. They did an
outstanding job at rectifying problems and getting people registered as quickly as possible.
Within a matter of days most of those who had registered could access the system and
claims were being processed. In short, the system did what it said it would do on the tin. I
would, however, like to offer an apology to any of you who experienced delays and
frustration in those early days.
But the benefits of the new system are clear. It reduces unnecessary legal costs and gets
compensation to claimants more quickly. From the insurance industry’s perspective, the
portal continues to be hugely successful.
The Jackson Review
Moving on to consider the Jackson Review — a subject that has been the subject of a much
debate in the legal, insurance and government sectors since Lord Justice Jackson released
his final report in January.
As I am sure you are aware, in his report Lord Justice Jacksons proposed substantial
reforms to costs in civil litigation matters potentially affecting almost every area of civil
litigation ranging from small personal injury matters to high value complex commercial
litigation
His terms of reference required r,m To cain ut n ndependent review of the rues and
prrrples o’erninq he costs of civil .tigation and to make recommendations in order to
promote access to utCe at proportonate cost.
In his Inal report, Lord Justice Jackson identified and addressed the key questions and
isues impacting upon the current costs of civil litigation. In particular. he asked:
• In hat c’ r imstan’-es shou d the ‘osing party he requ red to pay c etc to the w on nq
party’
• How nd in h3t ircumstancps houd the imount f ny costs poybe by the
smq party e educd or mited?
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• How can the procedural rules be improved so as to reduce the time lawyers need to
spend in the conduct of litigation and its associated cost?
You will see Jackson’s key proposals outlined on the slide. I do not propose to go through
each of these in detail but rather to say a few words on each.
In relation to cost shifting, His Lordship said that the 200-year old “loser pays’ principle
cannot realistically be abolished altogether. He suggested that it could be abandoned in
some areas and replaced by qualified one-way’ cost shifting - whereby successful claimants
would recover their costs but successful defendants would not recover theirs.
On fixed costs for fast track cases, Lord Justice Jackson proposed that a fixed-costs regime
for all fast track cases should be strongly considered. His report recognised that third party
funding of litigation improves access to justice. But he concluded that external regulation of
funders would be needed at some point as the market develops, but that a voluntary funders’
code is enough for now.
I thought it would be worth saying a little more on the issue that seems to be grabbing
everyone’s attention — the non recoverability of success fees and ATE premiums.
Jackson recommended that success fees payable by clients to lawyers under conditional fee
agreements (CFAs) should not be recoverable from the other side if the claimant wins the
case. Similarly, after the event (ATE) insurance premiums should not be recoverable.
Jackson also proposed an increase of 10% to individual claimants’ damages, including
personal injury cases, to enable them to better afford the success fees and insurance
premiums. Clearly, this will have an impact on the total amounts payable by insurers.
I will say a bit more about this later.
The ABI has long campaigned for disproportionate legal costs to be stripped out of the
system. A civil justice system is dysfunctional when it costs £5000 in legal fees to provide
£2000 of compensation to a claimant.
We believe Lord Justice Jackson’s report was a comprehensive, evidence-based and
objective consideration of the civil litigation system as a whole. It took a pragmatic approach
to addressing issues for both claimants and defendants and was undertaken by a senior and
respected member of the judiciary. As such, its recommendations should be given the
weight they deserve.
The ABI has considered very carefully Jackson’s recommendations and undertaken
research to assess their implications. From our perspective, the net impact of Jackson will
be a reduction in the costs of the civil litigation system and an increase in its efficiency.
Aithough it would have been easy for the insurance industry to cherry-pick the parts of
Jackson that NC prefer we sre not playing that game. The ABI’s posit on on Jackson is very
c:ear’ We want the see the J ckson recommendations implemented s a package and in
il. And e would ke to see the government deliver this package n an arnbitous but
eal;stic timeframe,
Implementation of the Jackson recommendations should improve the civil litigation system
for all involved’ the court system itself claimants and their solicitors. And yes. insurers.
The signals ccmrg out f Wnitehal are encouraging. Lord Young s uniertakng a revjew of
heath and safety legislation and has highlighted the problems of the over-interpretation cf
gulations and “xcessively sk-auerse behaviour In addition, Ministers are considering
eform of he legal aid system
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Jackson’s recommendations could form a third tranche of a wholesale package of reform of
the legal system in England and Wales. And in the current economic climate where
government departments are looking to make substantial cost savings, Jackson offers a
number of potentially attractive solutions.
And progress is being made. In July, Jonathan Djanogly, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of
State for Justice, announced an intention to consult this autumn on the implementation of the
Jackson recommendations, especially in relation to Conditional Fee Arrangements. We were
encouraged by this as it signalled that the coalition government is behind the case for reform
of the civil justice system.
But Jackson is just a start - reform needs to go further. We would like to see an early review
of the current level of Guideline Hourly Rates for lawyers in civil litigation. This would
address one of the direct causes of disproportionate legal costs, especially in personal injury
claims where a 30% disparity exists between claimant and defendant lawyer costs.
But one step at a time.
I could not leave the discussion on Jackson without saying a few words about access to
justice.
With claimant lawyers seeking to defend the status quo of disproportionate legal costs and a
dysfunctional system, they often argue that reform would inhibit claimants’ access to justice.
This is a nice, emotive phrase deployed by claimant lawyers to distract people from the real
story. There is no evidence to support the assertion, of course, so it is important to put the
facts on the table.
Normally, suppliers of services have an interest in ensuring that their clients can pay their
charges. Not so claimant lawyers. As Lord Justice Jackson states in his report: “the
[claimantj lawyers will recover whatever they can from the other side”. Of course, this is
usually without reference to the client. The first impact of any reduction in the costs
recovered from a losing party would be on claimant lawyers, not upon the claimant
themselves. The tenuous argument that the Jackson reforms will inhibit access to justice
needs to be seen in this light.
As if this wasn’t enough, an argument put forward by claimant representatives is that the
Jackson proposals would lead to some cases not being taken on by lawyers because the
case had a lower prospect of success. Yet if success fees were not recoverable, they would
still be payable by clients. And if clients are paying, you would expect to see much more
scrutiny of the fees being charged. A competitive market would reduce the level of success
fees and the level of hourly rates charged. And claimant law firms would be forced to
become more efficient
An arurnent that the J3kson oforms .ou d inh!bt lawyers taking on some cases s merely
3n 3njument ii savour of ccntnurq the status uo of a system characterised by perverse
incentives, nefficiency md N3ste The costs of this system are ultimately borne by
taxpayers throuqh a heavy cost burden on local authorities, the NHS and government
departments) and society more generally through higher insurance premiums.
The poirt is that th arrsc to j jtçq mrg.ir”ent ced by camant aws is We more than 3
,moke scr’en to d vert mttent on from the real ssces In effect, t IS an argument that states
Wat amants can oy ‘btain 1stire if the costs of the system remain b’cated and
cssive 3 whi e ttra t e s an amotiva sound bite, the argument that rnform of the ci’ i’t gat on ytem N I can to roduced acces to J’stce has ttle bass n reality
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ABI’s Code of Practice on Third Party Assistance
Leaving Jackson now, I would like to turn to the issue o
f third party assistance. As some of
you will know, earlier this year, the AB launched a
voluntary code of practice for insurers
involved in assisting third parties with personal injury cla
ims.
Again, let’s look at why such a Code is needed. The
reality is that in the vast majority of
personal injury claims, there is actually no dispute ab
out who is liable for the claim. So
compensation should be able to be paid quickly to mos
t claimants and everyone should be
able to move on. But what happens is that lawyers i
nvestigate the detaii of cases adding
unnecessary cost and delay to a process that could — a
nd should - be resolved cheaply and
quickly.
Third party assistance is designed to improve this situat
ion for claimants.
Third party assistance involves an insurer settling a
claim directly with a personal injury
claimant, without the victim receiving independent legal
advice. The purpose of the Code is
to set out how insurers should engage with unrepresent
ed claimants to ensure that they are
treated fairly. The Code makes clear that insurers shoul
d:
• only contact claimants by letter, phone, email or
text. The insurer should never
appear uninvited at the claimant’s home.
• remind claimants at each stage of the process
that they have a right to seek
independent legal advice
• make it clear to the claimant that there is no obl
igation to accept any assistance
offered by the insurer
• make offers or settlements that are fair and reaso
nable and based on appropriate
evidence.
The Code also makes clear that in certain situations
independent legal advice will be
strongly recommended. These include situations where
the injured person is under 18 years
old. where there is complexity as to who was at fault in t
he accident. if the claimant has a
limited understanding of English or where the injury in
volved has a degree of complication,
persistence or permanence.
Not surprisingly, the Code has come in for criticism
from claimant lawyers who insist on
referring to insurers helping claimants in this way as “th
ird party capture”. Cases are cited
where particular claimants have been offered one amou
nt by an insurer yet when legally
represented the insurer settles for substantially more.
Rather than arguing by anecdote, I would prefer to argue w
ith analysis. The ABI’s research
has demonstrated that of over 90,000 personal injury cl
aims between £1,000 and £5,000:
• Claimants without iegal representation receive on average
£289 more than claimants
with ‘egal representation; and
• The time taken to settle claims tthout legal repre
sentation is on average 95 days
shorter
inevitably, claimant awyers will continue to critcise the C
ode with unfounded allegations of
unscrupulous practices by insurers. Yet for some reas
on when asked to provide the
evidence. it isnt forthcoming.
Lots rot forget, that ne claimant awas has the ngnt to
seek ndeperdent legal dvce
when dealing with an nsurer directly We have also pr
epared a claimant guide to Dc
rrovded at the outset ef any cairn process This user fr
’endy u’de s designed to nsure
that the claimant understands the process and their ri
ghts at ach stage Furthermore, the
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FSA has produced a factsheet for insurers selling out their expectations when dealing with
third party claimants.
Trends in insurance fraud
Now turning to insurance fraud trends, I must say that I am not the expert on this topic but I
have been asked to say a few words on the subject. And sorry, there is one final graph!
As you can see, there is a clear upward trend in both the value and volume of detected
insurance fraud in the UK. This expense more often than not has to be passed onto
customers.
Savings made by detecting fraud amounted to £840m in 2009 from 122,000 claims. The
emphasis here is on detected fraud — that is, savings to the industry. On the one hand we
can say that insurers are detecting more fraud. What we do not know accurately is whether
there is more fraud being committed to detect.
Anecdotally I think we all expect there to be more fraud committed as the economy falters.
The recession will certainly be playing its part. But it is very difficult to objectively measure
the effect beyond the underlying trend.
Two particular issues that you may have heard of are the problems associated with “crash
for cash claims and the increasing frequency of whiplash claims.
Looking first at crash for cash. The Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB) estimates around 30,000
accidents were staged last year, costing insurers about £350m in 2009. Crash for cash has
attracted a lot of press attention recently. Indeed, Leeds was confirmed as one of the top
hotspots of this type of activity in the UK. The ABI is very concerned with these scams and
we are working closely with the Insurance Fraud Bureau to monitor this activity and raise
awareness of a crime that increases insurance premiums for honest motorists.
The other issue insurers are concerned about when considering fraud is whiplash which is a
major societal phenomenon. When we published a major report on whiplash in 2008, we
identified that the UK has a greater tendency to get whiplash than the rest of Europe. Since
then, I don’t think that British necks have become any stronger!!
Our research has revealed that over 432,000 people make a whiplash claim every year —
equivalent to one in every 140 people in the UK — and amounting to nearly 1200 claims per
day. And the problem is getting worse so it is no surprise that whiplash now leads to nearly
£2bn per year in compensation payments — accounting for 20% of the typical car insurance
premium, or £66.
Wh Ic insurers have no problem paying qenuine whiplash claims, part of the reason why
Brtish necks seem to be waker than elsewhere n Europe is that the personal injury
c’mpensat or’ system al ows iubio is c aims to be facil tated by claims farmers and otbrs
ivho are exp oit the slow and expensive system
So what are we doing to tackle insurance fraud?
The prPvention and detection of fraud is a priority for the ABI The Insurance Fraud Bureau
as estab shed in 2006 and is ncmasinq in its effectiveness and capabi ity We are
SOdi J ing the or nn emer t o ldtd snaring of known fra idsters
iVr are w )rk nq vith members to orb nr’e the deterrents to mm ttinq rurance ra id Th’s
, a mixkre of ethcatien case stud es n the media to demonstrate that frauthters are m re
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likely to get caught and making it clear that by committing fraud, you potentially severely limit
your future access to insurance and other important financial products.
Professionals, particularly solicitors, are involved in enabling several forms of fraud
, so we
are seeking ways to make it more difficult for solicitors to abuse the system or to
become
unwitting victims themselves.
Insurance fraud is a pernicious act which costs all of us, as honest customers, an ave
rage of
£44 per policy. I for one resent funding their gain.
Conclusion
Campaigning to reform the compensation system is a priority for the ABI. At the heart
of our
proposals for reform are the interests of claimants, Insurers are lobbying for a system
that
delivers fair compensation and early access to rehabilitation while cutting down on
legal
costs that make the system too slow and expensive. The key is proper, swift and full
redress
where there has been harm.
By implementing Jackson in full, the government would go a long way to address
ing these
issues.
Thank you for your time this afternoon and I hope that you found this presenta
tion
informative and I look forward to answering any of your questions.
Thank you.
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Direct Fa
The Rt Hon Kenneth Clarke QC MP 23 September 2010
Ministry of Justice
102 Petty France
London
SW1H 9AJ
4/ /7L
J
i
/
Reforming the Compensation System — A Better Deal for Consumers
I would like to invite you to make some key note remarks at an ABI Parliamentary
reception on personal injury compensation reform on Wednesday 27 October,
entitled “Reforming the Compensation System — A Better Deal for Consumers”.
This event will provide an excellent opportunity for key stakeholders to discuss therecent changes and the possibility of future reform to the personal injurycompensation system, in particular to discuss the recommendations of Lord JusticeJackson as outlined in his recent report on civil litigation costs.
I will say a few words along with a representative from an ABI member company. Wehave also invited the Rt Hon Lord Young to speak. Lord Hunt of Wirral has kindlyagreed to sponsor the event and will give some opening remarks.
The event will take place in Dining Room A of the House of Commons from 12:30pmto 2pm. The audience will consist of MPs from each party and members of the Houseof Lords, representatives from ABI member companies, and other interestedorganisations.
I s’ery much hope that ou are able to join us and deliver the keynote speech. If this isr’ot possible, I would be delighted to extend the invitation to the Parliamentary UnderSecretary of State for Jusflce, Jonathan Djancgly MP
Yours sincerely,
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From:
Sent: 23 september 2010 14:06
To: Wriqht, Robert (CMI Legal Aid)
Cc:
Subject: RE: AS! reception
Attachments: Kenneth Clarke MP reforming compensation systems 23SeptlOpdf
Kenneth Clarke MP
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,
C. ‘rc4’•” p e— iYiirC I ‘ and the rcor,t:ere’
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Page 1 of 2
Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From:
Sent: 29 September 2010 1058
To: Wrioht, Robert (Civ Legal Aid)
Cc:
Subject: Legal Expenses - ATE/STE
Dear Robert,
I wondered if we could please hu a auick chat about ATE/STE insurance policies and legal expenses
insurance generally? I spoke I :esterday and he mentioned that you are now dealing with this and that
his focus has shifted to dealing more with legal aid matters.
The ASl is holding its penodical Legal Expenses Insurance Committee meeting next week and it would be a good
opportunity for us to raise anything that you would like us to ask them.
Do you think that there is anything that you would like us to discuss with our members? If so, it would be good to
talk through it so that can add a point onto our agenda.
Kind reqards.
Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail.
************************************ ******* ************************* ******************************************** *****************
BOOK NOW FOR THE FOLLOWING ABI EVENTS:
Wednesday 20 October — ABI Solvency II Conference in partnership with PWC. To
register, please visit www.abLorgukIsolvencyliconference2010
*4*4** ************************************ ********* *4*4*4*4*4*4*4*4
oc aton of Brt sh insurers 51 ‘3resham Street EC2V IHO
T1 20 ‘8 0 3333 rx 020 8999
tp ivw ioi ‘rg K
ff e’i y d i i d
‘
e I • e e y
2 Tl A e B 11 r N N to j i r II r p n n 1/ F 30/ tenen , ‘l ig r I i to ‘arnatory
atr ae b any erpoye I r i Ffr pr per ii e I her i tea
I I
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Page 2 of 2
3 This footnote confirms that th s email message has been swept by Websense Hosted EMa for the presence of viruses and unacceptab e or
offensive material
The Association also scans all ncomng mai and reserves the rghtto reject and return any material which s considered ether to be a security risk
or o contain unsu tab e mater al
1 his email as receied from the lN1TRET and scanned h the Goernment Secure Intranet anti
\irus ser ice supplied by Cahle&\Vireless Worldwide in partnership ith \lessageLabs. (CCTM
Certificate \urnber 2009i 090052.> In case of problems. please call sour organisations IT helpdesk.
Communications ia the GSi may he automatically logged, monitored and or recorded for legal
purposes.
c, t
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Page 1 ot3
Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From:
Sent: 29 September 2010 17 50
To: Wright. Robert (Cwil Legal Aid)
Subject: Re. Personal n;ury event
Ti ma a sc.fui Jam. mass, a a a te:’aai aeaiss cm tic a men tn cc alarm a1 w:’ii a ya:. a ‘n
From: Wnght, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
c.i- Penteniher 29, 2010 05:06 PM
Subject: RE: Personal injury event
inst to kewo you cnfcrm’sd, I understand we wont act a m.arster,al msbonse mcd at CaSt Monday 1.1 October wen they are hack horn thecoafererane)
Robed
From: D
Senh 29 September 2010 13:24
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: Re: Personal injury event
Noted and fhaakt. Cbviausty cisc. caner tue better 1mm our perspective so we can send invites.
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Sent: Tuesday, September
To
Cc
Subject: RE: Personal injury event
We are stck vorkcng on ttss th Private offices Mcnwters are now unlikely to be around until after the Conservative conference rce’rt sock so t nay he
that we mc)) not he abe to contrrn anti then
Robert
From
Sent: 28 September 2010 11:52
To: Vlr)ght, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: Personal njury event
Soher’t
mist a ‘m$ note to ‘oTow up on our email eschange set week SOoiog:es that cite etter to .icathan Ojanoqiy tcck so cap In pet aver tolou.
Have you heard anything from his office about his avaitabitity? H/e need to send out the cnviiat:ons its ‘—e
ci cssshcsm Street
[“0
Pissacce acaviser cisc srrr’.arcnmesrt bcstore hnincinn tins commit,
(i.’l 1 /“°fll I
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Page 2 of 3
SOOX NOW FOR THE FOLLOWING
AS! EVENTS:
Wednesday 20 October — ABI Solv
ency II Conference in partnership wit
h PWC, To register, please visit
www.abLorg.uklsolvencyflconfe
rence2Olo
Assoctation of Brtsh ttsurers. 51 Gresham
Street EC2V 7H0
Tel: 020 7600 3333 Fax 020 7696 8999
t. The nforma000 transmitted ntend
e,I only for the 5erscn Or entity a
wttlCl. is addressed and ray contai
n confidential and/on pnuiieged ma
tenat.
Sny revew -efransrnisslon Os
sermnaton or ether isa of Or ab
ng Cf any action it tel-anne upon this
in’forrnation by persons ci- entities othe
r than the ntended recipIent 3 proh
ibited. If you recessed
thIs In ernon, rilease ct/of Sot the sen
der and delete the tnatersst from
any computer.
2. ttite Assoctation of tintisfi Insurers
wilt not ce IlCOle to you -Or any other p
erson or entity to, airy statement
noisdIng but not -mited to defamatory stat
ements made by any emo’oyee actin
g Outside the
OrSper Course Of heir duhes
3 This footnote nnnttrtns that tnis
email message ira, been swept 0y
Websense frosted ti-Mait for be presenc
e Of nirases and unacceptable or affen
siue inatenal
The Association also scans alt incom
ing mail, and w,eores the rght to reject
and return airy material ciuicit -s cons
idered ether to be a securIty risk or to c
ontain crtsitablo nrstenal
Ibis email stias receiired from the INTERN
ET and scanned by the Government Secu
re Intranet antivirus service supplied b
y
Cahle&Wireless Worldwide in partnership
with MessageLabs. (CCTM Certificate
Number 2009/09i0052. In case of problem
s, please call
your organisation s IT Helpdesk.
Communications Ga the GSi may he auto
matically logged, monitored and/or record
ed for legal purposes.
This e-mail 1arid any attaohm
en[t) Is ontondel only for t
he attention ci
aidressee s) . Its wuthor
rsed use, disclosure, stor
age or copyrng
is not permitted. If you
are nor the ontented recip
ient, please destroy all
co-noes and inform toe sen
der by return e-mail.
Internet e-mail is not a
secure nedium. An reply to t
his message
oould he mt cepted sod read by sorte
one else. Please hearthat
in
rtind when deco iingsr.etr-er t
o send c.a’:erra! in respo
nse to thos :nessase
This c—nail whether you a
re the sender or the reo
rpient) may be
monItored, recorded and re
tained by the Ministry
f Justioe. It-trail
:tonitorrns / blocking sof
tware may be used, and e
-mail content may be
read at any time. you have a
resnonsihility
l ensure laws are not
broken when oomoosing or
forwardinq c—mails and the
ir oomtents
The original of this email was scanned tbr
‘.iruses by the Goernment. Secure Intrane
t virus scanning service supplied
Isv Cable&Vs ire less
Worldwide in partnership with ytessareloth
s. (CC FM Certificate Number 200
9/09/0052.) on leaving the 051 this email was
certified virus
free.
Cemtnunicatiens cia the (aS i may be au
tt.ttnaticail) logged. monitored md/or reco
rded for legal purposes.
Click [tore to roport this email as sparn.
Thiy omall wa.y received from the fNT[/.R
NFT and scanned by the Government Soc
ure lt:tr:cnet ami-vlrs.ms -ervioe .surnlied by
C.abk&Wireioss Worldwide in partnersh
ip with hles.ssgeLahs. iCCTM Certi0cate
Nutntr 2009/09/0052d In oar-co F trroolems.
please o.a.ll
o our orOafltsatiitt s If I lelpdesk
Comtnunicattons vta the (151 may be :tu
tomatteatly logged, monitored and/or reco
rded for legal purposes.
OOt I. .02- . •0001 /Ot
rar-t- s:-nt ) .rs eo: eec only
too tho. at ted. .LOfl 10
he aidresa-eeLs.) . its •.ar:a/00
200.tsaO 150 di..000 -05 Ira
, s.t2ra/.:: 1: 0000-//0 0
r. eth i.f-n-eri it10 .aendeo
ho .re0002 a----mai
ooold be inte.roaoted .o1d r
ead S y sorte 0:0 aJLo.e . E-
lsae bs.a .0 •ti: a
.: •./.s-oroi r•u whet.ha.r 00/ sec
t) 1:/ate o a 1 III 05510 o:tse 0-0-- 0
.111/1 crsaaaOe
-nail.
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Page 3 ot3
ii r e rir r tiyb
r1r 1, r JI ri
‘r t41- 1/ i,
I he nnjnaI tthi email as eaiined hr irues h the Goernment Sectire Intranet irus ccanmng efl cc upphed h (ahle&\\ reIe
ide in rarlnership tith \leagel abs. ( ( I \l (ertiticate Number tii) O) 0u52.i On !ea ing the (Si this ema I w a certified iru,
free.
(ommutiication, ia the (ibi may be automatically loeged, monitored and/or recorded for legal purposes.
I ht email o i receis ed 1mm ‘he IN I I RN F I and anned by the (io emment Secure Intranet anti ms ser ice Nupplied by
t ahie&Vs re!ecc \Vorldside in partnership siith \lessacel abs i(( I \l ( eritticate Number flfl9 fl) iiO52. In ease problems. pIeie
‘ur rgLnisitft,n II I lelrdek.
t amn in cation, a the Si ii a be ai toniat ica I k loged_ mon tored and r rec’rdeJ tar legal purposes.
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Page 1 of 3
Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From:
Sent: 3 October 2010 1729
to: Vlngtit, Robert iCol Legal Ad)
Subject: Re ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS PARLIAMEN
TARY RECEPTION INVITATION - 27 OCTOBER 2010
From: Wright, Robert (CMI Legal Aid)
nt- tJn”” October 13, 2010 Ub:tJ PM
Subject: RE: ASSOCIATION OF BRiTISH INSURERS - PARLIA
MENTARY RECEPTION INVITATION 27 OCTOBER 2010
just tried cating am sorry to cay that nether Ken Clarke nor Jonath
an DanogIy is able to attend this reception, As you know, we we
re keen to
assst, But ou t understand tnat the nest few eeks .n p3ff cuia
r are fioredhly busy for rrnsters and lam afraid that 1 nas not bee
n possble at this
tone
Best wshes
From:
Sent 30 September 2010 18:02
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: FW: ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURERS - PARLIAMENTARY RECEPT
ION INVITATION - 27 OCTOBER 2010
I hope the on nrdirg a
Aononurfjn’n f SWish rsurens
51 (Cresham StrOCt
London EC2V ‘750
Sent: 30 September ?fltfl 1510
Subject: ASSOCIATION OF BRItISH INSURERS PARLIAMENTARY REC
EPTION INVITATION - 27 OCTOBER 2010
conuhi lOre to no ‘nj t vprd rOe ASIc P nria’nvrrfary ‘ecvrjtorr
on Reforr”irnu Hr ronne,nceto’n -- 7
Couu,rnrs on Wednesda.y 27 October 2OiO, the event is heir cr.po
rted by PS insurance.
lonere i-cn been ccoorh recent hones c rOe no-co ci Or i-mu
rrrnenrjr’un rtem nd i numh-r of f rrH--r r-f rn’s sccee.sted.
particuiar the recommend•atic.ns of Lord Justice Jacks.oWs recent repOrt on civil
tgat.lOn cocts, We believe these reforms wIll improve
Onrornes fr r cm rrsu mOrOi .r minor ci, fin p and
,orrHi, the rom -‘-‘- nation .c mc oem
Lord Hunt of Wirral has kindly apreed to host thin e icint Lord Y
oung, :.NhO has been conductin.e, a review of health and safety
laws on
be half of hon Sc” 00 rrrmnei A, ii coos sOr .j . eve nt..,s nd.s 7. . ,c
itro of oboe i. r’ woo h as a so iron rrvited to 53’ i fecnic, ord s. i
n a ddirion,,
Tire event coil take Gary in Cdi
. ScornS of the ho sooT Ccnnr on con ‘om 2. .10 to Torn, iTo: a
union so mill cons of rs:t fmmnrn 0 nc
party arrd members of the House of Lords, represccotani’nes Horn
ye ‘Oici her coon oanie.s, amnO mOSer interostoni or’nfan:sabons.
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Page 2 of 3
Association of British Insurers
Ptease consider the environment before printtng this ernait.
BOOK NOW FOR THE FOLLOWING ABI EVENTS.
Wednesday 20 October — ABI Solvency Ii Conference in partnership with PWC, To register, please visitwww.abi.org.uklsotvencyflconference2ol 0
Assoctation of British Insurers, 51 Gresham Street EC2V 7HQ
Tel 020 7600 3333 Fax: 020 7696 8999
pfithwth ab DG uk
i rhe ,rrforn’atroo transmrtted rs ntended n-dy for the person or entry to wtbch 0 %s addressed and may contaao rorrhdentrat ann-or pnutteged materiat.
Arty -Crew rettarsmrssron, -jisse-reatron or other use ,f Cr fakrrg Of any actron in n-hence upon. ft-ri riformatron by Demons or entree other than the n-ended redDen? 5 crohrb:ted 0 you recededtys in error please contact the sender and derete the matenat from any computer
2 rye Assocrabon of Sin-sb insurers cr0 not be habte to you or any other cemson or entity for any statement cudrq but -nt rimmed to detamatsry statements made by sty nmpoyee attrg outside t°ecorer course of her tut:eS
3 This footnote coin-rn-s that this en-art message has been swept by Websense Hosted 2-Mart for the presence of un-sea and unaccectabte Cr ot’ensrce matenai
the Assocatron duo scans arm nccmrng mart, arC n-serIes me nyrt to -eject and n-turn any matnr!at arch s zcns4ered en-er to Ce a secrlnty ‘Sb or to ::crtain unsurabe materat
Fitly email was received from the lNTERlFT and ccanned by the Government Secure intranet anti-s irus service oupplied byCable&°A ireless \Votr!dyside in partnership ssith \lcssageLabs. 1CC 1 \-1 Certificate \unrber tIfJ9. 1)0 11052j lit case srfprohlemc, please callc fur organisation s IF Ielpdeok.
(frmmmunrcatismns ta the (iSI may I-c automaocallv logged, monitored and/or recorded fur legal purpses
Th.is e-nnal 1 •ani any attacnment) is intended only n-r the s5er:jH-oi of
—
rn osrlttzen ye a are no t.hie ant ended .reeii. :Lenrrr please aestroy- an.
and inform the sender by return e—mail -
ha interce/oreni ann read by some ne else ii iuut beer C-hz:-
0 — 05 n.e -
iTO-ri JiCIr reco.rec and -Cub5iryj be t.be dines r toy of Jdati as -
ito flIT: -or no 1 b.iec I so I h-es air .0 CC u-ed r an: tt.S Ca I nit
C(5flfluifl 0 .r Si.c:i 0nC e---ma ,.. 5 and t: be.r, r ann rzetts -
o tr n by - it mt j r to to hr to- t rr C uL. s rt ml I to Is tf I t t u. 0 r ft r
t I r
Cumrnumnie mItoith :1 the (PSi tnav be automatically logged. tuontlorird and. c- r reer miLd tdr meal ptlmp-cmt-cs.
iY/l I /dfll I
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Click hcrc to rcport this email as spam.
[his cmail as rece ed from the IS 1 ERSE I and scanned by the Government Secure Intranet anti-virus sen ice supplied h
Cablc&\ Ireless WorldGde in partnership tbMes5aeelah . (C( INI Certiticate Number 2ou9U)Ofl52. In case of problems. please call
our urganisations II 1 leipdesk.
Communications ia the GSi ma be automatically logged, monitored andior recorded tbr legal purposes.
:-11,
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From:
Sent: 07 January Lull u:iu
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: 19th January 2011
Robert .- further to our conversation of yesterday evening, I promised to provide you withdetails of those who have committed to our morning meeting on the 19th in Westminster Thevenue is to be One Whitehall Place.
The attendees are as follows:
This is a total of 9 insurers, the MIB and the NHSLA. I have already excluded two peoplemyself where we had more then one representative per company.
In addition. from ABI were attend ing may agree todrop this to one to assist
a so ‘e ii eraf of Koq’s ie are therefore ck’ at an3ud ence of 15
the above are b ghly enqaged ii he process have been for some jears and will aH haie act o say and dscuss wth he Mirtster
e sseo’c ed at Qe ter’a Pace ani f ‘ ss ts r cms af0. d’na a cm fc t s then we ouid be 1elqhted to hnst the Mmster and be an arc e:“1 cave as ots s arj V s s ct ce’ et -en “cvcusy we aq “me “ MOi
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I have a longstanding relationship with B
eachcroft and have worked with Lord Hunt
and
over a number of years and would be hap
py to liaise I co-ordinate with them
on this.
I look forward to hearing from you - I am i
n London both next Tuesday and Wedn
esday and
would be happy to attend for a short mee
ting to discuss further or I am sure we c
an progress
by email / telephone.
With kind regards,
Keoghs LLP
Save Paper Do you realty need to print
this emait?
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Page 1 of 2
Wright. Robert Civil Legal Aid)
From: 2Jrql-t C nun Cc )rc,hA I
Sent:
To:
-
_- DC T
- %
-.
..- -‘,
C •3- -“a -‘ -.-a
From
Sent: 30h4mth C1t 18)2
To: Wrc’t, Insert C.tt Legal sd)
Subject: Rb oday s announcements
—--1r:”a-, --r-e- t”oa e1
- I c n --r set 2ay 1 lCD -C -t t -)r C It -—““ C--ar 1C - ICC €-‘tr C
From: Wrght, Robert Ctvil Legal Ad)
0111 10:13
Subject: cc. io,yS announcements
a ItO-s noded -een )U ta a ant y
a-” vay ‘-t’ a t’ e t- 1 --;3 COo aCrt rCrr ty -‘--t “-a -‘--a JaIls °‘ -\rtr It 1r. at at “‘a aI
3.351 v.vC’c
From:
Sent: 29 Mdrch 201 117 14
To: Wrtqht, R”bert tvrl I egat Ad)
Subject: Todays announcements
Rc0ert
arC sure ou nave r’ad a susy -Couple of weeKs but just wanted to dm0 you a -ne to say we 3l read all the papers di gently over the nest Couple of days but Justwanted to Ct you trat the nit a) react-on a very pos bye
Cress 3teC’ent a “CrC
t’ a,uwtn 3aIMI3FCIIS- 1i’ — -el* 3”) mr -311 +CV jj aI3 -t ‘‘a ‘rjaI”) Ci arq a-i lra a
r3an n
Jpconttag 3f31 C,CfltS
I I ‘I,,* I
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I Cr’ereoce 2’a Je d1 I
T er,ur rpstuset
AB, F ar a Mee a Aads Noeruer t I
F rtt çer crsr p ar’d abC raS p eme me
g
Page 2 of 2
hm email “as reced from the lNItR\h I and amicd
h the (oerrrntent Secure Imrarret .tnttIrLc erce cuppttd
h ( hk&Sitetss \ocd den partrrershrp
h \1 eaee[ ah Ct [\l CrIi ticate \ nler t) 0
ease it problems please cal I ‘ui or neitlr’rl s If Icr pds.ds
inmun cat ms a the (,St ‘rta he autoirati5l In ed nmiored
ansi or resurded tdr era] purpees
Ike origittal oHhis email em scanned Fir sirrise, hs the ticrserninen
t Secure Intranet lrus caniiing semice supplied be Cahle&W
ircless ‘Asrtdeide ii partuerhrp
with MessaceLabs ((CTM Ceriiticate Number’
1] 091)052 ) flit leasing the USI this email was cert
ified strus free
Commuitteations sta the (iSi ma be autoinaltealls looted. montto
red andor recorded for coal pursses
i lis.k trete to report this email as spam
I his mail em recets ed from the IN II RSi F attd scanned l’s the tie
s ernment Sesere lrttranet antos Tm ers ice suppi ed b
I able&’A ircies ‘A srrldsside re partnership
wh MesageLabs c( C 151 Certificate Number 20t .909 01 52 lIe case of problem
s, please call iour ordanisatlon s IF Helpdesk
I inmuttis atti nc a the C St mas he autontaticall Iriroed. monitore
d and, or recorded for lesal purposes
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Page 1 of S
Fm.
Sent 14 April 2011 1637
To:
Cc: Taylor. Jo L
Sutject RE. Referral fees - ABI views
I have h id a chance to liaise with various of our members and have outlined some more information below:
Referral fees are received by insurers in a variety of ways. Here are a number of e’amples:
• If i claimant is involved in a motor accident through no fault of their own and sustains an injury, their
motor Insurer may sell on the details of the claimant (as their policyholder) to a claimant solicitor. The
claimant solicitor will pay a referral fee to the Insurer for the introduction of the claimant.
• Legal expences insurers also receive referral fees through the operation of STE Insurance. If a
policyholder wishes to make a claim on their STE insurance, the insurer will engage a solicitor to act for
the cblmant. The solicitor will pay a referral fee to the legal expenses insurer for the instruction.
The solIcitor absorbs the cost of the referral fee as part of the cost of dealing with the claim. The referral fee Is
recovered from the defendant, and consequentially their insurer, as part of the solicitor’s fees, contributing to
the claimant’s legal costs. The referral fees therefore go full circle through the insurance Industry — being
received by and paId for by insurers. The payment of referral fees affects all consumers as they increase the legal
costs associated with settling claims, which is reflected in increased premiums, especially ror motor insurance.
UK consumers pay £2.7m a day to the legal profession through their motor insurance premiums — or £41. per
policy. A large bulk of this is due to the payment of referral fees — referral fees which we say do not contribute to
the value of the legal services offered to the claimant and If anything fuels the idea of a compensation culture
that permits unmeritorious cl3lms.
As I already mentioned below, insurers want referral fees to be banned despite the fact that many insurers
currently receive these fees. rompetition law prevents insurers agr€’eing collectively to stop selling claims and
rccelvlng the referral fee income. Understandably, there is no incentive, therefore, on any firm to top receiving
referral fees and there are substantial disadvantages to being the first-mover in terms of reduced income. The
only solution for our members is for the Government to legislate against this practice which is why we are keen
to see this happen
Ii term of the impact upon the i e f TF ir 5w inc S ef ‘rralf C • I’ ins d — aI’hnush e rsn lot a1 for
•rt.iin whit i i,gt’rs uNdo I ‘al > i t, a urn ire -ri c eai ii 3 e.ntheuptak.. cfPTE
tiLer ‘r.ce id a.’ hex. 4.1 itt tI’ec ‘1. i’d. h*’:.as to i.e r ,li.t p101’ to r nn.i ii rnqyi. viii nc” i •je
e .h4’ ‘, . 131 a. 7 ..a4 t J. flfl’fl .2 iii,. I ••,lf-a1,.ftfl :l w.nc’. ..n”rit’.—’. :id
H.e .‘*pt
.,fl.t.0 i.—.1j . r_l__1? r P..p.j hg . • r., .t’,.’.r a tea
b ‘4t3 IL tt’ a ‘3 f vt ntr i - ga ii •i r’th’ll*r’p)tari tie b
•i h i R1,ri Pj
jI ‘1.1.1, ‘ad L’.t fl*ar .nJ to’ ..‘ sn.- f ,, j .J en mr’l4$r9t’n ‘ei ,“ f bs ‘b:n-’.
iy • 4
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Page2of5
From:
Sent: 07 April 2011 14:51
To: Taylor, Jo
Cc:
Subject: FW: Referral fees
Hi Jo,
Just forwarding my holding email to see below) — got her out of office and wanted to keep you in the loop.
Will respond to you as soon as possible and please feel free to give me a call if you’d like to discuss anything.
Kind regards,
Association of British Insurers
wLilc
From:
Sent: 07 April 2011 11:34
To:
Subject: RE: Referral fees
Hi
Apologies for the delay — am liaising wdh our members about this, I shall get back to you as soon as I can.
Kind regards.
w’:w abi orq uk
From:
Sent: 05Apr11 2011 11:41
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: Referral fees
Ty for your reoiy Ore :nng e are keen o understand a how nsurers use referral fees and n oarbcu’ar what
the rnpact on the use of BIE :nsurance wouo ce f referral fees were bannea? Grateful for any ght you may be
able to shed on this
regards
From:
Sent: 04 April 2011 16:02
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: Referrai fees
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Page 3 of 5
Thanks for your email and good to hear from you. I am very well thanks, hope you are too? No doubt you and yourcolleagues are very busy with all of the Jackson related issues - as we are!
The ABI has a very strong position on referral fees - we believe that referral fees should be removed to ensurelegal costs are reset at proportionate levels without affecting access to justice. As you will be well aware,disproportionate costs are at the heart of the Jackson reforms and we believe that referral fees are an integral partof the current problem
Put simply, insurers want referral fees to be banned. This is despite the fact that many insurers receive thesefees, and competition law prevents insurers agreeing collectively to stop selling claims and receiving the referralfee income, The only solution for our members is for the Government to legislate against this practice. We wereencouraged by the Government’s endorsement of Common Sense, Common Safety where Lord Young, on page22. stated It is my firm belief that the government should adopt Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals as soon aspossible’. It follows that this includes a ban on referral fees. We were also pleased to see that pages 3 and 29 ofthe Chancellor’s Budget published on 23 March also confirmed the Government’s commitment to implementingLord Young’s proposals.
We believe that the issue of referral fees is fundamental and that it is imperative, for the benefit of consumers andclaimants, that the recommendations of Lord Justice Jackson is seen as a whole. We think that the key is toensure that proposals are not looked at in isolation and that the Jackson package is kept intact. The ABI wasdelighted to see the Governments commitment to implementing the vast majority of Jackson’s reforms,but we would also like to see a ban on referral fees to complete the package.
We have written to Jonathan Djanogly to highlight our concerns in this regard (please see attached). We have alsowritten to Chris Grayling to make him aware of our position on this following his announcement that he will beleading on the implementation of the Lord Young’s health and safety proposals (which contains a number ofinsurance related recommendations and which we wholeheartedly support).
For further and more detailed information, I also attach the ABI’s submission to the Legal Services Board inresponse to their consultation last year (this is the same document as Annex A of the ABI’s response to theMinistry’s consultation on Jackson).
I’d be more than happy to discuss this in more detail with you/your colleagues if you would like to talk through thisfurther, either on the telephone or in person. My direct dial is below so please don’t hesitate to drop me a line ifyou have any questions.
Kind renards
From
Sent 01 Anr,i )flii 36
To
“eerrai
R
Hope i’at 1cu are Cil ‘tie sa•v we ABI S cress eease filIorg
r b ie 3t on of te Govemmeot S resporse to The Jackson onsultat on
,Sny nfo’rnation you are aoe to cro’de on tre ABI’s pcsition on
referral fees would be welcome
ttp wwv abi org uk,MeaaReleases,2O11O3,’Govemrnentianstoreform
qol sjstm tiV ireon a ret:er Jeaior JenJ’necamants andnsirance
,stcmers says toe ARI awx
Thonks
P’s e-mail (and any attachment .s ntended only for the attenhon of
II ‘iii I
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Page4of5
the addressee(s). Its unauthorised use, disclosure, stor
age or copying
is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient, please
destroy all
copies and inform the sender by return e-mail.
Internet e-mail is not a secure medium Any reply to this messa
ge
could be intercepted and read by someone else. Please b
ear that in
mind when deciding whether to send material in respons
e to this message
by e-mail
This e-mail (whether you are the sender or the recipient) m
ay be
monftored, recorded and retained by the Ministry of Justice. E-
mail
monitoring / blocking software may be used, and e-mail con
tent may be
read at any time. You have a responsibility to ensure laws a
re not
broken when composing or forwarding e-mails and their co
ntents.
The original of this email was scanned for viruses by the Governm
ent Secure Intranet virus scanning service
supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with
MessageLabs. (CCTM Certificate Number
2009/09/0052.) On leaving the GSi this email was certifie
d virus free.
Communications via the GS1 may be automatically logged, m
onitored and/or recorded for legal purposes.
Please consider the environment before printing this e-mai
l.
Association of British Insurers, 51 Gresham Street, EC2V 7HQ
Tel: 020 7600 3333 Fax: 020 7696 8999
http://www abi orguk
Upcoming ABI events:
ABI Biennial Conference. 22nd June 2011, Riverbank Park
Plaza Hotel, 18 Albert Embankment,
London, SE1 7TJ
Bookings now open. To register, please visit www.abi.org
.uk/abibiennial201 1
/‘Rl Financial Media Awards 3rd November 2011.
For award sponsorshIp and table enquiries please emaIl events@abf
org Uk
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to cant n unsuitab’e mateha
This email was received from the INTERNET and scanned by the Government Secure In
tranet anti—virus
service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM Ce
rtificate
Number 2009/09/0052.) In case of problems. please call your organisation’s IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the GS1 may be automatically logged, monitored andor recorded for leg
al purposes.
This e—mail and any attachment is intended only for the atte
ntion of
the addressees) . ics unaurharised use, disclosure,
storage or copying
is not nermitted. If you are not the intended recioient, p
lease
desrou a7i
copies and inform the sender by return e—mail.
Internet e—mail is not a secure medium. Any reply to this
message
could be intercepted and read by someone else. Please bear
that in
mind when deciding whether to send material in response to
this
message
by e-mail.
This e—mail (whether you are the sender or the recipien
t) may be
monitored, recorded and retained by the inistry of Ju
stice. s—mail
monitoring / blocking software may be used, and e-mail conten
t may be
read at any time. You have a responsibility to ensure
laws are not
broken when composing or forwarding c—mails and their cont
ents.
The original of this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet virus sc
anning
service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with Messagehabs. (CCTM Certific
ate
Number 2009/09/0052.) On leaving the GSi this email was certified virus free.
Communications via the GS1 may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded tbr leg
al purposes.
Click here to report this email as spam.
This email as received from the INTERNET and scanned by the Government Secure Intranet
anti-virus
service supplied by Cahle&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with \IessageLabs. (CCTM Certific
ate
Number 2009/09/0052.) In case of problems, please call your organisation’s IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the GSi may be automatically Jogged, monitored and’or recorded ftr legal
purposes.
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Page 1 o13
Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid>
From:
Sent: 13 May 2011 17:09
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Cc: Taylor, Jo L
Subject: RE. Yesterdays meeting at Petty France
Attachments: Consultation Response - Referral fees - final.pdf
Robert
Yes sorry — please see attached
Will Take sure that the Trancport Select Committee Report in particular the recommendation on paragraph23) is on tie agenda for our next meeting
Have a good weekend and see you then
Kind regards.
General Insurance and Health Directorate
www.abiorg.uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid) [mailto:
Sent: 13 May 2011 17:03
To:
Cc: Taylor, Jo
Subject: PE: Yesterdays meeting 3t Petty France
rrs ‘c -c ci :a 2tC “e r’ r .ererro erd s 1orspoose to the [ B corsu tat n r af al aes It Nould aao be irte est rg o ee at tour asoonse ts to“-e Tarsport C’ire Rnrt as Jscussed hut we on aIk ancut tatcn 24th I ock forvard to scene1ou tnen
2
From:
Sent: 13 lay 2011 169
To: ivright Robert (Cvl [egal 4d; Tlyicr, Jo L
Cc:
TI 21)11
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Page 2 o3
Subject: Yesterday’s meeting at Petty France
Dear Robert and Jo,
t was good to see you both yesterday morning an
d to talk through the items on our agenda.
t was encouraging to hear that we share the s
ame views on the claimant lobby’s access to justi
ce arguments
and undesirable behaviours being driven by claim
s management companies. Indeed, these views
are not only
the insurance industry s but those of all compensators
that we have spoken to including various local
authorities and, whict confirmed in ou
r meeting. the NHSLA.
We are continuing with our efforts to ensure th
at this message is not lost on members of the pu
blic and that it
is more widely understood that these proposals can
have a positive impact upon insurance premium
s. As we
discussed, the rising cost of motor insurance is
in the forefront of everyone’s minds and we believe
that
Jackson’s proposals could benefit consumers witho
ut affecting the rights of genuine claimants.
As we mentioned, the missing piece of the puzzle
, for us, is a ban on referral fees. Claims managem
ent
companies use the current system to allow costs to
be injected into the compensation system with
out adding
any value to the claimant. It also drives undesirable
behaviour and encourages claims that should not
be
brought. Insurers make no secret that they receive
these fees and, as I mentioned, greater transparenc
y is
something which the industry can work towards but
the ideal position, for the reasons above and tha
t we
discussed, would be to remove them altogether.
The insurance industry would be very keen to engage
in how
this might work in practice.
Of equal importance is the issue of fixed fees and t
he hourly rate. We cannot support a system that
can factor
in up to 75% of the costs just to reflect a completely di
s-proportionate acquisition cost. By reducing the
fixed
fee, you will bring some commercial reality into play
and referral fees will be driven down by market fo
rces as
there will be less ‘fat” in the system.
We will contact our local authority contacts to discus
s the QOCS drafting issue; this is, we understand,
of
qreat interest to all compensators so as to avoid a “
have a go” culture. We would very much like to be
‘iolved in any discussions in this regard and we belie
ve that we have much to contribute to the debate.
Thanks again for your time yesterday and do let me
know if you have any further questions. As you
mentioned yesterday Robert, nd I have a m
eeting with you scheduled for
24th May and we look
forward to seeing you (and hopefully you too, Jo) th
en.
Kind regards,
General Insurance and Health Directorate
.wiw abi org.uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
L ndon
EC2V 7HQ
Fortncornng Events
BI B ennial Conference 22nd Jine 2011 Riverbank
Park Plaza Hotel 18 Albert Embankment
London SE1 7TJ
Bookings now open To register please visit .vww bi
org uk zibibienrl201 1
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ABl Financial Media Awards 3rd November 2011.
For award sponsorship and table enquiries please email Eventsabiorg.uk
1 The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidentat and/or privileged
materTal.
2 Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of. or taking of any action in reliance upon, this nformation by persons or entities other
than the ntended recipient is prohibited, It you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.
3. The Association of British Insurers will not be liable to you or any other person or entity for any statement including but not limited to defamatory
statements made by any employee acting outside the proper course of their duties.
4. This footnote confirms that this email message has been swept by Websense Hosted EMail for the presence of viruses and unacceptable or
offensive material.
5. The Association also scans all incoming mail, and reserves the right to relect and return any material which is considered either to be a security
rSk or to ccntain unsuitable material
This email was received from the INTERNET and scanned by the Government Secure Intranet anti-
virus service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM
Certiticate Number 2009 09OO52.) In case of problems. please call your organisation’s IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored andior recorded for legal
purposes.
This e-rrail tand any attachment) is intended only for the attention
or
the addressee (s) . Its unauthorised use, disclosure, storage or
copy i n g
is nor permitted. if you are not the intended reciPient, please
destroy all
copies and inform the sender by return e—mail.
Internet e-mail ..is not a secure medium. Any reply to this message
could he intercepted and read by someone else. Please bear that in
mind when deciding whether to send material in rosnonse 00 this
me s sage
coe—mal.
Thi.s e-rr,.ail (whethe.r you are the sender or the recipient) may hr.
monitored, recorded and retained b’ the Ministry of Justice * E—mai I
broken when compo .s ing or for’rardi e ‘-mai Is arid their ccsotent s.
The ori.cinal of this e•maii was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intraret virus cannine
service suppLied by Cahle&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with \4essaeeLabs. CCTM
C rtitft ite \umn,r 20tj P0 Cu2 fln L t H g thL GSi this email a is LLrtltLLd irus tree
C oimnunicatlons ta flit. (j’l m\ h.. imorn itiL ll ltratd monieorcd md or re,ordLd tc’r L_a1
‘irpo ses.
This email was received from the iNTERNET and sc.anned by the Govern.meflt Secure lnt.ranet anth
virus service supplied by Cabie& \ irdess in partnershi p with Mes.sageL abs. (( FM
Number 5”fliiQ i/O. rllO In case ut’ us -h1em. p!ease call mnir uroanisarionb { I ieipdesk.
f,omniunwations via the (iSi tna\ he automatically logged, monitored and.or recorded for legal
purposes.
1 ‘0!
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Asociation of British insurers
Legal Services BoarcPs Consultation Paper — Referral fees, referral arrangements and
fee sharing
Response from the Association of British Insurers
1. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) is the voice of the insurance and investment
industry. Its members constitute over 90 per cent of the insurance market in the UK and
20 per cent across the EU. Employing more than 300,000 people in the UK alone, it is an
important contributor to the UK economy and manages investments of £1.5 trillion, over
20% of the UK’s total net worth.
Introduction
2. This is the ABI response to the Legal Services Board’s (LSB) consultation exercise in
relation to the regulatory treatment of referral fees, referral arrangements and fee
sharing.
3. The ABI’s interest in referral arrangements stems from a number of perspectives. We
have an interest, as users of the civil justice system, in ensuring that access to justice is
achieved at proportionate cost. Some of our members are defendant compensators, who
ultimately foot the bill for referral fees, whilst some (including those same defendant
compensators) act as intermediaries and receive referral fee income.
4. More generally, the ABI believes that reform is urgently needed to limit unnecessary
costs in the civil litigation system — excessive legal costs for both claimants and
defendants and disproportionate litigation costs for the Government. We believe that the
costs should be proportionate to the issues and sums involved. We fully support the
recommendations of Lord Justice Jackson (as endorsed by Lord Young) and have
always maintained the position that a positive outcome for claimants, defendants, and
consumers would be the implementation of Jackson’s recommendations as a package
and in full.
5. The ABFs response is restricted to the issue of referral fees for personal injury claims.
This response does not comment on the operation of referral fees for conveyancing
transactions or criminal advocacy.
Summary of the ABIs Response
6 The Consumer Panel and LSB have suggested that there is no compelling case for
hannnq referril fees. The ABl does not agree w.th this assessment.
7 The payment of referral fees comes at a disproportionately high cost to the insurance
ndustry and ultimately consumers. fhe ABI beijeves that referral fees can be removed
from the civil justice system without significantly affecting access to justice, with the
added benefit of reducing legal costs. Referral fees contrtbute to excessive legal costs
without addinq any salue to the saniices provided to thp rQr,cp r It s for ths reason
at we e e’e they shm d be barned, and t s Mth tis ontext n T nd That we answer
e LSB’s questiuns as set out beow
Consultation questions
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Conclusions — Personal injury
1. Do you agree with our analysis of the operation of
referral fees and arrangements?
8. No. The ABI believes that the LSB’s consultation ha
s focussed too heavily on the use of
referral fees in isolation and not properly considered
the use of referral fees in the
context of the civil litigation system as a whole. We
also challenge the conclusions of
both the Vanilla and Charles River Associates (CRA)
reports.
9. The Vanilla research report derived its conclusion
s in relation to personal injury claims
from a pool of only 25 personal injury claimants.
A sample of this size cannot be
considered to be representative. In addition, of the 25
participants, only 15 took part in
the group discussions and other 10 contributors w
ere only interviewed over the
telephone. Both the sample size and methodology u
sed for this research report cannot
be said to be reliable enough for the LSB to draw sub
stantive policy conclusions from.
10. The CRA report also carried out some interviews in
addition to its assessment of existing
research. However, these were small in number too, co
mprising only 15 participants. Our
concerns about the size of this pool are the same as
outlined for the Vanilla research
above. In addition, the CRA report draws upon the Va
nilla report for its conclusions (for
personal injury claims, at pages 83, 97 and 103).
11. The ABI believes that the payment of referral fees
should be banned, and in tandem,
legal fees must be reduced by a corresponding amou
nt to ensure that supposed
marketing or acquisition costs are adjusted to a more a
ppropriate level. This will ensure
that any transactional savings to lawyers that come
from banning referral fees are
passed on and directly reduce the end legal cost t
o consumers. Legal costs have
become increasingly disproportionate over recent years
— as much as 87p for every
pound of compensation received (2009/2010 ABI r
esearch of over 50,000 motor
personal injury claims under £5,000). The Transport
Select Committee are currently
considering the escalating costs of motor insurance pr
icing1 - referral fees have been a
contributory cause to this escalation.
2. Do you have additional evidence about the o
peration of referral fees and
arrangements that should be considered by the
LSB?
Oxera
12. ABI commissioned research by Oxera2 concluded th
at because the legal fees charged
by claimant solicitors within the personal injury market are
not subject to sufficient market
constraints, the expenses incurred in marketing (e.g. re
ferral fees) are not constrained by
the claimant’s willingness to pay. Within this structure,
referral fees paid by solicitors
represent the difference between the costs of actually p
rocessing the case and the costs
that can be recovered from the defendant, Referral fees
hae, as shown by Figure 19 in
the CPA report (page 93), increased over time, indicating that
claimant solicitors have
ceen abe to drive efficienc,es. This has not, however,
resulted in any savings to
consumers in the form of reduced egal costs, because
the present costs structure has
referral fees factored into the fixed costs and hourly rates.
The costs system has in effect
allowed solicitors to increase their referral fees/marke
ting spend. The result. as noted by
Lord Justice Jackson in his Review of Civil Litigation Costs,
is that there are too many
mdde rnn nvoled addng no value to the consumer A
s Jackson says in his report:
p gvi r amcrt . s ,
n m t’’ i’tpp . r r p p p
pr’ rp’ ‘ “
.,
‘ rq C st’s f r r’ r3i v try O
ra C r ‘r “ t1 Al ceft” Ni 15 i
2
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“the present level of referral fees has grossly distorted the costs of personal injuries
litigation. ‘
13. Lord Justice Jackson’s report was a comprehensive, evidence-based and objective
consideration of our compensation system as a whole, and takes a pragmatic approach
to addressing issues for both claimants and defendants. It was undertaken by a senior
and respected member of the judiciary, and its recommendations should, therefore, be
given the weight that they deserve. The LSBs dismissal of Lord Justice Jackson’s
recommended ban on referral fees has not, we believe, been considered carefully
enough.
Access to ustice and claims frenuency
14. The ABI believes that the LSB has understated the effect of referral fees on claims
frequency. For example, the LSB states that the recoverability of CFA success fees and
ATE premiums is another factor driving claims frequency. CFA uplifts and ATE premiums
became recoverable in 2000 but the insurance industry has seen an increase in the
volume of motor accident claims since 2004. This happens to coincide with when
referral fees were permitted.
15. The increased frequency of motor accident claims has not been mirrored in employers’
and public liability claims (EL and PL) which would be expected if success fees and ATE
premiums were a major driver of claims frequency since these additional liabilities are
much more prevalent in EL and PL claims. A review of the number of personal injury
claims submitted in recent years shows that in 2000/2001, 219,183 EL claims were
submitted5.By 2009/2010 that number had fallen to 78,744. In respect of PL claims, in
2000/2001 the number of claims presented was 95,583. By 2009/2010 that number had
reduced to 91 .025 — a 5% reduction. Whilst we accept that workplaces and public areas
may have generally become safer over the last 10 years, the statistics would indicate
that employees and the public have not been pursuing additional claims as a result of the
additional cost liabilities. The same can be said for clinical negligence claims which have
also reduced.
16. Given this, and despite the increase in motor claims (which can be attributed to a wide
range of other competing factors), we would question whether there is any real evidence
that referral fees have enhanced access to justice. Indeed, the Charles River Associates
research (on page 83) acknowledged that despite a steady decline in road traffic
accidents (RTAs) motor personal injury claims have been increasing from 400,000 in
2000/2001 to 625,000 in 2008/2009.
17 The cost of marketing through claims management companies by way of the payment of
referral fees is very high. The ABI’s Oxera research found that, for personal injury claims,
marketing costs in the form of referral fees were high when compared to other
comparable markets. The research concluded that marketing activity for personal injury
aims ,vas around 23-4O’ of base eqal costs. This as compared with other
professional services, where the average spend on marketing as a proportion of trnover
was around 15%, For other egal services. (e.g. ills and conveyancing) marketing
spends were around 18 of base egal costs. The high marketing costs for personal
njury work can be attributed to the lack of market constraints for claimant solicitor’s
costs.
f ‘ t e k t I, p ‘ r
P e r h €- , r , er, t .“ i ‘re 21 p 4, RI
r-t’,’, ‘[4r —‘‘r ‘-‘;rj
3
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18. Oxera also concluded that it would be possible to reduce the marketing spend within
the
personal injury sector, without significantly impacting on access to justice. Therefore,
it is
possible that referral fees could be removed whilst maintaining access to justice.
Change to legislation
19. Since 2000, when changes to cost recovery took effect, coupled with a lifting of the
ban
on solicitors paying referral fees in 2004. intermediaries have been receiving referral
fees
to introduce people with a potential claim to solicitors. Intermediaries find poten
tial
claimants in a number of ways, including national advertising, local advertising, and
as a
result of their activity in another market (e.g. car hire companies). The most significant
intermediaries are claims management companies. Over time, Oxera found that the
level
of referral fees being paid to intermediaries has increased significantly, and particularl
y
for personal injury claims, have risen from £400 five years ago to up to £1000 now.
The
fees represent an increasing percentage of the costs they recover.
Quality of Claims
20. In insurers’ experience, the impact of activities of intermediaries involved in
referral
arrangements impacts on the genuine claimant. The referral arrangements, particularl
y
those involving claims management companies. present opportunities for dubious
firms
to take advantage of claimants, solicitors, insurers, and other service providers.
For
example, some referral arrangements work on the promise of a minimum volume
of
referrals. Given the variable frequency of genuine accidents, this practice represents a
higher than average risk of producing spurious or even fraudulent claims to meet agreed
volumes. This combination of factors means that there is a risk that those involved in
claim management companies may engage in suspect practices. This impacts upon the
genuine claimant accessing justice where a spurious or fraudulent claim takes
precedence, and on a defendant who must seek to rebut the spurious or fraudulent
claim, or unknowingly compensates a fraudulent claim.
Quality and independence of legal service provided
21. Under the current system, the claimant will generally be referred to a legal representative
who has been chosen by the intermediary, rather than the claimant. Therefore, the level
of quality will depend on the extent to which the intermediary has emphasised quality in
the service level agreement or contract with the legal representative.
22. The CRA research acknowledges that it is clear that introducers refer clients to particul
ar
law firms on the basis of referral fees (page 91). The independence of the lawyer is
governed by the professional duty of care they owe to the claimant as client and should
not be compromised by the referral process. Moreover, as legal services can be
considered to provide deferred value and thectaimant may not be able to observe the
quality of the service either before or after, it is difficult to measure the impact of referral
arrangements has had on quality.
Fraudulent claims
23. Nowhere in the LSB document are fraudulent claims discussed. The Insurance
Fraud
Bureau (IFS) believes that there may have been as many as 30.000 fraudulent RTA
a ma made in 2009 Cirrent estimates from the IFB indicate that undetected ii e the
true cost of) fraud total amot £2bn a 1ear, adding, un a’er3ge, £44 per insurane
colicy premium. The existence of referral fees may have nfluenced this behaviour by
ncouraqinq claims management companies to induce soicitors to accept vnat may be
,purous c aims Doctors igree that this is preb’em a recent urvey y one of ur
4
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member companies found that 93% of GPs have seen a patient in the past two years
who they thought was exaggerating their injuries in order to try to make a compensationclaim, and 79% said they had seen someone they suspected was making the injury upentirely.
Recommendations for improving transparency and disclosure
6. Will the proposals assist in improving disclosure to consumers?
24. Yes, provided that the standards applied are consistent and provided that the CMRegulator and the FSA apply a joined up and consistent approach. Indeed, the first two
objectives in respect of to whom the referral fee is paid to and the amount should
already be provided to the consumer, under section 2A (4) of the Solicitors Introductionand Referral Fee Code 1990. If the LSB does not, as it indicates in its report, believethat this is presently the case, then the issue is one of enforcement. Any rules designed
to improve disclosure must be supported by a robust enforcement process in order for
the aim for improved disclosure to be achieved.
7. Are there other options for disclosure that ARs should consider?
25. If the LSB wishes to ensure that there is full transparency to the consumer, provision
could be made to require that the written consent of the consumer be obtained beforethe payment of a referral fee is made.
8. What are the issues relating to the disclosure of referral contracts by firms toapproved regulators and their publication by approved regulators?
26. The ABI is concerned that the publication of these arrangements will not necessarily
protect the consumer. It is also likely to place commercially sensitive information in the
public domain. Competition law or data protection issues must be carefully considered.
27. Currently, the SRAJFSA can require solicitors/insurers to provide such information onrequest. Maintaining this arrangement would, in our view, be adequate andproportionate.
9. How should these issues be addressed?
28. Notwithstanding the ABI’s position that a ban on referral fees is most appropriate, wewould suggest that to address the issue at question (8) above, the LSB should seek thisinformation on a case by case basis as and when appropriate.
Recommendations for delivering active regulation
10. Will the proposals assist in improving compliance and enforcement of referral fee
rules?
29. The ABI believes that the existing rules ensure transparency, provided they are properlyenforced,
11. What measures should be the subject of key performance indicators or targets?
30. The aim here should be for th•e rules to be c.ompiied with in ea.ch and every referralcase,
12. What metrics should be used to measure consumer confidence?
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31. Strict measures such as the publication of
details of enforcement action taken against
firms who do not comply with the rules, and the po
ssibility of fines for serious or
persistent transgressors.
The ABrs Conclusions
32. The ABI believes that referral fees should
be removed altogether, as part of wider
reform to ensure legal costs are re-set at p
roportionate levels. This would benefit
consumers by reducing legal costs and reducing
the undesirable associated activities
such as persistent cold calling of potential claima
nts.
33. It is accepted that solicitors do need to und
ertake marketing and that claimants need to
be aware of their rights to compensation, howeve
r, we believe that this can be done at a
substantially lower cost to the consumer. Fo
r example, a centralised education
campaign, supported by stakeholders, could be
conducted at much lower cost than
through referral arrangements, without signifi
cantly impacting the existing level of
access to justice. It is argued that intermediaries
such as CMCs fulfil an important social
function in informing potential claimants about th
eir rights in respect of any damages
they might be entitled to. An alternative could
therefore be a public campaign which
fulfils the same role. Oxera’s research showed
that a public campaign could be
conducted at significantly lower cost than
through referral arrangements, without
significantly impacting the existing level of access
to justice. This may also increase
awareness and access for some consum
ers who indicate that personal injury
compensation advertising actually dissuades them
from claiming.
Association of British Insurers
December 2010
6
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From: Wright. Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Sent: 26 May 2011 18.22
To:
Cc: aylor, Jo L
Subject: RE: ABI/MOJ meeting. 2:30pm 24th May at Petty France
Many thanks for this, and for a very useful meeting with you and We have been in touch with
Jonathan Djanogly about a meeting: he agrees and we are looking to mid-June for that. His office will be in
touch with yours.
I look forward to seeing you on 16 June, if not before.
Best wishes
Robert
From:
Sent: 26 May 2011 16:52
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid);
Cc: Taylor, Jo L
Subject: RE: ABI/MOJ meeting, 2:30pm 24th May at Petty France
Dear Robert
Good to see you again on ruesday and tak through the ssues below. As discussed, we are generally verysupportive of the MoJ a reforms and we wiil continue with our messaging by voicing our support for the JusticeBill when the Jraft is released soon
We vould Nelcome the opportunty to provide data and input nto the more detailed implementation work thatvli take place over the coming months and we look forward to being engaged with this work and keeping ourdtalogue open
There are a number of ictions that I took away that I shall follow up Nth you in a coupe of weeks These are
• l- l be n Pouch with a Iditional ontacs from other personal iiry comensators I m fl trw
orocess f gettmg n touch th a ew more at the moment and i,iI keep iou nrormed.
I shl creaK to or Lega Expenses ircurance Comm’rtee to Jet tnmr ews on tre prov:scn of ATEnsurance for in cal ng gerrw claims
i nal .c te ,oi :.‘h bow the Leg 3i E,enses irsu’arce Comm tae se ic’v e Vorni c’ B E
‘sarce -an c’ as ncomnnded by lord Young and toe rec2nt Consumer Focus reprit
* I a w poken o embers abo t d scuss mis surrord ng the dameqes cahbratton tool — w are aso
m;cr Ntn FulL acm.t S .3rd Si’.3il ‘en’ain engaaed on this asue.
1 fl-S mmint.mau ve ek fmivard to h’arng from joi. or a colequ ‘ S 00 3 sttr’ 3 D .3 0 our
—
.z-’
a n
- 3 ‘ ‘3 u ‘ r’
I P r at t a a N - a a b
a
rnd ogaris.
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Page 2 of 4
ceneral Insurance and Health Directorate
wwwabIQrg1c
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid) [mailto:RoberLWright@justice.gsi.govuk]
Sent: 24 May 2011 11:52
To:
Cc:
Subject: FW: ABI/MOJ meeting, 2:30pm 24th May at Petty France
Many thanks for this; we have suggested some other items below, which should be selfexplanat
ory.
I look forward to seeing you here at 2.30.
Robert
From:
Sent: 23 May 2011 22:21
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid); Taylor, Jo L
Cc:
Subject: ABI/MOJ meeting, 2:30pm 24th May at Petty France
Hello Robert and Jo,
Below is a brief list of agenda items for our meeting at 2:30pm tomorrow (Tuesday):
• Referral fees
o ABI’s call for a ban backed up by other corn pensators
o Transparency and paragraph 28 of the Transport Select Committee report
Practical issues re banning/capping
• QOCS — drafting and implementation issues
; Insurers’ concerns
o Local authority contacts
o Selfinsureds
• Before the Event Insurance
o Lord Young’s recommendation re the promotion of BTE insurance
Customer Focus Report on consumer analysis of legal expenses insurance
o ABI’s dedicated Legal Expenses Insurance Committee (next quarterly meeting to be held on
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--C,
31 May)
After the E
vent insuran
ce
ABI vews on
future
Provision of A
TE for chnical
negligence ex
pert reports
Bill introduc
ing Jackson
changes
email to Lord
McNally of 1
7 Mayre con
cerns’ in the
Bill
Handling
Communicat
ions issues
Calibrated a
ssessment
of damages
lpredictable
damages
ABI vew
Discount rat
e
‘ Consultati
on
This isn’t defi
nitive by any
means, happ
y to discuss a
nything else
that is relevan
t and that yo
u would find
helpful.
I look forward
to seeing you
at 2:30pm.
Kind regards,
General Ins
urance and
Health Dire
ctorate
wwwabi.org
uk
Association
of British Ins
urers
51 Gresham
Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
Forthcoming
Events
,A,Bl Biennial
Conference.
22nd June
201 1. River
bank Park P
laza Hotel, 1
8 Albert Em
bankment,
London, SE
I 7TJ
Bookings n
ow open, To
register plea
se visit ww
w abi org uK
/ablbienniai2
0 11
Bl F9ancia
l Media Awa
rds 3rd Nov
ember 2011
For award s
ponsorship
and table en
quiries p’ease
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Ministry of Jo
L jiiSric:E
102 Petty France
London SW1H 9AJ
Association of British Insurers www.justice.gov.uk
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
25 May2011
Dear
Guideline Hourly Rates 2011
As you may be aware, the Advisory Committee on Civil Costs (ACCC) has proposed an
earnings related increase to the Guideline Hourly Rates for 2011. The proposal is to
increase the rates in line with the Average Wage Index (for private sector industries)
which would result in an increase of 2.1% on the 2010 rates. Unless and until the rates
are increased, they will remain at those agreed by the Master of the Rolls for 2010.
The proposed approach is consistent with that set out at page 8 of the ACCC’s
conclusions report completed in March 2010, which can be found on the Judiciary of
England and Wales website at http:!!www. udiciarq, qov. uk/publications-and
reports/quidance/quideline-hourly-rates/quideline-hourly-rates-201 0. I enclose a hard
copy of that report for ease of reference, (You may wish to note that the Average Wage
Index has been used instead of the (discontinued) Average Earnings Index which was
used to calculate the 2010 Guideline Hourly Rates).
The Master of the Rolls has asked that before he makes a decision on the ACCC’s
recommendation, the ACCC seeks the views of key representative groups. I am
accordingly writing on behalf of the ACCC to ask for ABI’s views on the principle of an
annual inflation linked increase as recommended in the ACOCs conclusions report.
  
 
355 
 
 
 
The Master of the Rolls has also indicated that he would welcome information as to the
possible impact of the increased rates on those who would bear the additional costs, or
evidence-based justification of the proposed new hourly rates by reference to solicitors’
outgoings or level of profit. You are therefore asked to submit any representations on
these points. I would be grateful for a reply by 14 June 2011.
I am writing in similar terms to the Federation of Insurance Lawyers, the Federation of
Small Businesses, the Bar Council, the Civil Court Users Association, the Association of
Personal Injury Lawyers, the Motor Accident Solicitors Society, the National Association
of Citizens Advice Bureaux and Action Against Medical Accidents.
Yours faithfully
Mrs Jo Taylor
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Page 2 of6
From:
Sent: 15 July 2011 16:50
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Cc: -
Subject: RE: Referral fee flowcharts
Dear Robert,
Thanks for your emails We are pleased to see the work on referral fees progressing and of course will assist
in any way we can
Insurers pay for referral fees through the inflated costs of claimant SOliCitOrS whose fixed fees and hourly
rates are. we believe, currently set too high. I attach one of our latest briefings on this matter which I hope
gives you some useful information on the issue I believe that we are still working on obtaining some figures
on referral fees so we shall keep you informed on that front too.
There have been developments on the STE front in terms of coordinating a larger share of the STE market to
provide input: e are looking to have a meeting of our members and wider LEI insurers in August so I would
welcome a discussion with you before that meeting.
Lots to discuss and I agree that it would be most useful to have a meeting soon: both nd I are around
over the next couple of weeks Perhaps you or a member of your team could give me a ring next week so that
we can arrange a convenient date and time?
Kind regards,
eneral Insurance and Health Directorate
wwwabiorg.uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid) {mailto
Sent: 15 July 2011 09:57
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: Referral fee flowcharts
Further to this I think is chasing the referral fee figures from Aviva2
Aso when ‘e meet it vouId be nelpful to discuss BE rcmot’on etc and develouments snue aur ast
meeting
Thanks
Robert
From: Wright, Robert Cvil Legal Aid)
Sent: l4July 2011 10:30
To:
,\i t ‘I\I
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Page 3 of 6
Cc: Taylor, Jo L;
Subject: RE: Referral fee flowcharts
Thanks for this, which is helpfuL As you know - and you will have seen PMQs yesterday - work is progressingon this.
Can you let us know if there are any circumstances in which insurers pay referral fees? Your chart hasnsurers only as receivers of referral fees (and only in limited circumstances)
Secondly, it may be helpful to meet with you and over the next few weeks as things develop - are yougoing to be away at all?
Thanks
Robert
From:
Sent: 24 June 2011 16:17
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Cc:
, Taylor, Jo L;
Subject: RE: Referral fee flowcharts
Hi Robert.
Further to my email below, I attach two flowcharts which show how claims are typically bought and sold in twodifferent types of claim.
The supermarket example shows how a potential PL claim can be processed through a CMC, generating areferral fee and thus adding to the claimant lawyers fee.
The motor example is slightly more multifaceted in that it shows how referral fees can be passed from oneorgan sation to another through a myriad of different routes. The interesting point to note re claims farm.9 inthe motor arena is that there is what is commonly known as a Golden Hour’ where the first organisation toobtain and sell the potential claimant’s contact and accident details receives the initial referral fee, Thesedetails can tuen be sold onto other organisations who themselves can potentially sell onto others, eventuallyending up with a claimant solicitor. By the time the claimant solcitor buys the claim and because of thislayering process, the referral fee can be substantial frequently up to £900 or £1 000 for low value motorclaims (which can only command fixed costs of £1200 when processed throuh the fixed costs RTA PtScheme/Portal).
if ycud like discuss this further or in mcre detail, id be to pop over to Petty France sometime in thenext couple of weeks if you are available (either before or after the API meeting with Jonathan Djanogly on4J aso IaTe u oi rktm ‘eare’ rerisic1crr’er’cersJni astafreholders to scoco’ he B we 0 ses ‘roccb e m m s oar’ a eo ay iCs s ear as roe AIwork on the other a.spects of Jackson to be implemented that don’t apr ear in he Bill (a. r
Kind ragard.s,
General Insurance and Health Directorate
02/11 201 1
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Page4of6
www.abi org.uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From:
Sent: 21 June 2011 18:31
To: Wright, Robert
Cc:
Subject: Referral fee flowcharts
Hi Robert,
Good to see you and catch up at the FO
IL event at St Pauls last Thursday. I
thought it was a useful and
informative event.
I am conscious that I promised you the
referral fee flowcharts sooner rather tha
n later; they are almost
finished and I hope to get them to you by
Friday. No doubt you will be busy this
week in any event after
publication of the Bill today. Needless to
say, all very positive in our view and w
e have issued the following
welcoming statement:
Nick Starling, Director of General In
surance and Health. ABI said:
‘This 81//is good news for the million
s of honest motorists who have en
ded up paying more for their
motor insurance due to spiralling le
gal costs. The removal of the ‘rio
win, no fee arrangements will
go a long way to stopping frivolous cla
ims encouraged by ambtilance cha
sing lawyers. The
Government must stay the course n
ow and implement the proposals pu
t forward by Lord Justice
Jackson in full, including banning re
ferral fees paid for tipping off lawyer
s about accidents and
looking at solicitors’ fixed and hourly
fees. We need to make sure we o
verhaul the whole system to
make it fairer for genuine claimant
s,’
Will be in touch later this week.
Kind regards.
General Insurance and Health Directo
rate
hcom
ingEvents
IABI Biennial Conference, 22nd June
2011. Riverbank Park Plaza Hotel
, 18 Albert Embankment
London, SE1 7TJ
1Bookings now open. To register p’e
ase vtsit www ab c’rg ‘eaDib:e
nnf 31201 1
ABI Financial Media Awards 3rd No
vember 2011
1For award sponsorship and table enq
uiries please email 6 ent@abi org
ik
I The nformahon iransmtted s ntended
oniy for the eror or enilty to mch is
iddressed and may c,ntan onfde
nhai ndmr pnv eqed
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Page 5 ot6
material.
2 Any rev ew retransmission, dissemin
ation or other use of. or taking of any action
in reliance upon, this information by persons
or eritties other
than the intended recipient is prohibited, i
f you received this in error, please contact t
he sender and delete the matenal from
any computer.
3 The Association of British Insurers w
ill not be liable to you or any other person or
entity for any statement including but not limited
to defamatory
statements made by any employee act
rig outside the proper course of their dutie
s.
4 ibis footnote confirms that this emai
l message has been swept by Websense H
osted E Mail for the presence of viruses an
d unacceptable or
offensive mater al
5 The Association also scans all incom
ing mail, and reserves the right to reject and
return any material which is considered
ether to be a security
risk or to contain unsuitab1ematenal
This email was received from the INTERN
E U and scaimed b the (iovernrnent Secure In
tranet anti-
virus service supplied by Cable&Wireless W
orldwide in partnership with MessageLabs. C
CTM
Certificate Number 2009 090052.) In case
of problems. please call your organisation’s If
Helpdesk.
Communications x ia the GSi may be autom
atically logged, monitored and1’or recorded for
legal
purposes.
This e-mail (and any attachm
ent is intended only for the
attention
tne addressee(s). ts unauth
orisec use, disclosure, stora
ge or
copying
is not permitte 1. If you are
not the intended recipient, p
lease
destroy all
copies snd inform the sender
by return e-mail.
Internet e-m3ii is not s secu
re medium. Any reply to this
messaqe
could he interceoted and read
by someone else. Please bear
that in
mind when deciding whether to
send material in response to
this
mess sac
by e-mail.
This e—mail (whether you are th
e sender or the recipient) may
be
muitcre , recor Jed n rerair
.e by the Ministry of Just ic
e. E—mail
monitoring / bLccKing softwar
e ms; ft used, cci c-mill cont
ent may
r’e I ao ..rOO 1n have
resr.v’ns ft:Zi7 or risure ftws
rr ncr
hr ftc ;ftn cr ‘rw
s’iicu —rift cc chair ntn
ts.
[he original of this email as scanned for irus
cs by the (iovernment Secure Intranet \irus
scanning
er ice supplied by Cahle&V ireless \orldi
de in partnership ith MessageLabs. CCT\l
( ertificate Number 21)0909 ()02.) Ors leai
n. the GSi this email as certified irus free.
( omrnunicaiiois ij the (r’si ma be iut
omaticallv loaged, monitored and or recorded f
or 1eai
purpo ‘e s
ibis email uas receied from the IN 1ERNL
1’ and scanned 1w the Cioerninent Secure Int
ranet anti
irus sen. ice supplied by Cahle&\Vireles ‘t
iVorlduide in partnership ith Messagel abs. 1(.CT\l
Certificate Number 2009 09 0052.) In case o
f problems. please call sour ‘jrganisation’s I F I l
eipdesk.
(‘rrprnijn[1tiops ; I thC ( Si tna tC iUtO1fldt1Cdil loiced,
trio sitored and or eordcd hr ccii
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the addressee ‘s) . Its authorised use, disclosure, storage or
copyIng
is not nermitted. il you are not the intended recipient, please
destroy all
copies and inform the sender by return c—mill.
Internet c—i I is oct secure rc ii m. Any r-nZv to this nessae
nId he intercepted and rea’ by smeooe else, Pleise bear hat in
mind when iecidnI whetner t send material on response to this
messe
by c-nail.
-nail ether you are the sender or the recioient) may be
red, oroe and retained by the Ministry ci Justice. E-mail
ring olocking software may be used, ni e-mail content may
cc st any ilme. You have a responsibility to ensure laws are not
bro when mposing or forwarding c-mails and their contents.
.inal of this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet virus scanning
rvice stlnr’ ‘d by ( able&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with \lessageLabs. (CCTM
Certif nber 2009’OQ/0052.) On leaving the GSi this email was certified virus free.
Corn inons via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for legal
purpose
This email w rorn ‘INTERNET and scanned by the Government Secure Intranet anti
\ i C Wireless Wor1th ide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM
Ceo. -. )52.) In case of problems. please call your organisation s IT Helpdesk.
Con’ c Si may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for legal
Iur:
u: 11 t,i
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From:
Sent: 14 July 2011 1031
To: Wright, Robert (Civ Legal Aid)
Subject: Out of Offlce Referral fee flowcharts
I shall be out of the oftice in meetings for most of the day on Thursda
y 14 July 2011. Please contact
if its urgent.
Kind regards,
This email was received from the IN ERNET and scanned by the Governm
ent Secure Intranet anti
virus service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with Me
ssageLabs. (CCTM
Certificate Number 2009/09/0052.) In case of problems, please call your or
ganisation’s IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and
/or recorded for legal
purposes.
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid>
From:
Sent: 19 July 2011 1409
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: RE Referral fee flowcharts
Hi Robert
Just received your voicemail am around for most of this afternoon so hopefully can speak to you at some
point. I assume youve spoken to i followng our conversation yesterday (confirming our meeting on 9
August) and that you have the answers to your email below?
On the point of referral fee figures from Aviva, the relevant member is on holiday this week but I am told that
this matter is in hand Unfortunately. we don t have these figures as yet but I shall let you know when we do.
Kind reqards,
General Insurance and Health Directorate
www. abi orgr uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid) [mailto:
Sent: 15 July 2011 17:13
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: Referral fee flowcharts
rhanks for tb s wil be m touch 3bout a meeting hme
On be first po it I u erstand tour aeneral oncerns about the costs flow ng ‘mm refvaI But are thre
tanc3s where ‘surers hrrsel’es csy referral ‘ces e r’ey Day ‘or ndid.aI ‘‘ams2
.A’so could you eoand on your pont the Driefing paper A ban must cc m.D!e,rented properly to ensure
that the prob!em dcesn emerge eiseM’ere :bearng n mind the moerding ntrcducton of ABS) Does :hs
st mean :hat tre fi’ed recoverabe costs ri toe RTA Drocess must cc at :he same ‘me r
ometOn se
Tans
).
10” 11 ‘fll 1
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From:
Sent: 15 July 2011 16:50
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Cc: -
Subject: RE: Referral fee flowcharts
Dear Robert,
Thanks for your emails We are pleased to see the work on referral fees progressing and of course will assist
in any way we can
Insurers pay for referral fees through the inflated costs of claimant SOliCitOrS whose fixed fees and hourly
rates are. we believe, currently set too high. I attach one of our latest briefings on this matter which I hope
gives you some useful information on the issue I believe that we are still working on obtaining some figures
on referral fees so we shall keep you informed on that front too.
There have been developments on the STE front in terms of coordinating a larger share of the STE market to
provide input: e are looking to have a meeting of our members and wider LEI insurers in August so I would
welcome a discussion with you before that meeting.
Lots to discuss and I agree that it would be most useful to have a meeting soon: both nd I are around
over the next couple of weeks Perhaps you or a member of your team could give me a ring next week so that
we can arrange a convenient date and time?
Kind regards,
eneral Insurance and Health Directorate
wwwabiorg.uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid) {mailto
Sent: 15 July 2011 09:57
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: Referral fee flowcharts
Further to this I think is chasing the referral fee figures from Aviva2
Aso when ‘e meet it vouId be nelpful to discuss BE rcmot’on etc and develouments snue aur ast
meeting
Thanks
Robert
From: Wright, Robert Cvil Legal Aid)
Sent: l4July 2011 10:30
To:
,\i t ‘I\I
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From: Wright. Robert (Civil Legal Aid>
Sent: O9August2Oll 11:50
To:
Subject: Fh. Meeting today
Yes. lock forward to seeing you at 2.
Robert
From:
Sent: 09 August 2011 11:35
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: Meeting today
Hi Robert,
Just wanted to check that were still on for our meet
ing today at 2pm?
cant make it unfortunately as he’s dealing with the AS l
’s response to the riots.
Kind regards,
General Insurance and Health Directorate
www abi,org,uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
Forthcoming Events
Bl Financiat Media Awards 3rd November 2011
For award soonsorshp and table enquiries please em
ail Events@abi org uk
-
,- ‘ .‘
t -, sei ‘d y r n
f1 i ‘
-r r’.y ‘t ar rr on em
oaton r tn*r a f rakn fanv rten
a a ‘a’ n y €- r ‘tt ‘tfle
t-an 0C r’ p-r’t r)i.red ‘ ‘-i - ‘-e,ed
!P. a op-ni. o3se ntaU ‘re sender and (IC eta
tcc m er a rrom ir’ - a p er
I Assoaaton nf rsh nacrers ‘not he ‘a
be to oi or any other ersop or a’tv nr any ta’em
ent actud r” bci a I a’ ad ‘o
oramatory tatemonts made hi any employee 301mg autstde the pro
per course f thaw dot as
I 1 1
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4. This footnote confirms that this email message has been swept by Websense Hosted EMail for the presence of viruses and unacceptable or
offensive material.
5. The Association also scans all incoming mail, and reserves the right to reject and retum any material which is considered either to be a security
risk or to contain unsuitable material.
‘This email was received from the INTERNET and scanned by the Government Secure Intranet anti-
virus service supplied by Cable&Wireless \Vorldwide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM
Certificate Number 2009/09/0052.) In case of problems, please call your organisation’s IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored andlor recorded for legal
purposes.
02:11/2011
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From: VVright, Robert (Civil Legal
Aid>
Sent: l5August2Oll 1141
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: Apologies
Entirely understood. We had a good
meeting and hope to be in touch shortl
y on more detail on referral fees.
Best wishes
Robert
From:
Sent: 12 August 2011 15:09
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Cc:
Subject: Apologies
Robert
Just a quick note to apologise for n
ot attending our meeting this week.
I am sure you will appreciate
that the riots have taken up an eno
rmous amount of time this week. B
ut 1 understand from
you had a productive discussion, D
espite the distraction of rioting this w
eek, please be assured that
LASPO, referral fees, etc are still ve
ry much on my radar.
Have a good weekend.
Best regards
General Insurance & Health Directo
rate
WN dbl or u
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7W)
Forthcoming Events
,,, , , ,I1
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ASl Financial Media Awards 3rd November 2011.
For award sponsorship and table enquiries please email
1 The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privilegedmaterial
2 Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of or taking of any acton in reliance upon. this information by persons or entitles otherthan the intended recipient is prohbted. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.
3. The Association of British Insurers will not be liable to you or any other person or entity for any statement including but not limited to
defamatory statements made by any employee acting outside the proper course of their duties.
4. This footnote confirms that this email message has been swept by Websense Hosted EMail for the presence of viruses and unacceptable oroffensive material.
5 The Association also scans all Incoming mail, and reserves the right to reject and return any material which is considered either to be a securityrisk or to contain unsuitab aterial.
canned by the Government Secure Lntranet anti-
ide inership with MessageLabs. (CCTM
a case of rc hIem e call ur organisation’s H’ Helpdesk.
‘mcations ‘ia ti rtav .tutonl . .o log ... tn red and/or recorded for legal
T’’ ad was reedy
service supplird
ert caL N.umber
‘l 1.2011
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From:
Sent: 31 August2011 1751
To: Taylor, Jo L
Cc: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: TRIM:ABI response - Qualified one way costs shifting - insured claimants and defendants
Dear Jo,
have discussed your email; here are our preliminary views:
BTE insurance
QOCS should apply in circumstances where claimants have BTh insurance. We agree that the alternative
would lead to perverse incentives at a time when both the government and insurance industry are keen to
promote the uptake of STE insurance.
Uninsured defendants
Our view is that QOCS should still apply to those defendants who are not insured, and that where a winning
defendant who is required to have insurance but who has not taken out such insurance, that the defendant
should nevertheless be required to pay their own legal costs. As you say, if the position were otherwise, and
the claimant continued to have to pay the winning defendant’s costs, the defendant would benefit from its own
illegal behaviour. QOCS should continue to apply where a defendant has failed to take out insurance which it
is by law compulsory to have. The alternative is that there will be the unintended result of appearing to favour
those who fall to comply with legal requirements.
also makes the following points from an MIS perspective:
With regards to the point made about uninsured defendants in motor cases, we agree that it does not seem
right that an uninsured defendant should be in a better position than someone who had obeyed the law and
taken out cover. Conversely, QOCS is a benefit to claimants who will argue that they should not be
disadvantaged in cases dealt with by MIB as opposed to those dealt with by an insurer.
It must be remembered that cases dealt with by MIB under the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement are, in law. still
cases against the uninsured driver. MIB has no direct liability. its liability is contingent upon an unsatisfied
/udgment being obtained against the defendant. Consequently if “uninsured defendants” are ecIuded from
the effects of QOCS this would have consequences for claimants and defendants in all MIB cases. I am sure
this was not the intention of the proposals.
I must stress that this is a provisional view 1 am seeking further input into the question put and will respond
with more detail as quickly as possible.
Compulsory insurance
There are no circumstances other than motor and employers’ i ability vhere by law organisations/individuals
must have insLrance. other than very scecialist Iires related to the keeping of certain animais Certainly there
are ‘ore that are compulsory h’cn mpact i.pon these proposals otner than those alreaay mentoned
VVe hope these initial views are helpful We are both more than happy to meet to J scuss these farther and as
menhoned above, is seeking further input and will respond with more detail when he s able to
Kird regards
General Insurance and Heaith Drectcrate
,-, Ii fl1 I
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wwwabiorglc
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
Original Messane
From: Taylor, Jo L
Sent: 17 August 2011 16:00
To:
Cc: Wright, Robert;
Subject: Qualified one way costs shifting - insured claimants and de
fendants
We have been considering whether QOCS should apply to claim
ants who have BTE insurance. As you know
the government is keen to encourage the take up of BTE insuran
ce. We are therefore minded to adopt the
general principle that QOCS should apply to claimants who have BTE
insurance because this would
encourage claimants to take out STE insurance (or at least would no
t discourage them from doing so).
The Government also accepts as a general principle, as propos
ed by Lord Justice Jackson, that QOCS
should not apply where defendants are not either insured or a la
rge self insured business.
However a question has emerged as to whether a winning defend
ant who is required to have insurance i.e.
employers liability insurance or road traffic accident insurance, but w
ho has not taken out such insurance,
should nevertheless be required to pay their own legal costs. If t
he position were otherwise, and the claimant
continued to have to pay the winning defendants costs, the defendan
t would benefit from their own illegal
behaviour.
Instinctively it seems right that QOCS should continue to apply w
here a defendant has failed to take out
insurance which it is by law compulsory to have.
But we would be grateful for your views and on any issues of which w
e may not be aware that should be
taken into account in any final decision.
There may for example be particular issues for the MIS when defe
nding proceedings in respect of an
uninsured defendant.
Are you aware of any circumstances in which by law individuals or or
ganisations must have public liability
insurance cover or any other examples of compulsory insurance - o
ther than motor insurance and employers
liability insurance?
It would be helpful to have initial views by the end of the month.
Ministry of Justice
102 Petty France. London SW1H 9AJ
This e-mail and any attachment) is ntended only for the attention of
the addressee(s). Its unauthorised use, disclosure, storage or copying
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is not permitted. If you are not the intended recipient, please destroy aH
copies and inform the sender by return e-mail
Internet e-mail is not a secure medium. Any reply to this message
could be intercepted and read by someone else. Please bear that in
mind when deciding whether to send material in response to this message
by e-mail.
This e-mail (whether you are the sender or the recipient) may be
monitored. recorded and retained by the Ministry of Justice. E-mail
monitoring / blocking software may be used, and e-mail content may be
read at any time You have a responsibility to ensure laws are not
broken when composing or forwarding e-mails and their contents.
The original of this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet virus scanning service
supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM Certificate Number
2009/09/0052.) On leaving the GSI this email was certified virus free
Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for legal purposes.
Forthcoming Events
ABI Financial Media Awards 3rd November 2011.
For award sponsorship and table enquiries please email Eventsabi.org.uk
ABI Motor Conference 22nd November 2011.
Grange City Hotel, 8-14 Coopers Row, London, EC3N 2BQ
Registration now open at www abi.org ukiMotorConference20l 1
For Sponsorship and Exhibitor information, accommodation enquiries and for all other conference information
please email ABleventsabi.org.uk or phone 020 7216 7487.
1. The nformaton transmittedis intended niy for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidentiai rnd or privileged
m jteriai
2 ny review retrenam esion asserninatiort r ofoer use of or taking of any action o r.ianre upon nis ,nforrration by cemons or enttes otherrn tP nen,1ed rerc.’t a
Orcnitccej yOU ‘nevd th’s ri error ease urtact foe render and aeete The n’atei ‘rorn any cCcrCJThr
‘re ssoc t on of 2 tsh nsurera II on he abe to you or any other oison r Ontity for ny s’.atement n ud up b t n’ t n’ ted
b’famatory tatemer’ta itade oy a y
n ove5c”g ,“defoerper .ur e
“S ‘t ‘ S “a ‘sa, is e’’ sct ny -‘.‘r.e’ t.. ‘r ‘i r’”eu s .‘i . I’
P c t n so a at cm up oat and sec. ‘a t e qt’d o ject a 1 a v mafo a w’ h a us ed C th”r to he a se .i tyk rto titan t ‘ab’e
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From: Taylor, Jo L
Sent: 06 September2011 17:10
To:
Cc:
Subject: Qualified One Way Costs Shifting - request for further data
Some ABI members (in particular who I have written to separately) provided data on claimant
costs which was really helpful in sense checking other data received and considering the impacts of the Jackson
proposals. We are now looking for further information on the defendant side to help in formulating appropriate
financial criteria for the application of qualified one way costs shifting. We wondered if your members had data
available which they would be able to provide which would answer the following questions:
1 The range of [the companies] defence costs incurred in cases that are successfully defended (smallest and largest),
and average costs incurred in cases that are successfully defended in different types of claim (e.g. EL; PL; RTA etc).
(If such information does not exist e.g. because there are costs that are fixed, rather than paid for on a per case basis,
would they be able to provide some indication of [the companie] costs to defend a case (regardless of case outcome)
and perhaps some narrative around how this varies depending on the case type and outcome?)
2. The range of costs recovered in cases where [the company] is successful in defending a claim, and the average
cost recovered where the claim is successfully defended in different types of claim as above.
3. Any information held about the costs incurred by [the company] in cases where claims are withdrawn after issue,
and how these costs compare to the costs in point 1. above?
It would be really helpful if any of your members can assist with the above however we are not asking them to do a
special data collection exercise if they do not hold this information.
It would be helpful to have any data they may be able to provide by 19 September if at all possible. Please could you
copy to your response, as I will be in and out of the office over the next two weeks.
Many thanks,
Ministry of Justice
102 Petty France, London, SW1H 9AJ
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From:
Sent: 08 September 2011 1728
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Operations Directorate
General Insurance & Health Directorate
www.abLorg.uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
J’D1i’3t n ‘rn ?—I s ce ry r e person r ‘hc t s j1rs5
ed an r’Iy nnf3n n’r ienfat andbr on ‘€qed
tfl&
i’
9
Forthcoming events
c
\BI Motor Conference 22nd November 2011
Grange City Hotel. 8-14 Coopers Row, London. EC3N 2BQ
RegistratIon now open at ww bi org ik/MotorConference2Ol I
For Sponsorship and Exhibitor nfcrmaton. accommodation enqulr!es and for all other
onference information please email ABtevents@abi org uk or phone 020 7216 7487
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2 Ary review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this information by persons or entities other
than the intended recipient is prohibited, If you received this in error please contact the sander and delete the material from any computer.
3 The Association of Br tish Insurers will not be liable to you or any other person or entity for any statement including but not limited to
defamatory statements made by any employee acting outs de the proper course of their duties.
4 This footnote confirms that this email message has been swept by Websense Hosted EMail for the presence of viruses and unacceptable or
offensive material.
5. The Assoc ation also scans all incoming mail, and reserves the right to reject and return any material vhich is considered either to be a security
rsk or to contain unsuitable material.
Fhis email as received from the INTERNET and scanned by the Government Secure Intranet anti
irus serice supplied by Cable&\Vireless Worlthide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM
Certiticate Number 2009’OO 0052.) In case of problems. please call your organisations IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the GSi may he automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for legal
purposes.
I 1 “iii 1
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Sent: 08 September 2011 1747
To:
Cc:
Subject: FW: MOJ NEWS: REFERRAL FEES BAN *EMBARGOED TILL 00Olhrs ON FRI 9 SEPT**
The press notice
Robert
From:
Sent: 08 September 2011 17:45
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: FW: MOJ NEWS: REFERRAL FEES BAN **EM8ARGOED TILL 00.Olhrs ON FRI 9 SEPT**
Final version. It is embargoes until 00.01
Ministiy of Justice
Ministry of
JUSTICE
News Release
www.justice.govukDate: 8 September 2011 48111
***EMBARGOED TILL 00,Olhrs on 9 September 2011****
CURBING COMPENSATION CULTURE:
GOVERNMENT TO BAN REFERRAL FEES
R ng nsurance costs wtl be tackled ny a can on rcterra1 fees announced today is part of tr a3o’jercnient s ccmmtment to curb compensation culture
The Government will ban the payment of referral fees in personal Injury cases. The current
(i II Ol I
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arrangements have led to high costs, encour
aged a compensation culture and led to the
growth of
an industry which pursues claimants for profit.
Insurance companies inevitably pass the co
sts they
incur through increased compensation claims
directly onto motorists and those with other
insurance
policies, unnecessarily forcing up the cost of
living.
An example of a referral fee might be:
• You have an accident and you are induced
through a TV advert or SMS text message to
make a ‘no-win, no-fee’ claim.
• Your claim is passed between claims manag
ement companies (who advertise compensat
ion
claims for accidents>, insurance companies, l
awyers and others who charge each other a
referral fee for ‘referring’ the claim up the line.
• The lawyer sues for compensation. If he wi
ns, he can recover his costs and his ‘no-win,
no-
fee” mark-up on his costs from the losing defe
ndant (or often the defendant’s insurance
company> which will cover the amount he pa
id out as a referral fee. So the lawyer may pay
hundreds of pounds as a referral fee because
he knows he can get the money back.
• To cover the loss, losing insurance compa
nies are forced to raise premiums, private
companies are forced to put up prices, and pu
blic authorities pass the burden on to the
taxpayer.
Justice Minister Jonathan Djanogly said:
“The ‘no-win, no-fee’ system is pushing us int
o a compensation culture in which middle men
make a tidy profit which the rest of us end up
paying for through higher insurance premiums
and higher prices.
“Honest motorists are seeing their premiums
hiked up as insurance companies cover the
increasing costs of more and more compensat
ion claims. Many of the claims are spurious
and only happen because the current system
allows too many people to profit from minor
accidents and incidents.
“Referral fees are one symptom of the compens
ation culture problem and too much money
sloshing through the system. People are being e
ncouraged to sue, at no risk to themselves,
leaving schools, business and individuals living in
fear of being dragged to the courts for
simply going about daily life.
“We will ban referral fees and we will go furth
er. We have proposals before Parliament to
end the bizarre situation in which people have
no stake in the legal costs their cases bring.
This will make claimants think harder about whe
ther to sue and give insurance companies
and business generally an incentive to pass t
he savings onto customers through lower
prices.’
The Government’s proposals currently before
Parliament focus on stopping losing defendants
having to pay a ‘success fee’ to reimburse the cl
aimant’s lawyer for other unconnected cases he
may have lost. The Government is changing t
he law so that in future the person making the
claim
will have to pay the success fee, rather than the
defendant, and that fee will be capped. The
intended result is a fairer split of costs betwee
n parties, and lower legal costs overall which m
eans
lower costs to pass on to customers or taxpay
ers.
The proposals follow a Ministry of Justice con
sultation published in November 2010. Much of th
e
evidence base for this consultation came from an
independent Review of Civil Litigation Costs
carried out by a senior judge, Lord Justice Jackso
n, and commissioned by the Master of the Rolls.
Notes to Editors
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1 Please note there is n
o universally recognised d
efinition of ‘referral fees.
Various
agreements have been re
ported between many type
s of organisations inclu
ding insurance
companies, repair garage
s, emergency services an
d not all these agreement
s include actual
fees. The scope of today
s announcement of a ban
will cover the payment of
referral fees in
personal injury cases.
2. The proposals before
Parliament are contained in
the Legal Aid, Sentencing
and
Punishment of Offenders
Bill. Click here for backgr
ound and documents arou
nd the Bill:
http://www,justice.gpv
.uk/publications/biitsanda
cts/bil1s/legal:aidandsent
encingbiUhtm
3. The Bill itself is publi
shed on the Parliament we
bsite at
http;/1svjc.parHamen
t. Lk/bills/2010-1
pis tQfQffnr .htmJ
- the relevant section is Par
t 2.
4. Lord Justice Jackson’s
Review of Civil Litigation C
osts was published by the
judiciary and is
available via their website
at www judiciary gov,uk
5. For more details, ple
ase contact Ministry of Jus
tice press office on 020 3
334 3536.
ENDS
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From:
Sent: 08 September 2011 1840
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: Fw AB! embargoed release on referral
fee ban
Pi’ I
General Insurance & Health Directorate
www.abi.org.uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From:
Sent: Thursday. SeDtember 08. 2011 06:29
PM
To:
Subject: ABI embargoed release on referral fee ban
Below quote issued now.
spoke to Today prog who will use this as basi
s for the intervw with you tomorrow
EMBARGOED UNTIL OOM1HRS, FRIDAY 9 SEPTEMB
ER 2011
ABI WELCOMES BAN ON REFERRAL FEES
The AB1 welcomes today’s (9 September) Government
announcement that they wlI ban the sellng on
of
personal ojury details — referral fees.
Otto Thoresen, ABI’s Director General, sad
‘We ir ierv pleased o’ it tb G errrnnt h3s sened to
the ‘surance ndutry s campagn or a ban en
refeiral f’es, They idd no ii ue md ncnrige spu
rmous and xegeratcJ personal rjury claims
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“it is important that the ban must be watertight and apply across the board. Banning referral fees is an
important first step in tackling our dysfunctional compensation system, and needs to be accompanied by a
substantial reduction in legal costs and action to tackle whiplash if honest customers are to benefit from
these reforms”
Operations Directorate
Forthcoming Events
-: I
-. ‘:, ., :.. - -
-, dNr er er2Oll.
C nge C 8 Row, London, EC3N 2BQ
RegisL ‘per at ww.abLorg.ukiMotorQqnfrence0j 1
For Sponsor.... an Hibitor information, accommodation enquiries and for afl other
conference informati ae email ABleventsabi.org.uk or phone 020 7216 7487.
I The information transmitted s intended only for the person or entity to which ;t a addressed and may contren conf’dentiat andor pnVleged
matenat
— ““i i e e arr as on r. -,em rat on -r her e of cr ‘a rg of any act,on c -‘I ar’ce pen t’ inrma”on y persons or n es” her
than the intrnded recipient is prohibited, if you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer.
3. The Association of British lnsurers will not be liable to you or any other person or entity for my statement including but not iimited to
defamatory statements made by any employe.e acting outside the proper course of their duties
4 This footnote conllrms that mis small message nas ceen swept by Weosense Hosted E4dall for the presence of njses and urtacceptanie or
hense matenaL
5 The Asscciaton also scans all ncomtng mail, and reserjes the oght to resect and return any materwi whtch a considered ether to be a security
risk or to contain unsuitable material.
lhts emutl was recei ed from the [‘FER\E 1/ and scanned by the Government Secure intranet tnti
VICUS service supplied by Cahle&Wireless World ide in partnership ith MessageLabs. ((CIM
Certificate Number 2009/09/0052,) In case of problems. please call your organisation’s IT Helpdesk.
07/1 1/2011
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Communications via the GSi may be automatically logged, monitored andt’or recorded for legal
purposes.
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Page 1 of2
Wright, Robert (Civil Legal A
id)
From:
Sent: 09 Septembe
r2011 17:54
To: Wriqht, Robert (
Civil Legal Aid)
Cc:
Subject: FW: Letter to
Djanogly - Costs Council
Attachments: Jonathan Djanog
ly - Costs Council -9 Septemb
er 2011pdf
Robert
Please find attached a letter
from our Director General to
Jonathan Djanog!y sent this
afternoon
Best regards
General Insurance & Health
Directorate
wwwabiorguk
Association of British Insurer
s
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
Forthcoming Events
F
(I
Bl Motor Conference 22nd N
ovember 2011
Grange City Hotel, 8-14 Coop
ers Row London, EC3N 2BQ
Registration now open at vww
abi org uk’MctorConferene2O1
1
1For Sponsorsh’p ard Fxhbitor
nforrnation accommodation e
nquir!es and for alt other
Iconference informatIon p
lease email ABIevantsab, org
uk or phone 020 7216 7487
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Page 2 of 2
1 The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privilegedmaterial.
2Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this information by persons or entities otherthan the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer,3. The Association of British Insurers will not be liable to you or any other person or entity for any statement nctuding but not limited todefamatory statements made by any employee acting outside the proper course of their duties.4 This footnote confirms that this email message has been swept by Websense Hosted EMail for the presence of viruses and unacceptable oroffensive material.
5. The Association also scans all incoming mail, and reserves the right to reject and return any material which is considered either to be a securityrisk or to contain unsuitable material.
This email was received from the INTERNET and scanned by the Government Secure Intranet anti-virus service supplied by Cable&Wireless Worldwide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTMCertiti Number 2009/09/0052.> In case of problems, please call your organisation’ s IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the (j maY he automatically logged, monitored and/or recorded for legal
purposes.
1)2/1 1/’()1 I
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
From: Wright, Robert (CMI Legal Aid)
Sent: 15 September 2011 13:37
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: Tackling the Compensation Culture: The Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Bill
Thanks for this. I am trying to catch up after a rather hectic few days, apart from the announcement on Friday
on referral fees (and Jack Straw’s Bill on Tuesday), we were also in Commons Committee all day on the
LASP0 Bill on Tuesday.
It would be helpful to discus referral fees and BTE in more detail soon How are you fixed next week? I
cannot do: all day Weds: Thurs morning or Fri morning.
Best wishes
Robert
From
Sent: 31 August 2011 18:05
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Cc:
Subject: FW: Tackling the Compensation Culture: The Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Dear Robert,
I thought you may be interested to see the final version of the publication I mentioned at our last meeting. As
well as the email below, we have put a letter and hard copy to your Minister in the post tonight. It will be
formally launched on Monday 5h September.
I would be interested to hear if you have any update further to our last meeting: happy to discuss over the
telephone or I can pop over to Petty France for a catch up sometime soon if that suits? I can also update you
wth progress on the BTE front further to the meeting with legal expenses insurers which was held at the ABI
rims afternoon
Kind regards
General Insurance and Health Directorate
vw abi org UK
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
02 II ‘21)11
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EC2V7HQ
From:
Sent: 31 August 2011 17:02
To: jonathandjanogly@justice,gsi.govuk’
Subject: Tackling the Compensation Culture: The Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Dear Minister
I attach an advance copy of a publication that the ABI has produced in support of the steps taken to
tackle the compensation culture in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill.
This publication will be sent to all Parliamentarians on Monday 5’ September to provide them with
information on the problem with the current compensation culture, the costs of this to consumers
and taxpayers and the solutions proposed by Lord Justice Jackson and included in the Bill. It has
been supported by a number of organisations representing a wide range of interests, from
businesses to local authorities and lawyers, as well as the insurance industry.
The publication aims to show that the measures adopted in the Bill will be a real benefit to all. I hope
you will find it informative and helpful.
Regards,
Forthcoming Events
- -
.Bl Motor Conference 22nd November 2011.
Grange City Hotel, 8-14 Coopers Row, London, EC3N 2BQ
Registration now open at www.abLorguk!MotorConferençe2Oi 1
For Sponsorship and Exhibitor information, accommodation enquiries and for all other
conference information please email ABleventsabiorg.uk or phone 020 7216 7487.
1 ‘e tkr—on rarso’ed reoer or’ty tor e ce’sor’ ‘-r -j o hch 1 s. rereo aro vccrtar1 :crttrIerta ard/cr ceed
ratertaL
2Any review, retransmission, dis.seminati.on or other use of. or taking of any action in retiance unon. ibm rnformation by riersons or entities other
than the intended recipient is orohi.bi.ted. if you received this in error, piease contact the sender and deiete the m.aterial from any computer.
3. The A.ssociation of British Insurers will not be fable to you or any other person or entity for any statement inciuding but not limited to
defamatory statements m.ade by any employee acting outside the proper course of their duties.
4 The footnote conflrms that this err’atj nessage has been swept by Websense Hosted E-Maf for the oresence of viruses and unacceptable or
2/I 1 !‘3n1 I
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offensive materiaL
5, The Association also scans at in
coming mail, and reserves the nght to
reject and return any material wh
ich is considered either to be a secunty
risk or to contain unsuitable m
aterial,
This email ‘Aas received from the
INTERNET and scanned by the Go
vernment Secure Intranet anti-
virus service supplied by Cable&
Wireless Worldwide in partnership w
ith Messagehabs. (CCTM
Certificate Number 200909/0052
.) In case of problems. please call you
r organisations IT Helpdesk.
Communications via the GSi may b
e automatically logged, monitored
andior recorded for legal
purposes.
,‘.“l -, 1
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Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid>
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Sent: 28 September2011 18:20
To:
Cc:
Subject: RE: Meeting with
Would ft be possible to move the meeting back by 30 minutes tomor
row afternoon. Thursday from 2 to 2 30?
I look forward to seeing here then.
Thanks
Robert
From:
Sent: 23 September 2011 u:it
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: RE: Meeting with
Hi Robert,
That is great. I have put it ri calendar and she looks forw
ard to seeing you next Thursday.
Thanks
Team Support
General Insurance & Health Directorate
ww abi.orguK
Association of British insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From: Wright, Robert (Clvi Legal Aid
Sent: 22 September 2011 1910
To:
Subject: RE: tleeting vth -
Wouid 2 on Thursday 2th. h3re be OK”
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Thanks
Robert
From
Sent: 22 September 2011 13:23
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid)
Subject: RE: Meeting with
Hi Robert,
I have talked to this morning and she suggested it would be more productive to meet after the
PIHLG meeting on Wednesday, as issues will be discussed there which she will be able to update
you on. Are you available Thursday(29/09) between 12:00 to 16:00 or Friday(30/09) between 1000
to 13 002 If you would like to meet with her before then, let me know, we just wish to ensure that
your meeting will be as producti’.e as possible. Look forward to hearing from you soon.
Regards
Team Support
General Insurance & Health Directorate
www.abi.org.uk
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
From: Wright, Robert (Civil Legal Aid) [mailto:
Sent: 22 September 2011 10:15
To:
Subject: RE: Meeting with
Further to our chat qesterdaj voud 11 30 am on Tuesday 2th here cc convenient0
Thans
From
Sent: 21 September 2011 14:55
To: Wright, Robert (Civil Leqal Aid’
Subject: Meeting iith
Robert
Co.rrd you pieas qive me a “all whon you h’e a spare mu rent n eqard to Jour meeting on
Thursday with i My number ‘s
Many thanks
()4 I I i)I I
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Pate 3 of 5
Team Support
General Insurance & Health Directorate
wwwabiorgj-iIc
Association of British Insurers
51 Gresham Street
London
EC2V 7HQ
Forthcoming Events
BOOK NOW FOR THE FOLLOWING A
BI EVENTS:
r
MOTOR CONFERENCE-22 NOVEMBER 20
11-GRANGE CITY HOTEL, LONDON, EC3
N 2BQ.
BOOKINGS NOW OPEN TO VIEW THE FU
LL PROGRAMME AND TO REGISTER
JISIT www abi.orgukfM orO,nference21
SOLVENCY II CONFERENCE-8 DECEMB
ER 2011-GRANGE ST PAULS, LONDON,
EC4V, 5AJ.
BOOKINGS NOW OPEN AND TO REGIST
ER PLEASE VISIT
ww, abi. org. uklSoivency2conference20l 1
For Sponsorship and Exhibitor informatio
n, accommodation enquiries and for all o
ther
onference formaflon pease ema ABI
events org phone 020 7216 748
7
1. TI-c information transrntted is intend
ed only for the person or entity to which it is ad
dressed and may contain ironfidential and
/cr privileged
materiaL
2Any review, retransmission. dissemina
tton or other use of, or taking of any action in
reliance upon this information by persons
or entities other
than the intended recipient a probb
ited If ‘ion received this n error, please cont
act the sender and delete the rnateriai from an
y comouror
A The Association of E3rltish insurers
wilt n.ot be liable to you or i.ny other person or entity
for any statement inctuding but not li•mite
d to defama..tory
statements made by any employee acti
ng outside the proper course of their duties,
k This ftrctncte confirms lI-at this smal
l m.essage has been swept by Websense Ho
sted EMail for the presence of viruses and
unaccept..abte or
offensive material.
5. The Association also scans all incom
ing mar. and reserves ide rig.ht to relect. an
d return any material which is conariared
either t.o be a recur/tv
risk or to contain unsuitable matenal.
‘Tb is email was received from the INTE
[)5J[/’f and scanned by the Gwemment Secure intra
ne.t anti—
fij5 serviee supplied by Cahle&Wireless Vvorldride
in partnership with NIessageLubs. tCCTM
(‘ertificate Number 2009/09/0052.) in case of
problems. please call your or anisation’s IT H
elpdesk.
Communications ‘ia the GSi may he automatic
ally lugged, monitored and or recorded tbr leg
al
r I ‘i’r 1
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a my ima. iou have respous
turilty to ns:re laws are rmt
hr ;h-m oairg or frwardi
n e—ai1s nI their cntnta.
the original of this email as scanned for iruse
s by the Government Secure Intranet virus scanning
service supplied by Cahle&Wireless Worldv.ide in
partnership with \lessageLahs. (‘U[M
(ertificate Number 2009 09 0052.) On leaving
the OSi this email was certified virus free.
Communications via the (iSi may he automatica
lly logged, monitored andor recorded tbr legal
purposes.
This email was received from the INTERNET an
d scanned by the Go’ernrnent Secure Intranet anti
-
virus service supplied by Cahle&Wireless World
wide in partnership with MessageLabs. (CCTM
Certificate Number 200909,0052.) In case of pro
blems. please call your organisation’s IT Helpdes
k.
Communications via the OSi may be automatical
ly logged, monitored andAr recorded lbr legal
purposes.
1 1111 I
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Appendix G – Ethics approval and UPR16 
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